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ABSTRACT 
New concepts and a synthesis of existing theories may assist in studying 
the relationship between social structure~ development and rural develop-
ment. 
The concept of social structure encompasses the concept of economic 
structure which may be analysed in terms of three -Moments"" of production. 
On this basis, one can distinguish between heterogeneous and homogeneous 
relations of production structures. HHomogeneous relations-~ together with 
"'system dynamics"" and '"'reproduction"', define the concept of a mode of 
production. -Development- refers to the expansion of total productive 
capacity, premissed on advanced means of production, and corresponding to 
the particular relations and forces of production in an economic system. 
The capitalist mode of production has both tendencies and counter-
tendencies to development. The latter prevail in the Third World due to 
the admixture and heterogeneity of production relations there~ and to their 
subordinate articulation within an international capitalist economic 
system. In this context~ underdevelopment is the result of the specific 
factors of monopoly competition, dependence-extraversion~ disarticulation-
unevenness, the three-tier structure of the peripheral economy, surplus 
transfer, and class structures and struggles. 
Rural development can be understood in terms of the specific contribution 
of agriculture to development, theorized as the "Agrarian Question-. 
Agrarian capitalism has been slow to develop in the Third World, and the 
state of agriculture rem3ins a problem there. -Rural development" has 
emerged as a deliberate and interventionist state strategy designed to 
restructure agrarian relations for development. This has contributed to 
the formation of particular heterogeneous relations of production 
articulated to the capitalist mode. In this context, the character of the 
associated classes has left the Agrarian Question unresolved. "Rural 
development" continues because it has an important~ and even primary, 
political significance - although this is not without contradictions. 
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NlTES ~ STYLE 
1. Abbreviations used in this thesis: 
CMP - capitalist mode of production. 
US - United States (of America). 
2. Gender references: 
The masculine gender is used throughout the thesis, but is not intended 
to refer to men rather than women. 
3. Quotation marks: 
Some terms (eg. "'peasant"') are placed within quotation marks to signify 
that their meanings are problematic. Once their meanings have been 
defined and clarified in my argument, they are then used without quotes. 
4. Author references: 
When quoting authors, I generally cite the date of publication of the work 
consulted. Where appropriate to the argument, however I I also cite the 
contemporary date of the quotation. 
Quotations (eg. from Marx) are drawn directly from the original works, 
except in a handful of cases where they come from secondary sources and 
are acknowledged as such. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is an investigation into the issues surrounding social 
structure and economic development, with specific reference to rural 
development. It holds that social structure is significant to development 
at various levels of generality and particularity. This is shown by means 
of a concept of development analysed as productive capacity, and a concept 
of economic structure analysed in terms of three '1Moments~ of production. 
The thesis begins abstractly, but becomes progressively less so. From 
theoretical issues, it moves to a general definition of development, and 
from there to basic social and economic concepts. These are then used to 
theorize the capitalist mode of production and its role in development and 
underdevelopment in the Third World. Finally, the role of agriculture in 
development is discussed, and different experiences of planned rural 
development are analysed. The problem with this logic of presentation is 
that in moving from the general to the particular I may seem to reify at 
times. However, I would request the reader to reserve final evaluation of 
the abstract parts until the more empirical sections have been read. 
The genesis of the thesis is important to its purpose. It began in 
1979 with research into irrigated development projects in South Africa's 
Ciskei bantustan. My motivation was to see if and how these worked, with a 
view to them serving as possible models for overcoming the poverty in rural 
Ciskei. For reasons beyond my control, it was not possible to continue the 
study beyond a number of field trips, interviews and assessment of some 
secondary material. But the initial attempts brought home certain points. 
The first of these was that the role of such projects needed to be 
analysed in terms of social factors - in particular, in terms of their 
social structure. This in itself was a highly complex issue: producers on 
the Ciskeian projects were widely described as a "'middle class""', probably 
one of the vaguest designations possible (see Venn 1979, Proctor-Simms, 
2 
TNTRnDUCT:rnN 
1978). A more rigorous understanding of their class character seemed 
necessary, not only for analysing the working of the scheme, but also for 
investigating whether these producers might form the embryo of a productive 
farmer capitalist class. 
The second point was that such projects could not be researched in 
isolation from much broader social structures and economic processes. The 
Ciskeian schemes were similar in many respects to those elsewhere in the 
Third World. They were also closely linked in both inputs and outputs to 
the wider South African and international economy. In addition, the 
~middle class- characterization of their producers carried (deliberately) 
substantial political connotations, which in turn linked the issue of 
social structure to the Ciskei and South African states. 
However, in my pursance of these points, the problems implicit in 
contemporary development theory proved to be an insurmountable obstacle to 
proqress. It is one thing (albeit important) to learn that development 
projects cannot be studied in isolation from the total social structure in 
which they are embedded (see Kahn, 1978:110; Legassick, 1976:435), but 
quite another to find the concepts to do this. 
The approaches I looked at include the modernization school; the 
dependency and underdevelopment theorists; the -articulation of modes of 
production'" framework; the ""laws of motion"" protagonists; and those who 
adopt a uclass struggle .... emphasis. Numerous debates have raged between and 
within different approaches. While the controversy has been immensely 
exciting and productive, there have also been some major problems in it. 
Not least has been the confusing range of phrases in circulation - Ugrowth 
without development .... , -underdevelopment-, and the udevelopment of 
underdevelopment" to list but a few. I also identified four general 
problems with the literature: 
(i). There has been a lack of clear philosophical principles in the debate. 
In particular, the status of theory in relation to material reality has 
been largely ignored. 
3 
INTRODUCTION 
On the one hand, this is evident in the existence of what Marx has 
criticized as Ugeneral historico-philosophical theory, the supreme virtue 
of which consists of being supra-historical- (Selected Works, quoted by 
Cohen, 1981:ixJ. At best, these theories have been too general to be 
useful for historically-specific empirical investigation (for example, 
Wallerstein, 1974, 1977), and at worst they have imposed reified 
relationships and processes onto empirical analyses (see for example, 
Banaii, 1976a). On the other hand, the lack of principles concerning the 
status of theory has also been evident in the number of studies that 
dispense with theory entirely. Thus, there is a distortion of both 
theoretical and empirical accounts of development, as well as a dis;unction 
between the two. 
(ii). The second problem is that where theory has been used, it has 
largely been in macro-terms, and the theoretical relationship between 
macro-, micro-and intermediate levels of development has been ignored. The 
units of analysis have not been adequate for grasping the specificity of 
each of the parts and of the whole, nor the relationship between them. 
This has had its neqative effects on research which has frequently focussed 
on development at one level only, and neglected the connections between 
levels. Rural development is studied in isolation from industry, and rural 
development proiects are studied' independently of their broader 
relationships and wider significance {see examples in Richards, 1979:272 
and Amin, 1974:32). 
(iii). The third problem with the controversy is that much attention has 
been devoted to cr iticizinq the inadequacies of opposinq approaches l ancl as 
a r-esul t, "Ijevelopment" as ttle J ocus of the debates, has not been proper 1 y 
theorized in most of them. Writers have become cauqht up in ""rnetropole 
sateillte'" versus "dual economy"; "'laws at motion" versus Uarticulation ot 
relations U , etc., anl.i "c1evelopment U has been lost Siqtlt of,. Cone-eDt':3 
needed to understand ""develupment'" have in consequence not tleen adequately 
theorized. 
( iv ). The tourU) profJlem in the debates is that each approach has tended 
towards exclusivity. Hostility between protagonists has inhibited the 
Possible sYnthesis of the wtlole ranqe. Colin Leys f or example wants wr i ters 
to rid themselves of ~the ideological handicap of dependency theory~ 
(1980:109; see~ similarly, Kitching, 1985:148). As a result of such 
attitudes, the insights produced by a given approach have generally not 
been integrated into other approaches. Where this has been attempted~ it 
has been on an eclectic basis and with little regard to theoretical rigour 
and consistency (see for example~ Roxborough 1976). 
In the light of these problems, it appeared to me that development theory 
itself needed to be ~developed~. This meant starting with basic 
detinitions~ re-workinq existing concepts, innovating different ones, and 
integrating the contributions of the various approaches into a new body of 
theory. Rather than the Ciskei schemes, this pro;ect became the topic of 
the thesis. Ironically, having started from a concern with povertv in the 
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Eastern Cape, my investigations led me away from this focus. As will be 
evident in chapter two, I argue strongly that the study of development as 
an economic phenomenon should be exactly that, and that other consider-
ations should not be conflated with this project. Development and poverty, 
despite often being interrelated, are still distinct concerns. I have 
chosen to focus on the former, and have defined it strictly in relation to 
productive capacity. I have also chosen to investigate its relation to 
social structure, and construct a broad framework around this issue. 
In attempting to meet these ambitious aims, I have drawn substantially 
from general Marxist theory. According to Marx and Engels, writing in The 
Conmunist Manif'esto, ..... the bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly 
revolutionizing the instruments of production and therefore the relations 
of production- (1986:37). Their vantage point was political and their 
concern was the relations of production, and not with development as such. 
In my view, while they produced invaluable insights, neither took on the 
task of properly explaining quite how, why and when capitalist social 
relations revolutionized production. Similarly, much Marxist writing on 
development has ended up talking about the development of social structure, 
rather than the social structure of development. My concern has been the 
latter, and as such, I found it problematic to discuss much of this 
writing in its own (i.e. different) terms. I have had to develop my 
own perspective partly as a precondition for relating to it. 
My approach remains within a broadly Marxist framework. Generally 
speaking, it is a challenge to see whether Marxism can be used to explain 
concerns outside of its central focus of political class struggle. The 
success with which it can help explain economic development is therefore a 
kind of sub-hypothesis of this thesis. At the same time, I have found it 
necessary to depart from Marx~s use of concepts like -base and 
superstructure'" and the State, relying rather on the insights of neo-
Marxists like Cutler et al (1977) and Jessop (1982). In many cases, I have 
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also developed new arguments around Marxist concepts such as -relations and 
forces of production"', "'exploitation"", ""'class", "'subsumption"', ""primacy 
of the productive forces"", "'capitalism"', and "the Agrarian Question",. 
Furthermore, these concepts have not been enough to successfully analyse 
social structure and development. I therefore have also had to develop a 
number of theoretical constructs, such as the model of three Moments of 
production and the phenomenon of ""system dynamics"", and these have been 
central to my arguments. 
If the method of presentation in the thesis is from the general to the 
particular, this differs from my method of investigation. The fact that I 
took development theory back to the "'drawing board'" does not mean that the 
thesis descended from pure theory. My method of enquiry has been 
continually to try and relate the theoretical and the empirical. As such, 
my sources have ranged from philosophical texts, through to detailed 
empirical studies of a wide range of situations. My field trips to the 
Ciskei development projects also informed my arguments. 
Before concluding this introduction, two self-imposed restrictions 
need to be noted. The first is that this work deals almost exclusively 
with social structure and development in relation to capitalism. The 
reasons for this are outlined in the text (see chapters one and twelve). 
However, the consequence is a fairly restricted account in terms of the 
complexities of the contemporary world. 
The second point is that most of the research was done in 1980-2, and 
new contributions to the debates have since been published. It has, 
unfortunately, been impossible to take account of all of these. The field 
is already vast, and to keep permanently up to date would prevent one from 
ever sitting down to produce one"s own work. Nonetheless, this still means 
a limitation on this thesis. I would hope, however, that the manner in 
which I tackle the problems and the theoretical solutions that I propose 
are of more long-term value. 
6 
P.l\RT A 
DEVELUPMENT: DEFINING HIE fFRRA IN 
CHAPTER 01£ 
THEORY - ITS ROLE AN) SCOPE 
1. The need for theory. 
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5. Methodological guidelines. 
OEFIN7NG THE TERRAIN~ 
THEORY 
5.i. Interconnections and the problem of units of analysis. 
5.ii. Interconnections and the totality. 
6. Conclusion. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A beautiful scene catches the eye - lushly covered units 
with mealies standing 2,4 metres high, ready to be 
picked. Cows grazed in the thick pasture. (The New World 
of Keiskamma), Daily Dispatch. 77.04.01. 
This is the idyllic view of a journalist visiting a rural development 
project in South Africa1s Ciskei bantustan. It is in a somewhat different 
light that development schemes appear in this study. This is because an 
academic analysis needs to go beyond what Poulantzas (1976:68) calls -the 
noisy illusion of the evident" and "the demagogy of the palpitating fact" 
(ibid:65). In order to do this, it is necessary to make use of theory. The 
objective of this chapter is to spell out what this entails in relation to 
theorizing the relation between social structure and development (including 
rural development in particular). 
2. USING THEORY 
Various writers have argued for the necessity of theory, and against 
empiricism, on the basis that there is no Uinnocentll investigation of 
reality {see Popper (1972), Kuhn (1962) and Althusser (1970a, 1970b»). 
Whether he knows it or not, every social researcher uses generalizations 
and abstractions in identifying, selecting and ordering -the facts- (see 
Carr, 1974:11; Moore, 1969:521; Hobsbawm, 1972:265-6).(1) 
Empirical information does not therefore exist as "raw data" 
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independently of more abstract assumptions. To the extent that the latter 
are systematized as formal concepts and a unified theory ... they can enhance 
the production of knowledge. Instead of knowledge based uncritically on 
observation ... theory makes possible knowledge based on the conscious applic-
ation of abstract principles involving logic and reasoning (Williams ... 
1976:100). 
The use of theory is no guarantee that the resulting knowledge 
corresponds accurately to reality (Popper ... 1973:13). Firstly ... while 
criteria may be proposed to validate the knowledge produced by a given 
theory; there is always the problem of validating these criteria in turn 
(Althusserl 1976:137; 1970:56/7). Secondly; as the sociology of knowledge 
shows ... every theory bears the traces of social values that lend signific-
ance and ordering to phenomena in its field (Weber ... 1948:77 ... 8; Popper, 
1973:213).(2) This applies no less to the field of development theory than 
it does to others. It is not possible to analyse this here ... but see for 
example the discussion by Goodman et al (1984) concerning the changing 
history of development theories in Brazil, and Kitching (1985:145/6) on the 
political context that underpins the debate around Kenyan development. 
In the face of these points, there appears to be little choice but to 
accept the precarious epistemological character of theory, and indeed of 
knowledge in general. This does not mean that all theories are of equal 
value. Within a given historical period, certain theories are socially 
recognized as more or less accurate than others, particularly in the face 
of the test of practical application. I have opted for a "pragmatic"'" 
methodological position based on this recognition. While this is far from a 
guarantee of infallible knowledge; it would appear - on the balance of 
probabilities - to yield a more coherent body of knowledge than (contra 
Feyerabend; 1970) would a wholly arbitrary selection of theory. 
For this thesis, Marxism has served as a broad theoretical framework 
for my investigation. Marxism has some social recognition as facilitating 
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certain insights into social life.(3) This is not to ignore the existence 
of alternative theories, nor of criticisms of Marxism itself. However, a 
defence of Marxism would require a different thesis.(4) My aim here is not 
primarily to investigate Marxism as such, but to use it in constructing a 
specific theory about social structure and development. 
3. THE LIMITS OF THEORY • 
. ~ 
, While theoretical abstractions playa key role in identifying and 
ordering empirical facts, Marxist methodology informs us that it is not as 
if abstract theory one-sidedly determines the empirical facts - as if the 
concept of ~simple commodity producing household u provided us with the fact 
of a particular family cultivating crops for the market. On the contrary, 
there is a material reality to the household and its activity, and a number 
of shared real characteristics among it and its fellows. It is this reality 
which underlies the (accurate) categorization as a simple commodity 
producing household (and not as a capitalist enterprise, for instance). 
It would therefore be incorrect to see empirical facts (and even 
reality itself) as simply a (Hegelian) product of the theoretical ab-
stractions inside people's minds (see Marx's Grundrisse 1973:100-101). 
Instead, there is a dialectical interplay between empirical (specific) and 
theoretical (general) levels of thought. In the Marxist view, this is 
ultimately determined by real practical experience of reality itself (see 
especially Marx's Theses on Feuerbach, in Suchting 1979).(5) Dynamic 
reality is therefore the context in which these levels of thought interact 
and undergo continuous modification and reinterpretation.(6) 
The significance of these points is that theory - while essential -
cannot become a static and rigid arbiter of knowledge. Empirical research 
-as an interface between theory and reality - cannot be redundant and 
ancillary to theory (Mouzelis, 1980:368). To avoid the dangers of 
theoretical reification, there is a need to acknowledge the limits of 
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theory~ and to avoid confusing it with reality itself, and treating 
empirical relationships as manifestations of the theoretical. A negative 
example in this regard is the way that, within Marxism, Leninls theory of 
capitalist differentiation in the Russian countryside has been incorrectly 
read into what have actually been quite different historical experiences 
(Williams, 1984:2; see Kitching, 1982:163 for a similar situation 
concerning Marxls Capital and studies of the genesis of capitalism). 
The major thrust of this thesis is theoretical, and in its presentat-
ion here, empirical references in it are primarily illustrative, rather 
than substantive. However, in researching the topic, it has been important 
to continually revise the abstractions and generalities of theory in 
relation to the ~concrete- specificity of empirical facts (while still 
bearing in mind that the latter are not raw, unmediated data). 
Distinct from reification, though often linked to it, is the danger of 
selecting only that empirical data which confirms the initial hypotheses 
(see Popper 1973:260). For example~ dependency theory has been said to 
block the analysis of phenomena that do not conform to its assumptions 
(Leys, 1980:109; Phillips, 1977:13). 
In countering this problem, I have tried to be open in relation to 
diverse empirical facts encountered, and to alter my assumptions where need 
be. I have also kept in mind Popperls falsifiability method in terms of 
which a theory should be practically testable by application to a range of 
empirical information (Popper, 1973:222, 260, 326 footnote 14). I should 
add, however, that my argument does not involve narrowly testable hypothes-
es of the -if x, then y- variety. It is intended to be explanatory rather 
than predictive; a framework of possibilities rather than a set of laws. 
At the same time, I have tried to construct my theory in such a way 
~ 
that it can be evaluated in relation to a wide variety of empirical cases 
(see Part H). My aim has been to specify general relationships which may be 
recognizable in a number of situations, and this would make for the 
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validity of applying the theory there.(7) As will become apparent in the 
body of this thesi5~ while I have a general definition of development~ and 
of mode of production~ there is no attempt at a grand and universal theory 
of development that would cover all modes of production. Rather I limit 
myself to theorizing development and underdevelopment only in relation to 
economic systems dominated by the capitalist mode of production, and with 
special relevance to rural development. To the extent that my presupposit-
ions are not borne out by new or different empirical evidence, this 
influences not so much the truth or falsity of my thesis, but rather its 
comprehensiveness and scope of application. 
4. CONSTRUCTING A THEORY. 
An important element in constructing a theory is the need to define 
the sense of general concepts. This entails using logic and semantics to 
establish meanings that apply in various situations, and which therefore 
specify the cornmon characteristics in each. As soon as any definitions are 
considered less abstractly, it is clear that they are composed of numerous 
layers of determinations which depend on the specifics of each situation 
(see the Grundrisse discussion on production~ 1973:85-100). However, this 
does not negate their value; on the contrary, they are a necessary and 
legitimate precondition for constructing a theory. Hence~ in the first 
part of this thesis I devote considerable space to clarifying definitions. 
In the case of -development- - where much writing has simply assumed an 
unproblematic general meaning (Wallman, 1976:102) - this is certainly an 
essential task. 
Another element in constructing a theory is drawing on the 
contributions of existing theories to the subject under study. For my part, 
I borrow (with modifications) from a range of Marxist and other theories of 
development, and attempt to synthesize their various insights. There is a 
danger in this of an eclecticism that lacks structure and logic, and which 
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assembles points rather than integrates them. To avoid this pitfall J 
"borrowing" needs to be on an explicit basis involving reference to the 
fundamental features of the argument J notably to its epistemological 
presuppositions J and to its basic definitions and its philosophical and 
logical protocols. The arguments in this chapter are therefore not just an 
introduction to this thesis, but the basis on which I have drawn on and 
merged insights from a variety of theories J as will be evident as my 
argument proceeds. 
5. METHODOLOGICAL GUIDELINES 
A theoretical investigation takes place not only in terms of the 
issues discussed above J but also with regard to philosophical principles. 
Marxist theory is not "derived from some imputed metaphysic# (Shaw J 
1978:2)J but at one and the same time depends on J and supportsJ Marxist 
philosophy.(8) The principles of the latter are thus related directly to 
analysis of social realitYJ and are valuable in informing the construction 
of theories. Some of these J as adapted from Cornforth (1968:78)J draw our 
attention to: 
(a) The structure of interconnections and relationships in society. 
(b) The structure as a complex of processes rather than ~ready-made­
things. 
(c) The developmental dynamics of these processes being linked to 
the dialectical contradictions of the structure. 
(d) Quantity and quality as two distinct dimensions of developing 
structures. 
(e) The historical character of social processesJ especially the 
origin and likely development of social structures. 
These points cannot be argued for within the parameters of this 
thesis. However, their relevance - especially that of contradiction - will 
be evident in greater and more concrete detail as the thesis proceeds. (9) 
Meriting more in-depth discussion at this point is the first principle 
concerning interconnections. 
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S.l. interconnectlons and the problem of units of analysis. 
l.,onstr-ucting a tt"leory that takes account of interconnections raises 
the difficulty of d1stinguishing un1ts at analysis at the various levels. 
(,r 1 tic 1sing "common-sense'" analysis, fvlarx says that where it succeeds in 
detecting a distinction, it rails to see a unity, and vice versa (cited in 
Larrain, 197~:b5). Llearly, any theory needs a range of concepts that will 
enat)le the researcller to grasp the wood as well as eaCh of the trees; in 
other words, a comprehensive specitication of tne relevant units of 
analysis and the relations between them. 
file wt-.ole and its constituent parts must botll be accounted for. For 
example, in studying rural development, we need to be able to analyse a 
specific rural development SCYleme without losing sight of the significance 
ot the Whole international context. This is important because as Baran 
t.19bL:Lld) points out, statements that are truthful with regard to the 
parts, can const1tute talsehoods with regard to the Whole. Further, 
supposedly sHnilar elements may perform fundamentally different operations 
it located within difterent structured wholes. (10) 
5.ii. Interconnections and the totality. 
Intrinsic to much Marxist theory is the point of view of the totality 
(Lukacs, 1971:5-12) and the primacy of the whole over its parts.(ll) The 
Whole is constituted by the active relation between the parts, but is also 
Hgreater~ than these parts. It acquires a particular kind of character 
trom its parts, and vice versa. (12) 
The question that arises is how to conceptualize at a general level 
the relations ot causality and determination between the whole and the 
parts (Althusser, 197b:141). What is needed is a theory that will help 
establish the differences between the parts, the relative autonomy of each 
and the mo~je of intera"etion between them and tile wllole (ibid: 177 ). In this 
tl-lesi s 1 investigate whetller MarXist concepts ar e able to specit y the 
er r ee. t ive wtloles and parts Hl 880) spec ir iC uni t of analysis ana the inter-
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relations between them, with regard to social structure and development. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have argued against a naive empiricism for the need 
for theory, and then explained my choice of Marxist theory as a broad 
starting point for my investigation. I have also specified a number of 
limitations on the role of theory, being concerned to highlight the dangers 
of theoretical reification and selective analysis of empirical data. 
Against this background, constructing theory involves defining general 
concepts, and relating theoretical abstractions to empirical data. It also 
involves borrowing from other theories, and in my case also using a number 
of Marxist methodological guidelines. I am now in a position to begin the 
task of constructing my theory. 
ENDNOTES 
1. For Kuhn, the -paradigm-, and for Althusser, the -problematic-, refers 
to the basic assumptions of a particular world view which determine what 
problems will be selected, and what, conversely, will thereby be exclUded 
(Althusser, 1971:113). 
2. For this reason, Weber cautioned that one should not be sc~entifically 
content with conventional self-evidentness of very widely accepted value-
judgements (ibid:13). I would add that while this is correct, we cannot 
wholly escape such judgements - indeed we are probably unaware of many of 
them (see Popper, 1973:222-223). Up to a point, we have to be content with 
being scientifically discontent. 
3. An additional reason for selecting Marxism is that a great deal of 
development studies has been located within the Marxist paradigm. By 
situating my investigation in this context, my arguments can be directly 
compared to the limits and possibilities evident in many of these existing 
works. 
4. In point of fact because of various weaknesses in Marxism, my argument 
in large part departs substantially from several key Marxist arguments. See 
for example, my discussion of base and superstructure (chapter four) and my 
discussion of forces of production (chapter five). 
5. See especially the second thesis: 
The question whether truth about the objective world is 
attained by human thinking - is not a question of 
theory, but a practical question. In practice must man 
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prove the truth, that is reality and power, this-
worldliness of his thinking. The dispute over the 
reality or non-reality of thinking - that is isolated 
from practice - is a purely scholastic question. 
6. With the assistance of semiology, it is possible to analyse this in 
greater depth. An empirical fact can be broken down into a sign or series 
of signs. Each sign comprises both a conceptual signified meaning and a 
material signifier (such as symbols, sounds and other physical objects with 
communicative significance). Together, these two dimensions provide 
knowledge about a referent material reality. Between the sign as a whole 
and this reality, there is a dynamic relationship. The signifier and/or 
signified dimensions of the sign may be modified to more accurately 
represent the reality (Sebeok, 1975; Fiske, 1979; Coward and Ellis, 1977). 
As an example of this, for a racist, the generally sorry state of rural 
development in Africa lies in the nature of the ~black man-. Looking at 
African farmers, a racist registers skin-colour as a socially relevant 
signifier and goes on to link it with a specific signified meaning (eg. low 
intelligence). In the course of experience and education, it may become 
necessary for our racist to be more accurate in understanding reality, and 
therefore to come up with a different signified meaning (eg. non-biological 
characteristics - culture, colonial heritage, etc.). In certain 
contexts, (eg. contact with successful black farmers), where in reality 
skin-colour has no sdcial relevance, this signifier may be discarded. 
7. As Marx notes, the same economic basis can show ~infinite variations 
and gradations in its appearance even though its principle conditions are 
everywhere the same" (Capital, vol. III, quoted by Baran, 1962:44). 
8. This cannot be elaborated here, but it should not be surprising, as 
Marxist philosophy is directly bound up with the proposition that the real 
has epistemological primacy over thought about the real. (See Marx, 
Grundrisse, 1973:100). A Marxist theory about the real, and a Marxist 
philosophy about the relation between theory and the real, are obviously 
going to be dialectically interconnected (see endnote 5 above). 
9. My ideas on contradiction are drawn largely from Althusser (Contra-
diction and Overdetermination, 1972, and Mao (On Contradiction, 1977b). 
10. Althusser rejects analysing categories in isolation "for it is less 
their name than their function in the theoretical apparatus in which they 
operate that decides their future" (1976:70). 
11. It may be added that the totality is differentiated, complex, intern-
ally articulated and uneven (Althusser 1976:177,183; Lukacs, 1971:12). 
12. While the parts cannot be reduced to the whole, one can still argue 
that "the whole is everything and the parts are nothing", (Williams, 
1976:190) in the sense that "the properties of things change with changing 
relations: what is true of a thing in one relationship is not true in 
another, what is true in one set of circumstances is not true in another u • 
(Cornforth, 1968:106). This applies to the concept of social structure 
(see chapter four), as well as to the concepts of various modes of 
production which cannot be defined as "combinatories" (Althusser, 1970:7) 
of a set of ahistorical factors (see chapter seven). It also defines my 
approach to concrete development schemes, and my class characterizations of 
rural relations. I reject analysing them in isolation of their economic 
and political context. 
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DEVELOPMENT 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
A necessary component and starting point in constructing a theory is 
to establish general definitions. This chapter takes on the task of 
defining development. I argue that -development- should be understood in 
an economic sense~ and not in terms of political, ethical, ideological or 
other criteria. This is not to say that the issue of development is an 
exclusively economic consideration. Rather~ I argue that the concept should 
designate solely economic characteristics of social life~ considered in 
abstraction from their extra-economic dimensions. What constitutes ""devel-
oprnentn therefore is an economic rather than (for example) a political~ 
ecological, spiritual or other phenomenon.(l) While development has extra-
economic significance, such considerations are not part of its definition. 
2. THE uHUMANIST~ CRITIQUE OF ECONOMISM. 
Modernization theory has come under attack for the priority it accords 
economic considerations and for its corresponding neglect of the political~ 
ethical and other issues involved (see Berger, 197b:53~ Phillips, 1977). 
The critique is that modernization theory perceives development simply as 
economic growth and, further, that it assumes this to be an end in itself. 
Consequently, it is argued, extra-economic considerations are side-lined, 
and seen only in terms of whether they help or hinder economic growth. 
Many of" the critics of modernization theory are what one could refer 
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to as -humanists"" who argue that the economistic approach of modernization 
theory needs to be overturned so that economic growth is seen as a means to 
extra-economic goals. They put these goals at the centre of their 
analysis~ with the result that development is defined ultimately in 
relation to a variety of moral values. For example, some ,uhumanists ..... would 
argue that development should be measured in terms of improving the quality 
of life, rather than in technical indices of economic growth. The two 
yardsticks, in their view, are not necessarily synonymous. While rejecting 
the modernization approach, I also disagree with this ..... humanist ..... approach 
and will argue my case below. 
3. THE DEAD END OF RELATIVISM. 
The ""'humanist" critique has in some cases opened the way for a radical 
position to emerge where "'development ..... ultimately needs have nothing to 
do with economic factors at all. Here development is so bound up with 
extra-economic ends, that economic factors are in no way a precondition for 
them. As the Tanu 1971 guidelines argue: 
for people who have been slaves and have been oppressed, 
exploited and disregarded by colonialism or capitalism, 
~development"'" means ..... liberation-. Any action that gives 
them more say in determining their affairs and running 
their lives is one of development~ even if it does not 
offer them better health or more bread. Any action that 
reduces their say in determining their affairs or 
running their lives is not progressive and retards them 
even if the action brings them better health and mor~ 
bread. (Tanzania, 1971, cited by Seidman, 1978:320).(2) 
The danger of this position is that once the link to economic factors 
is lost, -development- comes to have an entirely relative meaning. Peter 
Berger, for example, holds that the values constituting ..... development- and 
the role (if any) of economic growth as a means of achieving them, cannot 
be prejudged (1976:53t. On this basis, he argues that ""'development"'" be 
defined by mass participation (rather than by academics, experts, govern-
ments, etc.,). In other' words, there is no set meaning to ..... development",: 
it depends entirely on how people in different situations define it. 
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This approach makes it impossible to theorize -development~ in a 
useful way because the meaning of the term becomes wholly relative. What 
counts as development for some people, does not for others - there is no 
corrrnon ground to proceed on. In contrast, I believe that ""development'" must 
',I' be theorized as a concept with a consistent general meaning across all 
situations, and that crucial to this is the link between development and 
economics. uDevelopment"" with simply a moral or other extra-economic 
meaning, and without an economic component forgets that, as Marx (in a 
different context) observed, "'the middle ages could not live on 
Catholicism, nor the ancient world on politics'" (1972:86 footnote 2). It 
is not surprising therefore that most ..... humanists..., see economic factors as 
necessary (albeit not sufficient) elements of their definition. I take it 
therefore that the concept of development should intrinsically have an 
economic dimension. 
4. DEVELOPMENT AS SPECIFICALLY LINKED TO ECONOMIC GROWTH. 
My position is that development is linked not only to economic 
factors, but specifically to economic growth. However, for those who see 
development as including reference to extra-economic criteria, this is not 
necessarily so. For example, if development is defined as raising living 
standards for poor countries, this goal does not require growth per se for 
it to be achieved. Instead, it could be realized by redistribution (rather 
than expansion) of the world~s economic resources. 
In terms of such an approach, ..... development n is even compatible, up to 
a point, with a fall in a countryJ s production. For example, total 
production (and percentage marketed) might be lower in an ex-colony than it 
was before independence. But whereas previously, people went hungry and 
overworked (on behalf of the colonial power), their post-independence 
weltare could well be better than it was before. In this scenario, one may 
logically have udevelopment without growth", and even development with 
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economic stagnation or recession. Such phrases sound unusual and even 
paradoxical - yet they are a logical possibility of making extra-economic 
criteria central to the definition of development. 
Most writers do in fact accept that economic growth must be part of 
conceptualizing development - even where non-economic criteria form part of 
the definition. Thus even if social, political etc., ends are seen as 
essential to defining development, so with the criterion of growth. There 
is thus a (correct) general consensus assumption that development - at 
least in the long term - requires a minimum of economic expansion to be 
meaningful.(3) Accepting then that economic growth is necessary to 
defining development, we can now turn to the question of whether it is 
sufficient - or whether extra-economic criteria are also needed. 
5 ....... HUMANIST' .. ARGUMENTS FOR EXTRA-ECONOMIC CRITERIA. 
The #humanist ...... critique of economistic views of ""development.u does 
draw attention to the extra-economic significance of economic issues. As 
discussed at the end of this thesis (chapter thirty-six), many studies show 
that rural development is in fact often seen in terms of both economic and 
extra-economic goals (political, in particular) - by both planners and 
participants. The analyst should not therefore take ..... development"" at 
economic face-value. 
However, it is one thing to be aware of the broader significance of 
economic growth, and another to make one's definition depend on it. It is 
true, as Weber puts it, that ""a phenomenon is economic only insofar as and 
only as long as our interest is exclusively focused on its constitutive 
significance in the material struggle for existence ..... (1949:65, my 
emphasis). Similarly, by defining development solely in economic terms we 
are making an abstraction in order to highlight one aspect within the 
mixed-up character of reality.(4) It is precisely this focus which makes 
it possible to see how it relates to other extra-economic aspects. 
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! For the nhumanists""'" however" extra-economic considerations should be 
put up-front in development studies. This is evident in controversies in 
the literature concerning their distinction between growth and development. 
For example, ...... development U presupposes economic growth for both Le Brun 
(1973:286) and Berg (1964" cited in Markovitz" 1976:184" footnote 3). 
However" for """humanist n Le Brun" economic growth is necessary" but 
insufficient" to achieve certain socio-economic ends. For ...... modernization 
theorist"'" 8erg, it is both necessary and sufficient, because growth, in 
itself, constitutes udevelopment"'" (in Le Brun~s sense) eventually. His 
case rests on the ...... trickle-down ..... theory that everyone eventually benefits 
from growth. (5) 
Berg~s position has evoked much response for its historical flaws. 
Writers like Le Brun argue that growth is insufficient to count as develop-
ment; on the contrary, they argue" it is quite possible to have ...... growth 
without developmentu.(b) Indeed" according to Harrison (1981:406), despite 
recent growth in the Third World, there are still seriously poor people 
there. ""'They are the very crux of the development issue, for if develop-
ment is to mean anything, it must mean the eradication of this great mass 
of suffering."'" It is in the light of such arguments that Brett (1973:18) 
takes development to mean (inter alia) growth plus equity_ These issues 
lead Berger (1976:64/5) to criticize the ...... ideology of developmentalism u by 
asking """whose growth" who benefits, who decides,?u. The questions imply a 
calculus of the human costs of growth" raising (in an ethical way) the 
political context of development (ibid:95,,254).(7) 
It is against this background that the ""'humanists ...... are concerned to 
build their moral and political values into the definition of development 
(see for example" Todaro, 1981:69-72) ....... Development ...... thus becomes ...... good~ 
growth and "desirable ...... modernization (Berger, 1976:52). What makes growth 
count as """development""" depends on its extra-economic concomitants, and 
one's moral assessment of these. For several reasons, I will argue below 
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that this approach needs to be rejected. 
6. THE LIMITS OF "HUMANIST"" CONCEPTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT. 
One symptomatic effect of the problems in the ""humanist~ approach is 
that ~development~ is used inconsistently. "Development'" is used on the 
one hand to mean (inter alia) ""growth plus equity""; on the other hand .. 
western capitalist countries are labelled "'developed'" - desp'ite their lack 
of equity (Legassick 1976:437).(8) Another symptom of the problems is that 
inequality and politics (in Berger~s sense above) are not considered in 
terms of effectivity and determination in relation to economic growth .. but 
rather in terms of values alone. The emphasis is on the "ought" rather than 
the ""'is ...... (see Weber 1948:51; Phillips .. 1977:19).(9) 
By calling on us to apply moral values and make (related) extra-
economic considerations integral to our definition of development, the 
"humanists"" open a gigantic Pandora~s box of whi-eh values to choose from. 
As Weber has argued, it is impossible to refute value judgements (1942:4); 
consequently a definition of development on the ""humanist .... basis is of 
limited value to analysts holding different values. C10 ) 
The "humanist", definition thus directs us to the terrain of moral and 
poli tical debate about economic growth, rather tllan towards a concept that 
will help us to analyse this growth. It tells us more about analysts' 
values than about what is happening on the ground. It is one thing to be 
concerned about who benefits from growth, and another to explain the actual 
pattern it takes. In the light of all this, I would rather limit the 
concept to refer only to the economic significance of growth. 
7. THE ROLE OF VALUES IN DEFINING DEVELOPMENT. 
The "'humanist", stress on values is largely a reaction to the claims of 
modernisation theory to value-free analysis and prescription. The 
~humanists'" have correctly exposed the theory's implicit value-laden 
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Eurocentric and consumerist assumptions in terms of which "'development", 
conceived as high industrialization, mass consumerism, urbanization, etc., 
is seen as an end in itself (See Frank, 1969b; Bernstein, 1971; Tipps, 
n.d.; Phillips, 1977:11).(11) 
It may be pointed out, however, that defining ""development", as an 
economic phenomenon does not per se commit one to a Eurocentric conception 
of the process. Bernstein (1978:13), for example, has tried to avoid 
Eurocentrism by reversing the modernization school"s procedure. He takes 
as his starting point not ""development"" (with its Eurocentric connotat-
ions), but the conditions of what he calls ""'underdevelopment". ""Develop-
ment"" is then defined in relation to this vantage point. While this avoids 
"Eurocentr ism"", however, it introduces another problem - i. e. a "Third-
World-centric" definition of development.(12) For my part, I try to avoid 
the general problem by defining development not in relation to either First 
or Third Worlds, but in relation to the preceding situation in both. 
Development in my view refers to the expansion of productive capacity 
beyond what existed previously in any given economic unit. (See chapter 
three) • 
Certainly, there remain value assumptions in this view - for 
example, in defining productive capacity and in identifying what 
constitutes a productive force. (13) My critique of the .. "humanists ...... is thus 
not to imply that a value-free definition of development is possible. I 
accept that moral judgements and value assumptions about economic develop-
ment are difficult and even impossible to avoid. However, my argument is 
that they should not be the primary focus in specifying what social pheno-
mena count as development. They will influence the identification and the 
selection of economic phenomena in this, but where one is conscious of 
them, they should not lead to including extra-economic phenomena in the 
definition. 
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8. CONCLUSION. 
The arguments above are not to deny the importance of debunking the 
value-biases in every supposedly-neutral conceptualization of~ and recipe 
for~ udevelopment u • I would follow Todaro (1981:11/12) in acknowledging 
that value premises~ however disguised~ are an integral part of development 
studies~ and that consequentlv~ they should be made explicit where 
possible. For my part~ therefore~ I have argued for a definition of 
Udeveloprnent U that attempts to convey a strictly economic sense. While 
extra-economic considerations may be applied to the phenomenon I designate 
by the concept of "development ..... ~ where one is aware of them~ they should be 
explicitly precluded from its definition and identification. 
Moving on from this~ it may be noted that Weber has perceptively noted 
three areas of concern to an economic analysis. He distinguishes ..... economic 
events or institutions ..... deliberately created or used for economic ends; 
"'economically relevant ..... phenomena which in certain circumstances have con-
sequences of interest from an economic point of view; and ..... economically 
conditioned phenomena~ which are influenced by economic factors (ibid:-
64/5). My concern in this thesis is to establish the way in Which social 
structure serves as an economic institution~ encompasses economically 
relevant phenomena~ and in turn is itself an economically conditioned 
object - specifically with regard to development. 
EN)NOTES 
1. Theoretical elaboration of ~development"" as an economic category takes 
place in later chapters. 
2. Brietzke (1976:652) says that land reform in Mexico, Egypt and 
Ethiopia had the political aim of eliminating rural inequalities~ even if 
at the expense or disrwpting production: "the nature of the omelette to be 
made is less important than the breaking of the eggsU (ibid:659). 
3. Ihis is even the case with advocates of the ~basic needs~ development 
approach, an approach which has far more moderate development aims than the 
traditional modernization approach. The "basic needs'" development 
strategies have come to replace the previous (unsuccessful) strategies that 
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aimed at growth (even growth with improved income distribution). The new 
aim is simply minimum standards of living .. water .. health .. shelter and 
clotllinq. These criteria now govern World Bank and USAID loans (Hayter .. 
1981; Sandbrook .. 1982). But even these aims require some economic qrowth. 
4. As Weber (1942:64) observed .. ~the quality of an event as a ~social­
economic~ event is not something which it possesses ~objectively~. It is 
rather conditioned by the orientation of our cognitive interest .. as it 
arises from the specific cultural significance which we attribute to the 
particular event in a qiven case.~ 
5. This is the same as the '-'expanding cake .... · theory where everyone's piece 
grows bigger - a common theme in developmentalist legitimization. The 
approach is also known as the N8razil School""" where the emphasis is on 
creating rather than distributing wealth (Berger 1976:254). Thus it is 
that rural development is often presented as being in everyone~s interests 
-- on the grounds that .. through growth .. the lot of the poor is expected to 
improve without requiring sacrifices from the rich (Heyer et al, 1980:3). 
6. This particular way of distinguishing economic growth from "develop-
ment U has wide currency in the uhumanist U development literature. For 
Seers (1979) .. economic growth refers to per capita incomes and GNP, while 
development refers .. inter alia, to the elimination of absolute poverty, 
reduction of high unemployment, and narrowing of huge social inequalities 
(cited by Mouzelis, 1980:353). Clearly .. on these definitions .. there can be 
economic growth without development. There is no inherent reason why 
development in this sense should automatically follow in a Utrickle-downu 
sense from economic growth. The latter is a necessary means to socio-
economic ends, but it is not adequate by itself. In this view, ugrowthU and 
udevelopment U are quite distinct (See also Markovitz, 1976:183). 
7. The political dimensions of development are concretely evident in the 
classic remark by a former president of Brazil that his country was doing 
well, though not the inhabitants (Harrison, 1981:430). It is in response 
to these kind of issues that Nyerere believes that capitalist development 
might increase national wealth, but that the Tanzanian masses would not 
necessarily be better off (Hughes, 1977:219). 
8. Another example is made by Mouzelis~ critique (1981:354) of Seers' 
criteria of development as eliminating poverty, reducing unemployment and 
alleviating inequalities (see above). Mouzelis says that Saudi Arabia fits 
the criteria and therefore would count as a developed country in Seers' 
terms. Mouzelis' point is that this obscures the economic character of 
SaUdi Arabia which is not a developed capitalist country. 
9. An illustration of the differences can be seen by comparing Seidman's 
view (1978:307) of participation in development with Bergeris mentioned 
above. For Seidman~ participation is more than just a value. He points out 
that in terms of what actually happens, (i.e. irrespective of the analysts' 
values) "'participationU has little commonly-agreed content and that~ 
further, the extent and type of participation has very real effects on the 
expansion (or otherwise) or productive capacity. This approach therefore 
directs us away from rhetoric and towards explanation. 
,> 
10. Weber also argued that value-judgements require decisions about means 
and ends.. yet there is no rational or empirical scientific procedure that 
can give us a decision about whether means justify ends (1949:26, 56). Once 
a choice is made and ends have been selected, it is possible to measure 
when, for example, economic growth is an appropriate means to achieving 
them. But this is of limited general use because it simply evaluates 
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performance in relation to morally-derived targets (see ibid:l0)~ rather 
than explaining the performance itself. 
11. Wallman (1976:107) expresses reservations about a particular value-
laden conception of development. According to her~ ~it is increasingly 
argued that a condition of maximum industrialization~ etc.~ is not - or 
cannot be assumed to be - the ideal moral condition~. For Dos Santos 
(1969:60)~ existing models of developed society should not be taken as 
crystallizations of the aims to be achieved by development. 
12. For Bernstein, development refers to overcoming poverty, malnutrition 
and disease. However~ this leaves him unable to characterize economic 
processes which have overcome these ills. It moves him out of the economic 
arena into a confusing position where growth in many advanced capitalist 
countries could not strictly be described as development because~ in terms 
of their economies, it no longer relates to Third World-type problems. 
13. Cultural, class and other assumptions are inevitably involved in the 
decisions about whether industries producing military goods (i.e. means of 
destruction) and luxury goods count as development of productive capacity. 
This is discussed in more detail in chapter eleven. 
DEVELOPMENT ./ UNDERDEVELOPMENT 
CHAPTER THREE 
DEVELOPME~r AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT AS CORRELATIVES 
1. Introduction. 
2 ...... DeveloprnentU as a concept describing attributes. 
2.i. Correlative meaning. 
2.ii. Comparability. 
2.iii. Separate units. 
2.iv. Conclusion. 
3. -Development- used to describe a process. 
3.i. Development as the correlative of "'non-development"'" 
3.ii. Development as the correlative of a hypothetical non-process. 
3.iii. Development as correlative of a qualititatively distinct process 
(i.e. of an underdevelopment process). 
4. Conclusion: development as attributes and process. 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
This chapter deals with the semantics of -development-.(1) It cuts 
through many of the problems in the literature by defining both development 
and underdevelopment in a novel way by reference to productive capacity. It 
shows that ""'developmentU conveys both the notion of process (as distinct 
from a lack of movement), and attributes that describe a location in this 
process (for example, an advanced state).(2) At first sight, these senses 
appear straightforward and uncomplicated. However, as will be evident, they 
conceal highly complex issues. I deal firstly with the attributes sense, 
and secondly with process. 
2. -DEVELOPMENT- AS A CONCEPT DESCRIBING ATTRIBUTES. 
The literature uses various grammatical forms of udevelopmentn to 
characterize the attributes of a particular economic unit of analysis (be 
the unit a region, social formation, or economic system).(3) For example: 
Economic Unit X 
developed 
(advanced / modern) 
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Economic Unit Y 
developing /less developed / 
undeveloped /underdeveloped 
(backward / traditional) 
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Three assumptions are usually involved in these characterizations: 
i. The meaningfulness of X and Y is ultimately dependent on their 
relation to each other. 
ii. Underlying this is the assumption that they are comparable along a 
common yardstick. 
iii. Comparability depends on a second assumption that X and Yare 
separate and disconnected conditions. 
2.i. Correlative meaning. 
The characterization of one unit (as, for example, 
~developed/advanced-) gains its meaning largely in relation to the other 
(Uunderdeveloped/backward~~). As correlatives, the attributes of X and Y 
are therefore mutually dependent (Myrdal, 1957).(4) In itself this is not 
problematic - indeed, it is fundamental to semantics (see Leech, 1974). 
However, the problem is that in many cases in the literature, these 
correlatives are not defined around a concept of productive capacity, but 
solely in relation to each other. In particular, the attributes of one 
economic unit, ego country X, become the yardstick of comparison, and the 
orientation point in the relation.(5) The problem with this is that the 
relational character of meaning between X and Y is not equal and 
symmetrical. Unit Y (and everything "'beyond .... Y - i.e. unit Z, unit AA, 
etc.) gets defined negatively - i.e. by default - in relation to unit x. 
-Undeveloped~, etc., thus becomes an umbrella catch-all label for any and 
every region (or other unit of analysis) which - when juxtaposed to the 
""'norm"'" - shows up as taIling short (Mouzelis, 1980:356/7). 
Clearly, this obscures differences within these -undeveloped .... 
countries, regions, etc.(6) The same problem emerges when ""developed .... is 
used to group together all units that are not characterized by the attrib-
utes of ~undeveloped~.(7) It therefore does not help to reverse the 
method, taking unit Y·s attributes as given, and defining development 
negatively in relation to them. Rather, what is needed in the first 
instance is a detinition of development that transcends the specifics of 
the attributes of units X and Y. In my view, and contrary to much writing 
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on development, it is in terms of productive capacity that a broader 
concept of ~development~ and its correlatives have to be defined before 
embarking on an evaluation and comparison of given economic units. 
2.ii. Comparability 
Regarding the second point above, X and Yare assumed to be comparable 
and are assigned a rating in relation to each other on this basis. For this 
to be valid, X and Y cannot be ~apples and oranges~. Instead, they must be 
susceptible to being treated as equivalent units. This requires that all 
differences have to be ignored except for those which are comparable, and/ 
or that a reductionism has to be applied in order for them to be ranked in 
terms of a single yardstick. In itself, there is nothing wrong with this. 
However, in much of the literature the procedure involves a reductionism 
that leads to atomized comparison and quantitative ranking. 
These steps are common in modernization theory where X and Yare 
compared in terms of certain limited features, such as the Gross National 
Product (GNP), and where the differences between them are reduced to 
quantitative ones (for instance, X has a higher GNP than Y). The Adelman 
and Taft-Morris (1967) -Ideal Typical Index~ is a classic example. (8) 
In criticism of this approach, Amin (1974:18) has pointed out that by 
defining development by an index like per capita incomes, Venezuela appears 
more developed than Japan; Kuwait rates above America (see also Frank, 
1969a). Mouzelis (1980:354) takes the critique further by attacking not 
only the content of such indices, but also the use of indices per sea He 
advocates going beyond disparate indicators altogether and looking at the 
totality of economic, political and cultural structures of a country.(9) 
The point that emerges from this critique is that X and Y, exhibiting 
the attributes of ~development- and its opposite condition, need to be 
contrasted qualitatively and as totalities, and not merely quantitatively 
or according to isolated components. It also means that productive 
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capacity, the yardstick in terms of which they should be compared, needs to 
be defined in both qualitative and quantitative dimensions.(10) 
Concerning the qualitative issue, productive capacity in my view may 
be defined as the productive power of a given unit. Just as labour power 
(i.e. capacity) is materialized in labour-time (see Marx, Capital, 1972, 
Part II), so productive capacity (power) is manifested in output. Describ-
ed by Marx as the "'powers or social production", productive capacity 
results from "'''science, inventions, division and combination of labour, 
improved means of communication, creation of the world market, machinery, 
etc."" (Grundrisse, 1973:307/8). These factors in my view may all be seen 
as part of the means and forces of production, and "'development" (i.e. of 
productive capacity) may consequently be conceived as the improvement, 
generation and adoption of new elements within these (see chapter eleven). 
Considered quantitatively, how do we measure productive capacity? If 
one was to compare economic units producing identical items, using the 
identical means of production, it would be legitimate to use volume of 
output as an index. On this basis, we could rank them in terms of their 
relative (materialized) productive capacity. Even if different means of 
production were involved, we could still gauge the comparative productive 
capacity of the units in terms of volume. But in the more realistic and 
complex case of diverse output between economic units, volume ceases to be 
a common measure. In my view it is problematic to turn to monetary value 
of output as a common measure of productive capacity. This is a measure 
limited to certain societies only, and even there serves only as a (rather 
dubious) commercial value of output (as in Gross National Product figures) 
rather than as an index of productive capacity. 
In fact, it is questionable whether there is a common measure for 
productive capacity between different economic units. It is, however, 
legitimate to measure the rate of expansion of productive capacity internal 
to each unit over a period of time. Such expansion would be manifested in 
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increased output of existing products, enhancement of existing products, 
and the production of wholly new items. These indicators can be compared 
with the previous productive situation, and a quantitative assessment can 
be made. Comparing two units in these terms means comparing them relative 
to their own performance, rather than any absolute measure of productive 
capacity. 
To sum up: comparing economic units for productive capacity requires 
acknowledging their qualitative distinction, and ranking them is legitimate 
only in terms of their respective rates of expansion of output. 
2.i11. Separate economic units 
The meaning of any comparison or contrast is drastically affected by 
the extent to which X and Yare independent entities. Much modernization 
theory assumes that X and Yare in some way separate from each other - each 
having its own independent attributes and determination. This assumption 
legitimizes isolating and juxtaposing X and Y for the purpose of rating 
them against each other. This procedure is philosophically valid where X 
and Yare abstract mathematical units. But the whole meaning changes for 
both qualitative comparison and quantitative ranking - where X and Yare 
not in fact wholly separate units of analysis in reality. Where economic 
unit X and economic un1t Yare part of a broader single system, it is 
misleading to separate and juxtapose them as if they had no connection. 
Instead, as parts of a unity, they would need to be analysed in intrinsic 
relation to each other, and as integral parts of a wider whole. 
Whether the two units are in fact part of a wider whole depends on the 
e~istence or otherwise of real connections effectively constituting them as 
such. The point is that~development theory has to be sensitive to this 
issue in its identification of units of analysis and comparison.(ll) 
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2.iv. Conclusion. 
To summarize this section, in using udevelopment U to refer to 
attributes, it is necessary to take into account several points. Firstly, 
this sense of development must be defined in relation to a concept of 
productive capacity, rather than draw its meaning from its correlatives. 
(Failinq this, it cannot provide for a comprehensive analysis that high-
lights the nuances and differences within and between ""developed'" and 
-underdeveloped~ economic units). Secondly, atomized analysis and one-sided 
quantitative comparison of development should be avoided. And thirdly, 
separate units of analysis with independent attributes should not be 
assumed when this is not always the case. 
3. ""DEVELOPMENT- USED TO DESCRIBE A PROCESS. 
The sense of development as a process of expansion of productive 
capacity is crucial to understanding and defining development. To analyse 
development in terms of attributes (even as qualified above) is legitimate 
only inasmuch as one is aware that it involves arresting the dynamic in 
order to consider it at a given instant. Though artificially fixed and 
held, the attributes remain moments of the process. 
As a process concerning productive capacity, development gains several 
distinct meanings, depending on what its correlative is taken to be. I will 
discuss three possibilities here: 
i. development as the correlative of a non-process, (i.e. of non-
development or stasis). 
ii. development as the correlative of a hypothetical non-process. 
iii. development as the correlative of a qualitativelY distinct 
process (an underdevelopment process). 
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3.1. ~Development~ as the correlative of ~non-development~. 
Non-development - i.e. a lack of movement, a static ontological 
condition - can serve as a correlative in terms of which -development-
takes a particular meaning. ~Development~ here is thus the opposite of 
-stagnation~ or ~stasis~ and is synonymous with ~movement~ or -change~. 
Thus we have: 
_______ J~!'ocess-_-----
development/movement/change 
__ Condij:ion 
stasis/stagnation 
Conceiving development in this way alters the attributes allocated to 
X and Y in the typoloOY outlined at the start of this chapter. Instead of 
X being "developedn , and Y being -developing"', we now have: 
Unit X 
developing 
dynamic 
Unit Y 
stagnating 
static 
One implication of this is that Y, a Third World country for example, 
cannot be labelled -developinq~.(12) And even the term -less developed" 
might imply that Y is still in motion. Instead it is unit X which is 
"developing". Unit Y is a condition of stagnation and non-development and 
it is in this sense that the labels ~undeveloped~ and -underdeveloped~ are 
sometimes used. -Development~ in this view is simultaneously the movement 
out of Y, as well as the condition-of-being of X. It is both movement into 
the motion of economic expansion, and the motion of this expansion itself. 
"Development- for unit Y means that it emulates unit X in the sense of 
becoming dynamic. 
The positive side of this perspective is that X is not seen as having 
reached the end of a process - or as being -developed-, full-stop. 
Instead, its character embodies an ongoing process.(13) 
But, on the negati~e side, any region, etc. in condition Y, i.e. 
unchanging economically, would be a highly unlikely and artificial 
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situation. Marxism predisposes us to assume - correctly I believe - that 
social reality is always already a contradiction-ridden~ ongoing and 
changing part of history. Non-development is therefore really only a 
hypothetical condition. This is not to deny that productive capacity in a 
particular economic unit may not stay static or even decline over a 
particular period. But to imply that there is a lack of movement would be 
misleading. It provides only a description of attributes of non-develop-
ment~ but no explanation of the process which must underlie these. 
3.ii. Development as the correlative of a hypothetical non-process. 
A different approach in the literature has (in effect) taken 
development as a correlative to non-development in the sense of the latter 
being a hypothetical condition. It therefore sees all economic units as 
developing in one way or another. The question of distinguishing them and 
trying to capture the sense of development as a process often then becomes 
one of quantitative distinctions. Differences within economic motion have 
thus been analysed in terms of quantitative differentiation within a 
universal development process. 
Thus we have: 
Process of development: developing/modernizing 
----------------> y --------------~ X 
Attributes at any given instant: less developed more advanced 
Here, both units X and Yare ""developing ....... The difference lies in the 
pace and degree of expansion of productive capacity. The process of 
development is viewed as a continuum along which movement flows in the 
direction of Y to X. There is a veritable conveyer belt carrying various 
(separate) social formations, regions, etc., into development.(14) 
~Development""" is thus seen as an inexorable teleological movement 
through several stages towards (and beyond) the features that characterize 
the level that unit X has reached.(15) The natural implication here is 
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that the ""developing"'" countries, etc., stand a chance of one day catching 
up. The motor of this whole process is often not spelled out, but is 
assumed to be the working out of something already implicit - i.e. the 
unfolding of inherent tendencies.(16) 
This conception has been criticized on several levels: 
Firstly, the view that all societies can become ""developed''' has been 
shaken by the Club of Rome in their 1974 report on the limits to growth. 
Their argument is that world resources are too limited for the developed 
countries to develop much further, let alone allow for every country to 
reach the present production and consumption levels of the developed ones. 
While this argument is highly controversial, it has at least some 
pertinence in that many of the world"s ""developing countries'" are too small 
or lacking in local resources to develop national productive capacity -
unless they become an integrated part of a wider economic unit (Amin, 
1974:32,376; Rodney, 1977:112; Clegg, 1977:365). 
Secondly, to the extent that this perception sees unit X as continuing 
to develop, it ahistorically assumes inevitable progress in the development 
of productive capacity. This is difficult to square with the history of 
diverse economic crises affecting various economic units, as well as cases 
of decline such as de-industrialization across parts of Britain. 
Thirdly, this conception ignores the effects of the changed context on 
the situation. All countries move together towards the future and it 
is inappropriate today to try to emulate the historical economic experience 
of the ""developed'" countries (Dos Santos, 1969:59; Geertz, 1963:51). For 
example, the Third World has a net disadvantage when compared to the West 
before it industrialized - such as having to compete with long-established 
enterprises. It is arguably harder to use foreign trade for successful 
capital accumulation today than a century ago. Subsidies from slavery 
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and colonialism are no longer options (Myrdal 1957~ cited by Ehrensaft~ 
1971; Wallerstein~ 1971:280). 
Fourthly, this conception of ~development~ has been criticized on a 
more fundamental level for failing to conceptualize qualitative differences 
in tra jectory. 1 t assumes ttlat while X and Yare separate, they are not 
intlerentl y dif f erent, and theref ore that what applies to X is applicable to 
Y. Hence, to the extent that human intervention is given a role in speed-
ing up the transition from Y to X, it is held that Y should consciously 
imitate (perhaps on a more intensive basis) the history of X. There are two 
points made against this quantitative view. 
a. The economic models based on X, and advocating a repetition of XJ s 
experience~ in fact derive from a unique history - a ~special case N • Con-
sequently, these models are inappropriate to contexts foreign to that 
experience, such as the qualitatively specific internal economic processes 
ot Y. It is not surprising therefore that Berger (1976:249) and Mafeje 
(1977:417) hold that development models have only limited exportability. 
b. X and Yare often not separate and independent of each other. Instead~ 
they are frequently inextricable (though qualitatively different) parts of 
a single complex process and the outcome is by no means an automatic expan-
sion of productive capacity in both. 
The significance of all this is that economic history cannot be 
interpreted as a unilinear process (Dos Santos, 1969:62). The distinctions 
in economic movement cannot be reduced to quantitative differences in 
development. (Mouzelis~ 1980:373~ footnote 5). Instead~ X and Y involve 
qualitatively different economic movement - and are not necessarily both 
moving in the direction of expansion of productive capacity_ Thus we have: 
(' 
X /~ y 
~ 
I t tIle light of these arguments ~ it is now pertinent to turn to the 
next sense of development mentioned above~ where the termJs correlative is 
the process of underdevelopment. This sen~e makes it possible to grasp the 
35 
DEFINING THE TERRAIN, 
DEVELOPMENT ./ IJNDERDEVELOPMENT 
differences between qualitatively different economic movements. It also 
helps to distinguish when they are separate and unrelated, and when they 
are only distinctions within a single process. 
3.1ii. Development as correlative of a qualititatively distinct process 
(i.e. of an underdevelopment process). 
The term ~development~ may be conceived as referring to a particular 
type of movement - the correlative of which is a qualitatively different 
form of movement, i.e. underdevelopment.(1},18) ""Development"" here means 
forward or progressive movement and gets its meaning from its relation to 
Nunderdevelopment"" as reverse or regressive movement. In economic terms, 
Udevelopment .... describes an increase of productive capacity, "'underdevelop-
ment"'" communicates a reduction or blockage. Thus we have: 
Increasing productive capacity 
Development: X---------------------------> 
Underdevelopment: <-------------------------y 
Declining productive capacity(19) 
The characterization of unit X remains that it is ..... developing"" and at 
any given time is dynamic. But at any given moment, Y is also dynamic: it 
is underdeveloping.(20) 
This provides a preliminary qualitative distinction between forms of 
economic movement. It may appear to be only quantitatively different - as 
merely adding to or subtracting from productive capacity. But this is 
looking at things very abstractly. As will emerge in subsequent chapters, 
what helps to define an economic unit as a real effective entity is that 
its productive capacity is a function of the particular qualitative struc-
ture spanning it. It is artificial to break down such a structure into 
isolated components and evaluate ~development- simply in terms of the 
NprocessN of the incre';se or decrease of its individual components. The 
qualitative distinction being made here encompasses the qualitatively 
different processes that are bound up with qualitatively different 
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structural totalities.(2l) 
This conceptualization of development and underdevelopment as qualit-
atively different movements also applies when units X and Yare not 
separate~ i.e. where ~developmentU and ~underdevelopment~ are part of a 
wider process which simultaneously leads to an increase of productive 
capacity at X and a decrease at y.(22) 
3.iv. Conclusion. 
In tile above section I have argued that if development is seen as a 
process, it is unrealistic to view underdevelopment as static non-develop-
ment~ desplte the loqical possibility of this. I arqued instead for 
conceptualizing differences within economic processes, and have pointed to 
the inadequacies of analysing these differences as simply quantitative 
distinctions within a singular process of development. The usefulness of 
qualitative distinctions has been discussed~ and development defined as an 
increase in the total productive capacity of a particular structure. 
Underdevelopment has been defined as regression or blockage of capacity in 
a qualitatively different structure. 
4. CUNCLUSIUN: DlVlLOPMENT AS ATTRIBUTES AND PROCESS. 
F ollowinq tIle aL-guments above, "development N in this thesis is used in 
a way that combines the senses ot attributes and process. While lts 
attributes concern productive capacity, viewed both quantitatively and 
qualitatively~ with its effective unit of application clearly located~ the 
processual sense designates a movement that is qualitatively distinct to 
underdevelopment. 
This chapter has discussed -- at a very high level of abstraction - the 
semantic and conceptual dlstlnctions between development and underdevelop---
menta While there are limits to this level ot analysis, it is a necessary 
step towards establishinq a basic minimum ot qeneral meaninq for the less 
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a.b~;t.ta(;t investiqations that follow in later chapters. The focus of the 
latter takes us beyond development and underdevelopment defined in relation 
t.o each ott-leI' in abstract I qeneral terms. Thev show that the concepts have 
a complex meaninq which - althouqh linked to the meaning established here 
through bv loqic~l correlativitv and general arqument -- is not wholly 
reducible to it. 
-- -------- -------- - -- .. _------- - -- .-- -- -----_._------_._------------
Et£JNOTES 
1. Specific sources will not be given when the usages discussed are 
commonplace in the literature I but see inter alia Mvint (1971 1 1967); 
Myrdal (1957); Hagen (1962) and Gerschenkron (1965). It should be noted 
that the literature often uses words like uundevelopedu , .uunderdeveloped", 
and .uJevelopinq~ interchanqeably and without much regard for semantic 
distinction or consistency. In this chapter l I have attempted to separate 
out the different meanings involved, and the various senses are grouped 
together in a manner that is rather different from the mixed-up way in 
which they are usually presented in the literature. 
Z. This basic distinction is drawn from Hindess and Hirstl (1977:321). 
Although the two senses are related l there are sometimes problems in 
reconciling them. This will emerge in the course of this chapter l but see 
also Leqassick~s observation (1976:437). 
3. As will be shown later in this and subsequent chapters l the question 
of U-Ie effective unit to be designated is no simple matter. 
4. Although X is already ~developed~ in relation to Y, it can also be 
seen as -undeveloped-, etc. vis-a-vis a condition X+. SimilarlYI Y can be 
called ~developed~ in relation to a pre-1 state. The -mutuality~ of meaning 
still remains. 
5. There is a kind of teleological perspective here: regions l social 
formations l etc. 1 are categorized and judged as -undeveloped~ etc.~ in 
terms of a standpoint which assumes unit X to embody the desirable attrib-
utes of the ~developed~ ideal (Bernstein l 1979c; laylor~ 1979). The appel-
lations "'backward.N and .... advanced# illustrate this clear Iv. Even the terms 
°undeveloped u and -'Juriderdeveloped u often imply a very particular potential: 
i.e. defined in terms of the attributes of a .... developed~ economic unit. 
(The Eurocentric dangers in this were discussed in chapter two.) 
6. This problem also exists where udevelopment N is used to desiqnate a 
process. ~Development- as a process is sometimes defined solely in terms 
of X ~ s history -- underdevelopment iJeing all other processes. 
7. Mouzelis (lY81:354) tries to get round Eurocentrism by defininq 
development in relation to the conditions of underdevelopment (povertv~ 
etc. ). But in doinq 51) ~ his approach tends to lump togettler all countr ies 
WhlCll Ilave better living conditions than the worst ones. 
8. Another example is Rostow's (196~) method of labelling countries 
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accordinq to d single pattern of stages, namely, by their position on a 
step-ladder of savings-levels. This has been criticized by Baran (1961:55) 
for ignor ing ttle fact that dir ferent types of political systems and socio-
economiC organization meet the problems of economic development in very 
different ways, and these cannot be reduced to savings-level differences. 
9. What is also pertinent here is MooreJs view (1969:520) that distinct-
ions in forms and patterns of social relationships are not reducible to 
quantitative differences. 
10. QualitYI as Afanasyev (1980: 96-7) points out, concerns the 
attributes that make an object what it is - thereby distinguishing it from 
other objects. Quantity concerns the intensity, size or value of these 
attributes. Quantity and quality are a unity representing two sides of the 
same object and both characteristics need to be taken into account. 
11. It is a postulate of Marxism that interconnections between objects 
should not be lost sight of (see chapter one). As will be seen in the 
ensuing chapters .. this is very important for analysing the interrelation-
ships between development and underdevelopment processes. 
12. This may well be a more honest assessment of certain Third World 
countries where the appellation udeveloping country"" is a clear misnomer. 
13. This is certainly relevant regarding the various processes currently 
taking place in -developed- economies - some of which (like Italy) continue 
to develop .. others llike the Britain) actuallY retrogress. 
14. Unit X may sometimes be termed ""developed"" in this view, because even 
though it is still developing, it has reached a point on the scale where it 
can be said to have completed the particular movement that unit Y is still 
making. While Y might be ""less-developed~ or ""underdeveloped- in relation 
to X - it is ~developing~ nonetheless. It is merely at an earlier stage en 
route to becoming ""developed~ (Foster-Carter l 1978:207/8). 
15. Urbanization is often presented as an inevitable worldwide historical 
trend. But ~(n)othing could be more wrong than simplistic claims that 
urbanization is a linear .. positive function of Jeconomic growth J or time ...... 
(Standing .. 1981:180). Standing (ibid) cites the stagnation and decline of 
urbanization that accompanies the colonial entrenchment of feudalism in 
Latin American and India. Mamdani (1977:34/5) describes the de-urbanizat-
ion of Buganda under colonialism 1890-1940. 
lb. The result is that Uthe assumption of all societies as destined to 
become urban and industrial - not to say capitalist - is taken for granted ..... 
(Williams l 1976b:105). The Eurocentrism here is not only in the definition 
of Y in terms of XI but also in the understanding of historical traiectory. 
17. ~Underdevelopment"'" as used here clearly differs from the stagnation 
sense used earlier. It now designates a process rather than a condition. 
The term -non-development~ better expresses the static condition sense. 
18. It might be obiected that ~underdevelopment- is not really the correl-
ative of -development: but of ~overdevelopment~ (a concept sometimes used). 
This may be philosophically correct l but popular usage tends to use dev-
elopment rather than the opaque term of overdevelopment. 
19. To move away from the artificiality of X and Y being static condit-
ions l they should be seen as part of a process (i.e. as not simply entering 
or ending one). fhis would be represented as ---X--->, and <---Y---. 
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20. The movement of underdevelopment~ <---y~ could in principle be motion 
towards a condition of stasis - a winding-down to stagnation of productive 
capacity - to unon-development u • As argued above, however, this 
appellation obscures the processual character of even such a condition. 
21. This is not to deny the possibility of quantitative differences 
becoming qualitative at a certain point, but it is to draw attention to the 
qualitative semantic distinction between development and underdevelopment). 
22. It is in the analysis of this question - i.e. where development and 
underdevelopment are directly interrelated phenomena - that further 
qualitative distinctions can be made (see especially chapter twenty-one). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SOCIAL STRUCTURE AN) EC~IC DEVELOPK:NT 
1. Introduction. 
2. The social basis of development and underdevelopment. 
4. Social structure and social relations. 
5. Social structure and change. 
6. The whole, the parts and the system. 
7. Base and superstructure. 
8. Determination by the economic. 
9. Limits of base and superstructure. 
10. Conclusion. 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
8Ai5IC CONCEPTS' 
SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
In this chapter, I argue that development and underdevelopment have 
primarily a social basis, and I elaborate a concept of social structure as 
a foundation for theorizing this. As general component structures of the 
social structure, the concepts of base and superstructure and the relation-
ship between them are discussed. 
2. THE SOCIAL BASIS OF DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 
Development involves an interaction of humans, means of production 
(including raw materials - the objects of labour), and the context of 
labour (geographical and ecological) (Nolan and White, 1979:14). In inter-
pretinq the interplay of these elements, many writers have correctly argued 
against a -technicist- approach which ignores or underplays social issues 
(ct. Harrison 1981:419; Suret-Canale 1977:134; Berger, 1976:24; Baran and 
Hobsbawrn 1961:275; Kahn 1978:133; Hindess and Hirst 1977:passim; and Stand-
ing 1981:186). I would similarly argue that the human element is the 
ultimately decisive variable, and therefore that economic development often 
depends more on social rather than technical and natural factors. The 
examples below bear Ul·ls out. ( 1 ) 
3. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOCIAL: SOME EXAMPLES. 
Land availability may appear to be an objectively physical constraint 
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on agricultural (jevelopment. However, trJis condition is more commonly a 
social rather than a natural phenomenon. A land-population ratio is not 
given outside of definite social relations. Consequently the availability 
of land is primarily a social fact, with landlessness usually being a 
result of social arrangements (Friedmann~ 1979:176; Weeks, 1978:25). As 
Patnaik (1979:389) points out, land shortage is not usually generalized 
over an entire population. 
Land fertility is not a purely natural condition, but has to be 
understood in relation to production techniques and social relations 
(Hindess and Hirst~ 1977:335, footnote 6). In particular~ soil exhaustion 
is usually a socio-economic margin rather than an agronomic absolute. Thus 
it refers to a fall in fertility which is irrecoverable within existing 
social cost levels for the extra labour~ techniques and raw materials 
needed to restore the level of productivity (Hindess and Hirst~ 1977:169~ 
335 footnote 6; Genovese, 1971). 
Demography is also a social~ not a natural, variable in economic 
development, and its significance is largely dependent on factors other 
than sheer population density. It cannot per se account for economic 
development nor for underdevelopment. For example~ Britain, and several 
other Western countries - despite high population growth between 1870 and 
1910 - developed their productive capacity~ whereas India with a similar 
growth did not. (Amin (1974:8/9~ 1977:157). Baran (1962:242) holds that 
~over-population~ is meaningless in general terms: it has to be stipulated 
in relation to what it is supposed to exceed. (An ~excess~ of people in 
relation to resources often reflects an unequal allocation of resources -
and redistl- ibution may suffice to redress the problem.) 
4. SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND SOCIAL RELATIONS. 
The social fat;tor in development is not easily analysed. What we 
identify as social, political, ideological and economic realms are all 
inextricably interwoven in reality (Bernstein, 1978:15; Larrain, 1979:66)). 
In addition~ we are confronted with complex tangles of tendencies and 
counter-tendencies, forces, influences, convictions, drives and resistances 
- all of which determine patterns of development (Baran and Hobsbawm, 
1961:63). 
Orthodox economic theory has traditionally reduced the social to the 
technico-economic, analysing development solely at the level of economics 
(Bernstein, 1978:18). While development is an economic concern (see 
chapter two), its explanation needs to be more broadly social. It is to the 
credit of some modernization theorists (eg. Hoselitz~ 1964) to have drawn 
attention to the institutional and cultural concommitants of economic 
growth (Nafziger, 1979; Berger, 1976:51). (How successfully they have 
related these is another matter). 
42 
8A15l:C CCJNCE:PT15-
SOCl:AL STRUCTURE 
In my view, the concept of social structure is a basis for establish-
ing coherence and system among the myriad social dynamics affecting 
development and underdevelopment. ""Social structure"'" describes an organiz-
ed set of ""'social relations ...... It is constituted by social relations which 
in turn refer to the general patterns present in concrete (and, to a 
greater or lesser extent, purposeful) social relationships.(Z) For 
example, in the concrete daily relationship between worker Sipho Kunene and 
employer Fred de Villiers, there are practices that correspond to a partic-
ular pattern of social relations prevalent amongst most workers and employ-
ers. It is in terms of these shared relationships and practices that 
individuals may constitute a social grouping in relation to other groups. A 
social structure thus exists in and through the way that social relation-
ships and social practices/groups dialectically constitute each other. 
This approach contrasts with a pluralistic viewpoint which more-or-
less randomly identifies a hodge-podge assortment of disparate groups and 
activities. By focusing on relations, the concept of social structure 
provides the basis for understanding the basis of social groups, their 
activities and their interaction. 
There is a danger in theorizing about social relations abstracted from 
a series of concrete relationships, that the analysis risks generating a 
reified and formalistic concept of ""social structure",.(3) In my view, this 
can be avoided provided that the concept is seen as a concept and not 
confused with either the real relations to which it refers, and still less 
to real, purposeful and reflexive concrete relationships and practices 
sustaining these relations. (I return to this point in my criticism of 
Weber in section 9 below). 
5. SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND CHANGE 
Perhaps partly because of its origins in engineering and natural 
science, ....,structure .... may sometimes connote rigidity and permanence 
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(Williams, 1976:255).(4) However, within Narxism, the concept of 
structure involves the concept of contradiction and is therefore dynamic in 
character. Contradiction here refers to structural tensions between 
opposites which are related to each other within a unity (Nao, 1977b 
pass~; Bottomore, 1985:93/4).(5) The concept of contradictory social 
relations - and the corollary of contradictory social groups and group 
practices - is central to theorizing historical movement and change in the 
social structure.(6) This dynamic conception draws attention to social 
structure as historical - as having a genesis, as well as possible 
tendencies to dissolution or supercession. A social structure does not 
simply exist or persist - it is created, reproduced and transformed. At 
the same time, however, we should avoid the pitfalls of imposing a 
teleology on a structure which leads to ignoring or underestimating 
limitations, changes and reverses in its movement (see also Byres, 
1981:408). These observations are particularly apposite for the analysis 
I of economic development (see chapter ten). 6. THE WHOLE, THE PARTS AND THE SYSTEM. 
The social structure is based on relations between the parts (various 
constitutent groups and their practices) which make up the whole. However, 
the whole is also "'greater than'" the parts in that many constituent groups 
would not exist as such outside of their relations constituting the whole, 
while other groups would be rather different in a context involving differ-
ent relations. At the same time, one cannot focus on the whole as if it 
had unidirectional determinancy over the character of the parts. This error 
is evident in Wallerstein~s (1974) and Frank's (1969a, 1969c) views of 
world development (see chapter fifteen). Analysis needs to take both 
levels into account, looking at the dialectical relationship between them. 
That the whole is "'greater thanH the parts is significant because it 
enables us to conceptualize not only overarching relations between the 
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parts~ but also the dynamics that a given social structure gives rise to. 
An example here is competition as a phenomenon that is not wholly apparent 
in the immediate relations between groups (and group practices)~ but which 
is a dynamic generated by capitalist relations and which acts upon them as 
a function of the whole structure (see chapter thirteen). 
To encompass this phenomenon~ the term ""'social system" points to both 
the social structure and the dynamics it gives rise to. This is the 
background to the concept of "'economic system~ (discussed in chapter seven) 
and the relationship between "economic system'" and ""social structure"'. It 
is also the background to what I term the "'system dynamics" of competition, 
commercialization and capital accumulation (see chapter thirteen). 
7. BASE AND SUPERSTRUCTURE. 
In Marxism~ the concept of social structure can be broken down into 
several other structures~ particularly a ""base'" economic structure and a 
political-legal "super-structure. According to Marx: 
It is always the direct relationship of the owners of 
the conditions of production to the direct producers .•. 
which reveals the innermost secret~ the hidden basis of 
the entire social structure~ and with it the political 
form of the relation of sovereignity and dependence~ in 
short the corresponding specific form of state 
(1974:791~ my emphasis). 
This quotation puts forward a key element of Marxist methodology, 
namely, that analysis has to begin with the relations around production if 
it is to explicate the whole social structure (and, for the purposes of 
this thesis~ how this entirety relates to economic development). 
There is a second aspect of the base-superstructure model to consider: 
The totality qf relations of production constitutes the 
economic structure of society, the real foundation, on 
which arises a legal and political superstructure and to 
which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. 
The mode of production of material life conditions the 
general process of social, political and intellectual 
life. (Marx, 1977:20, my emphasis). 
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rhis statement deals with both structures (economic, legal and 
political) and consciousness. When carefully unpacked it can be seen as 
specifying two distinct relations among these elements. On the one hand, 
there is the relation between material structures (economic as the foundat-
ion for the legal and political structures). On the other hand, there is 
the relation between this entire (complex) totality of structures and 
consciousness. 
A pitfall in interpreting the model is to conflate these into a single 
relation, so that consciousness is seen as being determined by economic 
structures alone. A second pitfall is to view both relations in a transit-
ively causal or expressive sense. I will argue below that consciousness 
(including ideology) is complexly determined by all the material 
structures, not only the economic base structure, and that both 
consciousness and the superstructure are detenmined rather than caused. 
8. DETERMINATION BY THE ECONOMIC. 
Understanding the relations in the base and superstructure in a 
transitive, causal sense leads to the false(7) - and unproductive - #Marx-
Weber~ debate about the respective causal importance of the different 
components (see for example, Popper 1973:107). In the development context, 
Berger (1976:54) refers to the modernization theorists'" "'chicken-egg'" ques-
tion of which ""'comes first'" - economic growth or its social, cultural and 
psychological correlates. We could add here, political correlates too. 
Political development theorists like Apter (1965) and Almond and Coleman 
(1966) have assumed that economic growth automatically causes certain 
poli tical ef f ects (j'Vlouzelis, 1980: 354/5). The same assumptions for South 
Africa are held by O"Dowd (1977). 
Because these assumptions are based on ahistorical, over-abstract and 
formalistic premisses, the debate - phrased in chicken-egg terms - can only 
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go round in circles. In my opinion, a more sophisticated view (and one 
distinct from many Marxist interpretations) has been to see the base 
structure as integrally l~iting, rather than causing, the superstructure, 
and these structures as together having a similar relation to consciousness 
(Hindess and Hirst, 1977:16). This is understanding "determinationil by the 
base as the setting of preconditions and the exerting of pressures, rather 
than causing or producing the superstructure and consciousness. Thus in 
this sense, "'determined" is distinct from ""predestined" (Williams, 1976:-
90). Such anti-reductionism has been theorized in the concept of ""condit-
ions of existence" (see Cutler et aI, 1977). A particular superstructure 
and consciousness are understood as the necessary conditions that a parti-
cular base structure would require in concrete existence and vice versa. 
But the economic base structure does not cause or call into being these 
conditions. Indeed there may well be contradictions between them all. 
The advantage of this more sophisticated view is that it stresses - without 
overexaggerating - the connections between (i) the base, (ii) the super-
structure and (iii) consciousness .. This holism is valuable in that it 
shows, for example, that it is inadequate to analyse social structure only 
in terms of (iii) without reference to (i) and (ii). Thus, the pattern 
variable approach to economic development (Parsons 1966), by defining its 
"'modern-tradional" dichotomy in terms of values (universalism-particular-
ism; achievement-ascription; specificity-diffuseness), must be judged as 
inadequate (see also Magubane, 1971). A value such as individualism, 
associated with modernity, needs to be seen against the real structural 
atomization of people in an economy which isolates them as individuals in 
commodity exchanges with each other. Focussing exclusively on cultural 
values makes it difficult to understand how these change with circum-
stances, and the way that past and present structural experiences give rise 
to and maintain certain outlooks (Moore, 1969:486/7). 
Another example is that labour productivity cannot be subjectivized 
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and seen as a primarily voluntary phenomenon. This is important for 
evaluating the role that the ideology of ~freehold~ tenure has on agri-
culture. Different economic systems cannot be reduced to differences in 
motivation. Take for example, factory production (with concentrated super-
vision, labour pace dictated by subsumption to the pace of the machine or 
place ln the division of labour), and individual peasant production. The 
productivity advantages and disadvantages in each case occur regardless of 
differences in motivation (Hindess and Hirst, 1977:167/8). Consciousness, 
while obviously important, is not a free-floating independent variable. 
At the same time, neither (i) nor (ii) can be fully explained without 
(iii). Thus even it, for example, Weber gives too much weight to Protestant 
ideology in the development of capitalism, religious consciousness does 
have an efficacy in the practices and groups within the political and econ-
omic structures (Muratorio, 1980:38, Zeitlin, 1968:131-163). Althusser 
( 1976:65) is rightly emptlatic that capitalism cannot be analysed at the 
level of the economic structure alone. Similar points could be made about 
the inadequacy of analysing political and juridical structures without 
taking the economic structure and consciousness into account. 
9. THE LIMITS OF BASE AND SUPERSTRUCTURE. 
It is important at this juncture to note Max Weber~s criticism of 
Marxism for presenting a theoretical schema under which a real situation or 
action is ""subsumed as one instance;; (1948:93). Weber held that Marxist 
concepts are ideal types with only a heuristic use (ibid:103), and there-
fore that it is '~perniciousu to think of these concepts as empirically 
valid or real tendencies (ibid:103). But against this, Marxist concepts 
are intended to assist in producing a "'reproduction of tile concrete by way 
of thought;; (Marx, 1973:101), and for this purpose they are intended to 
represent dimensions of real phenomena. 
Thus, unlike the role of ideal types" the theory I am trying to 
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develop is one which refers ultimately to relationships and determinations 
within reality, rather than being a purely ideal limiting concept whose use 
is primarily for comparison (cf. ibid:97). While Weber's ideal types can 
fulfil their purpose just as easily by demonstrating divergence from 
reality (ibid:l02), my theory aims to secure (what social convention 
assumes to be) a correspondence. In this way, I see theory contributing to 
knowledge by highlighting the relationships and determinations operative 
within particular realities. 
Where Weber's criticism is valuable, is in pointing us away from 
treating the base and superstructure as reality itself. Some critics make 
this mistake, and argue that the model assumes too unproblematically that 
base and superstructure are distinct. Kahn and Llobera (1980:94), for exam-
pIe hold that the economic structure is not capable of universal definit-
ion. Laclau (1979) makes a similar point in arguing that -economic- in the 
sense of -pure economic- - distinct from other structures, practices and 
consciousness - is only the relatively apolitical form of production under 
market capitalism. 
However, it would appear that these remarks misunderstand the concept-
ual status of the base-superstructure model. While Weber errs by seeing it 
as purely ideal type, they go wrong by viewing it crudely as direct 
reality. Instead, the model needs to be recognized as an analytical 
concept in which the concepts of economic base, the superstructure and 
consciousness are abstracted separately out of complex reality. In this 
reality, base and superstructure are certainly comprised of real relations, 
but mixed-up and integrated with other aspects of the real. The model is a 
means to analyse reality, not a reproduction or representation of that 
reality. 
10. CONCLUSION. 
In the light of the preceding sections, determination by the economic 
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structure can be understood in the following way_ The economic base is the 
ultimate reference point in defining the way that the base and 
superstructure are related as ~conditions of existence~ for each other. 
The ubase u is the analytical uanchor'" from which one can investigate the 
general differences between structures~ and between these and conscious-
ness~ as well as their relative autonomYI real conditions of existence and 
their real mode of interaction. With this perspective~ one can analyse 
hOWl in realitYI economic relations are reproduced or transformed in con-
junction with their political and ideological conditions of existence l and 
what this means for development and underdevelopment. 
This interpretation of determination is different from that of many 
Marxists. However I in my view 1 it represents the maximum that can be 
granted at this level of generality. I am now in a position to proceed 
from this point and begin to theorize the character of the economic base. 
1. These examples are chosen specifically because they are often seen as 
the major blockages of development or contributors to underdevelopment. 
2. The distinction between "'relations~ and -relationships'" comes from 
Raymond Williams (1976b:257). 
3. This in turn may lead to a rigid form-content separation where struct-
ural form (social relations) is one-sidedly seen to determine content 
(relationships between practices/groups). In order to account for 
historical and empirical differences l this one-sided view ends up portray-
ing the social structure as an empty shell setting only negative (struct-
ural) limits within which the concrete contents (practices/groups) are 
-free'" to vary as they please. Such is the method of analysts like Wrong 
(1976)1 who try to temper structural functionalism with notions of individ-
ual free will. But individual will itself needs to be explained. In this 
regard l I would argue that an analysis of contractions within and between 
social structures and social consciousness is more valuable than meta-
physical speculation about human nature, reflexive praxis l etc. 
4. The Althusserian use of structure has also been critized for present-
ing a rigid and mechanical Marxist view (Geras 1972; Miliband 1972). This 
school·s interpretation ot social structure does indeed exclude the organic 
and processual character of the social structure. Thus~ both Althusser 
(1976) and Poulantzas (1973) make a sharp distinction between structures 
and what they call trleir usocial effects" - these latter being individuals 
or classes who are the supports or agents of the structures. Structures 
are not seen to exist in and through humans l but vice versa (Williams, 
197bb:257). The dialectic between structure and practice is lost. 
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5. Contradiction is different to -contrariety- which is the clash of 
unrelated forces (Colletti~ 1975:8). To understand movement and change, one 
cannot ignore contrariety. But because this concept refers fundamentally 
to disconnected and arbitrary forces and phenomena, it is not susceptible 
to ttleoretical elaboration. By contrast~ the Marxist concept of contra-
diction refers to an identity of opposing forces, in the sense that one 
could not exist without the other. Because these forces are directly 
related, they are open to being theorized. 
b. It may be noted that this movement is complex because of the uneven 
character of the dynamics, rhythms and efficacies within and between the 
constituent sub-structures and practices of a social structure (Althusser, 
197b:185). Later chapters, (especially in Part F), will investigate the 
uneven and contradictory relations within the structures of development and 
underdevelopment, as well as between the two structures. 
7. The debate is a false one because it inaccurately counterposes Weber 
to fV1arx, whereas it may be argued that Weber"s work is in fact 
complementary to Marx~s (see Zeitlin, 1968:130). 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
Introduction. 
The economic structure. 
The forces ot production. 
Productive capacity. 
Relations of production. 
Relations of production and class exploitation. 
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An example to illustrate the difference between forces and relations of 
production. 
8. Relations of production at all three Moments of production. 
9. Critique ot alternative conceptions. 
10. The economic. 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
The chapter analyses the concept of economic 5tructure~ breaking it 
down into torces and relations of production and viewing it in terms of 
three ~Moments~ of production. My theorization of forces of production~ 
productive labour~ necessary and surplus labour differs in several respects 
from most Marxist writings in field~ including those of Marx himself. 
2. TH[ ~CONOMIC STRUCTURE. 
According to Marx: 
In the social production ot their existence~ men enter 
into definite relations that are indispensable and 
independent of their will, relations of produ~tion 
appropriate to a given stage in the development of their 
material forces of production. The totality of these 
relations of production constitutes the economic 
structure of society ... . (1977:20, my emphasis). 
There are two distinct - though not in reality separate - structures 
in this totality of relations that Marx describes as comprising the 
economic structure (see Terray 1974:98, Morris~ 197b:298). One of these is 
the structure of technical social relations around the means of production. 
This is designated in this thesis as the ~forces of productior~. Used in 
this way where the term thus refers to a type of social relations~ it is 
not reducible to "'means of production" (see Hellman .. 1979:145/6)). 
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lhe second structure within the economic structure is that of the 
social relations around the performance or labour for people other than the 
direct producers. I use the term ---relations of productionU more narrowly 
than Marx (above) to refer to this structure as distinct from the forces or 
productlon. 80th sets of relations involve relationships between people 
and means of production. Beard (1987) makes a useful distinction between 
the two, in noting that means of production constitute a term in the one 
relationship (i.e. in my ~forces of production~), whereas they are simply a 
condition for the other (i.e. for the Urelations of production",).(l) Both 
types ot social relations are pertinent to productive capacity, but, as 
will be shown below, in ways tllat are quite dif f erent. 
lhese two social relations structures are effective at what I have 
distinguished as three UMoments of production: 
Moment A - relations of possession of and separation from the means of 
production" 
(Vloment J:) relations in production (i.e. within production),(2) 
Moment C - relations in the distribution and utilization of the product. 
As will be evident below, these three Moments of production do not 
relate to each other in a simple unilinear way (as the ~A~,~8~, and uCu 
designation might suggest). The Moments of production and my theorization 
ot forces and relations of production are key constructs for this thesis, 
and are used throughout the later chapters. 
3. lHE FORCES OF PRODUCTION. 
Social production takes place in concrete labour processes that 
involve definite combinations of producers and means of production (the 
latter including both instruments of production and objects of labour) 
(Marx, 1972:174). ~forces ot productionU refers to social relations within 
and between such labour processes based on differing technical functions. 
fhe concept ot "forces of production~ spans the totality of the 
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articulations within and between labour processes constituted as units of 
production (Godelier, 1969:335; Hindess and Hirst, 1977:11). It 
encompasses Moment 8, i.e. the specifics of co-operation within each labour 
process and the co-ordination of several labour processes within a single 
unit ot production (Hindess and Hirst, ibid:244).(3) ~Forces of production~ 
also covers relations outside of the production process at Moment C, i.e. 
relations of distribution and utilization of the products of each labour 
process/unit of production in terms of a societal division of labour.(4) 
The ~forces of production~ also encompasses Moment A - the technical 
relations of ~possession/separation~ from the means of production (see 
below) . 
The concept of ~forces of production~ also includes the relations 
between sectors of production. Examples are sectors constituted in terms of 
similar activities in the economic circuit (""industrial", "'commercial"', 
~financial~); or size (~small-scale~, "large-scale) or product ("services"', 
l 
1 
~manufacturing~, ""mining", ""agriculture"). It is partly in the relation 
between sectors constituted by product that the ~Agrarian Question ..... of 
economic development is located (see chapter twenty-two).(5) The balance 
between sectors affects productive capacity where a preponderance of, for 
example, commercial or financial over industrial activity may have adverse 
significance (see chapters eighteen, twenty-one and thirty-three). 
4. PRODUCTIVE CAPACITy 
The -forces of production" are directly linked to ~productive 
capacity~ (or "productive force""), but the two are distinct concepts. 
While ~forces of production" refers to the structure of technical social 
relations around the means of production, "productive capacity~ is a 
function of this (as well as of other factors including the relations of 
production). Productive capacity is (in part) a consequence of the ""forces 
of production"', and not a synonym for it. 
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ro undel-stan(j the t'elation between the two, we can start by noting 
that there is a distinction between productiVe capacity and the 
actualization of this capacity. From the viewpoint of development, what is 
significant is actual productive capacity in use, i.e. as realized in 
material output.(6) This is the result of various social and physical 
factors (see chapter four), and the rate of expansion of productive 
capacity depends on the most efficient ratio between them. Within this, 
the division and allocation of labour to various activities is a key 
factor, and the character of the forces of production have special 
significance in this regard. 
A focus on productive as ultimately referring to the material 
consequences of labour is necessary for understanding the development of 
productive capacity.(7) But while material output is the actualization of 
productive capacity, not all of it raises this capacity as such. Taking 
development to be a continuous process of expanding productive capacity, 
the most significant labour is that enabling increased improved or entirely 
new output, and this is labour that culminates in new, advanced material 
means of production. Development is thus bound up with the ability of a 
given economic unit to co-ordinate the forces of production in such a way 
as to maximize productivity in this area of work (not forgetting of course, 
that this area cannot exist in isolation of others).(8) 
5. RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION. 
The concept of -relations of production~ refers to the structure of 
social relations concerning a distinction between labour that is necessary 
and labour that is surplus to the direct labourers themselves. In my 
schema, necessary and surplus labour are characteristic of all types of 
relations of production structures, and not in the sense that Marx~s 
Capital uses them only in terms of capitalist structures (see Marx, 1972, 
chapter X). 
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fhe reproduction of a society is always greater than the reproduction 
ot the individual productive labourers. A necessary condition of its 
continued existence is that these producers perform a surplus labour beyond 
that needed to create the material goods for their immediate reproduct-
ion.(9) fhe surplus labour provides for the reproduction - dependents, the 
young (and to some extent the sick and the aged). It also provides for 
labourers involved in unproductive functions who perform activities which 
are indirectly necessary for the reproduction of the direct producers -
such as organisational~ co-ordinating, service, health, education~ etc., 
tunctions. The simple reproduction of a society therefore means that the 
labour of the direct producers may be conceptually divided into ~necessary 
labour'" and ""'surplus labour"" (Hindess and Hirst~ 1977:26/7). This divis-
ion~ its proportions~ and the allocation thereof, are pertinent to the 
development of productive capacity. For example, in some societies, repro-
duction may be on an expanded scale (Friedmann, 1979:162). Here, some 
surplus labour goes into development of the means of production. In this 
particular respect, the concept of surplus labour overlaps with Baran's 
(lY6l) concept of ~surplus~ (see chapter eleven). 
6. RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION AND CLASS EXPLOITATION. 
That the direct producers perform surplus labour for others, does not 
mean that relations of production are therefore relations of exploitation. 
The concepts remain distinct. Contra Meillassoux (1960) and Godelier 
(1965), exploitation is not reducible to the appropriation of surplus 
without counterpart (see Dupre and Rey, 1973:151; Hindess and Hirst, 
1977:68). The appropriation of surplus labour becomes exploitative when 
the producers are ""'separated"" From the means of production, and only have 
access through accepting controls and conditions that alienate a proportion 
ot their surplus labour to a '"'possessing'" class (in the form of work or as 
products) tMeillassoux, 1970:103; Hindess and Hlrst~ 1977:266,232; Galeski 
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1972:189). This exploitation, and struggle against it, determines what 
constitutes necessary labour for the producers. In many cases (for 
example, simple commodity production see chapter twenty-six), 
exploitation can push necessary labour to an absolute minimum. 
The concepts of ""separation/possession'" refer to the effective 
ownership of the means of production and the associated capacity to set the 
terms of exploitation. While this issue is bound up with the relations of 
production, it also has a technical dimension falling within the forces of 
production. An example here is the difference between an assembly-line 
worker and a hoe-cultivator in their respective capacities for individual 
control of the means of production and initiation of the labour process. 
The relations of production are primary, however. The feudal hoe-cultivator 
can only initiate and control production once he has access to land - for 
example, within the context of feudal tenancy (Hindess and Hirst, 1977:-
238). The assembly-line worker under capitalism must generally be politic-
ally and economically acceptable to the owners of the means of production 
(or their agents) in order to participate in the labour process - although 
even then he is still excluded from control of it. 
Class relations of possession/separation (i.e. Moment A) usually 
imply class power over Moments Band C. This involves control over the 
proportions of necessary and surplus labour (although not without an 
ongoing struggle) and therefore the extent of surplus labour, as well as 
the allocation and use of this surplus labour and its products. Relations 
of production embody relations of exploitation where class relations 
control of surplus labour at Moments Band C. 
Exploitation usually involves the extortion of more surplus labour 
than would otherwise be necessary to reproduce a society - for example, 
the ... "extra"" surplus labour to support unproductive members of the 
exploiting class, the above-average consumption of even the productive 
members of the exploiting class,(10) and the political and ideological 
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apparatus necessary for entorcing the possession/separation and exploitat-
ion. (Adapted from Morris, 1976:298; Hindess and Hirst, 1977:50; Wright, 
1980:179/180).(11) Exploitation, concerning the extent of surplus labour, 
and the distribution and use of it, has a complex significance for develop-
ment~ and varies in the context of different relations of production (chaj:r-
ter twenty-one contains a more detailed discussion of this). 
7. AN £XA~IPLE 10 ILLUSTRATE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FORCES AND RELATIONS OF 
PRODUCTION. 
The difference between forces of production and relations of product-
ion can be illustrated in the following example. A given technical labour 
process such as small-scale CUltivation may involve Ilired workers (who have 
no independent possession of the means of production) alongside family 
labourers. Ttle family possesses the means of production, controls the cult-
ivation and has ultimate say over what is to count as necessary and surplus 
labour tor the employees. Thus although all labourers may perform the same 
work technically, they still differ in their relations to surplus labour. 
1n other words, the forces of production are the same for everyone, but the 
relations of production differ (Cooper, 1978:158/9; Friedmann, 1978 pass:im, 
Friedmann, 1979:181, footnote 12). 
8. RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION AT ALL THREE MOMENTS OF PRODUCTION. 
Building on the discussion this far, it is possible to distinquish 
various ~stages~ of surplus labour corresponding to the Moments of product-
ion: 
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Noments or production Stages of sur:elus labour 
A. Relations of possession 1. These reiations 
separation from the means constitute a foundation 
of production. for the type, ex tent, 
etc. of surplus labour. 
B. Relations in production 2. Performance of 
i. e. the labour process. 3. Extraction ) surplus 
4 . Appropriation labour 
C. Relations of distribution 5. Distribution of surplus 
and utilization of the product. 
social product ("post- 6. Utilization of surplus 
productiontt relations). product. 
Exploitative surplus labour relations (in stages 2, 3 and 4) depend on 
class relations of possession/separation (in stage 1). Relations of 
distribution may also involve class relations of possession/separation 
not of the means of production, but the means of distribution. 
Class control of distribution can be the basis for class appropriation 
(stage 5) of surplus product. But this is appropriation of surplus which 
has already been performed and appropriated in the labour process. There 
is thus an important - but in developmentalist writing often neglected -
distinction to be drawn between exploitation in Moment B and Moment C.(12) 
Relations of distribution are important for understanding the differences 
between classes. Viewed in terms of both physical and social reproduction, 
there are distinctions in the relations that different classes depend on 
in the distribution of necessary and surplus labour. Distribution of 
both means of consumption and means of production is central to the 
reproduction of the relations in the whole. 
Forces of production relations have a bearing on class relations in 
" distribution-reproduction. For example, there is a difference between a 
hoe-cultivator in diversified production and a fellow-cultivator in mono-
culture in their respective abilities to produce direct means of sUbsist-
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ence more or less independently of Moment C and the classes controlling the 
means of distribution. 
9. CRITIQUE OF ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS. 
The concept of ~relations of production~ refers to the social 
relations within and between each stage of surplus labour. This perspective 
differs from those writers who reduce the term to refer to only some of 
these stages. Most writers seem to take a position against reducing the 
relations of production solely to relations in production. They argue 
against this by stressing the interconnections between Moment A and B, or 
Moment 8 and C. Few stress all the interconnections. A third approach 
that does stress ttlem ends up denying meaningful signlf icance to Moments A 
or 8 in characterizing the relations of production. 
For example, in an emphasis on Moments Band C, it is argued that the 
Urelations of production~ include relations of distribution, exchange and 
consumption (see Foster-Carter, 1978:233; Nolan and White, 1979:4).(13) 
Another writer (Bernstein, 1979br442) uses the concept in the same way, but 
adds the relations of utilization of surplus labour. In his view, the 
relations ot production designate relations in production, and relations 
outside and atter it - between units of production and in the whole process 
of reproduction. 
The inadequacy of stressing only lVloments Band C, has a mirror 
opposite in those who argue that ~relations of production~ encompasses A 
and B. It is argued that the relations within production are never given at 
the level of the labour process alone, but depend on the wider and social 
distribution of the means of production (see Sklair, 1979:330; Ennew et aI, 
1977:308). Hindess and Hirst (1977:83) go so far as to restrict the term 
~relations of production~ to Moment A. For them it refers only to the 
social distribution of the means of production and its corresponding relat-
ions ot possession/separation. However, against this, there appears to be 
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no reason to replace the more specific term ~relations of possession/separ-
ation to the means of production- with -relations of production~.(14) 
A third approach found in the literature uses the term -relations of 
production~ to refer to the whole structure of relations around surplus 
labour, but by ultimate reference to the very last stage: the utilization 
of the products of surplus labour. The concept tends to be used in the 
singular here (relation of production). Closer inspection reveals that 
utilization itself is seen to be determined by the -purpose of product-
ion#,(15) which in my schema is bound up with the system dynamics of the 
Whole. Thus for 8anaji (1980:516/7), a range of relations of exploitation 
can be grouped under one relation of production insofar as they serve the 
same end. (For example, all forms of surplus labour for him are paft of a 
capitalist relation of production when their products are ultimately used 
as capital). (See also Roseberry, 1978:79). In his view, therefore, a 
relation of production is not to be conflated or identified with a set of 
relations at exploitation (1977:7). In my terminology, Moment B and Moment 
A are seen as secondary to Moment C, in particular to the relations of 
utilization as affected by a system dynamic. 
This approach has the merit of linking the stages of surplus labour 
into an overall structural whole - but at the cost of blurring differences 
in exploitation relations between different labour processes, and even 
within them. Banaji attempts to define a relation of production by refer--
ence to what I see as two linked elements: "relations of utilization and 
system dynamics. But the former is only one aspect of a relation of prod-
uction, and the latter - while affecting the entire relation is nonethe-
less a distinct phenomenon and not part of the definition of a relation. 
Both elements may be assist in characterizing (rather than defining) a 
relation of production: But even here, they should not be override other 
aspects: notably, Moments A and B and tile issue of reproduction. 
Tile problem tllat this raises is how to define the overall structure 
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which unites the stages of surplus labour within it~ and at the same time 
keep account of the heterogeneity within it. As discussed in chapter seven 
(on the concept ot mode of production)~ the concepts of heterogeneous and 
homogeneous relations of production structures I and the articulation 
between them in an ueconomic system~J ~ help to clarify the issue. 
10. THE ECONOMIC 
Because every concrete existing economic structure involves a division 
between necessary and surplus labour I production is never a wholly tecrr 
nical process with only technically determined social relations (Hindess 
and Hirst l 1977:26). Not only can there never be forces of production 
without relations of production, but Marxism assumes that at the very least 
all three Moments of production have an ideological component. It also 
holds that when the relations of production involve exploitation, then they 
involve a political-legal aspect. Ex&nples here are the ideology of commun-
ity redistribution under primitive communism and the juridical relationship 
ot ownership under capitalism (Nolan and White, 1979:4). 
Such political and ideological aspects of production relationships 
have two kinds ot" efticacy. Firstly, there are ""external""''' structural 
interventions by institutions outside production (judiciary, police, etc.). 
Secondly, there is efficacy in the form of a dimension or quality of the 
relations around surplus labour. Thus, superstructural relations can be 
said to have, in the concrete, a presence in the relations of production. 
There are also other social relations which are pertinent to the 
relations ot production. Long and Richardson (1978:112) point to interpers-
onal and group relations outside prOduction but essential to its maintenan-
ceo For example ... kinship or associational membership may indirectly deter-
mine relations in all '~hree Moments of production (ibid:2Ub footnote 3). 
Such relations can Ilnk groups controlling resources with groups that do 
the actual production~ i.e. bring together Moments A and B (ibid:188). 
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Concrete relationships ot production can only exist and be reproduced 
or transformed in conjunction with superstructural relations (Locke l 
1976: 14). However I at tIle level of theoretical abstraction .. it is 
important not to conflate economic relations with their political and 
ideological conditions ot existence (Hindess and Hirst l 1977:19). Develop-
ment is and remains an economic category .. despite being crucially bound up 
wi th poli tical and ideological factors on the ground (see cllapter twO). 
ENJNOTES 
1. In naming the two relations, Beard appears to draw from Corlen; s 
distinction (1978:80) between the ~material~ and the -social~ relations of 
production. In my view, these terms are problematic. Firstly, material 
relations are no less social relations, and it appears strange to counter-
pose the two terms. Secondly, all social relations (including relations of 
production, family relations, friendship, etc.) have a material i.e. prac-
tical/physical dimension - just as they also have an ideal component. The 
Beard-Cohen terminology therefore can be criticized as being potentially 
misleading in regard to both the social dimension ot the forces of product-
ion and the material dimension of the relations of production. 
2. lowe this distinction between relations of produc.tion and relations 
in prOduction to Nichols (1981:115) (who uses it to make a different 
point). In this thesis; relations in both the relations of production and 
the forces of production structures are present in the ~relations in 
product1on" (Moment 8 of production). 
3. Within each labour process, these technical social relations exist as 
an internal division ot labour - for example, as a horizontal occupational 
work specialization. Thev may also involve a separation of the functions 
of organising production from direct productive activity itself .. i.e. a 
vertical division Ot labour (Galeski, 1972:40). 
4. A vertical and horizontal division of labour may also be involved here. 
5. These sectors in the forces of production should not be confused with 
the so-called sectors defined by Hmode of production~ (e.g. ~capitalist 
sector~) or by ~relations of production~ (e.g. -co-operative sector~; 
~public/pr1vate sectorH; ~subsistence sector U ). Such ~sectorsH are not 
part of the structure of forces at production. 
6. As Marx puts it: 
A machine which does not serve the purposes of labour, 
1S useless. Livinq labour must ... change them 
(i.e. means of production - G8) trom mere possible use-
values into real and effective ones. Bathed in the fire 
of labour •.. they are consumed with a purpose, as 
elementary co'hstituents of new use-values, of new prod--
ucts, ever ready as means of subsistence for individual 
consumpt1on, or as means of production for some new 
labour" process. [1972:1]8). 
7. Marx otten uses the term ~productive~ in the context of capitalist 
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production where it refers to labour that generates profits, as distinct 
from labour which consumes revenue. This distinction is independent of the 
mater ial char'acter of the labour concerned. (See Marx .. 1976b: 1038-41; 
1973:30!)). This sense is clearly narrower than the general one I am work-
ing with. 
8. Tllis is important for analysing 110W the production of inter alia means 
of consumption and means of destruction should be seen with regard to 
development. There is a detailed discussion of this in chapter eleven. 
9. This refers to the items requisite for the extant socially determined 
level of reproduction, not to sheer physical survival (Keyder .. 1974:222). 
10. Not all members of an exploiting class are inherently unproductive -
contra Moore (1969:471), Friedmann (1979:168), Hindess and Hirst (1977:26), 
and (less so) Wright (1980:179,180). 
11. For some writers (Clammer; 1978:216; Dupre and Rey .. 1973:152) it is 
this use of surplus to reproduce the sUbjection of the producer which 
defines exploitation. (Hindess and Hirst (1977:68) misunderstand this and 
their criticism of these writers is thus misplaced.) The viewpoint of this 
thesis is that it is relations of possession/separation which are central 
to the functioning of exploitation, whether or not utilization of surplus 
reproduces subjection or not. 
12. This distinction is conflated in the dependency theory of Frank 
(1969a) (see Booth .. 1975:78/9; O~Brien .. 1975:27 .. footnote 1). 
13. Strictly speaking, relations of production as a general concept cannot 
include exchange U which is only a form of distribution in certain relations 
of production, and not a universal feature. (The Gr-undrisse (Marx, 1973) 
makes the same mistake). As regards "'relations of consumption"', this can 
be located within the broad concept of ~relations of utilization~ (which 
would distinguish consumption from productive utilization). 
14. The ~relations of production~ thus conceived by Hindess and Hirst, are 
then held to determine the second Moment of production; and - through this 
the third (see also Wright, 1980:179/80). It can be argued against them 
though; that relations ot possession/separation in Moment A are not always, 
and are not totally, determinant of the relations around surplus labour. 
Relations such as control of distribution (e.g. markets) and utilization 
(e.g. finance) can determine the relations in the other stages of surplus 
labour (see Clegg, 1977:364; Terray, 1974:335). 
15. This is especially clear in Banaji's argument (1976b:315) that the 
purpose of production (e.g. consumption by a feudal lord, rather than 
capital accumulation) defines the ~relation of production~. He holds that 
this is the case even if the labour process and immediate relations of 
exploitation (e.g. wage-labour) usually correspond to a different Urelation 
of production~ (i.e. correspond to a different purpose of production - such 
as capital accumulation associated with wage-labour) (see also Banaji, 
1980:516). He quotes the Grundrisse (Marx, 1973:469) for support: 
if a nobleman?brings a free worker together with his 
serfs, even if he resells a part of the whole product, 
and the free worker thus creates value for him, then 
this exchange takes place ... for the sake of super-
fluity, for luxury consumption. 
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1. INTRODUCTluN. 
Much has been written on the Marxist theory of classes~ and it would 
be both redundant and too lengthy to reproduce and comment on all of it 
here. Instead~ 1 focus on what is significant about this theory in terms 
ot the theoretlcal framework developed so far~ and in relation to the 
concerns ot social structure~ development and rural development. In this~ I 
criticlze alternative notions ot social structure and investigate the 
complexity ot class structure in terms of the three Moments of production. 
2. CLASS AND FORCES OF PRODUCTION 
In my framework~ classes are constituted by groups of people sharing 
common locations in the relations at production, specifically in regard to 
the control and extortion ot surplus labour. Because class relations thus 
concern exploitation, the class structure is clearly not identical to the 
occupational structure as designated by the torces of production relations. 
A given technical tunction can perform a range of roles in the social 
relations ot control and exploitation (Wright~ 1Y80:186). Forces of 
productlon are pertinent for the class structure nonetheless. For example~ 
technical differences between units and sectors of production can serve as 
a basis for classes to appropriate surplus in the relations of distribution 
between them (see Hindess and Hirst~ 1977:134/5; Carchedi~ 1975:19-36). A 
particular occupation in the labour process can similarly be an aid to 
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enforcing class control. However, it is the relations of production, not 
the forces, that define classes as such. 
3. CLASSES AND STRATA 
The class structure also differs from the structures designated by the 
stratification approach which divides the social whole into horizontally 
adjacent layers - usually in terms of income or wealth differentials. 
There are great inadequacies in this approach, with corresponding 
weaknesses in its value for understanding development. 
Firstly, it ignores exploitation because inequality and exploitation 
are not always necessarily related (Clammer, 1978b:11). And where the two 
are related, the approach fails to link them to class exploitation in 
Moments Band C. While wealth differentials are significant for social 
conflict and class differentiation, the point (in this thesis) is to see 
under what circumstances they are the consequences of and contributors to 
class relations of exploitation, and how this relates to development 
(Bernstein, 1979b:430, see chapter thirty).(1) 
Secondly, stratification analysis fails to designate real effective 
social entities. It produces only juxtaposed labels and passive categories 
(Cox, 1979:23). In contrast to this, although the term ~middle class~ 
(encountered in chapter thirty-five) implies the existence of upper and 
lower classes, this is only in an abstract and nominal sense. There are no 
necessary real relations between them.(2) What is specific about the 
Marxist view, is that it does not define classes simply by their 
philosophical and logical mutuality, but by their real interdependence. 
The Marxist class structure therefore refers to real social forces 
engaged in practices that are directly - and contradictorily related to 
each other. (3) The relations between classes inherently involve 
relationships of control, exploitation, domination and subordination - and 
therefore conflict (Byres, 1981:406). Class in the Marxist sense refers to 
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real concrete actors and joint practices, to contradiction and therefore to 
movement, change and development of social and economic structures. In 
terms of my theory (see below), this can best be analysed by locating 
classes in terms of Moments A, Band C of a relations of production struct-
ure - a method that is more comprehensive than several other Marxist 
approaches. To this 1 would also add the need to characterize classes in 
terms of how they reproduce themselves, and in terms of whether they 
exhibit any system dynamics deriving from the whole. 
4. CLASSES IDENTIFIED AT MOMENTS A, 8, AND C. 
Class relations at Moment A, i.e. the relations of 
possession/separation do not in themselves ensure exploitation, but they 
characteristically provide the foundation for this to occur in Moment B -
the labour process (Meillassoux, 1970:103). However, the relations at 
Moment A are not always totally congruent with the relations of exploitat-
ion in the actual labour process~ There may be overlaps in production 
itselt (i.e. in Moment B), between the conceptually-exclusive class funct-
ions implicit in class possession/separation (Moment A). Classes located in 
these places or overlap perform contradictory practices: for example, the 
~new middle class~ executes exploitative control in the labour process, but 
is still an exploited class (Carchedi, 1975:51; Wright, 1980:183). As will 
be discussed in chapters thirty-one and -two, overlaps also exist with rich 
peasants and also often among rural development scheme settlers. 
Class relations structured in Moments A and B have a specific presence 
and effectivity in Moment C - reproducing themselves through different 
relations ot distribution and utilization. With regard to distribution, 
there are differences between those classes constituted in Moments A and B 
of production. For example, there is the difference between the 
distribution of surplus product by a wage-labourer to his family .. and the 
distribution of surplus product by a capitalist to agents operating 
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repressive and ideological control apparatuses. These distributive 
relations are not in themselves exploitative; they occur after the initial 
exploitation of the wage-labourer by the capitalist and are not relations 
directly between these two parties.(4) They are distinct from class 
relations ot exploitation within distribution which depend on relations of 
possession/separation from means of distribution (see section 5 below). 
With regard to utilization of surplus labour/product, there are again 
difterences between classes pre-constituted in Moments A and B. These 
difterences are important for understanding economic development -
particularly the extent to which surplus product is used for productive or 
unproductive purposes. Differences in utilization are conditioned by the 
nature of the class structure. For example, capitalists J possession of 
means ot production enables them to utilize much of the surplus labour they 
appropriate to consolidate and expand their possession. For wage-labour-
ers .. utilization is generally limited to reproducing their families without 
transforming their separation into possession. Comparing class utilization 
In ditferent class structures brings out .. for example, the different signi-
ficance for economic development of a (consuming) feudal exploiter and a 
(reinvesting) capitalist exploiter. 
Consideration of distribution and utilization leads directly to an 
assessment of reproduction of the Whole class structure. Indeed, a focus 
on class differentiation in terms of reproduction is common in the literat-
ure (see chapter twenty-three). It is valuable insofar as it shows how 
distribution and utilization relations reflect and reinforce the other 
Moments of production. However, this ought not to be seen as the sole or 
even major utility of focussing on these relations. Distribution and utili-
zation are not only significant for class reproduction, but crucially for 
the issue at development. And while the notion of reproduction links 
IVloment C back to A, SUCJl unity should not automatically be assumed. 
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Class exploitation can also exist within Moment C in the distribution 
and utilization of surplus labour in the form of surplus product.(5) An 
important distinction to bear in mind here is the difference between 
classes defined by their relations in Moments A and 8 as they relate to 
distribution and utilization (as discussed above), and a class structure 
which is constituted in Moment C. Of course, the relations of exploitation 
in Moment C will articulate with the relations of exploitation in 8, but 
they are distinct in that they involve ~fresh- exploitation. Exploitation 
in this situation occurs where one class (eg. merchants) has exclusive 
possession of the means of distribution and on this basis compels other 
classes to yield a portion of their surplus prOduct in the distribution 
process. These other classes are those based in Moments of A and B of 
production and whether they be exploiter or exploited, may both be 
exploited by this class controlling the means of distribution (See Palloix, 
1973:83).(6) (That such a class makes its prot its from control of markets 
rather than production does not mean that it has no effect on production -
see chapter twenty-one}.(7) 
£xplo~tative relations within utilization are signiticant for class 
distinctions, and for development as well. Here surplus product is extorted 
on the basis of control of the means of utilization - for example, by 
financial capitalists. (8) Insotar as an exploiting class, constituted by 
exclusive control over means of utilization, exploits classes that use 
surplus product for means or subsistence, the exploitation is of a fixed 
amount of surplus already produced and appropriated. Insofar as the 
exploiting class exploits by controlling the acquisition of means or 
production, it can intluence the actual performance and initial appropriat-
ion of surplus labour, again significant for producers in rural development 
programmes where debt relations often influence Moment B to raise the rate 
of exploitation (see chapters twenty-five and thirty-three).(9) 
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b. CLA~SE.S THAT ARE PART OF A HETEROGENEOUS RELATION OF PRODUCTION. 
Certain classes have consistent relations to each other and a presence 
in each Moment of production~ as in the case, for example, of capitalist 
and proletariat classes. However, how do we analyse groups that are not 
part of such a homoqeneous relations of production structure at A, Band C? 
What is referred to here are those classes in what I term heterogeneous 
relations OT production i.e. classes which articulate to other classes 
only in one or two of ttle Moments of production. (The concept of a 
tlomogeneous and heterogeneous relation of production is further elaborated 
in the next chapter.) There are two different categories here: 
firstly, there is the question of relations between classes that are 
based in different Moments ot production. The existence of an exploiting 
class based in Moment A and B does not preclude the existence of a 
different class in ditterent exploitative relations in Moment C, tor 
example, merchants and tinance capitalists. At the same time, the existence 
of class exploitation in Moment C does not depend on class relations in 
Moments A and B. For example, simple commodity producers or co-operatives 
embodying no exploitation in their labour processes, may be exploited in 
Moment C by merchants or usurers.(10) Exploiting classes based in Moment C 
articulate within themselves and with the external classes Which are 
already part of a ditferent structure. This articulation constitutes a 
heterogeneous structure because while it involves real relations of 
exploitation, and therefore class relationships, these do not involve the 
same classes relating to each other at each Moment of production. 
Secondly, there is the question of the relations between the classes 
which are part of different relations ot production structures. For 
example, there is the" relation between the °peasantry'" or self -employed 
commodity producers to capitalists and workers in a predominantly capital-
ist SOCiety. These classes are only classes vis-~-vis the classes in the 
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capitalist relations or production structure insofar as there are exploit-
ative relations between the two structures.. In the absence of this .. 
classes mav be disarticulated tram each other, though as classes they still 
retain relations with a counterpart in a single relations of production 
structure. But between the two situations, there may well still be articul-
atian between one or other of the IVloments of production. In order to 
comprehensively identify classes in these situations, it is necessary to 
examine the articulation of differing relations of production structures 
and look at the way that a heterogeneous relation of production may be 
created via intersections at Moment C (eg. commodity exchange), Moment B 
(labour), or Moment A (overlapping relations of possession/separation) .. 
(See Poulantzas, 1973:33; Meillassoux, 1970:103). This is taken up in 
chapter seventeen. 
7. CLASS, NON-PRODUCTION RELATIONS AND SOCIAL PRACTICES. 
Another dimension of concrete class relations to consider is that just 
as the relations of production are only -purely economic~ as an abstract-
ion, so are class relations and practices. Because class relations involve 
domination, subordination and exploitation - i.e. power relations - they 
have a political and ideological as well as economic character (Steeves, 
1978:124; Mamdani, 1977:11; Crouch, 1977:4; Wright, 1980:212). It is 
acknowledged that class bellav iour is a far more complex, opaque and 
ambiguous ptlenomenon than many Marxists would concede, even though manv 
have tried - with varying degrees of success - to explain this by seeing 
trle issue as a process over time and by identifying more specif ic structur-
es and relations that individuals are involved in (eg .. see Dupr~ and Rev, 
1973:152; Clammer, 1978b:15). Class practices vary organizationally .. ideo-
loqlcally and instituiionally. There are various reasons for this: 
Firstly, class practices and interests emerge in concrete class 
formation and creation, class consolidation, class reproduction, class 
71 
BASIC CDNCEPTSli 
CLASS STRUCTIJRE 
development and class demise. Some classes and practices will exhibit 
features difficult to understand because they are transitional and 
uncrystallized (Mamdani, 1977:10; Raikes, 1978:286; Byres, 1981:406/7). 
Classes and their practices need to be understood in terms of their 
capacity and likelihood to become something else (Cliffe, 1977:197). 
Certainly, much rural development planninq assumes certain class traiector-
ies for the people it aims at (see chapter twenty-nine). Multi-class 
membership by individuals is likely to affect their practices, as will 
seasonal ctlanges in class membership, geographical mobility and interclass 
mobility (see Cliffe, 1978:327; Charlesworth, 1980:265; Alavi, 1973:295; 
Clammer, 1978b:15).(11) Ttlis complexity is important for productive 
capacity. 
Secondly, the way the class structure is articulated with the forces 
of production will affect class practices in several ways. It may isolate 
or atomize members of a class, rather than bring them together. It may mix 
members of different classes together in the sarne technical function. It 
may combine contradictory class functions into one technical one. It is to 
be expected that classes constituted in thls latter instance will exhibit 
ambiguity in the practices of class struggle (Wright, 1980:183; Crompton 
and Gubbay, 1977:95-8). This is an important issue in examining the 
significance of class formation under rural development strategies (see 
chapter thirty-three and -four). 
Thirdly, class places, relations and practices are also affected by 
relations outside of production. Production relations may be embedded in 
broader and diffuse social, ritual and political relations - such as 
patron-client relations (Herring, 1981:139). Concrete class structures are 
therefore a result of~~multiplex- structural relations such as relations to 
a ruling political party, cultural and educational resources, and juridical 
and kinship structures (see Herring~ ibid:148; Byres, 1981:444/5; Miliband, 
1972; Friedmann, 1978). 
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fourthly, much variation in class practices is due to the deqree of 
class consciousness - i.e. the consciousness ot a class as a class for 
itself (Byres, 1981:4U7). Besides the siqnificance of class location for 
class practices, location in extra-economic structures (families, a nation-
state) are also pertinent.(12) Class practices are also influenced by 
culture and by consciousness derived from the ideologies imposed by other 
classes (see Femia, 1975 passim; Awiti, 1973:231, describes this tor rural 
Ismani, Tanzania). Because of all these variables, one writer concludes 
that 'pure; class consciousness is rarely, if ever, to be found. It is 
nearly always 'cross-cut; and may even be nullified (in certain 
circumstances) by ethnic, regional or religious loyalties (Kitching, 
1972:336). A related factor affecting class practices is the extent to 
which class relations are visibly manifested. This is especially important 
in both exploitation itself and its results (Feldman, 1975:162; Hindess and 
Hirst, 1977:b4; Cabral 1969:51). Class formation is less socially eftect-
ive where no distinctive cultural characteristics have evolved to identify 
classes as groups with distinct lifestyles (Feldman, 1975:165). This has 
special relevance to the political significance of many rural development 
strategies (see chapter thirty-six). 
Notwi thstanding the complex signif icance ot trlese structural, 
institutional and ideoloqical influences, the fact remains that a class 
structure and class practices involve people sharing similar actions and 
therefore classes are still of relevence as social forces - be their 
members -conscious- or not. 
8. CONCLUSION. 
The analysis above has outlined a theory of classes that will be 
applied in subsequent chapters. It is worth briefly concluding by noting 
how this ttleory relates to the mass of disparate non-class groupings and 
inst i tutions wrlich inf luence the question of development - for example, 
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religious movemerlts~ political parties~ occupational groups and so on. In 
my v iew ~ two f actol-S point to the importance of class groupings over and 
above these in economic development. 
Firstly, and admittedly tautologically, classes by definition are 
directly related to production. In contrast, the general practices of these 
other groups qua groups do not involve consistent or direct relationships 
to the means of production. They are therefore not related to each other 
in terms of production - i.e. they do not form a structure of relations 
around the means of production (Williams, 1976:253). While they may be 
important and indeed crucial at certain periods, it is evident that classes 
are consistently involved in economic issues. Hence the importance at 
classes in studying social structure and economic development. 
Secondly, while no one would deny that non-class groups and their 
practices - for example, national movements, kinship associations - have 
played a part in the history of economic development .. these movements are 
not wholly separate from classes. Rather, they are comprised of classes and 
fractions of classes in particular alliances and accpmmodations. The 
grouping as a whole is linked to class practices accordingly, and economic 
development affects people in such groups differently in relation to their 
varying class places. In the context of the study of development, it is 
therefore valid to analyse non-class groups in terms of their relations to 
classes (see Galeski, 1972:108; Meillassoux, 1970:103) (although such 
groups are certainly not reducible to the sum of their class components). 
In the same way, and with the same objectives, non-class structures 
may also be analysed in terms of their relation to classes. These struct 
ures include familial (see chapter twenty-six, for example); political 
(State) (see chapter twenty-eight); economic and market; the "'structure of 
dependence u (Dos Sant6s, 1970); the structure of -centre-periphery~ (Amin, 
1974) or ~metropole-satellite~ (Frank, 1969); and the ~colonial structure~ 
(Arrighi:1977) (see chapter twenty-one). 
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1. The stratification approach does not simply neglect this class 
exploitation point "- it actually obscures it. Focussing on the variations 
of wealth serves to cover over the social relations of production (Smith, 
1979:306). The difterent component origins (and therefore social 
relations) behind the wealth are blanked out (Little-John, 1973a:115). 
2. No doubt it is this type Or limited classification to which Keita 
subscribes, iudging by his remark (1960:34~ quoted in Miller, 1974:524) 
that ~the differentiation of classes does not imply a diversification of 
interests and still less an opposition of interests-. But in the Marxist 
view~ groups are not classes it they are not connected by contradictory 
practices and interests. 
3. It is evident therefore that classes in the Marxist view only exist in 
terms of their social relationships with each other (Wright, 1980:178). In 
each structure of a set of relations of production, the classes complement 
and presuppose each other (Godelier, 1972:335). As Byres (1981:406) puts 
it, they cannot be understood without each other: nThey are constituent 
and mutually determining parts of a whole process. To isolate them from 
each other is an act of distortion •••. -. There is therefore no such thing 
as a single class (Mffiodani, 1977:8). In other words; class is a relational 
property of a group of people vis-~-vis another group. 
4. This is distinct from class relations of exploitation within 
distribution. These relations take place after production proper and the 
initial appropriation therein and are concerned with the distribution of a 
fixed quantity of surplus product (see below). 
5. Clarke et al {1978:119) identify classes in production; distribution, 
exchange and consumption. There are several problems in this however. 
Firstly, exchange may be regarded as a form of distribution and it is 
therefore questionable whether separate classes may be identified in 
distrlbution and exchange. Secondly, it is difficult to conceive of 
classes based in consumption; unless this is interpreted more widely as 
relations at utilization. To identify classes in Moment C requires 
specifying surplus labour extortion in these relations. Thirdly, Clarke 
et al (ibid:120) claim to have in their method a basis to distinguish 
between industrial, landed and financial capitalists. It would appear, 
llowever; that only the latter are identif ied by the focus on IVloment C 
relations. (The criticisms made here are supported in ttle next few pages). 
6. It is possible that the exploiting class of Moments A and B may also 
control the means of distribution in C and thereby doubly exploit the 
producers. Where it does happen~ as in the case of certain rural 
development strategies (see chapter twenty-nine)~ the two forms of 
exploitation still remain conceptually distinct. The nsecond round~ 
exploitation is a zero-sum equation of fixed proportions determined by the 
previous Moments. 
7. Merchant capital affects production because it tends to drain surplus 
out of it and reinvest it in trade (Kay~ ibid). (See chapter twenty-one). 
fhere is nothing to stop merchants trom moving into exploitinq in 
production proper- particularly wtlen there are low returns in Moment C 
but then the nature of the exploitation changes (Kay~ ibid:124). (Joffe 
(1980:18) incorrectly criticises Kay for inconsistency here). 
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8. This distinguishes it from the former tvpe ot exploitation - and also 
from the case of an exploitative class based on possession of the means of 
distribution where exploitation is limited to a fixed amount of surplus 
product (ego merchants). In real lite, usurers and merchants may be 
combined in the same people, but the two forms ot class exploitation are 
still conceptually distinct. 
9. There are different opinions about the extent to which financial 
capital can enter into exploitation at Moment 8 even if, unlike productive 
capital, it does not bring the labour process fully under its sway_ 
Accoroing to Bradby (1975:14b), Rey (1973) holds that finance capital can 
control social reproduction without getting involved in tile lmmediate 
process of prOduction. For Roseberry (1978:23), unlike merchant capital 
which by definition is confined to relations of distribution, ~interest­
bearing capital~ can enter into direct relations with direct producers (see 
also Howard, 1980:73). Clearly it can also enter into direct relations 
with direct exploiters. However, even though it is in these ways able to 
dictate certain of the conditions of production (witness the International 
Monetary Fund), and therefore appears close to exploitation in Moment 8, it 
is still conceptually distinct from class exploitation based on direct 
immediate possession of the means of production. Joffe (1980:23) follows 
Roseberry (1978) in arguing that ~usury capital~ can enter into relations 
with direct producers and become the primary mechanism of exploitation. 
Hence, she says, it must be considered as a production relation. A more 
precise conceptualization, however, would be to see this as a heterogeneous 
relation of production in as much as it does not have an integral link with 
any particular relations (and classes) at fvloments A and B. 
10. As noted earlier, however, where usury enables the debtor to acquire 
means of production,. it comes close to exploitation and control in Moment 8 
even although it is a distinct form of exploitation. 
11. Such phenomena wlil affect the extent to which individuals become 
crvstallized into a class tor itself. Relative stability in class 
membership is generally a pre-requisite for the development of class 
consciousness, interests and conflict. (Littlejohn, 1973:113; Kitching, 
1972:342; Feldman, ~975:162). Where individuals straddle several different 
class.places or are mobile between separate class places, this has 
consequences for their social effectivity. If such experiences are 
~stable" in the sense ot constituting a patterned experience, and if they 
are widelv sllared, they may well generate consciousness and interests whicll 
constitute the individuals involved into a social group. This will clearlv 
be ditferent from groups constituted by experiences in single class places. 
12. As Herring notes, 
The embedding of production relations in personalistic 
and customary social relations of a broader sort alters 
the experiential quality of class relationships, 
encasing them in an elaborate ideational complex of 
mutuality, quasi-familial lntimacy and norms of 
reciprocal diffuse obligation" (ibid:141). (See also 
Alavil 1973:23; Hobsbawf(), 1973: 7/8). 
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1. INTRODUCTION. 
IJNTT$ f:)F ANALY5T5' 
MODE OF PRODUCTION 
This chapter theorizes the concept of ~mode of production~ - a concept 
which is central to analysing patterns ot development. It outlines the 
obstacles to be avoided and also specifies the level of abstractlon and 
scope of analysis covered by the concept. I deal with the question of its 
relation to productive capacity in chapters eleven and thirteen. 
2. RELATIONS AND FORCES OF PRODUCTION. 
In Marx~s view: 
The direct relationship of the owners of the conditions 
ot production to the direct producers .•• always 
naturallY ... (corresponds) to a definite stage in the 
development of the methods of labour and thereby its 
social productivity. (1974:291, my insertion). 
In my terminology, we may discern here a proposition that there is a 
correspondence between relations and forces of production. To this 
correspondence also corresponds a level ot productive capacity. In Marx's 
view, there is thus a limited functional compatibility between these 
elements (see also Godelier, 1972:349). In support of this, one can cite 
the example at capitalist relations of prOduction which cannot simply 
correspond to any method of labour or any degree of productive capacity. 
Instead they require forces ot production with a hierarchical division of 
labour, and a minlmum productive capacity (see Marx, 19Ibb:1024/5,103S). 
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In my view, it is when this correspondence between relations and 
forces of production structures spans Moments A, Band C - and is 
reproduced as such in conjunction with system dynamics deriving from the 
whole - that a ""'mode of production .... is constituted. This is what makes it 
possible to identify for example, a capitalist relations of production 
structure (as opposed to a structure which might involve some seemingly 
capitalist features but will still not constitute a capitalist mode of 
production) • 
Such an articulated combination of a homogeneous relations of product-
ion structure with a homogeneous forces of production structure, is the 
basic structure of the general concept of mode of production. It is there-
fore also the basic structure of all modes of production in general, 
designating the essential relations common to the (less-abstract) concepts 
of each particular mode of production. The correspondence of mode of 
production to a level of social productivity (i.e. productive capacity in 
my terms) makes it a central concept for development studies. 
3. CONCEPTUALIZING THE JVIODE OF PRODUCTION. 
Although a mode of production is an articulated combination of both 
forces and relations of production, the concept is conventionally charact-
erized primarily by the relations of production structure, and only second-
arily by the associated forces of production (Hindess and Hirst, 1977:183). 
Thus, the major (but not the sole - see below) differentiating feature 
between modes of production is the structure of relations around surplus 
labour in each.(l) This characterization enables distinctions to be drawn 
between class and classless modes of production, as well as between differ-
ent modes of production within this.(2) 
The existence of the concepts of mode of production and particular 
modes of production does not mean that concrete situations solely involve 
the relations these concepts designate. There may well exist heterogeneous 
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relations of production structures - i.e. structures whose articulation of 
Moments A, Band C is not homogeneous in terms of the classes involved. 
The concept of mode of production is complex in two respects: firstly, 
the place of "'mode of productionU in levels of abstraction, and secondly, 
its scope of reference. The first issue concerns the extent to which the 
concepts of "'mode of production"" and particular modes can be elaborated at 
the conceptual level without losing their status as conceptual abstract-
ions. This involves the question of what details (such as component units 
of a mode) can be elaborated at the given level of abstraction, without the 
t concepts sliding into limited empiricist generalizations (see sections 4 and 5 below). The second issue concerns the relation of ..... mode of product-
ion- to different units of analysis, from the labour process to the total 
economy. This involves locating the basic effective unit of relations 
designated by a mode of production, within the context of a myriad of eco-
nomic articulations and interconnections (see section 6 below). 
4. LEVELS OF ABSTRACTION 
The concept of the mode of production designates not a jux-taposition 
of relations and forces of production structures, but an articulated 
combination in a particular mode of effectivity.(3) Each specific mode of 
production therefore refers to a unified structural whole and, as such, 
modes are mutually exclusive objects. It follows from this that although 
modes are distinguished by relations of production, the differences between 
them cannot be reduced to this factor alone. One also needs to locate a 
mode's differentia specifica in the fact that the concept covers more than 
the sum of its parts. Here, the system dynamics generated as a function of 
the whole are significant. For example, the capitalist mode of production 
differs from other modes not only in its relations and forces of production 
structures, but also in the way that these structures generate competition. 
Reference to the forces and relations of production helps to pinpoint how 
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modes differ on points like control at various Moments. But the differences 
between the system dynamics of diverse modes cannot be ignored. 
This argument means that an element like wage-labour is not on its own 
evidence of the CMP (see chapter thirty-one). Similarly, there is the very 
different nature and function of rent in the totality of the feudal mode 
of production compared to the capitalist. In the feudal mode, rent is a 
relation of exploitation in Moment B of production (the labour process). 
In a society with a dominant capitalist mode, it is appropriation within 
relations of distribution, (i.e. effective at Moment C) (Hindess and Hirst, 
1977:296/7). The mere presence of rent is not evidence of the feudal mode 
of production - what counts is its function in the whole (ibid:293). 
The points made above demonstrate that general theories applying to 
all modes of production can only be minimally elaborated. Similarly, 
general theories of development that transcend the differences between 
modes of production are - at best - highly limited. Largely for this 
reason, I eschew a general theory of development for all modes, and 
concentrate specifically on the CMP in this thesis. 
5. UNITS OF ANALYSIS 
The limits to theorizing the general concept of mode of production 
also imply that the constituent units of each specific mode will - to a 
certain extent - be mode specific. For example, while the hunting/gathering 
bands of ""primitive" communism have a division of labour within and between 
labour processes, it cannot really be said that these labour processes 
constitute distinct -units of production~. In the ~Asiatic- mode of 
production(4), the effective unit was the commune, in the ""Ancient ..... mode of 
production(5), it was the warrior city (Duggett, 1975:165). The effective 
economic unit under feudalism - the village or local region, has a very 
different status under capitalism (Hobsbawm, 1973:219). Another example is 
1 
the so-called ..... Germanic- mode of production. Here -the economic totality 
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is, at bottom, contained in each individual household, which forms an 
independent centre of production for itself~ (Marx, 1973:484, quoted by 
Duggett, 1975:165). In other words, there is not much distinction between 
:1 
l 
1 the unit of production and the mode itself in the Germanic case - in 
j contrast to the capitalist mode whose relations between units (commodity exchange) are crucial features tor the mode of production. The issue this 
raises (and dealt with in Part I) is to what extent an articulation 
between capital and upeasant"" producers (for example on outgrower schemes) 
t 
i 
constitutes a capitalist unit of production in the CMP. 
:! b. SCOPE OF ANALYSIS . 
. ~ 
Cohen (1981:79) distinguishes mode of productioF'l from ""'manner" of 
produclng, and indeed, a mode is not simply any manner of producing. It is 
a defined concept with a specific scope of analysis. Marx's writings do not 
make it easier to pinpoint the scope of the concept: he uses umode of 
production N to refer to both the entire base structure in the base 
superstructure model, and to the (narrower) actual labour process at the 
point of production (Bana;i, 1976a:301). The question is what distinguish-
es and what relates the umode of production N to the two units of analysis:' 
The answer lies in locating them all wi thin the var ious Moments of produc t--
ion. However, as will be evident in the discussion that follows, few 
writers explicitly approach the problem in these terms. Instead, it has 
been common to def ine the mode of production either in terms of the small---
est units (labour processes) or the largest (the world economic system). 
7. MODE LOCATED AT THE LABOUR PROCESS. 
If we accept that a mode of production is an articulated combination 
ot homogeneous relations and forces of production, and that both these 
structures are wider than the structure at the labour process, then umode 
of production~ and nlabour process" are certainly not coterminous (Sklair, 
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1979=329/ju; Littlejohn l 1973b:89). However I even if a mode of production 
is not identical to a labour process l this does not rule out the possibil-
ity of using the latter as a basis for deriving or qeneralizing the former. 
However I two errors are of ten made in this approactl. The first is a tech-
nicism which only lOOKS at the technical division of labour in the labour 
process and iqnores the question of surplus labour. The second, more fund-
amental, error ignores the role of relations beyond the individual labour 
process - i.e. Moments A and C of production. This second error invalid-
ates the basic method of this approach, even when it is not hampered by the 
technicist error. fVleillassoux (1972) and Terray (1972) have come under 
fire for both errors (Cooper, 1978 pass~; Hindess and Hirst, 1977:61).(6) 
The technicist error faces the problem that every labour process with 
a different internal division of labour and/or means of production, becomes 
the basis for a new mode of production. There is no foundation for under-
standing that (within limits) there is space for some variation in the 
labour processes that may exist within a single mode of production (see 
Hindess and Hirst, ibid:62; see chapter eight). 
Even where the technicism avoids the second error and operates with 
units of analysis wider than the labour procesS I it can still be criticized 
for ignoring the relations around surplus labour. Categorizing modes of 
production in terms of sectors of labour processes (for example l as "'small-
scale manufacture mode of production"; "'agricultural modes of production"') 
is inadequate because it is still only half the story.(7) 
It is evident that even where the technicism is avoided, the actual 
method of deriving the mode of production from the labour process can still 
lead to a mistaken proliferation of modes of production. For example, such 
an approach would see a feudal corvee labour system as an articulation of 
two modes of production: one where the producer works for his family, and 
another where he performs surplus labour for the lord. Against this, the 
concept of mode of production is based on the premiss that the structure as 
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a whole is crucial (Sale, 1977:Y;J). It does not refer to the level of the 
labour" process alone, nor to that ot sectors of labour processes, but to 
the total structure spannlng the three Moments of production (see Lecourt, 
Itj77:149; Sklair, 1Y79:3:LY/330). Referring back to the example above., ttle 
two teudal labour processes are not independent adjacent processes but are 
integrally and interdependently linked within a feudal mode of production. 
fwo writers who have tried to generalize the mode of production (or 
the heconomy" in a synonymous sense) from the labour process are Sahlins 
( 1974) and Chavanov (1925) (see 1966: 166). (8) They both assume ttlat the 
structure ot the whole is no more than the aggregation of similar units 
(Friedmann, 1979:159). In opposition to their position, however, it is the 
ensemble of social relations (both forces and relations of production) 
wtlicll sets the conditions of existence of labour process8's and their 
effectivity as individual units, and this cannot be neglected in theorizing 
a mode ot production tEnnew et aI, 1977:306).(9) 
In consequence, I would argue that the structure of the mode of 
prOduction cannot be der ived f rom the labour processes. The mettlod needs 
to be reversed so that labour processes are located and characterized in 
terms at their wider conditions of existence, i.e. within a heterogeneous 
or homogeneous articulation with Moments A and C of production (see Ennew 
et al, 1977:307/<:5). In the case of homogeneous articulation, in 
conjunction wlth reproduction ot the Whole and the associated system 
dynamics, the labour process would be part of a mode. 
(3. WORLD SYSTEM AS lVlGOE OF PRODUCTION. 
If the mode ot production cannot be identified at, or derived from, 
the mlnimum unit on the scale, what about the other extreme? Here the 
Gundar Frank school ot dependency theorists have approached the question 
tt-Irough tlleit- analysls ot how economic unlts link up to form a total system 
(O~8rien, 1975:112). Wallerstein (1977:5) is probably the most explicit 
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dependency theorist in locating the ~mode of production~ at this level: 
A mode ot production is a character1stic of an economy 
and an economy 1S defined by an et~ective ongoing 
div ision of productive labour. Ergo, to discover tile 
mode of production tllat prevails we must know the real 
bounds at the division of labour of whlCh we are 
speaking. Neither lndividual units of production, nor 
politlcal or cultural entities may be described as 
having a mode of production, only economies. Given this 
premise, there are only four possible modes of product-
ion, only three of Which have been known thus far in 
empirical reality. They are reciprocal mini-states, 
redistributive world empires, a capitalist world eco-
nomy, and a socialist world qovernment. (Wuoted by 
Foster-Carter, 19J8:239)(10)-
There is something to be said for stressing interconnections and 
eftective totality. The problem is that remaining at such a level leaves 
the economic structure explained in general and nothing in particular 
(O~Brien, 1975:12). Everything is connected to everything else, but the 
how and why remain obscure (ibid:L3). One can see the wood, but not the 
trees. 
Indeed, it is most unlikely that the total structure which Wallerstein 
identities with a mode ot production in fact constitutes an articulated 
combinat1on ot a sinqle and distinctive relations of production structure 
with a single and distinctive forces one. Such a combination is more 
likely to be located at a lower level substructure.(11) It is not 
surpr1slng, theretore. that the whole Frankian approach has been criticized 
tor detracting tram the complexity of the whole (Foster-Carter, 1978:239; 
Laclau, 1971 pass~; Brenner, 1977, paSs~). 
Laclau (1~71) has tackled this problem by retaining the Frankian 
stress on totality, but not conrlatinq this with the mode of production 
structure. He describes the totality by the useful concept of ~economic 
system", WhlCh designates a unified, structured and ditferentiated Whole 
that comprises the articulation ot a number of modes of production (and, I 
wuuld dtJd~ tleterogeneuus relations of production structures). Such a 
cuncept ut the economlC totality can be characterized in terms of the 
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dominant mode of production in the articulation - for example, one could 
speak of a -capitalist economic system~. This is very different to 
identifying a capitalist mode of production with a capitalist economic 
system - which is what the Frankians do (Booth, 1975:75). A capitalist 
economic system is fundamentally, but not homogeneously, capitalist 
(Obregon, 1974:394-7; Mamdani, 1977:138). And, as a system, the unit 
involves not a simple juxtaposition of elements, but a structure of 
relations. In addition, it is likely to be characterized by system 
dynamics deriving from the whole (see chapter four). 
9. CONCLUSION. 
If it is inadequate to locate the concept of mode of production at 
either the minimum or the maximum effective economic unit, this is because 
the concept lies somewhere between these extremes - which in turn are 
related to each other through it. A concrete labour process must be 
located at least within a heterogeneous relations and forces structure or 
within the homogeneous relations and forces structure that, if reproduced 
in conjunction with the system dynamics of the whole, will make up a mode 
of production. Whichever situation prevails, it in turn is likely to be 
located in the context of an economic system of articulation of diverse 
modes and heterogeneous structures. It is also likely that this economic 
system will be characterized by the system dynamics of the dominant mode of 
production (Long and Richardson, 1978:183). The next chapter analyses the 
specific relationship of a labour process to a mode of production. 
ENJNOTES 
1. It is in this sense that Gallisot's remark (1975:426) should be 
understood: J#it is by reference to the nature of social classes that one 
identifies the mode of production~ - classes being located in the relations 
and not in the forces of production. 
2. It would be wrong to assume that because productive capacity is the 
focus of this thesis, that the analysis should concentrate solely on the 
forces of production. As argued in chapter five, productive capacity is a 
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tunction of both forces and relations ot production. In looking to explain 
productive capacity and its correspondence to a given mode of production, 
an analysis should therefore begin by identifying the relations of product-
ion, and then investIgate their articulation with forces of production. 
3. A mode ot production is not a structuralist ~combinatorv- of 
variables - the formal play of which would allow for the deduction or 
prediction of different modes of production (Althusser, 1976:130). 
4. Strictly speaking, because a mode of production is an abstract 
concept, it is misleading to characterize it in geographical terms (Sole, 
1977:41) (That modes exist and vary geographically in the concrete is a 
different issue). The "'geographical"" label here, like that later in the 
paragraph l-Germanic~) is retained because of its classical usage and for 
want of an accepted alternative. 
5. The remarks in endnote 4 apply here~ Although a mode ot production is 
an abstraction from the historical concrete, it should, as an abstraction, 
not be characterized by the ~heyday- of its historical existence. 
b. This criticism is less iustified in Meillassoux's case who (inconsist-
ently) acknowledges that hunting, cultivating and herding are not to be 
identified as modes of production (see 1972:99). Terray, however, uses the 
different terms of co-operation in the labour process as a means for ident-
ifying modes of production (Hindess and Hirst, ibid:340, footnote 10). 
7. The same applies to attempts to locate the mode of production at the 
level of the whole forces of production structure. Thus concepts like 
""industrial society~ are only half the story (Littlejohn, 1973b:384). Aside 
from the question of the scope of analysis (the Moments of production), it 
would be an even worse error to ignore - not only the surplus labour 
relations - but also those ot the forces of production. Such an error 
would end up characterizing a mode of production in terms of its 
instruments of production or its product / raw materials (Sole, 1978:4). 
8. In fact Chayanov ignores not only external relations but also surplus 
labour relations internal to the labour process of a peasant to the 
household. His view of ""self-exploitation"" of the household conceived 
monolithically depends on this (Harrison 1979:89) 
9. A unit of production like a household labour process can exist within 
a ranqe of inter-household and group relations. Far from being reducible to 
the relations in production, the broader relations in fact set limits to 
intra-household relations (Friedmann, 1979:159). 
10. Wallerstein seems to treat the forces of production in the economy 
(~division of labourN) and the relations of production (i.e. surplus labour 
relations) as the mode of production (~redistributiveN; ~reciprocal-). For 
him it is primarily the former which defines the effective unit. 
11. It is theoretically conceivable that a particular effective economic 
entity may have interlinkaqes that add up to a single articulated relations 
and forces ot product~on combination and nothing more. In this case, the 
mode of production would be the economic system. However~ this seems 
unlikely in any concrete economic totality. 
B6 
UNITl'5 OF" ANALY!5Il'5' 
INTERNAL ARTICULATIO!'-J 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
MODE OF PROOUCllON AI'IJ THE ARllCULAlION Of LABOUR PROCESSES. 
-----------_._---------------
1. lntroductlon. 
2. fhe need for conceptual distinctions. 
3. When the labour process is internal to the mode. 
4. Internal labour processes as distinguished in the literature. 
4.i. The criterion of laws of motion. 
4.ii. The criterion ot reproduction. 
4.iii. The criterion of inteqration into Moments A and B. 
4.iv. Conclusion. 
5. Subsumption and variant labour processes. 
5.i. Subsumption of Moment 8 through the system process to C. 
S.ii. Subsumption through the articulation of Moments A and 8. 
6. Class and articulation. 
7. Conclusion. 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
As discussed in the previous chapter" an economic system involves an 
articulation between diverse labour processes. This raises the question of 
how within this system" a mode of production relates to its own endogamous 
labour processes" as well as to those that are linked to it but remain 
exogenous. Seen from the other side, the question is what makes a labour 
process part of a homogeneous, rather than a heterogeneous" relations and 
t orces structure-( Put metaphor icall y" we need cr iter ia to identit y which 
trees tall squarely within the wood" and - by implication - which are 
merely on the tringes. 
2. THE NEED FOR CONCEPTUAL DI~TINCTIONS. 
One approach to the problem of distinguishing internal and external 
articulation has been simply to gloss over the difference altogether. 
Friedmann (19/9:16U) proposes the term uform of production'" to cover both 
types at articulation" but lt is precisely the differences between them, 
i.e. the correspondence or otherWlse of a labour process to a mode that 
needs to be theorized. 
Investigating this issue miqht seem to be conflating two levels of 
analysis -- the case at "external" labour processes being an empir ical 
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question varying according to the concrete specificity of the economic 
system; the case at the ~inter'nal~ ones being a purely conceptual question. 
But tllis 15 a talse polarization. 80th ~internal~ and -external~ articul-
ations 1nvolve theoretical and empirical issues. This can be demonstrated 
by a rev1ew1ng a debate between Taylor (1979, 198U) and Mouzelis (1980) 
concern1nq chanqes in the articulation between modes of production. 
In the debate, Mouzelis (ibid:366) criticises Taylor~s lacK of 
crlteria tor distinguishing when ~relations of production~ (sic) constitute 
a mode of production, and when they only constitute a labour process within 
a mode. (By ~relations of production~ Mouzelis means what I have called the 
relations in production, i.e. within the labour process).(l) TaylorJs 
response (1980:389) is (in part) to historicize the question and argue that 
it cannot be dealt with in the abstract. He holds that the articulation of 
modes of production is a temporarv affair characteristic only of 
transitional periods between modes of production. While the CMP at one 
stage articulated with full non-capitalist modes, it has since undermined 
their reproduction to the extent that it now only articulates with their 
remnant labour processes. These processes (by Taylor's implication) are now 
internal to the CMP, though he still describes them as non-capitalist. 
Taylor~s point has some validity - there are limits to abstractly 
theorizing about these issues and the articulation of modes is often a 
transitional affair (see also Spiegel, 1979:23). However, this is not 
entirely satisfactory. Firstly, the CMP currently articulates not only 
with the remnants ot tormer modes (as Taylor assumes), but with entire no~-
capitalist modes (in the socialist countries) and with labour processes 
Wllich Ilave never been internal to a mode of production as such (f or examp-
le, domestic labour and simple commodity production). This articulation has 
to be conceptualized. Secondly, it is necessary for Taylor to explain the 
point at which a historical articulation of modes of production changes to 
the articUlation ot one mode with remnant labour processes. Thirdly, and 
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crucially, in wllat way (it at all) can there be non-capitalist labour 
processes within a CMP? Alternatively, at what stage can ~remnant~ labour 
processes be said to be transformed into capitalist ones within the CMP~ as 
opposed to being externally articulated to it? The point is that the need 
for conceptual criteria does not vanish by seeing the articulation of a 
mode of production with its own and with external labour processes in 
historical and empirical terms. 
I 3. WHEN THE LABOUR PROCESS IS INTERNAL TO THE MODE. TIle issue of internal articulation could be easily grasped if a characteristic labour process could be theorized for each mode of product-
ion - for example, a particular labour process that could be described as 
crlaracteristically capitalist. This, however~ requires an explanation of 
the criteria conferring such a status, and here the issue becomes complex 
because ttlere can be (UP to a point) some variaid,on in the labour processes 
within a single mode of production. For example, there are the different 
labour processes involved in a feudal mode which correspond to different 
torms of rent payment (labour, cash, kind). Another example is the differ-
ent labour processes between capitalist piece-work and factory production. 
A related complexity concerns the question whether all the labour 
processes within a mode of production should be characterized by the name 
of the mode -- f or example .. as capitalist labour processes in a capitalist 
mode. This is more than a taxonomic quibble - it has implications for 
seeinq the tendencies in the labour process (see Galeski, 1972:22). In 
turn, this is significant for studying economic development - despite the 
way that some writers simply dismiss the issue.(2) 
Several writers have tackled the need to develop criteria to identify 
~internal- labour proc~sses, and analyse the similarities and differences 
between them. However, as I will now show, the division between Uinternal U 
and "external'"' labour processes varies from writer to writer, and the 
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4. INTERNAL LABOUk PROCESSES AS DISTINGUISHED IN THE LITERATURE. 
Some writers just take for granted the typicality of particular labour 
processes (and related units or production) f or particular modes of prod--
uction. For example, they assume the latifundium for slavery, the estate 
for feudalism, and the factory for capitalism. But even those who broach 
the subject more critically and consciously are often unsatisfactory. 
Among them, various criteria have been used to characterize ~internal~ 
labour processes, including those of Hlaws of motionH, """reproductionU and 
""integrationN , but none of these is adequate on its own. 
4.i. The criterion of laws of motion. 
Banaji (1976a:302) focusses on the ""laws of motion'"' of the mode as the 
key element in the relationship between a.mode and its internal labour 
processes. For him, the typicality of labour praCtZtsses for particular modes 
at production depends on whether they function according to the ulaws of 
motion;; of the particular mode of production. Ultimately his position 
distinguishes degrees of correspondence of motion of each labour process 
"""part N to the mode of production .....,wll01e ...... a Thus he speaks about labour proc-
esses as varying in the extent to which they are an -adequate ...... or ~crystal­
lized u torm ot the mode at production. (3) 
Banaji's view, however, is basically circular: the mode and the labour 
process correspond it they manifest the same laws. What these ulaws""" are, 
how the labour process and mode of production might interact to produce 
them, and what the explanation is for different -crystallizations""" in 
ditterent labour processes, are all unexplained. Banaji therefore fails to 
answer r-lis question -- Uthe process of labour, the mode of production -
what connects them?N (ibid:30U). This is not to say that the criterion of 
correspondence of the par·t (the labour process) to the "'laws of motion'; of 
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trl8 wt-Iole is per se invalid (although I would prefer to interpret such 
"'laws"'" as system dynamics). However~ it is inadequate as the sole determin-
ing criterion. This can be seen in the case of merchant capitalists 
exploiting a class of producers who maintain possession of the means of 
production~ e.g. artisans. Despite often exhibiting characteristics of a 
capitalist system process (e.g. competitiveness and commercialization)~ 
such producers are not integrated within a capitalist relations of product-
ion structure. Instead they relate to it as an external class relationship 
mediated through Moment C. As a structure of three Moments of production~ 
this is a heterogeneous relation of production, and not part of the CMP. 
4.ii. The criterion of reproduction. 
For some writers, a labour process is an internal part of a mode of 
production if it is physically reproduced within it (see Taylor~ 1980:389; 
Ennew et aI, 1977:310; Williams~ 1975:31). One potential problem here is 
that this is broad enough to incorporate. fundamentally different labour 
processes within a single mode of production. (4) For example., besides wage-
labour exploitation, one finds that simple commodity producers, domestic 
labour, co-operatives and state enterprises can all be integrated into 
reproduction based on exchange of products with capitalist labour processes 
and sharing the superstructural context of capitalist property relations. 
To call all these "'capitalistU because of this, would be to obscure 
important differences in their relations at Moments A and B and their 
relations to the system dynamics of the CMP. (5) Tile danger in using 
the criterion of incorporation into reproduction is therefore that it may 
locate a labour process within a mode when this process is actually only 
part of a heterogeneous structure articulated to the (homogeneous) mode. 
4.iii. The criterion of integration into Moments A and B. 
Some writers draw the line by specifying strict integration of a 
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labour process into a homogeneous relation of production structure. This 
focus differs from the reproduction approach described above, in that it 
does not rest only on a physical articulation between a labour process and 
a mode of production, but on integration at the level of social relations. 
Hindess and Hirst (1977:270,104,305) hold that a mode of production is not 
defined by the relations within a labour process; instead it is the determ-
inate articulation of the process within the system of social production as 
a whole that counts. On this basis, they argue that a unit which appears 
to be capitalist is only strictly so if its reproduction is dependent on 
capitalist exchange relations. For them this means a system of commodity 
circulation in which means of production and labour power are also exchang-
ed. (See also Friedmann, 1979:16).(6) In this view then .. a labour process 
is capitalist if it involves the same classes as are present in capitalist 
relations in Moments A and C of production. 
Clearly, this ignores the issue of system processes as they relate to 
the labour process. This position also involves the danger of designating 
a labour process based on wage-labour exploitation as non-capitalist if it 
has some integration with non-capitalist relations at Moments A and C such 
as plunder, unequal exchange or with labour-power that originates in other 
modes of production. In other words, the purity of the whole becomes 
everything; the cllaractet- of the par t 5 count s for nothinq. 
Here Asad and Wolpe (1976:503) have criticized Hindess and Hirst, 
asking: 
if the appropriation of surplus value by productive 
capital under a specific form of labour process 
structured by the relations of production (i.e. 
relations in production - GB) is not capitalist, what 
is it? 
In fact Hindess arid Hirst do not go as far as claiming such instances 
to be non-capitalist: they refer to them as ""capitalist...., in quotation marks 
to distinguish them from true capitalist labour processes. But the problem 
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still remains that what constitutes a ~true~ capitalist labour process -
namely, in this view, absolute integration into Moments A and C - makes it 
difficult to grasp the complexities and the developmental character of 
labour processes which are not so neatly categorized. (See Part J). 
4.iv. Conclusion 
It is clear that defining a labour process as internal to a mode 
cannot be limited to any single criterion. The criterion of "laws of 
motion"" (or, better, system dynamics) leaves things too broadly defined. 
The criterion of ~reproduction"" does likewise. And the criterion of 
"integration'" into Moments A and C is too narrow by itself. In my view, 
.~ 
all of these criteria play a part in characterizing a labour process. 
Relating them to my conceptualization of modes of production (see previous 
chapter), it follows that a labour process is internal to a mode of 
production when (i.) it is integrally articulated into the structure of a 
homogeneous set of relations of production and corresponding forces of 
production; (ii.) its operation contributes to and is affected by the 
system processes (Banaji~s ""laws of motion"") produced by this structure; 
and (iii.) its reproduction is within this structure and on the basis of 
products originating within it. 
5. SUBSUMPTION AND VARIANT LABOUR PROCESSES. 
We now have established criteria for defining when a labour process is 
part of a mode of production. It is possible to proceed to investigating 
the range of variations within this - i.e. variant labour processes that 
still form part of the same mode of production.(7) In my view, variance 
needs to be located in the context of certain basic invariant relations in 
" 
Moment B with particular regard to the three criteria noted above. The 
substance of this variance has been explained by Marx's concept of 
sUbsumption, interpreted in various ways. Some writers use the concept to 
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theor ize tile articulation between Moments A and 8, wllile ottlers tocus on 8 
and L. Depending on the emphasis, a different picture emerges as to the 
range ot labour processes reproduced within a mode ot production. Subsump-
tion in either sense is a concept originally linked to the theorization of 
the capitalist mode, and its application to other modes cannot be assumed. 
However, one can argue tllat, if conceived in its most abstract meaning .. it 
would appear to have some relevance to conceptualizing variants at a 
(limited) general level.(8) 
5.i. Subsumption of B through the system-process to C. 
For some writers, it is the degree to which the actual labour process 
is subsumed under the system dynamics of the mode that is important in 
assessing the range of labour processes possible within a mode of 
production. For Banaii (1980:516-8), a mode of production is defined by 
its motion, manifested in its direction towards a particular end - Moment 
C. lY1 Banaji claims that the motion of accumulation under capitalism can 
eXIst in non-wage-labour labour processes which, in Ilis view, means tlley 
are therefore subsumed under -' and indeed are part of a capitalist 
relation (singular) of production structure.(10) (For similar reasoning 
regarding artisan producers SUbsumed to merchant capital, see Taylor (1979, 
in Mouzelis 1980:363) and Jotte (1980:18b).(11) 
Marx distinguished between formal and real subsumption, both of which 
exhibited the system dynamic of co~nercialization (see 1976b;1037). 
Indeed .. it is difficult to grasp how any internal labour process in the CMP 
could not. Formal subsumption may, Ilowever, exist outside the CfvlP, and 
while it may still exhibit commercialization there (ibid:1019/20), the 
latter only becomes fully realized and indispensable when the labour 
process is within the 'CMP (ibid:l037). As regards the interpretation of 
subsumptlon in terms of system dynamics, therefore, it appears wrong to see 
it as a criterion for conceptualizing variation within a mode of product-
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ion, or' for U1at matter, even to see it as distinguishing between what is 
internal and external to the CMP. 
Tile problem wi til Bana i i ~ s approach (as we have seen above) is that it 
conflates what are actually several different sets of class structures, and 
then concludes that the diverse labour processes do not actually differ 
from eactl other. However, seen in terms of other cr iter ia, in particular a 
single set of relations in production, it would appear that different 
degrees of subsumption of Moment B to the system process can - and do 
signlficantly characterize labour processes. 
5.ii. Subsumption through the articulation of Moments A and B. 
The concept of subsumption has been used in a different way-to that 
described above to link the relations of possession/separation with the 
relations in production, in particular regarding the forces of production 
at each {vloment. A precondition f or both formal and real subsumption of the 
direct producer within exploitative relations in production is some form of 
separation of the direct producer from the means of production (Marx, 
197bb:1025/b; Hindess and Hirst, 1977:226; Asad and Wolpe, 1976:484). 
Although it is not specirically clear in Marx, the specific type of 
subsumption depends ultimately on the forces of production relations in 
Moments A and B, and variations here mav be used to account for variations 
in labour processes. The invariant relations are the relations of 
production as they exist in Moments A and 8, the variants are in the forces 
ot' production at A and B. 
In Marx~s theory of the capitalist mode of production, the producer is 
formally subordinated to and exploited by capital by being separated from 
the means of production (i.e. conditions at Moment A). This is a negative-
ly-determined subsumpfion, though lt is no less effective for this in 
enabling a capitalist to intervene in and direct the labour process. 
Indeed, it is an adequate basis for the capitalist to increase surplus 
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value absolutely through intensifying production and lengthening the 
working day. uReal subsumptionU~ for Marx~ takes the control of the worker 
a stage turther. It corresponds to the production of relative surplus 
value~ which Marx saw as being based on large-scale production using 
science and technology in the labour process (197bb:1035). (See chapter 
twelve for a discussion of relative surplus value, the detailed meaning of 
which is not pertinent here). For Marx, such technical conditions of 
production in turn involve the development of specialization and co-operat-
ion and a division of labour within the labour process (1976a:464/5;486). 
What makes this different to formal subsumption is that the new forces of 
production at Moment B deprive producers of any individual control over 
their labour and the means of production. They are now subordinated not 
only to a capitalist~ but to capital-in-action in the form of the pace of 
a machine or an assembly line division of labour (Marx~ ibid; 1976b:1024; 
Morr is ~ 197b: 300). T hey become really subsumed under capital. ( 11 ) 
Extrapolating from this analysis, it may be said that the scope for 
variation in labour processes internal to a mode of production is in the 
forces of production at Moments A and 8, and that this occurs within the 
limits of the class structure as defined by the relations of production. 
Variant labour processes conceived in this way have effects on the surplus 
labour relations - but within the limits of the basic class structure. For 
example, within the class relations of feudal possession and separation and 
exploitation, differences in the proportions and forms of necessary and 
surplus labour may exist as a result of forces of production relations 
corresponding to cash, kind or corvee rent appropriation. 
6. CLASS AND ARTICULATION. 
According to Kahn (1978:123) the question of distinct production 
relations can only be resolved in terms of class relations. This is an 
important point - not only for adding clarity to the analysis, but also 
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because it draws attention to the tact tllat ttle integration or articulation 
ot a labour process with a mode ot production needs to be seen in terms of 
contradiction and struggle. fhis applies not only to external articulation 
between different·production relations, but also to articulation between 
labour processes within a mode of production. 
At the level of the enterprise, a labour process that is internal to a 
mode of production must involve homogeneity between the classes in it and 
in Moments A and C. Thus it an economic system has a predominantly capital-
ist mode of production and therefore capitalist relations in Moments A and 
C, and there is a co-operative or simple commodity production enterprise in 
the system, then these latter must be characterized in terms ot their own 
relations of possession/separation, distribution and utilization i.e. as 
external labour processes that articulate to the capitalist mode through a 
heterogeneous relations of production structure. There cannot be a non-
capitalist labour process within a capitalist relations of production 
structure strictly defined. Only capitalist labour processes (including 
very particular var iations) are admissable. (Hlere may, however I be 
capitalist characteristics outside of the CMP, wlthout this being suffic-
ient to constitute the capitalist mode as such). 
lhe relation at a (class) mode of production to its internal labour 
processes lincluding variations) wlll involve: 
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Up to now it has been assumed that the labour process internal to a 
mode of production is homogeneous in the sense that it contains only one 
set of relations of exploitation. But at a less abstract level, there may 
be different relations of exploitation within a single concrete labour 
process unit.(12) An example is the combination at family and wage labour 
in a middle peasant enterprise. In this case, we could speak of the 
articulation of ditfering relations of exploitation in a labour process 
only one set of which would be internal to a mode. 
7. CONCLUSION. 
This chapter has covered the debate concerning articulation between 
the parts and the wholes of modes of production. It has arqued for 
criteria for what makes a labour process internal to a mode of production 
(and thereby also dealt more closely with what constitutes a mode itself). 
These cr i ter- ia also int arm us what locates a labour process outside a mode. 
Wi tt-lin internal labour processes, I have examined the quest ion of variat--
ion, in terms of differing ~subsumption~ of a labour process to Moments A 
and (throuqh a system dynamic) Moment C of production. In the next chapt 
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er, I look at trle articulation between modes of production and external 
labour processes. 
EN:JNOTES 
1. In particular he cites Taylor"s view that waqe-labOur under feudalism 
is merely a labour process, whereas ~Asiatic~ and lineage-based production 
are actual modes of production articulated to the capitalist. 
2. For instance, in referring to certain Third World units of production, 
Kay (1975:102) writes: 
It would be wrong not to recognise these undertakings as 
capitalist, for they possess all its formal qualities. 
On the other hand they have certain features which 
suggest that it would not be completely correct to treat 
them in this way. 
Af ter mentioning tt1e features of migrant labour and low capitalizat-
ion, he continues; °of course it may be claimed that neither of these 
features change trle fundamental character of these enterpr ises as capi tal-
ist ... but merely define them as a particular type of capitalist enterprise. 
Whatever one decides ••• ~ and he goes on to a different point. But in 
order to explain the specificity of these undertakings; their character and 
their likely development, it is sure~y necessary to try to characterize 
them as accurately as possible. 
3. For Banaji (ibid:301/2), industrial capital~s initial labour processes 
are hardly distinct from the feudal guilds. In other words, capital begins 
by operating with labour processes inherited from another mode of product-
ion. In his view ... the real capitalist mode of production is when the 
labour process is determined by capital itself and corresponds to the 
modeis motion. To support his point, Banaji quotes fv1arx"'s Grundrisse 
(1973:586/7) that where merchant capital pumps surplus labour out of small 
peasants, ~here then the mode of production is not yet determined by 
capital, but rather found on hand by it.~ 
4. Tilis prOblem is evidenced by Hindess and Hirst in their view (1977:82) 
that the .... Ancient ..... mode of production is based on; inter alia ... slave 
prOduction, tax farming, independent peasants and artisans. 
5. Taylor (1980:39) shares the position that a single relations of 
production structure can reproduce a range of labour processes. However; 
his pOSition is slightly different in that he distinguishes between a 
capitalist and non-capitalist labour process within a capitalist relations 
of production structure. The problem is ... however ... how is one to disting-
uish between these labour processes? Wilere is the line to be drawn between 
the different deqrees of integration into reproduction, in changes from 
quantity to quality? How are we to demarcate capitalist and non-capitalist 
labou!' processes tllat" are articulated to Moments A and C? In answer to 
this~ it can be arqued that in a hornogeneous production structure; the 
labour process is directly and integrally articulated with Moments A and C. 
In sucrl a conception tile relations in production are uniquely and intrins-
ically linked to ttle relations of posseSSion and separation and to specific 
relations of distribution and utilization. 
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b. Frleamann takes an even stricter view than Hindess and Hirst. For her 
(1978: IbU): 
markets in products, labour power, credit and means of 
production must encompass all units with wage relations 
in order for the reproduction of each unit to be fully 
capItalist in form. From this perspective, latitundia 
emploVlng landless labour in a context of labour 
immobllity are not fully capitalist .. 
7. That the issue is ridden with problems is evident in the claim by 
Hindess and Hirst (1979:21) that variants can correspond to different mech-
anisms of exploitation - i.e to diverse sets of relations in production. 
lhis clearly runs counter to the schema developed above about the internal 
elements of a mode ot production, as well as to Hindess~ and Hirst's own 
stress on integration of Moments A and B. 
8. In some respects this discussion below overlaps with the earlier 
analysis about what makes a labour process internal to a mode per se, 
althougr-I it deals with the distinct issue of variations within internal 
labour processes. 
9. ConverselY, for him (1976a:315) a wage-labour exploitation labour 
process need not be part of a capitalist mode of production and may lack 
capitalist motion. 
10 .. This is perhaps how Galeski's view of sLibsumption should be 
interpreted. For him (1Y72:22) the concept refeF~to~ the subordination of 
forms ot economic activity to principles determining the functioning of the 
economy as a whole. 
11 .. For Marx, both formal and real subsumptions are variants of a Fully 
capitalist labour process, i.e. both subsumptions are fully integrated into 
capitalist relations ot possession/separation, distribution and utilizat-
ion, capitalist reproduction and capitalist system processes .. Formal 
subsumption of labour to capital may exist outside of the CMP, but it also 
may be a stage in the CMP, and a foundation for real subsumption (Marx, 
1976b:1U34; 1972:478). As such, formal subsumption in the latter case is 
not simpl V wage labour and commodi tv production at fvloment B, but this in 
articulation with a capitalist mode as a whole. 
12. For Joffe (ibid), while the differences are in subsumption to 
capital, one cannot therefore say that one form is capitalist and the other 
not. Instead the one is only a cruder and more overt capitalist labour 
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1. INTRODUCTION. 
This chapter looks at the dynamics of articulation and draws attention 
to the role of classes and the relations involved. Some models of different 
situations of articulation are proposed. Articulation is then analysed 
more concretely in reference to social formations, and in terms of its 
superstructural dimensions. 
2. EXTERNAL ARTICULATION. 
The criteria for what constitutes an internal labour process (see 
previous chapter) provide a negative designation for when labour processes 
- despite articulating to the mode of production - still remain external to 
it. The task remains to theorize the positive content of articulation 
between external labour processes and the mode, and what developments are 
likely from this. 
An initial problem is in distinguishing when the economic system 
involves an articulation of complete modes of production~ and when only an 
articulation of a mode with some labour processes and classes via hetero-
geneous relations of production. This involves the question whether an 
Hexternal H labour process is actually internal to a different mode of 
production and therefore an aspect of the articulation of entire modes of 
production, or whether it is only part of a relation of production which is 
too heterogeneous to constitute a mode. (The detailed implications of this 
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tor development are elaborated in Parts E and J at this thesis.) 
An artlculatlon of two mOdes ot production would require the existence 
or two dlstinct relations and torces at production combinations - eaCh with 
its own relations ot possession/separation~ labour processes and relations 
at dlstribution/utilization. Ihere would appear to be few analytical prob-
lems when the interaction here is ot a periplleral or ad hoc kind. However~ 
the artIculation between modes can (and often tends to) become a more com-
plex interaction than simply juxtaposed coexistence - namelv~ an intersect-
lnq relationship involving domination and subordination.(l) 
4. UUMINAflON AND SUBUkDINAfrON IN ARTICULATION.(2) 
Articulation is not stable~ nor is it given by some sort of 
metaphysical tunctionalism (JVlouzelis .. 19BO:3(7). It is usuallY a dynamic 
and changlnq historical phenomenon. However~ at anyone point it should be 
possIble to analyse artIculation in terms ot domInation and subordination. 
For example ~ this is ev ident in tile work of Terray (1974: 335) who descr ibes 
articulation in pre-colonial west Africa. Here a slave mode articulated 
with a lineage mode. The tormer was domlnant because it subordinated the 
tunctioning of the latter to the dictates of its own reproduction. It 
seems fair to say that in this case there were still two modes of 
production in existence - even it they were not completely independent. 
However~ other writers describe situatlons where the subordination is 
not simply to a dominant mode's reproduction - but is within this 
reproduction. Hindess and Hirst (1977:lbl) speak about a subordinate made 
as beinq dependent tor its conditions ot existence on other modes ot pro~~ 
uction (referring here to American slavery articulated with capitalism). 
It this is the case, to what extent can the dependent or subjected mode at 
productlo'n stIll f.Je 11eld to constitute a "tull N mode of production:' Asad 
and Wolpe, tor example, believe that a mode that is dependent on another 
tor its reproduction is not a non-mode .. but simply a subordinate mode 
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(1976:492~503/4). However~ if modes of production are exclusive concepts 
and reproduction one of the criteria for a mode (see chapter seven)~ it 
seems difficult to comprehend how an entire mode of production can be held 
to exist if it is reproduced by another. (3) 
This issue can also be analysed from several other angles. One of 
these is the role of material inputs in reproduction and dominant/subord-
inate articulation. Spiegel (1979:27) argues that a mode of production is 
no longer a mode if it becomes dependent on another for such inputs. This 
would certainly appear to be the case if the dependence that Spiegel refers 
to means that the subordinate "'mode of production'" is not inherently viable 
economically. If~ however~ the dependence is not structurally intrinsic to 
it - for ex&nple~ if it simply uses a particular substitute for its own 
inputs, such as a particular technology - and the mode is capable of repro-
duction without these~ then in my view its relations may still constitute a 
mode of production. 
A different angle to consider in dominant/subordinate articulation is 
the dependence of one mode on another models social relations (rather than 
material products). It is highly questionable here whether the dependent 
-mode'" is still a mode - it is more likely to be a heterogeneous structure 
in subordinate articulation to a mode of production. (This is the case 
with simple commodity production as analysed in chapter twenty-six). 
Moving on to another angle, it may be noted that, if the subordinate 
structure is not a mode of production, this has not prevented Hindess and 
Hirst (1977:15,263) from allowing that it may constitute elements of a mode 
of' production within the reproduction of a dominant mode, provided that 
they do not contradict its conditions of existence. In response, Asad and 
Wolpe (1976:502) have accused Hindess and Hirst of inconsistency. Because 
Hindess and Hirst see a mode of production as an articulated combination of 
elements~ they should allegedly - not be able to specify elements of a 
mode outside of the combination. 
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But this is a rather formalistic criticism. That the combination is 
crucial for the nature of the elements in a mode of production, does not 
preclude these elements from existing - with inevitable differences in 
their nature and functioning - outside the mode of production and articul-
ated to other modes of production through heterogeneous relations of prod-
uction. For example, wage-labour (at Moment B) as an element of the 
capitalist mode of production (and therefore as a capitalist feature in 
consequence), may exist outside the CMP as such. As a result, it would be 
wrong to treat wage-labour as evidence of capitalist relations of product-
ion (i.e. at all Moments of production), let alone a capitalist mode of 
production complete with system dynamics and reproduced as such. At the 
same time I I would hesitate to conceptualize such an element of the CMP as 
being within for example, a feudal mode of production, rather than being 
articulated to it through a heterogeneous relation of production. This 
point has important bearing for conceptualizing rural producers who artic-
ulate with capital, as discussed in chapters thirty-one and -two .. 
An additional angle to consider about domination/subordination in 
articulation is the issue of system dynamics and the role of superstructur-
a1 relations. I deal with these in sections 4 and 8 below. 
4. ARTICULATION, SYSTEM DYNAMICS AND "'SURVIVALS". 
Articulation between modes of production appears historically to have 
led to the undermining of one mode, transforming it into pure capitalist 
forms, or reconstituting it in a new form as an external heterogeneous 
relation of production.(4) Webster (1978:168, footnote 6) points to the 
latter in noting that while it is useful to distinguish features of Chopi 
society that are not manifestly capitalist, from the capitalist mode as 
such, it is questionable whether these features can still be seen as pre-
capitalist if they are "'fully incorporated under the hegemony of the 
capitalist mode of production~ (see also Cowen, 1981:123). 
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~ome writers have taken this up in a rather vague -form-content~ 
dlstinction. For example~ Roseberry (1976:47) speaks about pre-capitalist 
torms of labour process being maintained while their basis is altered. 
Mamdani (1';177: 138) (jescr ibes pre-capitalist relations and forms of product -.-
ion as being restructured wi ttl new content.. This distinction becomes 
clearer when seen in terms ot an articulation that imposes a new system 
dynamic on d pre-existinq structure of production. 
One example tllat can be seen ln tllese terms is the way that a 
~peasant~ farm subsumed under a capitalist economic system changes its mode 
of tunctioning lGaleski~ lY72:22). The farm becomes determined by the 
capitalist economy as a whole and it consequently acqulres some of the 
teatures ot a cap1talist enterprlse. lhus capitalism~s drive to accumulate 
can be imposed on non-capitalist labour processes which persist despite 
losinq tt-le system dynamics corresponding to tlleir modes of production. For 
th1s reason (inter alia)~ the labour processes in such a situation are not 
modes of production uin any scientific sense~ (Joffe~ 1980:25) .. (This is 
taken up aqaln in greater depth in chapter seventeen). (Writers like 
Banal1~ Jotte and Taylor (1~J9~ cited in Mouzelis~ 1980) go too far~ 
tl0wever ~ and see tllese labour processes as now belng internal to the 
capitalist mode ot production see prev10us Chapter). 
Some wrlters (eq. Fransman and Davies~ 1Y77:29l~ footnote 4) use the 
term "form of production" rather than mode of production °in order to 
stress the siqnificant degree of dependence H of an external production 
structure on a mode (see also Haikes~ 1978:321~ footnote 23). However~ this 
provldes little more than an an index of the consequences of articulation. 
If the implication 1S that a -t'orm" (unlike a mode) mav develop new content 
(l.e. system dynamics)" tt-Ien Ule points above are pertinent. 
Foster-Carter (19JB:218) holds that Rey~s concept (lY73) at relatlons 
at exploltatlon is helptul in conceptualizing "survivals~ in this type of 
sltuatlon. It otter5 1 he savs~ some preclsion tor those who allow for the 
10':) 
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survival of pre-capitalist forms in ~indirect relations of production and 
exploi tation U (i. e. in Momerlt B in my framework) ~ but who react against the 
idea of entire modes co-existing. This does provide more specificity than 
the metaphorical ...... form-content", view. It accords with my theorization 
which takes account of articulation of production structures at each of the 
different Moments of production~ and enables us to analyse ~survivals~ in 
terms of heterogeneous relations of production. 
5. SOME MODELS OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF ARTICULATION. 
Some of the differences in articulation (in a class mode of product-
ion) can be represented as follows: 
M MODE OF PRODuCTION 
tVjoment B: 
XY :::~lass fe13.tIons ~ 
--------. f40ment C: 
Homent A: 
XY c!ass relatIOns 
In this dIagram, the same classes are present 
and the three torm an Integrated whole. T: lnus 
XV class relations 
in each Moment ot PL·oduction. 
relations in the labour 
process at B are congruent with the general class relations of poss2ssion 
~nd separation at A. in addItion. the relations of dIstribution and 
utiliz3tion at C tallow the slass divide in Moments A and B. and in turn 
they reinrorce and perpetuate the possessIon-separatIon relations at A. 
5.2. ARTICULATION OF TWO MODES OF PR00uCTION IN AN ~CONUMIC SYSTEM 
Moment b 8D 
r 
~-'C". i (c~ '--------- / ' 
r·llc~fne!l t ,\ ,t:..a n 
ThiS dlaQram shows two distinct ana autonomous modes or production that 
pal t i ali \: I n t e i sec:: L a t t II e POl n tot the i f dis L fib uti 0 n r e 1 a t ion s • D i r t e r -
2r.t class f2id11GnS eXist in eacr: mooe. present at .:d I Uuee Moments. 
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110ment E 
f'1omen t C 
t10ment P', 
Laoour processes I invOlvIng the same general Class relations at Al articul-
ate witn each other tnrough common and intersecting distribution relations 
at C. These iabour processes ate internal to the mode or productIon. 
5.4. ARTICULATION OF AN EXTERNAL iABOUR PROCESS WITH A DOMINANT MODE OF 
PRODUCTION. CO~STiTUTING A HETEROGENEOUS RELATION OF PRODUCTION. 
8 BB 
r 
I 
r 
I 
I !(' ..... 
\ 
,.--.-.. -y~ A "-" p'.p.~ 
In the articulation with mode ot production \A. B and C). the structure or 
AA, BB. CC.l and CC. i1 is constltutea as a heterogeneous relatIon of 
productIon. ThIS situation covers simple commodity producers whose distrib-
utive relations are wholly within the CMP. Its relations of 005se55ion-
separatIon. in production and of u~ilization remain non-capitallst. 
6. ARTICULATION AND THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM. 
Domination and subordination in articulation means that it is possible 
to characterize the economic system in terms of the dominant mode of 
production - as, for example, a capitalist economic system. It is worth 
noting that the economic totality of an economic system has different 
territorial levels of effectivity - ego at regional, national and inter-
national levels (Laclau, 1971:33). In terms of empirical analysis, it is 
necessary to spell out how (if at all) each level constitutes a specific 
effective unity, and what the interrelations between levels are. 
It would consequently be wrong to restrict the identification of modes 
of production to the level of separate national economic systems where 
these systems are parts of a wider international economic system. For 
instance, the capitalist mode of production exists (and is dominant) across 
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a number of national economic systems. fhe efficacy of each system -
including the articulation within each national economic system between the 
dominant capitalist mode of production and other local modes of production 
and production structures - gives it a significantly different character in 
each. But it remains the capitalist mode nonetheless. The articulation 
of different modes of production may also span several national economic 
systems. An example of this is the Comecon regional socialist economic 
system articulated to the international capitalist economic system. 
The concept of economic system (at regional~ national or world level) 
includes not only an articulation of modes of production, labour processes 
and heterogeneous relations of production~ but also articulation between 
labour processes constituting sectors. Sectors may span several distinct 
forces of production structures (and therefore also the distinct relations 
of production structures that correspond to them). Thus, forces of 
production sectors defined by activity, size or product may involve 
relations which are part of several modes or heterogeneous relations of 
production.(5) 
The economic system involves not merely different labour processes, 
but also a range of relations of circulation, distribution and consumption 
(Godelier~ 1972:335). This attention to the complexity of articulation in 
the total division of labour enables us to follow Amin (1974:4) in distin~-
uishing between a world (-international- is actually more accurate) capit-
alist economic system and a world capitalist market. For Amin, Eastern 
Europe is a marginal part of the market~ but it is not part of the system 
because its internal relations are not dependent on this market.(6) In 
other words, there are different levels at which the economic totality 
designated by economic system is effective depending on the integration 
and intersection ot the various Moments of each production structure. 
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7. ARTICULAfION AND THE SOCIAL FORMATION. 
Articulation ~on the ground~ involves far more than economic factors, 
and here the concept ot social formation is useful in analysing the added 
complexity. For some writers, the concept of -social formation~ is not very 
different from that of ..... economic system# (for example, Asad and Wolpe, 
1976:492,504). However, the concept usually refers to more than this in 
that it designates the concrete conditions of existence of these economic 
forms (Hindess and Hirst, 1977:13/4, Morris, 1977:308). In addition, 
although an economic system may exist at varying levels of territorial 
effectivity, ~social formation~ tends to designate only the effective unit 
covered by a nation state (Poulantzas, 1978:95). HSocial formation u takes 
the national economic system into account as a politico-spatially constit-
uted system. Even more than this, the concept includes the entire social 
and political tableau of a national economic system, and not only where 
this pertains to the effective economic unit.(7) The concept is therefore 
far broader than that of economic system. 
Articulation of modes of production within and across social 
formations involves both economic and extra-economic dimensions (Locke, 
1976:18, footnote 6).(8) There is some debate, however, as to the 
implications of this point for the scope of the concept of mode of 
production (see Sale 1978:41; 1977:38). For example for Terray and 
Poulantzas, the concept includes political and ideological elements, but 
for Meillesoux and Balibar it covers only the economic (Mouzelis, 
1979b:175/6, footnote 51). 
For Muratorio (1980:40, 57 footnote 2), this kind of articulation 
indicates that the concept of mode of production itself includes the 
totality of social relations and human practices - not just economic. For 
her, it is because fact'ors like ~ethnici ty, religious beliefs, values, 
norms, laws, symbolic forms of domination and resistance, in sum institut-
ions and ideologies, enter as constitutive elements of the modes of produc-
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tion" I tt-18t tl"le ar'tIculation at mOdes 1nvolves iljeolo01cal articulat1on. 
nle suostance at Muratorlo's point 1S correct~ but she neverttleless 
cont-lates the concepts ot- soc1al t-ormation and mode ot production.<Y) 
Ihis 1ssue about whether mode ot product1on refers only to the 
economlc~ or to the social total1ty has been an important debate in the 
Ilterature. Clarke et al (lY}B:1191 say that the political and 1deoloq1cal 
are ot a dittecent order to the economic~ and only enter tIle analysis at 
ttle level ot- concrete social formations dominated by a mode of productIon 
(see also Roxborouqh~ 197b:1Lb/7). But there are problems with th1S view. 
firstlv~ 1t mIght be taken to 1mplv that - unl1ke the case at pol1tics 
and ideology theoretical elaboration at the econom1C can De appl1ed 
unproblemat1cally 1n emp1rical analysis. However. even at the econom1C 
level, the concept ot a mode of production designates only general teatures 
and theretore 1ts eX1stence in a social formation depends also on specitic 
concrete economic conditions of existence. conseQuently~ a mode ot 
product1on may well exist in more complex, uneven material economic form 
(not to ment10n here its articulation with other econom1C structures). A 
better way of viewing things is to see the social t-ormation as the 
Pol1tical~ 1deoloqical and economic relations necessary for the eX1stence 
at a mode Ot production (Hindess and Hirst, lYl7:l3/4).(lU) 
~econdlv, the perspective of Llark et al is problemat1c in that 1t can 
lead to a t-unct1onalism wnereby the econom1C teleoloqically invokes the 
polit1cal and ideoloQ1Cal (Mouzelis, 1Y8u:3b7; 374 footnote 11). In my 
View, the mode at production 1S better seen as determininq the relations 
between the politIcal, ideological and econom1C conditions at existence 
(Hindess and H1rst,197J:l~). In terms of the base/superstructure model 
(see chapter tour)~ 1t may be arqued that in any given social formation~ 
the superstructure corresponds (In some cases in a contradictory way) to 
the relations ot the base (structured in dominance by one mode), and the 
base can only exist and be reproduced in conlunction with these extra-
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economIC condItions. 
f 11e su~)erstructural condl tiorlS Or existence at a mOde are U-IUS never 
given In the abstract by a mode. 80th these and the economic conditions 
are t On()ed .. modlt" ied and transt ormed at trlis level. And as Morr is 
(lY7b:3U8) correctly notes, 
all modes of productIon exist only in the concrete 
economic, political and Ideological condItions of a 
socIal tormatlon . ... A mode at production cannot effect 
its reproductlon/transtormation in and of itself. this 
can only be ensurea as the outcome at specltic class 
struggles conducted WIthin these very conditluns. (~ee 
also Mouzells, IYbU:Jb4 - GB). 
It is at this level that modes at production are to be analysed in 
terms Ot the classes and torms of state that affect their development. The 
dynamIcs of class formation and transformation need to be seen as part at 
the articulation ot mudes ot production in the concrete (Cliffe, 1917:19J; 
see also laylor, 1919, in Mouzelis, 1980:3b4). 
8. AkllLULAlluN AND IHl SUPERSTRUC1URE 
ArtIculation at the level at the social formatIon thus implIes an 
artILulatlon between economic and extr'a-economic levels -- but wtlat does 
thIS actually involve:' In answer to thIS, one can point to the way that 
tne artIculation of particular structures at one level aftects the 
structures at other levels. 
Chanqes in ttle base at a pre-capi talist mode at prOduction Nare gOInq 
to qenerate .. and be visible through, changes In all social relatlons~ 
(Cllfte .. 1~77:2U5). Clitfe notes that changes in land tenure attect family 
patterns, and kinsl-lip is re-shaped by re-organisation at ttle dIviSIon at 
labour. Irle changed patterns due to articulation are "'resultants U -
"shapea by baH) parents, ret lectlnq crlaracter istics of botll". 
Another outcome at articulation may be that a dominant mode ends up 
artlculatir)C) only WI th superstructural relICS at trle otrler rl10de (::'Pleoe1 .. 
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lYI~:~j). (lhiS lS one way at trying to theorize the form-content problems 
o~ external labour processes articulated to a mOde). In some cases~ 
however, it is the superstructural level trlat may be changed wt-lile the base 
remalns more-or-less constant. Another scenario is evident in the Peruv1an 
case (bradby, lY15:155) where the articulation destroyed the particular 
economic relations that specitlcally underpinneo the political power at the 
Inca state, but maintained the rest in transtormed torm. 
The efrect at articulation between particular instances lS not 
syrnmetr lcal for tt-Ie two sldes at the relationship. lrlus tIle West At r lcan 
slave trade t-Iad a oif f erent siqnif icance t or the two modes of produc tion 
lnvolved in this articulation. Whereas tor the capitalist mode, it was 
primarily at economic signlticance, for the pre-capitalist mode of" 
production it served to boost political power. The further subsequent 
(Jevelopment of exctlange (into the trade in products) undermined the pre-
capitalist ruling class. This was because while commOdity excrlange is 
distinct tram the political in capitalism, it lS the way that the polltical 
operates 1n a lineaqe mode at production (Dupr~ and key, 1973:15b/7). 
Dlfterent realms at a social tormation have difterent roles for each 
concrete mode at proouction. Iherefore, the transition tram one mode at 
production to another may lnvolve -- ttlrougtl the transformation of tr"le 
conditions ot eXlstence of the earlier mode - a re-ordering at the roles at 
the various levels ln the social formation. Development policy often Vlews 
articulatlon (not alWayS recognizinq it by this name) in terms of the 
putative etfects at the superstructural level (see chapter thirty-five). 
9. CONLLUSluN. 
If articulation at an economic level has effects at other superstruc-
tural levels, it is also often the consequence at forces at these levels. 
In particular the role of the state in articulation is a key element of 
unuerstandlnq questlons at development~ unc1erClevelopmen"[ and econornlC 
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ctlange. It fs taken up in chapter fourteen. The significance of this, and 
ot dominat.ion and subordination at all levels of articulation, for develop--
ment is discussed in Part D in the context of the international capitalist 
economic system, and in Part I in conceptualizing rural social structure in 
articulation with the capitalist mode of production. 
EN)N()TES 
1. It would be fascinating to analyse Marx"s remarks in the Grundrisse 
about the ef fect of conquest in terms of the articulation framework. fv1arx 
describes how the conquered may be brought under the conqueror"s mode of 
production - although sometimes only partially; how the conquered mode may 
be left intact - but have tribute extorted from it; and how there may be a 
reciprocal interaction which creates a new synthesis from the fusion of 
both systems of production (Marx, 1973:97) 
2. Domination and subordination are further analysed in chapter sixteen. 
3. Wolpe~s response to the issue has been to label the dependent -mode~ a 
-restricted mode of production~ (1980a:34-38). This he counterposes to an 
"'extended mode of production" which has its own nlaws of motion'" and 
mectlanisms of reproduction. While Wolpe is on the right track in his 
distinctions, it seems confusing to call both situations a -mode'" of 
production, albeit "restricted" or "'extended ..... In my terminoloqy, Wolpe"s 
~restricted mode of production" is a heterogeneous relation of production 
(subordinately articulated with a mode for its reproduction and system 
processess), and the ...... extended mode" is simply a "'mode of production". 
4. Changes that occur in concrete articulation may appear as subtle, 
undramatic and seemingly insignificant, but these may culminate in 
qualitative transformation of the distinctions, relations and class 
interests of the subordinate mode (Cliffe, 1977:205/6). 
5. Contrary to Long and Richardson (1978:177), the ~informal sector n 
involves more than only petty commodity production relations. 
b. It is sometimes held that while there is a First, Second and a Third 
World, there are only two maior modes of production in the current world 
economy (Mafeje, 1977:413). This observation can be more precisely 
conceptualized in terms of the above discussion. 
7. Understood in this way, the concept of nsocial formation'" draws 
attention to elements that are not necessarily given by the concepts 
Usociety'" or "'country". "Society'" draws attention to social characterist-
ics, but not necessarily to the articulation of different structures. 
~Country~ is similar to "'social formation~, except that it is historically 
specific - tendinq to refer to nation-states only. In contrast, ~social 
formation~ covers any effective societal entity based on an effective 
economic, social and political unit. 
8. It is important to state this because the articulation approach has 
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been crItIcized for beIng economistic and iqnoring the political level ot 
articulatIon (see Mouzelis~ 1980:368/9; Foster-Carter~ 197M:243). 
9. poulan~zas (19JM:27) also argues that political and ideologIcal 
relations are present in ttle constitutIon ot a mode at production and do 
not only and tunctionalistically enter the picture at the level ot repro-
duction. For him~ it is because they are present in this first place~ that 
tney play an essentIal role In reproduction. However" what he confuses here 
is VOle level ot tne social tormation with that of tile 'mode ot production. 
lU. Hindess and Hirst are not entirely consIstent on this issue. They 
sometimes imply that these conditions are part at the mode~ as in their 
analysis ot ideological and political relations vis-a-vis primitive cor~nun­
ism and the ancient mode ot production (Asad and Wolpe~ 197b:4t$9" 492). 
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CHAPTER fEN 
l:.CON(Jlo1IC TRANSITION 
L. Economic change through internal and external articulation. 
3. The ~transitional~ mode of production. 
4. All modes of production as finite. 
5. Critique ot the finite mode approach. 
6. Concrete transition. 
7. Transition and articulation. 
8. Class and transition. 
9. Conclusion. 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
TRANSITTON 
The previous two chapters have analysed articulation between economic 
forms, concentrating on articulation between modes of production, as well 
as between modes and labour processes via heterogeneous relations of 
production. Domination and subordination in this articulation may result 
1n destruction, absorbtion or qualitative restructuring ot the weaker side 
in the relationship. This significant component of economic change is 
analysed in depth in Part E in the context of articulation within the 
international capital1st econom1C system. However, economic change may 
also result from a dynamic ttlat is internally rather than externally 
determined, and this is the major topic of this chapter. 
2. EC~NOMIC CHANGE THROUGH EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL ARTICULATION. 
Articulation, as discussed in the previous chapter, involves relation--
ships of domination and subordination. These may lead to transition from 
the dominance ot one mode to another. 
For Asad and Wolpe (19/6), it is the contradictory combination of 
modes of product10n (and of modes and elements of modes) which explains 
transitions between difterent modes. The idea 1S partially correct 
(although even here this is not the whole story of transition - as the 
discussion below will clernonstrate). However, contt-ary to another idea 
they advance, it is difticult to see how a sltuation ot contradictory 
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comDination ca.l be seen in terms ot a whole mode beinq reproduced within a 
ditterent mode ot production. It would appear instead that what is involv-
ed is an external articulation between one mode and some element(s) ot 
another. Ihls artlculation can constitute a heterogeneous relation ot prod--
uction with the external element, (which may, if it is not part at a mode 
at production, also already be a pre-constituted heterogeneous relation). 
In tact, because Asad and Wolpe see external articulation (and hence 
domination and subordination) as internal to a mode of production, they are 
unable to otter criteria for explaining change and transition, i.e. when, 
tor example, the subordinate mode/elements become the dominant mode, and 
when the dominant mode eventually ceases to be a mode and becomes only 
elements. It can be argued that it is more fruittul to see domination/-
subordination and reproduction/transition in terms of an economic system 
involving an artlculation ot a mode of production through external hetero-
geneous relations of production. This enables a clearer picture ot changes 
in domination and subordination to be drawn. 
lxternal articulation is an important factor, but by no means is it 
the whole story ot transitlon from the dominance of one mode to another. A 
mode ot production does not stay static during external articulation: a 
signlticant part or economic chanqe is the outcome ot a modeJs internal 
contradlctions as distinct trom its external dynarnics. The genesis and 
development ot new economic torms out of the old in this manner does 
involve artlculatlon - but among elements ot the same mode ot production, 
ratrler than between qualitatively dif f erent economic relations. ( 1) 
3. THE ulkANSITIONAL u JVIGDE OF PRODUCTIUN. 
Balibar (191U) has theorized a concept of a Utransitional mode of 
productlon u to characterize internally-determined transition from one mode 
to another (Hlndess and Hirst, 1977:2b4).(2) In particular, he argues that 
a 'Jtransitional mode at production U powered the historical change from 
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teuOallsm to caP1talism IMouzelis l 1~/~b:~L). In contrast l Dobb (19bL:lb) 
Cllsml~;ses dnv H1ea ot an u intermeC1late mooe ot prOduction" between capital-
ism and teudalism l ask1ng what kInd of an1mal thIs would be. But it 1S 
precIsely this issue that Balibar tackles with hIS theory ot the structures 
ot a trans1tional mode. For him" a transitional mod8 - unlike an ordinary 
one does not have a correspondence ot structures. On the contrary" it has 
a distinct non-correspondence - both within economic structures" and also 
between these and political structures (Mouzelis" 1979b:52). 
Ballbar arques that between teuoalism and capItalism there was a 
d1st1nct mode at production" namely" "manutacture" I whictl involved a non-
correspondence ot feUdal forces or production and capitalist relations ot 
product1on. He descr ibes this (at Moment I:) -- the labour process) as 
involv1ng handicratts and the manutactory combined with wage-labour 
exploitatIon (although a d1sjunction would prObably also be evident at 
Moments A and C) (see also Hindess and Hirst" 1~1}:267/~). 
Uther wrIters have stressed the non-correspondence between economic 
and political structures. Dupr~ and Rey (1~13:1bUI162) write ot a new and 
"unstable U mode ot production constituted by colonialism - a mode Which is 
"neIther capitalism nor tIle lineage made of production" 0 rhis reterence to 
the Instability at the structure (and l by 1mplication l to 1ts transitional 
nature) is exp~icItly developed 1n Rey's later work (1975 1 CIted by Bradby, 
1'::1/5:14/) wnel-e he speaks dIrectly at "transit1onal modes ot production;;, 
crlaracteriz1nq them as str-uctures U-lat give way to other modes. (5) 
~or ~alibar" it is the non-correspondence 1n the transitional modes at 
production Wh1Ch makes them trans1tional. It 1S this structural tendency 
Wh1Ch distIngUIshes them tram ordInary (non-transitional) modes. He holds 
ttlat the corr'espondence of torces and relations of production in an 
ordinary mode ot pruduct10n is such that the efticacy of each is lImited to 
HIe r eprOCluct lon at the wrJole. by contrast,l the non-correspondence of a 
tranS1 t10nal mode means ttlat e1 ther- the relations or the t orces ot product---
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lun ar 8 tr ansr onneC! by tne et r ee t or tne one on ttle other-. 
I rlUS, In a tranSl tional mOC1e or proC!uction, reproduction is simul tan--
eDusly dissolutlon. fhe non-correspondence ensures that the mode has an 
endlrtCl to It. Indeed it lS almost teleoloqical in its development towards 
a new stable mode where either the forces or relations will correspond to 
new counterparts (HindeSs and Hirst, 1~7b:Lb4/~). What Balibar is theoriz-
lng her'e l.S a concept at a ·'t ini teN mode at production to complement the 
concept ot an "eternal U mode (ibid:Lj~). While the finite mode inevitably 
dlssolves or transtorms itself into a new mode, the ~eternal~ mode has no 
SUCh structural necessity. 
Ihere are two baslc prOblems with 8alibar's etforts. In the first 
place l althOuqh he credibly tries to theorize the contradictions internal 
to the structures at a transltional situation, there is no explanation as 
to how tllese contradictions work themselves out in social transformation 
(Mouzelis l 10/~b:S3). Nor is there a clear distinction drawn between 
changes which take place within the terms at a contradiction, and changes 
WhlCh qualitatlvely transtorm the contradiction. 
Secorujl y, balibar does not explain how the correspondence of an 
ordlnary mode or prOduction can become the non-correspondence of a transit-
iunal one. tHe rather weakly suggests that the movement trom stable repro--
ductlon to unstable transtormatlon is a contingent and accidental matter 
lsee Hlndess and Hl.!'st, l'7I!:Ll~». rhlS problem cannot be overcome by 
posltinq yet another structure -- this time between eternal and finite modes 
lMouzelis, 1~/~b:~2). Ihe approaCh is thus unable to fully explain histor-
l.cal transition between modes at production. 
4. ALL MUU(S UF PHUDUCTION AS FINITl. 
Une appruach to understanding how modes or production change is to 
elirrllnate 8allbar's radlcal dlvlsion between eternal and tinite modes ot 
prOductlon. banan lISJ/ba:Jll) ror example, says tllat trle "laws of motlon~ 
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01 Ule teudal mC)(je qenerated ttle conditIons tor the capitalist mode. This 
type ot approach tllere~ ore does away WI ttl "eternal" modes altogether - all 
modes become transltional.(4) 
In one strand ot Marxism, thIS type ot view sees history as a more-or-
less 1nevitable sequence at staqes throuqh the various modes of productIon. 
frle motor ot the process is seen as being the Inexorable growth ot 
prOductIve capacity. Ihe role Ot the relations of production is viewed as 
reactlve and limIted to acceleratlnq or retardinq tIle inevitable growth or 
trlis caoacity, but still as ultimately swinging in behind this qrowth (see 
~talirl, 194Ub, In Lecourt, 1~l/:10; Cohen, 1978:165; Cabral 1969:77; 
8arratt brown, 19/b:47, tootnote 10). Clearly this Vlew is an advance on 
balibar's Insotar as It provides a motor tor chanqe within and between 
modes Ot proouc.tion. However, as discussed below, it is highly problematic 
wlth reqard to ttle particular motor designated. 
ftlis teChnologIcal determinist conception has its origins in Marx's 
Preface to the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (see also 
Lecourt, 1~Jj:11U, tootnote 9). It is also partly rooted in the passage 
trom JVlarx's Poverty of Philosophy about the handmill qivinq rlse to SOCiety 
W1th ,eudal lord, and the steam mill produclnq the industrial capItalist 
(see braverman, l~j4:1~). 8ecause this conception seems to grossly 
underestimate trle role ot tluman aqency in histOl-y, attempts have been made 
to reconc1le 1t with less determlnistic facets of Marxism. ~or example, 
braverman tries to modity technoloqical determIn1sm by argUIng that While 
productive capaCIty may produce social change, it is itself a product of 
soclal conditlons (ibid:19). He pOints out that productive capacity grows 
within the context ot a particular relations ot production structure. rhus 
the stearn mlll qrows out ot feudalism; capitalism In turn produces 
electr lCltV, internal combustion and atom1C power. In other wot-ds, wtlile 
the movement wlttlln a mode ot Pl'oductlon 1S seen by Braverman as beinq of 
the forces ot productIon, it is powered by the relations ot prOduction. 
11'::1 
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J. fl 8raverrnan' s V lew, the determ1ninq role ot t orces of prOduct ion on 
ttle t·elatlons or prOduct1on is only wrlen they "outgrow" the relations 
Wlttl1n WhlCh they have developed. In th1S conception, the contradiction 
Detween the relations and forces ot product1on develops within a mode at 
pt'OCluctlon. It 1S resolved by new relations which correspond with the 
torces, whereupon the contradictlon develops aqain, and so on. ~raverman 
thus rerines technological determinism, but it must be pointed out that he 
still stlares ttle ma ior t laws of the approach. As I discuss below, these 
are the unsubstantlated assumption ot ever-expandinq productive capaclty, 
and the unexplained way in which such expansion is supposed to bring about 
chanqe between modes of production. 
5. CHI1IWUE UF THE FINIll MOD[ APPROACH. 
Against ~raverman and the technological determ1nists, it is incorrect 
to think that modes at production teleoloqically develop productive 
capac i ty, or that tt-lis alleged phenomenon creates a structure of nort-
correspondence between torces and relations ot production WhlCh then pulls 
the latter into line with the tormer. 
~Ir·stly, not all modes of production involve an inexorable qrowth ot 
productive capaclty -- the course ot productive capacity itselt needs to be 
explaIned. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, not all transitions 
between modes ot production are the result of relations ot production 
"catchlng up" wlth advanced means ot production. Several writers have 
argued that teudallsm dld not lnevitably lead to capitalism. Capitalist 
torces and relatlons of production, in their view, qrew independently ot 
developments wlthin teudalism. lhey add that feudalism collapsed ln its 
own rUlns, and that capltalism qrew upon these (see tor lnstance, 8renner, 
l~/!:jd, bll. Another example lS that world h1story thus tar has seen a 
transltlon between capltalism and soclallsm in cases precisely wtlere 
capltal1sm has DIllv part1allY developed product1ve capaclty (and even 
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underdeveloped it in some instances). Indeed~ it has been arqued by some 
Marxists that socialism is a pre-requisite to the development of productive 
capacity in the lhird World lsee ~klair~ 197~:3lj).(5) 
I wou~d argue that wnile it is necessary to reject 8alibar~s 
assumptlon Ot modes as inherently eternal, it does not follow that modes 
(by vlrtue at an allegedly expanding productive capacity - or anything else 
tor that ma~ter) are theretore inevitably finite. This is not to deny that 
where a mode of production (eq. capitalism) has developed productive 
capacity" It may create structural tensions and pressures towards new 
relatIons and torces of production. (In advanced capitalism~ there are 
pressures towards collective production and general regulation of the 
economy). rhe paint is therefore to take account ot tendencies and 
contradictions of a mode of production which may, though not necessarily, 
result in non-correspondence ot economic structures. Such dislocations 
allow tor possible outcomes wherein correspondence is re-established or 
created anew in a new mode of production. I t is still necessary" Ilowever, 
to spell out the actual transforming agencies in these situations. As 
Locke (lYlb:17) says, no concrete transition can be explained in terms of 
the contradictory presence of the general form of two modes of productIon. 
b. CUNCRE1E lRANSITION. 
The reproduction and transformation of a mode of production has to be 
located in terms at the conditions at existence in a social formation. In 
my view, tIle ['eal motor at change wi thin (and also between) modes of prod-
uction is primarily the class strugqle (in its various torms) taking place 
within the social structures and system dynamics of a particular concrete 
situatlon (see also Mouzelis, 1~19b:53, 19~u:367; Morris" 197b:309). 
On thIS baSIS, it is possible to agree with Hindess and Hirst 
(1';I//:2U2) that Unottunq in its concept prolllbits the continued 
121 
IJNTTS OF ANAL YSl::=5. 
TRANSITION 
repruduction at a mode at production, and nothlnq in its concept requires 
trlat a mode ot productIon transqress its own limits, i.e. dissolve itse.lt. N 
The concepts ot the varIOUS modes ot production provide the basis for a 
qualitative ditterentiation ot historical realitv. But they do not 
constItute a theory at transition between a sequence at modes (ibid:]). 
The conclusion to this is that transition cannot be theorized in great 
detail In the abstract. for example, there is no general pattern ot 
transition tram feudalism to capitalism (Hindess and Hirst, ibId:~M9). rhe 
most that can be done is specity the necessary changes for the transition 
from one made of production to another, and to analyse the stabilitv or 
otllerwise or a mode's Internal contradictions - both wi thin and between its 
torces and relations ot production, and between these and its political and 
ideologIcal conditions at existence. 
l. IkAN~I1ION AND ARfiCULAflON. 
An important point about lrlternally-powered transition is that It is 
neither a rupture where production is suspended, nor is it a pure, total 
and unltarv transformation of the given mode at production. Instead, 
economic Chanqe is likely to be uneven, and to involve external articulat-
ion relat ionships --- t or example, capitalist labour processes articulated 
WIth the (Changing) feUdal mode of production. 
1-01' IVlol-rlS (197b::297L the transitional period between feudalism and 
capitalism combined features at each mode of production. He arques that 
this does not constItute a new mode because despite the umerqing of 
features - it is still possible to disentanqle the web of relations 
sufticientlv to speclty the dominant mode of production~ (ibid).(b) 
LertaInlv the identitication ot such a mode and its tendencies does 
I,elp to cl-Iaracteclze tile direction and cont licts in the situation. Dobb 
(l~bL:lbJ tor example, in arguinq aqalnst an ~intermediate mOde of 
l prOductIon" in lnqland between lbUU and lC;UU, demonstrates the value of 1~2 
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::;eelrl<::] tt-le 31tuation as caPitalist at an immature staqe, but capitalism 
IH]Tl8trtpless. t)8cause 8alibar frlls!)erc..eives ttllS, tle tails to see tt-Iat ttle 
labour process non-correspondence whICh he describes 1S actually a variant 
ot a cap1 tallst labour process. (I he re1ations HI product1on were 
capItalist, they varied only in their torces ot production dimension). 
8alibar thus ends up reducing the capitalist mode ot production to only one 
ot its var1ant labour processes - ~real subsumption~ based on advanced 
means ot product1on (HlndeSs and Hirst, 1~j]:2b/). In Marx's V1ew, while 
torma~ subsumption ot labour under capital may exist outside the CM~ as 
such, It may also be a stage within the CMP (see previous chapter; Marx, 
1';;:1 ibtJ: lUl~/2u; lUj4 ). 8alibar' s v iew is poorer t or excluding SUC~I a 
conce~)t ion. 
b. CLA~S ANU rkAN~llION. 
A question Wh1Ch still remains to be examined is when the turn1nq 
point 1S reached: at what staqe can the capitalist mode (or any other) be 
saId tu have emerqed as domlnant( (see Hindess and Hirst, ibid:~89). 
Uobb's (llistorically-app1ied) answer here IS that "one could only speak ot 
HIe sltuat10n as being non-teudal It there were no lonqer a teudal rullnq 
class WIth Its particular source ot income still surv1vinq~ (see also 
Gallisot, lY]~:41b).(J) 
IransIt1orl, seen in terms at class contradictions, can be identlt1ed 
.. ~ 
as qualitative or' quantitative aCcorrJ1nq to wrletrler the ma ior terms at tile 
contradict1on -.-- VIZ. the classes involved -- are ctlanqed or' not. InasmUCh 
as classes can serve as indices ot qualitative and quantItative transition, 
1t 1S necessary to establish Changes in class structure and class dominance 
c..learly at all three Moments ot production (and a1so at the level ot 
polit1cal structures and consciousness). 
I t11S 1S not to reduce all ttle contrarJictions ot transi tion to class 
contl'adictions. For example I trle contradict1ons between the relations and 
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forces of prOductlon are ~ensions between two structures of social 
relatlons: ~he technlcal ano the surplus labour relatlons. Although class 
reldtl(lnS are attel_teo lJV, anel involved 111, tllese tenSIons, the two 
cont[adictluns are stlll distinct. Furtnermore, analysinq transition 
involves lClentlt virl';l not only Class issues, bUL also tile constitution ot 
system dyrlamlcs out at the whole, and its continued reproduction as well. 
'-j. CUNLLU::-'lllr---j. 
hJCUSslng on classes provIdes more ttlan criteria for quantitative/-
qualitative assessment ot economic change - it also enables us to analyse 
transition in ter-ms ot class tOrmatlon, coni licts and alliances. Any conc-·-
rete teanSl t Ion (eg. t ollowlng tile kussian revolution) involves ttlese class 
dvnamics ootll wltrlln the domlnant mode of production ana in its relations 
or E'1<_ternal artIculatIon. Tile separatIon of internal and external dynamics 
is an atlstractlon pertor-meO in U'leor-y. In any empirical situation, all the 
class dynamIcs llncluding Doth those lnternal and external to the dominant 
mOele tJr pcuuuction) are part ur the picture ot economIC cnange.(CS) 
The points HI ttlis Chapter are ot particular relevance tor ttJis tt1ESlS 
HI anal ysing Ltle role ot planned deve lopment: in economic crlanqe. ~uch 
development strategIes are otten conceIved by planners as being ca~alysts 
ot r unoamental economic transition lr) rhird War lei economies. lhis may be 
protitably analysed In the llgnt at the lssues dealt wlth In this chapter, 
viz. how the class relations ana torces/relatlons ot productlon lnvolved 
ar ticulate botn witll planneo development sctlernes themselves, as well as 
Wlttl exterr,al classes ana production relations, and wllether the economic 
ct-ianqe tlley lnltiaLe is qualltdtlve or quantitative in character. 
--- -- ---------- ---------._-------------- ----_.--------------------------
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ENJNUJE.~ 
1. Rey t l'-ijj) r-ldS been accuseCI of creating a macro-r ramework of articul--
at ion Wnlcn ignores the distinction wnicr-I 1 tt-Ieor ize rlel'e as trlat between 
internal and external articulation {see foster-(;arter~ 1978:218). In fact~ 
Ilowever, Hey (joes note the ait tecence between the articulation of fully--
tledyed mOdes Ot prouuction (Wltn one being introduced tram the outside) 
and wilen ttle art iculation ar lses endogamously t see quotation from Rey in 
Foster-Carter, ibid:230). 
2. It is interesting in this regard to note that the Grundrisse speaks 
or certain modes of production as Uhybrid, intermediate forms" (Marx, 
19"J3:5lL) • 
3. Rey holdS that a transitional (to capitalism) mode replaced the pre-
capitallst modes as a result at their articulation with the capitalist 
mode. Strlctly speaking, this understandlng of -transitional mode~ is of a 
different order to Balibar's - it arises from external rather than internal 
articulation. Rey also dll-ters tram Balibar by arguing that there was no 
transltional hybrid mode In the transition from feudalism to capitalism. 
Instead, tIle dynamic of reudallsm was itself transitional in that it 
created the conditions for the capitalist mode tBradby, 1975:144). On this, 
Rey's position is similar to Banaji~s (see Banaji 197ba). 
4. Godelier (1912:)4~) describes this type of view. For him, it sees 
the genesis or one system as tIle slmul taneous process of tl-Ie development of 
internal contradictions In the old system. 
~. Although there is not space here tor a detailed crltique of G. A. 
Cohen~s defence of the forces of production as the motor of history 
( 197e: Ibb), the two points made in ttle main text here are - in my v lew 
fundamental criticisms at the tecllnological determinist approach wllictl 
COhen tails to ret ute. 
b. Hindess (1976) and tless explicitly) LOCKe l197b:17) argue along 
simllar lines that there is no dsoclalist mode of production" in a 
socIalist trdnsltlon per 10d. lnstead, at any given stage tIle cornbiflatlons 
l.)t CClPl tallst and communlst modes can De ldentlt leo so as to reveal tile 
(jc1mlnarl t melde. 
i. ftH HiltOl1 (l':1ij!LUbJ, even tilOUgll European capl.talism was and is 
r-ldclled Wltl"l feuljal rellcs" capltalism ana reLlcJa-Lism are distinct social 
tonnatlons uecause tl"ley are based on (jiiter-ent modes or production, 
lel;1i timare!j by cllt" t erent ldeologlcal systems and domlnated by strugqles 
between soclal Classes distinctive o~ eactl. 
~. fh-LS werspeC~lve enables us to understand how~ as Asad and WOlpe 
llY1b:S0~) argue, the conditlons of eXlstence of one mode can partially be 
tr1e coneJitions I)t existence tor the elements ot anottler mode - as in the 
way ttlat the t eLloal mode prov ided a market tor emerglng bouI"I;Jeoisie at the 
capitallst mode (Hindess and Hlrst, 19J7=29b/7; see also Rey 1973). 
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SURPLUS AN) ECONlMIC OEVELO~Nr 
1. lntroductlon. 
2. rhe case at LhInese aqrlculture. 
j. utIlIzation ot surplus labour. 
4. rhe concept ot surplus and development. 
~. lhe two departments ot production. 
b. ConclusIon: polItics and surplus. 
1. INfRuUUCfION. 
The prev ious chapters Ilave established a general f rarnework tor 
analysing development~ with the concepts of forces and relations of 
SURPLUS 
production ot a mode ot production and articulation between different 
economic elements in an economic system. Transition and change in these 
relations lies not In some metaphysical inexorable growth of productive 
capacitv~ but in class structures~ contradictions and struggles. This 
chapter analyses tile way in which all this at f ects tile development ot 
productIve capaCIty. To this end~ It looks at relations ot utilization In 
terms ot tIle concept ot "surplusJ#". 
2. IH~ CA~E OF CHINlSE AGRICULTURE 
A brIef case study is useful for bringing out the tundamental issues. 
fhe experience or collectivization in Chinese aqricu1ture up-ended the 
technologIcal determinist view in terms ot which transtormation ot the 
relations of prOduction tallows the development of productIve capacity 
(Nolan and WhiteJ 191~:1j). In Maoist Lhina~ transformation of the 
relations of production preceded rationalization of the forces of 
production~ and the modernIzation at productive capacity was predicated on 
these changes INolan~ 19jb:213~194; Nolan and White J 1979:13). ~ollowinq 
socialist co11ectIVIsatIon J the process saw increased production in the 
short term. and mechanization eventually_ The Maoist arqument was that 
SOCIalist relations of production enabled the most efficient orqanisation 
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ot the eXlstinq means or production~ and therefore ot the extraction and 
utllizatlon ur surplus labour- tor technoloqical development (Sklair. 1':1}';7:---
jlj,jl~). it is ralrly well documented that thlS development strategy did 
raise output ."" indicatinq ttlereby tflat some unrealized potential capacity 
was unleashed by the production relations (Moore. l':1b'.7: 20':7; Nolan... 1':17b:--
LUL,Ll) tootnote 1M; Sklair. 1979:317).(1) from this. several significant 
pOlnts can be made about the utilization ot surplus labour. 
j. U1ILIZATIDN OF SURPLUS LABUUR. 
What emerqes from the Chinese experlence is that a transtormation ot 
the relatluns of production coupled with a change in the forces ot 
productlon can -- wlth the existinq means ot production increase the 
amount ot surplus labour performed and surplus product produced. This is 
achleved by brinqinq unused items into production and also bV organization-
al measures llke rationallzation ... co-operation and speciallzation in the 
division ot labour (Baran .. 19b2:2U; Hymer ... l'.77Z).(Z) Trlis type at re-
orqanizatlon occurs at the level ot the forces of production within a given 
mode at production ... which may (though not necessarily) require transtormat-
ion ot relations at production as a prerequisite. 
fhere are limits to the changes possible within a given mode of 
production and its structure ot production relations. There are also limits 
to any lflcrease in output possible without introducing new technoloqy.(3) 
Nonetheless .. even limited increases can be crucial for economic development 
-It they are channelled into the development ot new means of production. 
This latter proviso lS cruclal. Changes in the torces ot production can 
lead to increased surplus labour and therefore to increased output, but the 
relations ot production may absorb this in increased consumption rather 
than use it tor deve16pment and expansion at the means of production.(4) 
Wllat lS v 1 tal r or econOfOlC development is not only how the relations ot 
prOductlon (class structure) can affect (through the forces of production) 
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the extent ot surplus labour (embodled In surplus product)~ but also lts 
use ,Stlrton Wedver~ 19}1~ cited In ~ooth, 1915:/1). In other words l both 
quantlty and quality have to be taken into account In analysing Moment C. 
1 he importance ot anal ysing tile use ot surplus is t urther ev ident in 
those cases where 1t conditions the extent ot surplus labour in a given 
production system. ror example, in the pre-colonial Ashanti and Gyaman 
kinqdoms at West Africa, the relations of utilization were such that goods 
were sought atter due to their own utility - rather than being bought with 
a vlew to selling at a prot it. The result ot this was that the needs (and 
capac1t1eS) ot consumption - rather than profit-making - determined the 
volume of the surplus labour performed by the explolted class (ferraYI 
1~J4:3j4). In this type at situation l the scale at productlon and degree at 
exploitation is lImIted because at the predominance at use-value production 
rather than production for exchange (Meillassoux~ 19/2:91). Ihus~ analysis 
at development needs to encompass not only the generation ot surplus, but 
the relations ot utilization as well. 
4. fHE CONCEPT UF SURPLUS ANU DEVELOPMENT. 
These issues have been tormally theorized by 8aran l19b2:22-4) with 
hIS concept ot ~economic surplus~. For him, the rate and direction of 
economIC development dependS on the size and mode at utilization of 
econom1C surplus (lb1d:44). burplus in his sense reters to the resources 
available to build productive capacity.(~) It is the difterence between 
what a social tormation produces and what it actually consumes. More 
prec1sely, surplus is wl-Iat is left over for investment in growth after tile 
consumpt10n ot social groups and the r"enewal ot the means of prOduction and 
other Items regarded as necessary in the social formation concerned (see 
also Heilbroner~ 1981:31; Arriqhi and Saul, 19bt1:287).(b) 
ror Baran" "potential surplus" is what would be available for economic 
development in a ditferent orqanisation o~ the social formation. buch a 
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case wou1.cL tot' Instance~ dO away with F?lite excess consumption, unemploy-
ment~ waste~ excess unprouuctlve labour .. and so on. Huqhes t191J:L17,22U) 
makes a distinction within ~potential surplus" between ~hidden~ and 
"latent" surplus. "Hidden" reters to items such as the consumption ot the 
exploi tinq classes.. luxury (lousing.. remi ttances abroad, loan repayments .. 
Pl~ot it outflow and investment in prestige projects. "Latent N surplus 
reters to what could be done with better methods or prOduction .. land-use 
and scale ot produc t lon. I n my conceptual schema.. the cateqory ot Utlidden" 
surplus is bound UP wIth the relations of production .. and particularly at 
Moment L - the relatlons of distribution and utilization. ~LatentN 
surplus refers primarily to reorganizing the forces of production. 
~urplus tor development may thus be increased by realizing what was 
prevl.ously only potential surplus. rllis involves a change in the relations 
ot productlon tor releasing hidden potential, and a change in the forces ot 
production tor realizing latent potential. However .. it is also necessary 
to lnvestigate how surplus is actually invested for development. Ultimate--
ly .. ralsing trle productive capaclty ot an economic unit is prernissed not 
merely on realizing potential surplus and using actual surplus, but on 
these bel.nq geared towards exponential development ot prOductive capacity. 
Ttlis means development not simply as a quantitative expansion ot the extent 
or eXistinq farces ot prOductIon, but as qualitative expansion by the 
introductl.on ot advanced means ot production. In my view, the latter is 
the key tactor in development. 
Relations of production may constitute a limit on quantitative 
development. For example, it has been argued that feudal lords attempted to 
increase surplus by expandinq U"leir estates onto peasant land and increas-
ing peasants' rents (Banaii, 1~7ba:314/~). But, after a point~ this meant 
exhaustlnq the peasantry (ibid: 317/8) - as indeed happened in countries 
like ~rance (see brenner, lY7~). fhere was thus an intrInsic limit to this 
t~rm at teudal development. Arquably .. it qave rise to two options: either 
, 
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it remained blocked~ or it torced exploitation beyond its limits~ provoking 
the creation ot new relations ot production. Ihe latter option, as it 
turneCj out.. was in the torm of capitalism more conducive to using 
surplus to expand capacity by investinq it in advanced means of production. 
5. IHE TWU Ol~ARIM£NTS OF SOLlAL PHODUCTION. 
The category of ~hidden~ surplus can be interpreted to refer to not 
only the consumptlon bu~ also the production of luxury goods (and 
annaments .. tOO). Interpreted in this way, such production can be seen to 
divert surplus away from areas that are more productive from the pOlnt ot 
view ot development. The signiticance of SUCh hidden surplus can be pin-
pointed wlth Marx's concepts of two departments at social production 
(19/1:599). In Marx's view .. society's reproduction may be seen in terms ot 
the co-ordination of these departments. Department I concerns tile product-
lon of means of production, While Department II concerns the production ot 
articles ot conslJ1Iption. What is important for development is the expans-
ion Ot productive capacity throuqtl the development of Department I. 
In terms of the discussion ot realized productive capacity in chapter 
five, the prOduction of hidden surplus such as luxuries land armaments) is 
productive labour because it involves the production at material items. 
However, tIllS needs to be qualif ied somewhat in the liqht of Marx' s two 
departments. what is ultimately most important is that productive capacity 
is based on particular material items: the products of Department I, viz. 
means of production. Clearly, luxuries and armaments are not means of 
prOduction (the latter in f act concern means of destruction - hence IVlanclel 
(1975) terms them 0epartment Ill). However, neither are socially necessary 
material items such as clothes, tOad, housing and so on, means at product-
ion. Un tile contrary, these-- plus luxuries (and armaments also in a 
sense) - are artlcles ot consumption coming trom Department 1. None at 
these are ln themselves direct contributors to productive capacity. 
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However, tl-Ie proGue tlun or new mater lal means ot product~on l.n order to 
rtianut ac ture any or "Crlese (l. e. includlng luxur les and armaments) ~ does 
airectly qUdllry as expanaing tne productive capaclty ot a unit. 
from trlls standpolnt, there lS no debate about the extent to wtlich 
luxury tand armament) productlon constitutes a hldden surplus. While 
rliucJen surplUS is Pl"O(iUCeO by productive labour in the sense at it 
consisting ot materlal items, ttlese items do not increase productive 
capacity. It one lS talking about the productlon at means of production 
( tor wt-lic.tlever purpose J, ttlen one is talk ing about tile use or actual 
surplus, and hidden surplus does not enter the picture. This does not 
escape value corlsiderations about the role at luxur ies and armaments in 
development, but it does Shift them to another plane.(7) 
b. CUNCLUSION: POLITICS AND SURPLUS. 
'1 
8 
'J Focusslng on the role ot surplus in economic development draws attent-
f, 
1 ion to the polltlcal character of the process. Relations at utilization do 
I 
( 
! 
1 not exist lndependently at Moments A and B at production. Indeed, it may be 
t argued that it lS the class structure and class struggles that determine 
both the amount at surplus labour performed and appropriated, as well as 
wila t 1 S done with it thereaf ter (see t or example, Ziemann and Lanzens--
ddrfer~ 1977). This raises important political and economic questions like 
wtv..J works tor wilOm and witn wflom, wtlere tile product goes and WflO controls 
it; and flOW tile system l.S reprOduced ~ see fvleillassoux, 1972:08). 
As an example, the allocation ot surplus to re-investment for economic 
development is a political issue because saving must come out ot class 
incomes (iV1amClanl, 19//':5; Hugrles, 19}7:L1). In this reqarlj~ Rostow's 
partlcular tlleory of economic development based on levels of savings, can 
be round wanting. It lS ultimately a "blOOdless SCi-lema o~ sta';les" tllat 
does not do lustlce to the multitUde ot politlcal and economl.C tactors in 
f 
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A focus on the political aspect of development leads us to see that 
the creation and use of economic surplus~ and therefore the pattern of 
economic development~ depends on the dominant class political forces 
(Hughes, 197):21b; Weeks, 1975:99; Harrison, 1981:331). And indeed, 
dltferent classes define development differently according to their 
particular interests - and likewise for the measures they prescribe to 
achieve it (Dos Santos~ 19b9:b2). fhis is taken up again in the context of 
development planning in chapter twenty-seven. More i~nediately~ however, I 
take on the task in the next chapter of analysing the capitalist mode of 
production as a preliminary step to relating it to the issues of surplus 
and economic development. 
--------------------------------------
EKJNOTES 
1. At tile same -time however, the level of the means of production did 
afrect the operation at the forces and relations of production. As the 
Chinese were to discover, they could not ""'leap" too tar ahead of technical 
conditions without talling on thelr faces. 
2. In this regard, Hughes (1977:219) holds that Atrican agriculture has 
great potential. Lewis (1954) also points to this phenomenon with his 
concept of ~disgulsed unemployment~ in pre-capitalist African agriculture 
(although this should not be exaggerated - see Arrighi's criticism of the 
concept, lY 7u). 
3. 8erore the advent or machinery, only a limited increase could be gai~­
ed bv conqregating workers together (Dobb, lYb8:23). 
4. For example, ttle wealth produced in the Ancient World went not into 
development, but luxury consumption, politics and patronage (Hindess and 
Hirst, 1977:166). 
5. Hindess and Hirst (1977:74) reject the concept of surplus because of 
the lack of any absolute standard tor evaluating what is surplus and what 
is necessary to a society. Taylor (1981:383) criticizes the concept as 
making it dlfficult to differentiate between economic systems. Both these 
criticisms have some validity and are symptomatic of the over-generality of 
the concept. Nevertheless, the concept is still very useful at the level 
ot discussion ln this_chapter for deslqnating important overall isssues in 
economlC development. 
b. fhe pr'oducts ot surplus labour (as det ined in chapter five) are not 
identical to surplus in the sense described above. Surplus labour in my 
definitlon is labour that is surplus only to the immediate reproduction of 
the producers involved in perrorminq it. It does not necessarily produce 
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surplus products tor investment In growth. 
7. Ihe dlScussion about productive labour has another complication added 
to It wlth the concept ot relative surplus value. Here, what becomes 
important is labour that produces those specitic means of productlon which 
in turn reduce the labour-time necessary tor the social reproduction of the 
producers. ~ee chapter thlrteen. 
e. Rostow's attention to political issues in economic development is 
limlted to his private political bias WhlCh appears in the subtitle of his 
book I lS1b:') --- """An Anti-Communist Manif eston • 
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CHAPTER TWELVE. 
IHE SJRUCTURE OF THE CAPITALIST MJDE OF PRODUCJION 
1. lntroduction. 
2. Moments A and C of the CMP. 
3. lhe system dynamic of commercialization. 
4. Moment 8 and the CMP. 
5. The CMP and surplus labour: exploitation. 
b. The expansion ot the LMP. 
7. Conclusion. 
1. INTRUUUCTION. 
In this chapter~ I draw sUbstantially from Marx~s theorization of the 
capitalist mode of production (hereafter CMP) - but reinterpretinq and 
developinq it in terms of my framework as theorized this far. The aim of 
thls enterprlse is to highlight the aspects of the capitalist social 
structure which are significant for analysing issues around surplus and 
development under capitalism (as discussed in the next chapter). I beqin 
Wl th fvloments A and C" and tllen turn to ucommercialization'" ~ Moment 8 and 
the expansion of the CMP. 
2. MOMENfS A AND C OF THE CMP. 
Beginning with Moment C" commodity exchange is a central invariant 
element of the CMP (Hindess and Hirst" 1977:102).(1) Under capitalist 
relations oi distribution and utilization" the means of consumption, the 
mea,ns ot production and labour-power must all be commodities. And the 
latter two mUS1: enter into Moment 8 (production proper) as such. 
Analysing this more closely, it is apparent that such generalized 
commodity relations are based on a particular class structure. From the 
vantage point of Moment A, this involves the separation of the direct 
producers from the means of production (leaving them only in possession of 
trIelr labour power), and the concentration of these means in the possession 
of a ditterent class (Marx~ 1972:668).(2) A historical precondition for 
the existence of the CMP therefore is the dispossession of the producers 
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(Godelier, 1972:334). But while this is a necessary condition for capital-
ism at Moment A, it is not sufficient unless it has a particular consequen-
ce at Moment C (see Duggett, 1975:165). The consequent labour-power must be 
available as a commodity, and must therefore be mobile - i.e. free to 
circulate within Moment C, as should be the case with any other commodity 
under the CMP. Similarly, the means of production must also circulate as a 
commodity at Moment C. Capitalists should be free to buy~ sell and accumu-
late these through the market. And for the generalized exchange of all 
these commodities, a standard of value and means of exchange is needed in 
the form of money_ This facilitates the concentration of movable wealth 
capable of being turned into profit-yielding capital (see Marx, Grundrisse, 
1953:404, quoted by Baran, 1962:138).(3) 
A capitalist must thus be able to buy all production inputs on the 
market, and assembled under his control, a capitalist labour process is 
constituted (Sohn-Rethal, 1979:118/9).(4) Particularly important in this 
schema is the notion that capitalism involves not only the market, but also 
the labour market (Friedmann, 1978:80). In fact, ~only where wage-labour 
is its basis, does commodity production impose itself on society as a 
whole N (Marx, Capital I, 1976:733, quoted in Sohn-Rethal 1979:51; see also 
Cohen, 1978:183). This is because separation from the means of production 
determines that producers (outside of thieving) can only get means of 
consumption through purchasing them with cash received from the sale of 
their labour-power. For the means of consumption to be available to be 
bought requires that they are - or become - commodities. The growth of 
proletarianization - the supply of wage labour - is therefore also the 
growth of the internal market and generalization of commodity relations 
across the means of consumption (Dobb, 1962:26). 
It is therefore not enough for a CMP labour process to be integrated 
into cornmodity circulation - it must obtain its labour through this too. 
This point is ignored by Frank (1969c), for whom capitalism is merely a 
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system of production for profit on the market in which someone other than 
the direct producer realizes the profit. Frank concentrates primarily on 
Moment C, and to a lesser extent B, and ignores how commoditization at C is 
integrated with class relations at A. Wallerstein, however, explicitly 
tackles the issue within the Frankian approach. For him, 
Capitalism ••. means labour as a commodity to be sure. 
But in the era of agricultural capitalism, wage-labour 
is only one of the modes in which labour is recruited 
and recompensed in the labour market. Slavery, cash-
crop production ••• , share-cropping, and tenancy are all 
alternative modes (1974:400). 
He concludes that participation in the market means that "slaves and 
serfs receive payment (however euphemisti.c this term)"'. This line of 
argument leads to designating these classes - as well as peasant petty 
commodity producers - as wage-labourers/proletarians (see also Amin, 
1974:26; Joffe, 1980:24). This rather tortuous reasoning is clearly 
inadequate when seen against the more rigorous view of capitalism as a mode 
of production that combines specifically homogeneous, rather than 
heterogeneous, relations. 
Capitalist production is therefore the production of commodities by 
means of commodities. A unit of production is only capitalist if (inter 
alia) it is integrated into such a total commodity circulation system 
(Hindess and Hirst, 1977:220). This system rests, as will now be apparent, 
on a structure of definite social class relations.(5) If, in addition to 
being integrated into capitalist Moments A and C, these labour processes 
are reproduced predominantly by articulation with each other, and if they 
further exhibit CfvlP system dynamics (see chapter eight), then they are 
internal to - and in fact constituent elements of - the CMP. 
3. THE SYSTEM DYNAMIC OF COMMERCIALIZATION. 
The context of commodity circulation integrating Moments A and C 
together means that there is mobility of labour power, money, means of 
production and wage-goods. This mobility in turn gives rise to competition 
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as a system dynamic at ttle CM~~ as explained in the next chapter. For the 
present, however'" 1 take competition tor granted. Commodity circulation 
and competl tion underpin a system dynamic of corrmercialization wherebY ClV1P 
labour' processes necessarily have a prot it rationale. Capital is any sum ot 
money advanced to make more money I Kautsky .. 197b:12). Thus the general 
tormu1a tor cap1tal 1S M -> M' .. money to more money. In fact, this covers 
not only productive capital. but also merchant and finance capital: in all 
ot these, the oriqina1 outlay is an advance~ rather than an expense~ and 
the rationale is the largest possible increase in money (Kay, 1975;87; 
8ernstein~ 1979b: 423). However~ as discussed in chapter six, merchant and 
tinance capital may articulate with a whole range of labour processes and 
only exploit in Moment C. for this reason .. they constitute heterogeneous 
relations ot production and are not an integral part of a mode of product,-
ion. productive capital is distinct tram these other capitals because it 
combines the commodities of labour-power and means ot production and 
organizes them into a productive labour process (Bernstein, 197~a:424). In 
a SOCIal tormation dominated bv the CMP, merchant and finance capitals may 
articulate with productive capital (and even directly With wage-labourers) 
outside ot the labour processes. 
4. MQ/vIENT 8 AND THE CfVIP. 
Moments A and C serve as the context - and in some respects, as the 
foundation for Moment 8. How does the capitalist labour process 
articulate with thIS context:" Firstly, it can be noted that, insofar as 
prOduction units in Moment B articulate with each other via C, the 
relations within a capitalist labour process are very difterent from the 
relations between these labour processes. fhe latter are exchanqe relations 
trlat constItute a societal division at labour. Within each individual 
labour process, the diVIsion of labour takes place under the control of a 
slnqle cap1tal. Instead ot internal exchanqe, there is a planned and 
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controlled distribution within the unit of production (Braverman~ 1974:73). 
By contrast" the division of labour at the level of the market is structur-
ed relatively independently ot subjective factors, and operates as a system 
effect of the CMP at the societal level (Hymer .. 1972:41).(6) 
In what way is the capitalist labour process still integrally 
articulated with Moments A and C? In response to this question, it has 
been noted that 
the capital-relation during the process of production 
arises only because it is in the act ot circulation, in 
the different fundamental economic conditions in which 
buyer and seller confront each other in their class 
relation (Marx, Capital I, quoted by Palloix, 1973:71). 
Capitalist class relations at Moment A mean that ~to those who have 
machines, men are given~ (Berger and Mohr, 1975:67). In exchange for a 
wage, workers sell their capacity to work (i.e. their labour-power) to 
capitalists, and therefore constitute themselves as subordinates under the 
control of others (Marx, 197bb:1025; Crouch, 1977:4,5). The capitalist 
labour process takes place between elements which are a capitalist"s 
property. It is therefore determined by the capitalist and the product 
goes to him (Morris, 1976:299; Carchedi, 1975:13; Wright, 1980:180).(7) 
Control and exploitative relations in Moment B are made possible by the 
class relations of Moment A (see chapter five). 
In a capitalist labour process that is only formally subsumed, workers 
may be conglomerated (but in independent work operations, and in which the 
capitalist may directly participate). In a different case of formal 
subsumption, workers may be in a piecework putting-out system.(8) Under 
real sUbsumption, the workers become ""collective labourers u and the 
capitalist who under formal subsumption often takes direct part in the 
labour process tends now to distance himself (Marx, 1972:312-314). 
While retaining economic possession, he usually hires another to control 
production. 
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None of this variation - contra Berle and Means (1932) - changes the basic 
capital-labour relation or the mechanism of exploitation. Nor does it 
change capitalist features at all Moments of production, reproduction and 
system dynamics. I discuss these issues again in chapters thirty-one and 
-two, where I analyse various rural classes and their labour processes in 
terms of whether they are capitalist or not. 
5. THE CMP AND SURPLUS LABOUR: EXPLOITATION. 
For Marx, capitalist exploitation consists in the fact that labour-
power can produce value greater tllan its own. The difference between its 
value as paid for by the capitalist, and the value of its output, consti-
tutes a surplus labour expended by the producer, embodied in commodities as 
a surplus value. This is appropriated by the capitalist and realized as 
profit throuqh exchange.(9) The production and distribution of surplus 
value tends to involve conflict, largely around the struggle of the produc-
ers for a family wage and humane working conditions. 
Marx (1972:299) further identified two forms of exploitation under 
capitalism. ~Absolute surplus value extraction~ involves an absolute 
increase in the labour-time exacted from the producers - whether by 
intensif ying labour or lengthening tIle working day. While such absolute 
surplus value involves more surplus through more work, ~relative surplus 
value~ involves more surplus through more productive work (Fine, 1978). 
This latter form of surplus value is qualitatively different from absolute 
surplus value. It involves two ways increasing surplus labour time: 
firstly, increasing the surplus labour of one set of producers relative to 
the others, and secondly, increasing the surplus labour relative to the 
necessary labour time of all producers. 
The former is not always recognized as relative surplus value in 
Marxist literature, although clearly identified by Marx as such 
(1976a:530/4). By mechanizing production, the productivity of the worker is 
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raised~ enablinq nim to prOduce more in a Olven time. lhis adds the same 
value to the total product~ but spread over more individual items. The 
value or eaCh item thus taIls in relation to the socially average value. 
~y sellinq above the lndividual value, i.e. at the average value, the 
capltalist realizes the ditterence in value as a surplus relative to other 
caPltalists producing at the average social productivlty. 
In contrast to this kind of relative surplus value that pertains to 
advanced labour processes, the second kind affects the entire capitalist 
mode or production. It too derives from the way that mechanization reduces 
the value or indlvidual goods. Taking place in sectors producing wage-
goods, this phenomenon reduces the labour tlme necessary to produce the 
value ot the wage. Heductlon ot necessary labour-time means the expanslon 
ot surplus labour-time - a potentially key factor tor economic development. 
Whlle all capitallst-employed wage labour can produce absolute surplus 
value, not all such labour contributes to relative surplus value exploitat-
ion. For example, capitalist service, circulation or entertainment enter--
prises produce profits through absolutely exploiting wage-labour, but only 
where these activities cheapen the costs of reproducinq waqe-labour, do 
trley contr ibute to relative surplus value. Luxury and armament prOduction 
also do not attect the costs of waqe-goods and therefore mechanlzation in 
these sectors cannot directly help reduce the socially necessary labour-
time tor repr-Oducinq labour power (see 8ullock, 1974:9). They may develop 
productive capacity in a ditferent way, l.e. indirectly, where their 
protlts or technology find their way into Department II (the production ot 
means ot production) (Amin, 1974:1M5), but this is quite distinct. Aqri-
culture, unlike armaments and luxuries, is fundamental to relative surplus 
value and ln this way (as well as others) to economic development. (See 
discussion on the Aqrarlan Question, chapter twenty-two). 
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6. THE EXPANSION OF THE CMP. 
The widening and deepening of capitalism is seen by Marx as expanded 
reproduction (1972# chapter xxiv; Amin# 1974:2# 190). As the expansion 
proceeds# the size of individual capitals increases and the vertical and 
horizontal division of labour within each of them grows accordingly. The 
capitalist enterprise may grow from workshop to factory and from national 
corporation to multi-dimensional national corporation and to multinational 
(Hymer, 1972:43,37). In Marx~s terms, this is the phenomenon of concentra-
tion of capital, alongside which is centralization - a drop in the number 
of effective units of production (Marx, 1972, chapter xxv, section 2). 
Centralization comes about through the merging, take-over or elimination of 
existing enterprises by others.(10) The result is monopoly at Moment A, 
and this also often has implications at Moment B and Moment C. 
In Marx~s work, the expanded reproduction of capitalism is character-
ized as a process of capital accumulation (Marx, 1972, chapter iv). 
Capital accumulation is dependent on the rate OT proTit which determines 
the speed of possible expansion of each capital. In my schema, this 
accumulation involves the exponential development of production based on 
capitalist relations at all Moments of production, with its main system 
dynamics being competition and production for profit. 
Capital accumulation thus amounts to the development of capitalism, 
but this is not the same thing as capitalist development, i.e. capitalist 
development of productive capacity. For example# accumulation may be in 
Marx~s UDepartment lIN (the production of means of consumption). The means 
OT production in these kinds of capitalist enterprise must certainly be 
included in an inventory of the productive forces constituting capitalism's 
productive capacity. But the products of these enterprises are a different 
question. Where these products help to reduce necessary labour and there-
fore to increase surplus labour, they may increase productive capacity, 
especially in ~Department I U - the production of means of production. 
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Items such as luxurles or armaments do not have this signiticance, 
because they do not contribute to relative surplus value, and thence to an 
Increase In relative surplus labour. file complex relationsl-Ilp between 
capitalist development (of productive capacity) and capitalist accunulation 
are discussed in the next chapter. 
b. CONCLUSIUN. 
ft-Ie LMP IS a mode ot production in the sense that it is based on homo--
geneous relatIons ot production, i.e. relations between the same classes at 
all three Moments of production. These Moments are integrated togettler in 
an interdependent whole, with particular system dynamics deriving from It. 
As tar as its lnternal articulation is concerned, the CfvlP ~ s labour process--
es can be seen to be reproduced within the CMP, integrated with Moments A 
and C~ and exhibiting the system dynamics of the whole. It is against this 
background tllat I now turn to consider In more detail tile relationship 
between trle CMP and development. ( 11 ) 
----- -----------------------
ENDNOIES 
1. At the level at capitalist soclal formations, there are aifferences in 
the extent to WhlCh various spheres of social life are integrated Into the 
commOdl ty excflange cirCUl t. Housework and childrear ing activ i ty straddle 
the margins at commodity circulation, unlike transport, furniture and even 
fooa productlon which are tar more integrated Into the clrcuit (see 
Poulantzas, l~j8:2J). 
2. Prlvate property in the means of production is an invariant condition ot 
tile LMP (Clifte .. 1971:205; Hindess and Hirst, 1977:294). However, it is 
not necessary that these means must be privately owned by the capitalists 
themselves; enough If they can be privately hlred. Thus state or 
communall y-owned land can be compatible with trle CMP (HindeSs and Hirst, 
ibld). fhlS is an important pOlnt in evaluating the class character ot 
rural development schemes set up on state or communltv land and managed bv 
a capi talist company (see crlaptecs trlirty-one and -two J. 
~. Both caPItal and labour are vItal. As Amin (1974!BJ) pOlnts out~ ~paln 
lIao tt18 weal trl, but not tt-Ie pr-oletar'lat. rtle same point applies to the 
Mlddle Ages, antiqulty, and the last llbld:lj~). In many Ihlrd World 
CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENTJ 
CAPITALIST MODE OF PRODIJI::TIOr·J 
countries. the situation is the direct opposite. 
4. Of course~ in the historical development of capitalism~ the capitalist 
has of ten Ildd to take part in tile labour process (Soi"ln-Rethal. ibid). 
However, this labour input may be viewed analytically as the capitalist 
selling labour-power to him/herself. Clearly~ this is a contradictory 
condition (see chapter six), and it is similar to that of kulaks discussed 
in Part I. 
5. This is a fact forgotten by MarxJ s unfortunate Mr Peel of Swan River. 
Thls character - despite taking 3000 -persons of the working class~ to 
Australia - was unable to bring the CMP with them. He was left without 
even anyone to umake his bed or draw his waterU (Marx~ 1972:717). 
b. There Is also a third level to take into account in any social 
formation: the State"'s role of providing a degree of conscious co-
ordination of the market's structuring of the division of labour (Hymer~ 
ibid; Heilbroner~ 1981:37). (See chapter fourteen). 
7. If workers were not separated from control of these~ the labour 
process could be dit f erent. I f they had access to money, tlley would not 
have to sell their labour-power to survive; if they controlled the means of 
production they could produce as they determined; if they controlled the 
labour process they could set the pace and extent of surplus labour 
(Wright~ 1980:181). 
8. The piece-work payment system makes no difference to the essentially 
capitalistic nature of the wage (see Capital~ 1976a:517). It should not be 
confused with independent simple commodity producers selling to a merchant 
capitalist. In this latter instance, the capitalist does not possess all 
the means of production~ and to the extent that there is exploitation, it 
is in Moment C rather than (as in the CMP) in Moment B. 
9. This exploitation is distinct from expenditure on labour-power that 
does not generate any profit~ but merely transfers income~ i.e. labour-
power that represents an increase in consumption without any surplus value 
exploitation (Amin~ 1974:196). (This shows that not all wage-labour is 
capitalist: a distinction must be made between revenue (spending profits) 
and capital (making them)). It is also distinct from that profit-making 
capital which derives its profits not from wage-labour exploitation~ but 
(rom surplus transfer within Moment C of production (This latter is - as 
has been argued - a heterogeneous relation of production). 
10. Where ownership ot agricultural land is fragmented~ centralization may 
sometimes be a pre-condition for concentration (Kautsky~ 1976:30). 
11. While the emphasis in tllis chapter has been on what Cohen (1978:181) 
calls the Ustructural ..... definition of capitalism, the next chapter examines 
its "modal" definition (ibid) - that is, the purpose of capitalist 
production~ viz. the accumUlation of capital. 
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1. INTRODUCTION. 
USE OF SURPLUS 
It has been claimed that capitalism refers ultimately to the product--
ion of relative surplus value on the basis of machine production and large-
scale industry (see Marx~ 1976b:l021; Poulantzas~ 1978:57). According to 
fVlarx (ibid! 1035)" Uthe development of capitalist relations in adequate form 
to establish a mode of production sui generis .•. presupposes a definite 
stage in the evolution of the productive forces of labour~. But capitalist 
social relations and exploitation (as opposed to the capitalist mode of 
production)" can and do exist at low levels of mechanization and small-size 
of establishment (Ennew et al~ 1977:303). The direct subordination of 
labour to capital may occur irrespective of the state of technological 
development (Marx" 197bb:1034). What" therefore, is the connection between 
capitalism and development? This chapter analyses this issue, examining 
both its positive and negative features. 
2. THE CMP AND EXPANSION. 
Capitalism involves expanded - rather than simple - reproduction. The 
nature of the CMP requires that profit is reinvested and the field of 
capitalist production be expanded. This may be on an extensive or intens-
ive basis. The former involves the enlargement of given enterprises, the 
latter is the setting up of new enterprises. (1) (Another form of capital-
ist expansion is transformation through articulation of non-capitalist 
units of production, as discussed in chapter sixteen). But whichever kind 
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or expanSlun 1 s invol verJ, 1 t need not - as cLi.scusseu in tne pr'ev lOUS 
cllapter' ,- be in inC1ustT ial capacIty anrj development ur U'le means or PI'Od---
Llctlon. 1 t can be 1n quant.ltatlve extension Ot eXlstulCl prolJuction, or Hi 
sectors like luxurIes or armaments. It can up to a pOInt ---- even be 
outslde ot the LM~, tor example as merchant or finance capital Investlnq Ir) 
[vloment L rather tllan 1:). 
Nonetheless, capitalism in USlnq its surpluses to create the means tor 
qatherInq additional surplus, has tended hIstorically to transform its 
wealth into new and better means ot production. While both capitalism and 
ear'lier pre-capitalist societies have used surplus for war, public adorn-
ment, religion and the maintenance of privileged classes, only caPItalism 
has had a systematic tendency to use surplus to expand its productive 
capacity lHeilbroner, l~~l:j). How is thIS character at caPItalIst 
relations ot utilization to be explalned~ ~everal explanations have been 
oitered to account tor why the cap1talist mode ot production has an expans-
ionary dynamic and how this operates to increase prOductive capacity. 
j. PAkllAL lXPLANA1ION~ UF LAPIIALIST DEV~LOPMENr. 
,-
.. 
I 
Une explanation - common to modernization SChool writers is a 
voluntarist account wrliCh rests ultimately on a conceptIon of homo econom--
icus. It tocusses on aCqUISItive and ~maximizinqU economic motivation. 
Lapltalism is seen as a system rewarding tlard work and innovative r isl.<-
takInq, and as unleasninq tt-Iese drlves in sucn a way as to optHfllze econom-
lC qrowth. fhlS assumes that capitalist ideas pre-exist ana in tact qive 
r-lse to a capitalist SOCIal structure. but such Ideas themselves need to 
be explainelj in terms inter alia or ttle ir structural context. (L) 
Irle homo economicus v iew does not pr'ov loe an adequate account ot 
expansion, nor ot the connection between expansion and economic develop--
ment. II-lese are not explained by attl'ibutinq a univer sal character and 
primary causal siqniticance to an Isolated aspect ot the cdpitallst super-
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structure. (Jee cnapter tour J. ln aUc1itl0n, It IS eviclent trlat tne r-atlon--
ale or capItalist productIon IS no~ reducible to the consumption demandS or 
the capitalist. Lapltallsrn Involves buyinq in order to seJ 1 l i.e. startlflq 
wltll money In 0['(le1- to make more money J ~ not sellIng one commooity In order 
to obtain a ditterent one lsee Marx, l~7bb:l030). At the level ot the 
system, tne prot it rationale exists -- as will be arquecj below --- indepeneJ-
ently ot the motivatlon ot the capItalIst (WhICh IS not to dismiss the 
importance ot capItalist ideoloqy and capitalists' motivations), and this 
system dynamic needS to be explained. 
A second explanation about why the CMP tends to develop productive 
capaCIty is based on the ability at the capitalist enterprise to reap the 
benet Its ot co-operatIon and division ot labour, and the advantaqes ot 
specIalization in tt-Ie societal {jlvison ot labour (see, tor example, Mar-x, 
l~)L:jl4; Hymer. l~1~:41; Sweezy, 19~b; Adam ~mith. 1~37). These reatures 
are contrasted to small-scale individualistic and unarticulated production 
processes. ~v owning all the inputs of production, the capItalist was 
hIstorically able to assemble them In one place -- therebY increasinq 
prOductivity and enablinq maChinery to be used. 
However, there are certain problems with this explanatIon. For 
example, co-operative laboul anel speCIalIzation are not unique to the 
capltallst mode at prOduction, but are also round in slavery tor example. 
~o thIS IS unlIkely to be the maior eXPlanatory tactor for capitalist 
development. Further-, and more tundamentally~ the question ot economic 
development is not SImply productivltY~ but why this Should be contInuously 
expanding throuqh the production and adoptIon of new means ot production. 
It is necessary to explain the LM~'s use ot surplus tor reinvestment. 
A third explanation emphasises the role at competltion in the CMP, and 
tlolds tllat ttlis eXPlains increaslnq mecharllzation ot production l see 
fVlamdani, l.SlJl:l4j; FurtadO, 1~b4:jb; Howard, l';/()O:b5). [Jynarrllsm is not 
locatea In capitalist units ot production taken sepal'ately, but derives 
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nom t.t"le ef feet or tfle wflole system on tt-18 parts~ An isolated capitalist 
unIt in a non-capitalIst context may have only sImple and not expanded 
reprOductIon -- but~ this approash aI-gues~ thIS is not possible within the 
LMP as a whole. 
TllUS. Baran t19bL:4S) sees competItion as el"tective in that it forces 
businesses to improve methods ot production and to increase and diversity 
output. fhis compulsion is etfective because only by continual reinvestment 
and cost-cuttinq Innovations can they remain in ttle competi tive struqqle 
(ibId:4~). Lompetition is crucial to the enqine of capitalIst development 
because I t involves the "'stiCK or bam(['uPtcyN and the "carrot ot extra-
prot Its" to enrorce investment. and technoloqlcal proqress (ibid:}~). Ur. 
as UoDb (1~51:SJ) puts it. Nit any spur was needed to make hIm (i~e~ the 
capitalist -- G8) ploUqh baCK rather ttlan hoard tlis gaIns~ competition was 
that spur --- tt-18 tlaunt inq t ear or beinq ousted I" rom the struqqle if he did 
not continually improve his methods 01" production~~(3) 
I flere is mUC/-j 01" value in this third approaCh. But it remains 
inadequate in two respects. How is competitIon itself to be explainedl 
AnC1 how exactly does its cost-cutting pressure lead to continual 
meO-lanization of production? Only by answering tt-lese questions can we 
understand how the articulation of capitalist relations and forces at 
production in the CMP results in relations of utilization where capital 
accumulation encompasses expansion through advanced means of production. 
4. EXPLAINING COMP~lIrION AND ACCUMULATION. 
One cannot simply explain competition in terms of the profit motive of 
individual capitalists. Competition is a structural situation which, like 
Hobbes~ state ot war ot all against all~ produces its own condition as its 
own result - largely irrespective ot individual feelings about the matter. 
Friedmann (19}~:lb7) holds that it is the commoditization and mobility 
ot taetors of production and subsistence~ and their incorporation into the 
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reproduction of each unit of production (i.e. total integration into the 
market) which explains competition. She does not spell out exactly why~ 
but this idea can be developed. 
Human existence under capitalism can only be secured through exchange 
and for this it is necessary for an individual to have something to 
exchange. Clearly, the lot of the wage-labourer who has only labour-power 
to exchange is more tenuous than that of a capitalist who owns not only 
personal labour power, but also capital (monetary and/or in means of 
production) and the conYflodities produced by this capital. Yet the Hstick 
of bankruptcy~ remains nonetheless a very real threat to capitalists. 
There is no guarantee that the goods produced in their labour processes 
will be accepted by the market. Survival of a capitalist enterprise under 
capitalism requires that each tries to get an edge over its rivals in the 
marketplace. (In fact, even when a capitalist concern is economically 
secure, this tendency still manifests itself - and necessarily so, because 
security under capitalist competition can only be temporary.) If capital-
ists failed to respond to the pressure to successfully exchange their 
products, they would cease to exist as a class. The existence and contin-
ued reproduction of the CMP therefore implies ipso Facto that capitalist 
production units are integrated into, and subsumed under, the competitive 
imperatives implicit in the structure of generalized cOfl1'nodity exchange. 
It can therefore be seen that the very class structure and relations 
of distribution (exchange) under capitalism provide the foundation of 
competition. The latter is, in short, a system dynamic deriving from the 
structure of the CMP at Moments A, Band C, and it tends to have a self-
perpetuating effect. Competition underpins a system dynamic of commerc-
ialization, in terms of which the motive force of capitalist production is 
profit. More than this, the CMP is not simply production for profit, but 
on a continuously expanded scale - i.e. it is the accumulation of capital. 
As three system dynamics of the CMP, competition, cOO111ercialization 
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and capital accumulation are both distinct and closely related. 
1 now turn to the issue of wtlY competition Sl-loulel lead capitalists to 
reinvest in expandlnq productive capacity. Irlteqration into the market 
means that the surplus appropriated by a capitalist is worth only as much 
as its social exchanqe value~ and this is set by the average socially 
necessary labour time tor the production of that particular good (Marx~ 
1972:51/52). In order to be able to exchange at this value~ the enterprise 
has to introduce measures which keep it on a par with its competitors. 
However~ it is by no means ObVlOUS that these methods automatically involve 
the use of new means of production - i.e. the qualitative expansion ot 
productive capacity via the mechanization ot productlon. 
s. COMP~lITION AND ADVANCED MEANS OF PRODUCTION. 
Measures to keep abreast ot competition can include - other than 
adoptinq advanced means of production - expansion through the extension of 
existing methods and means of production, without this includinq technoloq-· 
ieal change. (4) In addition, capitalists may qain a competitive edqe on 
the market by cost-cuttinq- not by the introduction of advanced means at 
production, but through increased absolute surplus value exploitation. At 
the same time~ there are limits to this form of exploitation~ and this fact 
impels capitalists to look to other methodS as well. A brief look at these 
limits bears out the inadequacy of reliance on absolute surplus value 
exploitation to survive competitlon. 
Firstly~ one limit on absolute surplus value exploitation is the need 
for the reproduction of the workforce, which is a precondition for the 
continued existence of ttle capi talist qua capi talist. A second lirni t is 
the degree of mobility at labour. Where possible~ workers tend to move 
away f rom the worst exploiters -- compellinq the lat ter to reduce exploi t-
ation l and simultaneously enablinq lesser exploiters to increase exploita-
tion in tt-leir new context of excess labour- suppl y. This ptlenomenon tends 
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to equalize wage rates, making it more difficult for a single capital to 
extract more absolute surplus value than its competitors do. A third limit 
on absolute surplus value exploitation is the way that class struggle 
inhibits the utilization of this method (Marx, 1975:534). Historically, 
there is the example of the world-wide struggle over the length of the 
working week and the working day in the history of capitalism (Marx, ibid: 
chapter X; Fine, 1978:92). 
The limits and blocking of absolute surplus value exploitation histor-
ically has meant that it has been advantageous for capitalists to cut costs 
by mechanizing production. Higher labour costs in the United States were 
an important cause in the development of a ready market amongst capitalists 
there for labour-saving technology (Habbakuk, 1967, cited in Hindess and 
Hirst, 1977:334, footnote 59). There is more to mechanization, however. 
The adoption of advanced means of production does not only save labour 
(and enable new tasks to be performed) - it can also increase both the 
productivity per labourer, and the speed of production. These latter two 
factors are both important elements in affecting rates of profit, and 
therefore capitalist accumulation as a whole. It is in them that further 
reasons can be found for why competition develops productive capacity 
through revolutionizing the means of production. 
With regard to the first factor, an increase in productlvity per 
worker means that labour-time for the production of a given item can be 
reduced below the socially average labour-time. As a result, an individual 
capitalist can sell at the going exchange rate (i.e. at a price above 
actual value of the goods) and appropriate a surplus profit thereby. 
Alternatively, he can realize the average profit rate - but at a cheaper 
price than the going rate, and in this way "corner the market". 
The average rate of profit is included in the total costs of 
production, which in turn is the basis of the going market price (Kautsky, 
1976:16, Friedmann, 1979:181, footnote 14). Where this price is above the 
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real value of a mechanized production process - and the capitalist thus 
realizes an above-average profit rate - it is likely to be only temporary. 
The average rate of profit does not necessarily appear at any point in 
time, because it is continually in the process of formation and reformat-
ion. Advantages underlying a higher rate are gradually eroded as other 
capitals adopt new production methods (Tribe, 1977:78). There is thus an 
inbuilt continuous dynrunic towards raising the productive capacity of the 
whole. (5) 
The second factor affected by advanced means of production is the 
speed of production. An increase in the turnover time of production means 
that the value of commodities realized can be put back into production more 
quickly, and this reduces the total capital needed to be advanced over a 
definite period of production cycles. Although the absolute amount of 
surplus value and profit may be unchanged, the fall in the amount of 
capital advanced raises the rate of profit (Kay, 1975:138/9,145; also 
Sohn-Rethal, 1979:148). This then is another key reason why individual 
capitalists tend to mechanize under competition.(6) (That capitalists also 
try to speed up production through uFordism" and time and motion studies, 
etc., complements rather than contradicts this predominant mechanization 
strategy).(7) 
6. THE CMP~S COUNTER-TENDENCIES TO DEVELOPMENT. 
Berger (1976:51) holds that capitalism's Ubuilt-in commitment to 
growth'" is not negated by temporal variations, and says that the same 
applies to the operation of the market and its formal and informal 
modifications. But this remark needs to be weighed against the CMP~s own 
real countertendencies to development. Certainly, the CMP does not develop 
productive capacity smoothy, evenly, universally or even unambiguously. 
The theorization earlier in this chapter relates the economically 
progressive character of the CMP to competition, which in turn rests on a 
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capitalist class structure and the associated mobility of labour and 
capital. But while competition (as the contradictory interaction between 
capitals), is a most important phenomenon, it should not obscure the 
existence of capitalist collaboration (eg. oligopolistic price-fixing) 
which comes about precisely because of it and which may have adverse 
effects on development (Fransman and Davies, 1977:293; 296 footnote 42). 
Within the CMP itself, competition tends to generate its opposite in 
the form of monopoly (or oligopoly more strictly speaking). This is bound 
up with a stage in the development of the means of production where 
overhead costs make it difficult to adjust production profitability to 
market fluctuations. The response of the larger capitalist enterprises is 
to try to control the market, and one method to aid this is monopolization 
(Sohn-Rethal, 1979:145). 
Monopolization may involve the development and adoption of enhanced 
means and methods of production at Moment B, but it tends to reduce the 
structural imperatives for this. Under monopoly, there is a small number of 
firms of very large size, and the costs of entry into competition are 
high.(8) The result is a privileged sanctuary of a sort: price competition 
declines and the market is informally regulated (Baran, 1962:76/7, 83). 
Both within a social formation, and especially on an international plane, 
this is likely to have negative consequences for development, with 
inequalities in bargaining position and opportunities, and political and 
economic privileges of all sorts - a far cry from the ~mirage of perfect 
competition- (ibid:116; Amin, 1974:53). 
Monopolies thus create immobilities that weaken the progressive 
economic effect of competition. However, monopolies remain mobile 
themselves, and in a way that may often undermine development. The 
productive capacity of a given economic unit may be weakened where (for 
example, Ireland, Wales) capital has moved production away in search of 
greater profits elsewhere. And even within a given unit, capital -
152 
OAP%TAL%5T DEVELOPMENT' 
use: OF SURPLUS 
motivated by profit rather than development - may move out of the most 
developmentally productive spheres into less productive and even parasitic 
realms such as luxury production, finance capital or real estate 
speculation. 
Another countertendency to development exhibited by the CMP lies in 
the essentially unplanned character at Moment c. Baran (1962:39) thus 
holds that waste and irrationality (i.e. "'hidden surplus'" - see chapter 
eleven) - rather than being fortuitous blemishes - relate to the very 
essence of capitalism. Heilbroner (1981:38) points to the disruptions at 
all stages of production: in the hiring and disciplining of labour, selling 
of output, etc. And according to Dobb (1951:61), capitalist crises can 
lead to bankruptcies, stagnation and retardation (see also Beckmann, 
1980:55).(9) 
7. CONCLUSION. 
It would be simplistic to draw a single conclusion about the CMP and 
economic development, particularly at this level of theorization, and 
certainly much more could be said on the issue. For my purposes, however, 
I have highlighted some of the key ways in which the social structure and 
system processes of the CMP have consequences on the development (and 
underdevelopment) of productive capacity. To complete this general 
picture, I turn now to the significance of the capitalist state for 
development. 
ENJN1TES 
1. This distinction shows that it is incorrect to assert as do Berger 
(1976:151) and Smith (1979:306) that the expansion of each enterprise 
appears to be built into its operational rationale. Rather, this 
characteristic applies to each capital and may be manifested not in the 
extension of its given enterprises, but in the setting up of separate ones. 
2. For example, motivations like acquisitiveness are not natural, but 
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historical products of social development (Marx, 1973:222). See Brenner 
(1977) for a devastating criticism of homo economic us assumptions. 
3. If competition is the incentive, then the consequent expansion of each 
enterprise serves as a market for others. Known as the ~accelerator 
effect~, this describes how an increase in demand may induce an increase in 
investment (Amin, 1974:224). (The ~multiplier effect~ is the relation 
between investment and the increase in consumption which it engenders). 
4. It is partly because Chilean market farmers only increased their 
production in this way, that Kay (1981:489/90) argues (incorrectly in my 
view) that they were not capitalists even though they employed and 
exploited wage-abour. 
5. Fine (1978) holds that the blocking of absolute surplus value compels 
the capitalists to mechanize for the purpose of relative surplus value 
exploitation. As discussed in the previous chapter, there are two forms of 
relative surplus value. One form is the objective effect on the value of 
labour-power across the entirety of capitalist society, caused by 
mechanization in sectors relating to wage-goods production. The other form 
is the distinct situation resulting from an individual capitalist's 
deliberate stategy at the level of his enterprise. Mechanization puts a 
capitalist ahead of competitors by enabling him to sell at the average 
price and (until they catch up) receive a relative surplus value over and 
above what they realize. It is only this form of relative surplus value 
that holds good for Fine's analysis. 
6. Turnover time affecting the rate of profit includes not only production 
time, but also circulation time. Marx cites improved communications (based 
on new material means of co~nunication) as the chief means of reducing 
circulation time (1974:71). 
7. There are complex debates about whether advanced means of production 
do not, paradoxically, also reduce the rate of profit - i.e. Marx's theory 
of the ~falling rate of profit~ (Marx, 1974: Part III). Suffice it here to 
say that Marx believed that as capitalist mechanization increased, there 
was a relative decrease in the proportion of new value created in relation 
to total capital outlay, and the rate of profit would fall in consequence. 
Among what Marx saw as several countervailing tendencies to this ~falling 
rate of profit~, he noted that mechanization itself can indirectly increase 
the rate of surplus value exploitation through contributing to relative 
surplus value. However, it may be argued that far from being a mere 
countertendency, this phenomenon in fact renders problematic the notion of 
a falling rate of profit per see While the debate is important, it has 
little direct bearing on my theorization of capitalist development; I hence 
leave it aside in this thesis. 
8. For example, the minimum size of a steelworks is determined technical-
ly, but its economic minim~n size - i.e. for it to be viable - is deter-
mined by competition in the market (Carchedi, 1975:72, footnote 27). 
9. This is not the place to enter into the debate around the nature of 
capitalist crises, but r~ther to draw attention to this phenomena and its 
negative economic significance. (See O'Connor, 1973; Mandel, 1975). 
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1. INTRODUCTION. 
THE STATE 
Capitalism at the level of a social formation (rather than simply as a 
mode of production) cannot be analysed without taking into account its 
superstructural conditions of existence and especially the state.(l) 
Indeed, the state stands out as being of major significance for not only 
the CMP, but also often as the locus of articulation between this mode and 
other economic forms. This is certainly the case with the colonial and 
post-colonial capitalist states (Mamdani, 1977:143). 
The emphasis in this chapter is mainly on situations where the CMP has 
already achieved dominance over non-capitalist relations of production, and 
the significance this has for development. The status of this discussion 
is theoretically informed generalization from concrete social formations 
rather than a general theory about the role of the state in capitalist 
society (see Jessop, 1982:211). 
Analytically speaking, the state is part of the superstructure in the 
base-superstructure abstraction, and it is conceptually distinct from the 
economic structure of relations and forces of production (see chapter 
eight). This structural distinction is also evident in real social 
formations, notwithstanding the way that each capitalist state is closely 
integrated with economic structures and processes. 
There are two key aspects of the capitalist state: its superstructural 
form on the one hand, and its role and functions on the other. In addit-
ion, there is the relationship between these to be considered. In certain 
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strands of Marxism~ the structural form of the capitalist state is seen as 
deriving from its ~necessary~ functions. My position would accord with 
this form-From-function model - but with the following qualifications: 
Firstly, the role of the capitalist state is dialectically related to 
base and superstructural levels of analysis (as well as to other factors). 
As such, this role (and therefore the structural form of the state as well) 
cannot be seen as being functionalistically invoked or crudely determined 
by the economic base. 
Secondly, both form and function need to be understood in terms of 
their constitution by real social classes and processes. The capitalist 
state is therefore a living structure and a fluid reality: a process 
embodied in changing forms, roles and functions (Wolfe, 1974:143,149). 
Thirdly, the state form itself has a character that exerts its own 
relatively autonomous influence on the functions performed by the 
capitalist state (see below). 
2. STRUCTURAL FORMS OF THE CAPITALIST STATE. 
The historical development of capitalism has involved distinct realms 
of economy and state. The state both rises from capitalist society and 
imposes back on it (Wolfe, ibid:147). While the state is by and large 
institutionally separate from the relations of production, it has a pres-
ence and effectivity in them. This is the very basic form of the capitalist 
state and it continues despite changes in government~ the differences in 
degree of involvement in the relations of production, and variations within 
the state structure itself (Wolpe, 1980b:401,403; Wolfe, 1974:149/50). 
Unless both political and economic structures are changed - as well as the 
relationship between them - into qualitatively new entities, the state 
remains fundamentally capitalist. 
Within the limits of capitalist relations of production, the state 
generally promotes capitalist exploitation, but does not do the exploiting 
directly: this is done by the capitalist class - with the aid of the state 
to be sure, but not through the medium of the state (Holloway and 
Picciotto, 1977:96).(2) This does not preclude the capitalist state from 
becoming involved in production and exploitation, and developing an econom-
ic apparatus for this purpose as in the case of state capital. (State 
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capital in agriculture is discussed in chapters thirty-three and thirty-
four). However, state capital is only capital in so far as it still exists 
within a context of capitalist system dynamics and capitalist relations at 
all three Moments of production in the social formation concerned. Where 
state capital develops to the point of supplanting, for example, private 
capitalist relations of possession-separation and capitalist processes such 
as competition, then the dominant mode of production is no longer capital-
ist in the sense defined in this thesis. 
Because of all this, the existence of state capital does not mean that 
the state has become a class. Under capitalism, the bureaucracy and the 
army are not a class. Despite high incomes and vested institutional 
interests, these state groups can only become a class by creating an 
independent base in the economy. state aid can be - and in many cases, 
especially in neo-colonialism, often is - used to this end. But until such 
an independent base is achieved, state functionaries are not a class 
although some of them may be in the process of becoming such. In the 
interim, they receive surplus and direct it on the basis of their state-
based relations with production-based classes (Mamdani, 1977:287/8). 
3. CHANGING FORMS AND FUNCTIONS. 
The changes within this basic form of the state are bound up with the 
changing functions it has been made to perform, as described in the 
following brief and generalized sketch.(3) 
The early capitalist state in its absolutist form has been explained 
by its role as a centralized apparatus used against pre-capitalist classes 
and economic forms. It was therefore the form of capitalist state suitable 
for creating new relations at Moment A - i.e. suitable for dispossessing 
the peasantry and creating a proletariat, and for centralizing wealth and 
means of production in a different class. It was also suitable for creat-
ing new relations at Moment C - i.e. eliminating feudal features that 
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inhibited generalized commodity exchange both territorially and socially 
(Marx~ 1972~ chapter xxiv; Hindess and Hirst~ 1977:298).(4) 
The same type of context explains the form of the capitalist state in 
colonial social formations. Economic mechanisms for monetarizing, commerc-
ializing, and proletarianizing pre-capitalist production were often inade-
quate, and were often replaced by the colonial state's taxes, compulsory 
crops, and expropriation of land (Amin, 1974:143). As state-imposed 
measures forced the commoditization of pre-capitalist simple reproduction, 
producers were pushed into the commodity circuit as cash-croppers or wage-
labourers (Bernstein, 1978:423/4). In this way, the colonial state interD-
alized in the colonized social formation, an external relationship of 
domination by the CMP (Legassick, 1976:439). 
This interventionist form of state has historically been a precondit-
ion for the economic instance of a capitalist social formation to come to 
the fore in reproducing capitalist relations of production. Once estab-
lished, these relations of production can be reproduced - in comparison to 
other class modes of production - relatively independently of the state 
(Wolfe, 1974:152/3). (Dispossessed workers have no option but to contin-
ually sell their labour power in order to survive~ and in doing so they are 
continually exploited.) The role of the economic in reproduction is not 
only with regard to the CMP alone~ but also with regard to its domination 
over other external modes and elements of production. Once established~ 
exchange at the economic level perpetuates domination, and in this situat-
ion, neo-colonial capitalism can function without coercive control being 
primary (Dupre and Rey, 1973:159). 
All this said, however, the state is still essential in such 
situations - even if only in a supplementary way - to reproduction (Wolfe, 
1974:153). At the very least, it guarantees exchange and exploitation 
through upholding private property ownership (Holloway and Picciotto, 
1977:87). Under monopoly capitalism especially~ there is a tendency for 
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the state to go further and assume not merely a ""'steering'" role (with the 
driving power located outside it), but to extensively intervene in capital-
ist expansion (Burton and Carlen, 1979:41, Heilbroner, 1981:39).(5) 
In the next section, I look in more depth at the capitalist state and 
its economic and political roles, in particular, at "'valorization- and 
"domination'" (cf. Burton and Carlen, 1979:36). Valorization is linked to 
the economic role of the state (especially as regards maintaining 
capitalist accumulation). Domination refers to political and ideological 
control (ibid:37/8). These two state roles do not operate exclusively 
of each other, but their effects on society can distinguished. Thus, 
the primary impact of valorization is upon the forces of production 
(even if sometimes only indirectly so). Domination has its primary 
effect on the relations of production. The two functions may be retrogress-
ive as well as progressive in terms of developing productive capacity. 
4. POLITICAL FUNCTIONS OF THE CAPITALIST STATE. 
How is the state~s political role to be understood? The state is a 
structured relationship of forces. As an unstable equilibruim of compromis-
es, it institutionalizes (to lesser or greater extents) conflict and 
contradictions, and it facilitates the unity of a dominant class under the 
leadership of a class fraction (Poulantzas, 1978:127/8; Mamdani, 1977:13). 
These functions are specifically materialized in the ideological and 
repressive (and even the economic) state apparatuses (which apparatuses are 
not in every case entirely distinct or exclusive) (ibid:32-4). However, 
the state should not be conceived as the simple tool of a class or coalit-
ion of classes and fractions. There are two main reasons why: 
Firstly, the class struggle, capitalist competition, and the general 
requirements of capitalist reproduction set limits on the capacity of any 
grouping to use the state entirely for its own purposes. (6) Each class"s 
strength and interests in one way or another have effects on and in the 
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state~ and relations of power among all classes are reflected in the 
ultimate policy~ functioning and structure (see JessoPJ 1982:61). All 
this makes the state relatively independent of any single class groupinq. 
Secondly" the state has a relative autonomy from class forces because 
of its own structures and processes which condition and limit political 
practices (Burton and Carlen~ 1979:40,43; Wolpe~ 1980b:401/2). For example" 
the means of political representation in the state structure have their own 
effectivity in determining the outcomes of political practices (Hindess and 
Hirst, 1977:36). The relative autonomy of the state can also be seen with 
regard to the means of political execution. The bureaucracy is not a 
neutral mechanism with regard to executing directives from either legislat-
ure or lobby groups: it has its own internal dynamics. In addition it is 
also linked to society through the varied class linkages of its members, 
i.e. bypassing the legislature (Herring, 1981:143, 146). Because of all 
this, the stateJs functions do not express class interests in an unmediated 
way. 
The state has therefore - to an extent - an independent dynamic which 
means it may become a social force in its own right. The effectiveness of 
the state ~is to be found in its institutional structure as much as in the 
social categories, fractions or classes that control it U (Jessop~ 1982:27). 
fhis critique of the instrumentalist view of the state is not to ignore 
cases where, due to the weakness of both state institutions and social 
classes, a single class/fraction (or even individual personality) has 
enioyed special access to and utilization of state power (see MarxJs 
Eighteenth Brumaire, 1977b). 
5. ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS OF THE CAPITALIST STATE. 
The state has some functions that are primarily economic in nature, 
and its form may involve an economic apparatus to execute these functions. 
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This does not mean that the economic functions are unmarked bv politics or 
unaffected by apparatuses that are primarily political and ideological. 
Economic tunctions have a political character. This is central to state 
development policies and projects" as dlscussed in chapters twenty-eight 
and twenty-nine. Because capitalist production is simultaneously exploitat-
ion, state economic actions tend to reinforce the domination of the 
exploiting class (Mamdani" 1977:12" fVliliband; 1972). At the same time, 
domination is not without its economic effects - particularly on the 
absolute surplus value exploitation, and the extent and use of surplus. 
Baran (1962:92/3) describes these economic functions .. noting that the 
state has played a major role throughout the history of capitalism: 
Whether directly or indirectly .. whether by subsidizing 
the construction of railroads as in Germany and the 
United States" or by promoting with suitable measures 
the native capitalist~s economic interest abroad as in 
Britain and Holland; or by elaborating financial 
transactions and imposition of tariffs in France and 
Russia .. the state everywhere had an important hand in 
determining the course and speed of economic development 
in the capitalist age. 
It needs to be borne in mlnd that the capitalist state has also in 
some cases .. notably for those on the receiving side in colonialism and neo-
colonialism" operated in a way that is negative for economic development 
{see chapter twenty-eight). However; spelt out in more detail" the 
~positive~ economic functions of the capitalist state relate to: 
property rights; liberalization (as regards commodity 
circulation); orchestration of development policy; input 
provision (land" capital" means of production such as 
infrastructure" steelworks); social consensus; 
management of the external relations of the capitalist 
social formation; serving as a market; taxation and re-
allocation of surplus; protection of monopolies (Murray; 
1971:111-4; see also Jessop" 1982:48,,55,,91).(6) 
State economic activities vary in form .. degree; agency and timing -
largely depending on the degree ot international competition; the outcome 
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of class struggles~ and the stage of capitalist development (MurraYI 
1971: 118) . 
With regard to the role of agency~ the detailed functions listed above 
are only latently state or public functions (ibid). There are no economic 
functions related to production in general which every capitalist state is 
bound to fulfill (Poulantzas~ 1978:173). In fact~ the state is not 
inherently necessary for most economic functions. It takes them over for 
the following reasons: 
Firstly~ there are the concrete class struggles and strategies where 
classes and fractions seek the aid of the state to further their economic 
interests. SecondlYI there is the reproduction role of the state whereby 
it may take over activities that are unprofitable to capital at a given 
iuncture~ or which are unreliably secured by private enterprise despite 
being essential to the whole system (see Mamdani l 1977:12). 
An important way in which the form and economic functions of the state 
are bound up with each other~ is the national character of the state. The 
capitalist state may act not only to establish and help extend the CMP 
within a social formation l but do this specifically against foreign 
capitalist and non-capitalist classes (eg. through protectionism, colonial--
ism and imperialism) (see Kaplan, 1977:112; Jessop, 1982:113). 
Amongst a capitalist state~s possible or existing economic activities, 
some are ultimately of more importance than others. Thus, although the 
state stabilizes and ensures continuity in production by the functions 
described above, its key role is in terms of production, rather than 
exchange (the market) (Poulantzas, 1978). One case of this is in 
redistributinq surplus value. The mechanism for this is that some capital 
is devalorized by beinq statized and then subsequently redistributed to 
other capitals (see Jessop, 1982:68). Nationalized or statized capital is 
not exempt from competitive pressures to maintain or increase profit rates. 
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But, being relatively devalorized in most cases and therefore able to con-
tinue unprofitably by means of state subsidies, such capital permits a 
transfer of surplus value to other sectors of capital (Poulantzas, 1978:-
176). This may be through exchange between state and private capital 
(state enterprises buying above or selling below value), or through the 
injection of state funds into a state enterprise and such an enterprise 
subsequently sold off cheaply to private capital. In this way, state 
development programmes may end up subsidizing capital, and to lesser 
extents (and even contradictory extents - see chapter thirty-six) ~kulaks-
or settler tenants rather than expanding productive capacity_ 
Another case in which the state acts on the relations of production, 
is in terms of raising the rate of exploitation. This is partially through 
repressing or institutionalizing struggle against this exploitation. The 
state also helps to increase relative surplus value exploitation by train-
ing labour, technical innovation, facilitating concentration and centraliz-
ation, and promoting growth in areas (eg. agriculture) that cheapen the 
value of labour-power (Holloway and Picciotto, 1977:92/3). (It is important 
to bear in mind, however, the structural limits of the intervention of the 
capitalist state in a capitalist economy.) As discussed in Parts I and J, 
the capitalist state has also had a significant involvement in agricultural 
production in the Third World, either creating detailed conditions for 
capitalist investment there, or taking a direct part in various development 
strategies itself. 
6. CONCLUSION. 
This chapter has reviewed the role of the capitalist state in relation 
to development in national social formations, analysing its political and 
economic significance in this light. It needs to be remembered, however, 
that nit is still necessary to examine each state in its own terms rather 
than treat all capitalist states as identical because of their common 
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foundation~ (Jessop~ 1982:24). This chapter also concludes the general 
theorization about capitalism and development. The argument can now move 
to a different level of analysis - namely to examining these issues in the 
context of the international capitalist system. 
E~TES 
1. It is at the level of the social formation that the state must be 
analysed - contra Poulantzas (1973) who (in places) tries to theorize it 
entirely by abstract logic at the level of the mode of production. 
2. Where the state appropriates surplus labour in the form of taxes~ for 
example, this is not a capitalist form of exploitation. 
3. My account may appear somewhat stipulative and unsubstantiated~ given 
that it is not possible within the confines of this thesis to provide a 
full treatment of the issues. However~ it is drawn from more concrete 
studies (if often indirectly), and is of significant heuristic value in 
informing the more empirical analysis in Part I of this thesis. 
4. The power of the state was used to ..... hasten, hot-house fashion~ the 
process of transformation of the feudal mode of production into the 
capitalist mode and to shorten the transitionU (Marx~ 1972:203). 
5. Monetarism and cutbacks in the state's expenditure on welfare are not 
so much an absence of state involvement in the economy, as a specific form 
of involvement that undermines or resists working class gains. State 
involvement in monopoly capitalism does not negate competition nor the 
fundamental "anarchy'" of capitalist production (Holloway and Picciotto~ 
1977:96). 
6. This is not to imply that the state has privileged knowledge of the 
general interest of capital (see Jessop~ 1982:98). It is only when the 
range of specific interests are articulated and aggregated~ that the state 
can serve capital as a whole. 
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THE CMP AN) THE INTERNATIONAL CAPITALIST SYSTEM 
1. Introduction. 
2. Units of analysis 
2.i. -The international capitalist system as coterminous with the CMP-. 
2.ii -Each social formation as a unique mode of production~. 
3. The CMP at the centre and the periphery. 
4. Critique of dependency theory·s units of analysis. 
s. Conclusion. 
L. INTRODUCTION. 
Having theorized the CMP and development l it is now possible to move 
to a less abstract level of analysis and see how these concepts relate to 
social formations and national economic systems. In particular, the inter-
national capitalist economic system and its component parts can now be 
investigated as a step towards analysing the relation between social 
structure and development (and underdevelopment) in the Third World. The 
major issue in this chapter concerns the appropriate units of analysis. 
2. UNITS OF ANALYSIS. 
Two approaches have been adopted in conceptualizing the relation 
between the CMP and units of analysis. The first sees the international 
economy as coterminous with the CMP; the second effectively limits the CMP 
to First World social formations I and sees Third World social formations 
(or at least a group thereof) as constituting a unique mode of production. 
2.i -The international capitalist system as coterminous with the CMP-. 
The Frankian approach to the place of the CMP in the international 
economy is to conflate the two into a single unit of analysis. For Waller-
stein (1974:77) and Frank (1969a, 1969b), the dependence of producers on 
the market links them together internationally and they thereby become 
direct and equivalent participants in the international capitalist 
system.(l) However, this view detracts from the particularities of the 
articulation of the CMP with external non-capitalist relations at the 
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various Moments of production (see Mouzelis, 1979b:43; Foster-Carter l 
1978:239). Differences between the ..... treesu , so to speak, are hidden by 
their intertwined foliage.(2) 
The Frankians cannot properly explain why - if it is the CMP that 
characterizes First and Third World alike - the two are so different 
economically'? Why do the underdeveloped social formations not follow the 
developmental tendencies of the CMP as these operate in the developed 
countries? (Roxborough, 1976:119/20). As Dos Santos (1969:75) asks about 
the Third World: 
How can one characterize such a system of production? Is 
it a particular case of capitalism, a completely 
different mode of production, or a system in transition 
towards capitalism ? 
Indeed, such have been the differences between developed and under-
developed social formations, that some writers have seen the latter as 
exhibiting a mode of production sui generis, complete with its own system 
dynamics. 
2.ii. -Each social formation as a unique mode of production~. 
From the Frankian position of identifying the international capitalist 
economy with the capitalist mode of production, I now turn to the other 
extreme where modes of production are located at the same unit of analysis 
as social formations, and a unique mode of production is attributed to each 
social formation (or group of similar formations). For example, a concept 
of a ~colonial mode of productionu has been advocated to cover certain 
Third World social formations (see Alavi, 1975; Cardosa, 1976; Banaji, 
1972). There has also been an attempt to utilize the concept of a "settler 
mode of production~ (see Biermann and K6ssler, 1980). 
In this approach, the international economy is seen as an aggregate of 
its (highly) different units. However, as Roxborough (1976) warns, this 
type of approach can lead to an uncontrolled proliferation of modes of 
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production.(3) It becomes difficult to see similarities between relations 
of production in different social formations - i.e. which ~trees~ are of 
the same uspecieso. The concept of a colonial mode certainly emphasizes 
the difference and specificitv of the Third World, but at the cost of 
obscuring its similaritv to the First (viz. the CMP dominant in both).(4) 
In addition, the stress on the parts (social formations with unique 
modes of production), independently of the whole (the international 
capitalist system), gives us nothing about the relations between the parts. 
This is to ""'see the trees without the woodu • It implies that any articul-
ation between the parts is an articulation of independent units. Yet many 
writers have argued that Third World economies are better seen as parts of 
the First (see Ehrensaft, 1971). Foster-Carter (1978:230) calls them 
Upart-economies-, while Mouzelis (1979b:34) describes them as dependent 
appendages of the metropolitan economies. Amin (1974:289) goes so far as to 
question whether they are national economies. He argues that a national 
economy only really exists when it constitutes a relatively autocentric and 
integrated economic space where growth is diffused throughout. In con-
trast, underdeveloped economies do not have internally integrated sectors 
because they are inteqrated with entities whose centre of qravity is in the 
economies of the ~centren. 
From these arguments, I take it that social formations are not isolat-
ed autochtonous entities; rather there are very important linkages with 
each other.(5) The problem is therefore to capture the way in which social 
formations are meaningful units in a wider international economic system 
i.e. to discover what their effectivity is within the integrated whole. 
This will help give part of the answer as to why, if Third World economies 
are ~appendaqes~ of' the capitalist First, they remain different - i.e. 
underdeveloped instead of developed. 
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I would argue that the units of analysis in the international whole 
can best be analysed by identitying one single mode of production (viz. the 
CMP) as dominant throughout the international capitalist economic system~ 
though still having a different form and different articulations in each 
social formation. Taking a single social formation~ this means that its 
major mode of production in a is not unique or separate~ but the same as 
and linked to - that prevailing in a number of other social formations~ 
despite secondary ditterences that may exist in each case. 
It would seem useful here to follow Foster-Carter (1978:23) who says 
that it is necessary to distinguish abstract capitalism (i.e. the general 
concept of the CMP) from its concrete form in different national capital-
isms. In my view~ the different national forms are explainable in terms of 
several factors including: 
(1) the specific class forces and state in each social formation; 
(ii) the different articulation with the CMP at Moments A .. 8 and C 
within and between each social formation; and 
(iii) the specitic non-capitalist elements in each situation. 
These wlll now be discussed in more depth. 
(i). One at the reasons for the concrete differences in the CMP around the 
world is the role of the state and classes in a given social formation. 
Thus, tor example .. Kaplan (19/7:9J/'d) describes how state and class 
tactors may enable one part at the international capitalist mode of produc-
tion to dominate other parts - resulting in metropolitan and colonial 
characterlstics. Mamdani (19//:1U(:$) speaks of ttle specificity of capitalism 
under colonial conditions - a capitalism which is distinct precisely 
because it is not a properly national capltalism. 
( ii). Wi ttlin tne Lfvlf-! i tself ~ dif t er lnq artlculations between Moments 
(within and across social tormations) also explain the differences between 
the CMP in difterent cases. Thus for Dos Santos (1969:72) underdevelopment 
is neiUler a state ot backwardness prior to capitalism .. nor is it pure 
capitalism. Rather it is a consequence of capitalism constituting a partic-
ular torm ot capitalism: ~dependent capitalism~. 
Most writers seem to share this general perspective .. but prefer to use 
the concepts of ""capi tallsm at the periphery" and .... capi talism at the 
centre~. For example .. Furtado (1964) says that the Third World is not in a 
transition stage trom pre-capitalism to capitalism .. but a particular modern 
form ot capitalism and an lntegral part of the world capitalist market, 
i.e. it is "peripheral capitalismN • Amin (1974:35) holds that the trans-
tormation of pre-capitalist social formations integrated into the world 
system is not to the CM~ in general~ but to ~capitalism at the periphery~. 
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This form has its own specific tendencies regarding development because it 
is the CMP based on an external market (ibid:39). It is distinct from the 
CMP at the centre which is based primarily on an internal market. (6) Amin 
therefore argues (correctly) that the international capitalist economy 
cannot be analysed simply in terms of the CMP in general. Rather, its two 
concrete forms must be taken into account: the CMP at the centre and the 
CMP at the periphery. 
(iii). A further point affecting different national forms of the CMP is its 
articulation with non-capitalist relations. Here it is argued that the CMP 
at the centre tends to become exclusive, whereas in the periphery it is 
predominant~ but not exclusive (Amin, ibid:5,38).(7) This point about 
central CMP exclusivity needs, however, to be qualified. The CMP certainly 
is the primary and most extensive form of production in the centre. But it 
is not exclusive to the extent that capitalist relations and forces of 
production are the sole production relations there. For example, the CMP 
in the centre still articulates - via heterogeneous relations of production 
- with merchants and bankers, with housewives engaged in domestic labour 
and as described in chapter twenty-six with simple commodity producers. 
This does not negate the general point, however: the CMP at the centre 
is far more widespread in comparison to the CMP at the periphery (hence the 
different market structures), and it is the peripheral formations which are 
really the hybrid economic systems (Furtado, 1964:36). The significance of 
these arguments is that a peripheral social formation in particular cannot 
be seen as constituting a single mode of production: it is an economic 
system that involves the CMP articulating with a diversity of external 
production relations. The notion of a mode of production sui generis for 
each social formation (as discussed above) obscures not only the nature of 
the real dominant mode, but also the existence of other production 
relations within a social formation. Differences between social format-
ions in the international economy are thus not only within the national 
forms of the CMP, but also in the economic relations that it articulates 
with in each case. 
In the light of all the above, I would distinguish between the CMP and 
capitalism. Capitalism - at both the centre and the periphery - refers to 
an economic system (see chapter seven) dominated by the CMP, notwithstand-
ing important structural differences between central and peripheral 
capitalist economic systems (see below). 
4. CRITIQUE OF DEPENDENCY THEORY'S UNITS OF ANALYSIS. 
It is worthwhile pointing out here that it is precisely the three 
points made above (class forces, internal CMP articulation and CMP-external 
articulation) that dependency theory tends to overlook; hence its inability 
to properly explain the different character of First and Third Worlds (not 
to mention variations within each). 
As Mouzelis (1979b:45) says, ~dependence~ is a vague concept. Indeed, 
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this is so much the case that it is hard to distinguish between dependency 
within the CMP only (be this the CMP within or across peripheral or central 
social formations), and dependency across a spectrum of diverse economic 
forms in a given social formation. This lack of precision is an obstacle 
to analysing how dependence relates to development and underdevelopment. (8) 
Similarly, the way that dependency theory conceptualizes exploitation 
and surplus is so general as to obliterate differences within the economic 
relations of a structure of underdevelopment (Taylor, 1979, cited by 
Mouzelis, 1980:382/3). There is a uniform hierarchy of metropole-satellite 
exploitation upwards and outwards with no distinction between the diverse 
relations involved (see Foster-Carter, 1978:211; Booth, 1975:79). Thus, 
amongst dependency theory's blindspots, there is the admixture of economic 
relations within international (and national) capitalist economic systems. 
The dependency concepts of centre-periphery and metropole-satellite 
are used to refer both to classes and systems (eg. urban centres) - and 
this collapsing of spatial and social relations under the same concepts 
pOints to a lack of concreteness (l"louzelis, 1979b:43; Barnett, 1977:23). (9) 
The concrete differences between CI"IP relations and non-CfY1P relations, and 
their articulation at various Moments of production are lost sight of. The 
conflation of class and spatial relations further detracts from the specif-
ic role of classes and the state in determining differences between nation-
al capitalisms. The important distinction between exploitation in Moment B 
and Moment C (see chapter five) is ignored by Frank. 
Luton (1976:573) says that the question is not whether Frank's 
position is too general, but whether it is logically possible to move from 
it to more specific situations. Given all the criticisms above, it would 
seem that without the addition of more analytical theory, the answer is 
negative. It is significant that dependency studies have generally failed 
to look at the impact of global processes at the local level (Bodelman and 
Allahar, 1980:460; Oxaal, Barnett and Booth, 1975:2/3). Foster-Carter 
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(1978:211/L) says that dependency is a macro-framework and it is difficult 
to operationalize metropole-satellite linkages: for this, the concepts of 
articulation of different economic relations are required. I agree broadly 
with this point, and in chapter nineteen I attempt to synthesize these 
concepts with the dependency approach. On its own, dependency theory is 
inadequate for pinpointing the distinctions between units of analysis 
within the international capitalist system. 
5. CONCLUSIUN. 
In looking at the CMP in contemporary social formations, two errors 
need to be avoided. The first is to brand every social formation, and 
every production relation in it, as uniformly and equivalently capitalist. 
The second error is to go to the other extreme and lose sight of the CMP 
eXisting in and across several social formations, seeing in its place a 
unique mode of production in each social formation. 
Instead, it is possible to recognize the existence of an international 
capitalist economlC system in which the CMP exists in (and across) many 
social formatlons. LJitferences between these social formations depend on 
the specific state and class forces; the specific character ot the CMP; and 
the articulation of diverse productlon relations. These three tactors are 
sufticiently difterent in First and fhird Worlds to constitute two quali-
tatively different types ot economic system: capitalism at the centre and 
capitalism at the periphery. These two units of analysis exist as econo-
mic sub-systems within a wider unit, viz. the international capitalist 
economic system. 
There is an important distinction between these sub-systems. In the 
centre, the social formations each generally constitute an effective 
economic unit; and in addition, they collectively constitute a broader 
(united and integrated) economlC system. lhe ~central capitalist economic 
system" is the outcome. In contrast, peripheral formations neither singly 
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nor jointly constitute properly effective economic systems. This does not 
mean~ however, that - considered individually - they do not constitute an 
economic unit at all: on the contrary, each makes up a detinite structure 
and economic system or underdevelopment. Precisely because of this, one 
cannot - when considering them jointly - meaningfully speak of a "periph-
eral capitalist economic system~ in the singular. Rather, it is necessary 
to refer to uperipheral capitalist economic systems"". 
To understand these ditferent units of analysis requires discussion of 
the articulation in the international capitalist economy~ and this is the 
topiC of the next two chapters. 
EN)~nES 
1. For Frank, this is based on the transtormation of diverse relations of 
production into production for eXChange (Banaji, 198U:514). 
2. The pittalls of this approach can be clearly seen with regard to the 
Frankian argument ttlat the Amer lcan South was capitalist because it was 
integrated into the world market and produced for profit (see 8anaji~ 
19~u:5lb). rhe problem is that it the South is called capitalist, it is 
difticult to explain why its social relations impeded the development of 
capitalist features at all Moments of production. While the CMP tends to 
lead to industrlalization, in the ~outh, reinvestment led to only 
quantitative extenslon of eXlsting means of production, and not through 
qualltatlve development lnvolvlng new means of production lHlndess and 
Hirst, 1977:15u-2). fhe situation is better explained as the South having 
a slave mode ot production subordinately articulated to the CMP through the 
international division ot labour and world market (ibid:161). 
3. indeed, why stop at each type ot social formation having its own mode 
of prOduction - Why not each local or regional economy within a given 
soclal formatlOn( This kind of approach makes the same error as 
Wallerstein (i.e. confusing modes of production with economic systems) 
but at a smaller unit of analysis. 
4. Colon~alism lS primarily (though not exclusively) a political 
relationship. To be sure, it has crucial economic implications, but 
contrary to the notion at a colonial mode of production, colonial 
relations - even when reduced to the economic level - do not in themselves 
constltute a mode of productlon because there is no articulated combination 
ot detinite and corresponding relations and forces ot prOduction (Hindess 
and Hlrst, 1~/1:1~~/LUU). 
5. At the very least~ there are connections like international 
communications, influence ot international organisations~ terms ot 
exchange~ transfer of technology, trade relations and international debt -
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which attect even the most local units of production (Heyer et al~ 1980:-
2/3). Ihe Marxist principle ot keeping sight ot interconnections when 
studying individual things (see chapter one) sensitizes one to this 
reality. 
b. To qualify this somewhat, (without pre-empting the later discussion), 
tile "internal market"'" of the central social formations is not necessar ily 
internal to eacll individually. Hather it is internal to the broader 
central economic system as an effective economic unit. Thus, trade among 
trle advanced capitalist social formations is far greater than trade between 
them and the peripheral formations. In contrast, the CMP in the periphery 
articulates with a market that is external not only to the specific 
peripheral social formation concerned, but external to all peripheral 
formations. 
7. Obregon (1974:394-8) makes similar distinctions. For him, under-
developed formations are very particular ""'peripheral formations ..... which are 
fundamentally, but not homogeneously capitalist. The whole structure is 
characterized by dependency and subordinate articulation within the inter-
national capitalist system. 
8. I leave aside here the question of dependency in a non-capitalist 
context and whether for example, dependence in a socialist economic system 
is difterent in nature to that within or linked to capitalism (Berger, 
197b:15; Uos Santos, 1969:78, footnote 15). 
~. ~rank has an image rather than an analysis of exploitation (O~Brien, 
1975:27, footnote 40). 
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CHArfER SIXIEE:-N 
ARJ lClJLAllON WITHIN HiE INTERNAfIONAL CAPITALIST SYS1EM 
--------_._------------------------------------
1. Intr-oduc tion. 
2. The CMP side of the articulation. 
2.i. Genesis ot the CMP. 
2.ii. Expansion ot the tully-fledged CMP. 
3. The non-capitalist side of articulation. 
4. Articulation transforming non-capitalist elements into capitalist ones. 
4.i. Commoditization. 
4.ii. Monetarization. 
4.iii. Commercialization. 
4.iv. Proletarianization. 
4.v. Capitalist class formation. 
5. Conclusion. 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
This chapter looks at the articulation of the CMP with non-capitalist 
economic elements in the international capitalist system. As a phenomenon 
creating a patterned linkage of economic structures, articulation constit-
utes new relations. There are two different dimensions to this: firstly, 
as it relates to the different Moments of production, and secondly the 
relative contributions that different structures make in an articulation 
relationship (see Taylor, 1979 in Mouzelis, 1980:362). This chapter analy-
ses these issues, and highlights several key factors which are taken up 
again in more depth later in this thesis. Historically, the nature of 
capitalist articulation and the consequences tor U)e pre-capitalist side 
has been a function primarily of the CMP and only secondarily of the pre-
capitalist structures (Bradby, 1975:1~7), and I thus begin by analysing the 
CMP side of the articulation. 
2. THE CMP SIDE OF THE ARTICULATION. 
CMP articulation has often involved the transformation of the pre-
capitalist side through undermining its reproduction, system dynamics and 
class relations, and recomblning aspects of these into new capitalist 
relations (Friedmann, 1979:162). It may be noted here that the tendency of 
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CMP articulation to develop through transformation is by no means automat-
ically given. Firstly, underdeveloped economic systems are characterized 
by restricted development of the CMP (especially in agriculture - see 
chapter twenty-five). And, secondly, where the CMP does articulate, the 
phenomenon of ~conservation-dissolution- rather than transformation may 
occur. (See next chapter). 
In order to analyse CMP articulation, it is important to examine what 
is involved for the CMP to come into articulation with other economic 
forms. The CMP involves a general tendency to expansion. The question is, 
what causes the CMP to expand extensively into economic systems outside tt-,e 
CMP, and not only intensively within the CMP? 
I follow Bradby (1975:127) here in rejecting any attempt at a general 
theory of this historical phenomenon. Bradby reviews and rejects the 
possibility of general laws such as that the CMP needs to export capital 
(to counter the falling rate of profit) to non-capitalist economic 
structures, that the CMP requires labour-power from bther modes, and that 
the CMP needs non-capitalist markets. She argues instead that capitalism 
has different demands at different development periods and local condit-
ions. While concurring with this, I would also argue that one can still 
pinpoint the general features of extensive capitalist expansion and the 
associated articulation. 
In this light, the spread of capitalism can be defined, following 
Halliday (1979:104), in terms of: (a) the development of commodity 
relations in production inputs and outputs, (b) the growth of a home 
market, with commodity exchange between agriculture and industry, and (c) 
the growth of a capitalist class structure. In the terminology of this 
thesis, Halliday~s points encompass Moment C (distribution and utilizat-
ion), and Moment A (possession and separation). To this analysis, we can 
add the need for capitalist relations in the labour process (Moment B), as 
well as the system dynamic of competition and the asociated dynamic of 
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commercialization, and the reproduction of these relations. It will be 
clear below that these apply to both the genesis of the CMP and subsequent 
articulation as a fully-fledged mode of production with non-capitalist 
economic elements. 
2.i. Genesis of the CMP. 
Applying this theorization, it is evident that the elements which were 
to constitute the CMP inevitably involved articulation with non-capitalist 
structures. For example, proto-capitalist labour processes, depended on 
outside supplies - means of production and wage-goods. They also depended 
on external structures for markets, and thereby on the level of surplus 
labour and exploitation in these structures. In these respects, they 
constituted a heterogeneous relation of production with Moment B dependent 
on non-capitalist relations of distribution and utilization, and therefore 
on non-capitalist relations of exploitation, possession and separation. 
Regarding the genesis of other relations of the CMP (eg. accumulation of 
wealth at Moment C through control of pre-capitalist production, distribut-
ion and/or utilization), again heterogeneous relations ot production were 
involved. Capitalist relations at Moment A (i.e. separation of the produc-
er from the means of production and their concentration in another class) 
may also prefigure the CMP as such, articulating in a heterogeneous 
relation with a range ot non-capitalist relations at Moments Band C. 
Transition towards the dominance of the CMP at the centre historically 
has involved the expansion of commodity production and exchange between 
capitalist units, and the development of the internal capitalist market to 
dominance in the economic system as a whole (Hindess and Hirst, 1977:305). 
This comes about in part as the CMP expands interlsively, developing its own 
mar-ket througtl commodity specialization and produc1ng its supplies within 
ltself (Bradby, 1975:129; Ennew et aI, 1977:298). It 15 also achieved by 
transformative articulation with non-capitalist relations. Thus, as noted 
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in chapter twelve~ the CMP~s internal market historically has been an 
aspect ot the growth in the supply of wage-labourers dependent on commodity 
exchange for their reproduction (Dobb ... 1962:20.). The development of the 
internal market was ... further ... not only in wage-goods ... but also in means of 
production (Amin ... 1974:156). For these reasons, the development of' the CMP 
at Moment C is bound up with the transformation of non-capitalist relations 
of possession-separation at Moment A into capitalist ones. 
2.ii. Expansion of the fully-fledged CMP. 
While the CMP once fully constituted is able increasingly to expand 
internally, it still tends to articulate with non-capitalist labour 
processes ... thereby creating heterogeneous relations of production with 
them. Primarily ... this is through Moment C ... where one of the factors behind 
this articulation is the CMP~s quest for markets to realize the surplus 
value embodied in its cornmodities. Although Luxemburg (1951) (writing in 
1915) incorrectly deduced an absolute structural necessity for the CMP to 
trade with non-capitalist structures... there is an undeniable historical CMP 
tendency to reach out to these through eXChange. 
Extensive expansion of the CMP may also be through articulation 
whereby the CMP introduces its own labour processes or transforms existing 
non-capitalist ones. This is largely through industrial capital investment 
in ... and jOint ventures with ... other economic structures - though finance 
capital also plays a part (see Palloix, 1973). The system process behind 
this phenomenon is imperialism understood as the export of capital in the 
era of monopoly capitalism. Writing in 1916 ... Lenin (1964) argued that in 
order to combat the falling rate of profit, the CMP invests in the non-
capitalist underdeveloped areas. In these areas ... the higher rate of 
absolute surplus value exploitation ... and the lower organic composition of 
capital helps to oft set the falling rate of profit. While both theory and 
data in this view are controversial (see Gallagher and Robinson, 1953; 
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Fieldhouse~ 196-/; Emmanuel .. 1972b), it is not necessary to enter the debate 
here. Suffice it to say that the CMP historically does seem to have had a 
tendency to expand and articulate with non-capitalist structures through 
extensive investment. 
In all this articulation~ it is important to distinguish the uneven-
ness in the parts of the CMP that articulate with other economic struct-
ures. fhere may be~ for example .. unevenness with regard to cash .. commodit-
ies and labour-power and particular types of the latter two (see Radice, 
1975:17, footnote 14). Articulation may also involve different fractions 
of classes in the CMP: for example .. with the competitive, monopoly or 
international bourgeoisies and this is important for development and under-
development (Mare .. 1977:5). For example, in underdeveloped social format-
ions" the CMP had a very particular character: it was monopolistic right 
from the start" and of a commercial rather than industrial bias.(l) 
As discussed in more detail at the end of this chapter, there is also 
the point that the articulation may be indirect and occur primarily through 
non-economic structures such as the state. This is particularly evident in 
the way that capitalist relations of possession and separation are estab-
lished, and in the various strategies used to develop pre-capitalist and 
even wholly new non-capitalist production in the periphery in the interests 
of the CMP. Indirect articulation is also evident in peripheral capitalism 
where the dominant capitalist class is absent" and dominates these social 
formations through intermediaries (Amin, 1974:360; Cabral, 1969:81). 
These are points tt,at can be made about internal dynamics of the Cfv1P 
within the international capitalist economic system which are relevant to 
articulation. I now turn to the non-capitalist side of articulation. 
3. THE NON-CAPITALIST SIDE OF ARTICULATION. 
Rey (1973, cited by Bradby, 1975:145) holds that the difference 
between the developed and the underdeveloped countries lies not in the CMP 
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side of the articulation, but in the pre-capitalist side. Although Rey is 
too one-sided,(2) his emphasis draws attention to the internal dynamics of 
the non-capitalist side (see also Friedmann, 1979:180). This means looking 
at: the principal relations of production (with relevance at Moment A); how 
surplus labour is appropriated (Moment 8); and (at Moment C) how the 
product circulates, for what purpose wealth is accumulated, and how the 
division of labour is organized (see Bradby, 1975:130). It is significant, 
for example, that some non-capitalist modes of production tend to be a 
passive, non-initiating partner in articulation with the CMP especially 
when they have only s~le, and not expanded, reproduction (see chapter 
five), and therefore lack a tendency to expansion and generalization 
(Terray, 1974:334). 
Luxemburg (1951) used the term ~natural economy- to designate the 
characteristics of pre-capitalist modes of production that were essentially 
opposed to the CMP and which had to be destroyed in order for it to 
develop. These characteristics are specifically those inconsistent with 
commodity exchange and expanded reproduction (8radby, 1975:127/8). For 
example, much so-called peasant production and reproduction is premissed on 
conditions inimical to the CMP. As Friedmann (1979:175) puts it, 
The whole complex of institutions of ~peasantH 
reproduction which resist commoditization must decompose 
in order for capitalist (or simple commodity) production 
to emerge. Communal and upre-capitalistN class 
relations must give way to mobility of labour and 
national markets in credit and land. 
On the other hand, and contra Friedmann, much ..... peasant ...... production is 
commoditized in varying degrees (see chapter twenty-six), and this facilit-
ates articulation with the CMP.(3) What also affects the articulation 
from the non-capitalist side is the nature of its classes, and to what 
extent they find the articulation complementary or contradictory to their 
interests.(4) Resistance from the non-capitalist side to the capital-
ist is important in shaping articulation. 
179 
INTERNATIONAL CAPITALISM. 
INTERNATIONAL ARTICIJLA.TION 
4. ARTICULA1"ION TRANSFORMING NON-CAPITALIST ELEMENTS INTO CAPITALIST ONES. 
Some general points can be made about articulation where the CMP 
generalizes itself by incorporating and transforming economic forms~ i.e. 
wrlere assimilation implies transformation (Barratt-Brown~ 1976:279). 
The criteria for identifying when a labour process becomes part of a 
mode ot production have been discussed in chapter eight.(5) How do these 
relate to capitalist transformation of non-capitalist labour processes into 
capitalist ones~ There are five basic elements in a process of capitalist 
transformation: conTnoditization~ roonetarization, corrmercialization, pro-
letarianization and capitalist class formation. Most of these have been 
touched on in chapter twelve, but it is important to spell out their signi-
ficance for articulation here. 
Monetarization refers to the spread of money as the universal medium 
of exchange and measure of value. Commoditization is the production for 
exchange, and ttle corresponding circulation of commodities. Monetarization 
and cornroodi tization serve to integrate the reprOduction of a labour process 
wi tllin the CfvlP at Moment C. Cortvoercialization in this thesis ref ers to the 
operational principle of increasing profit as an end in itself and this 
covers the absorbtion of non-capitalist labour processes into the CMP;s 
systffn dynamics. Regarding Moment Ai proletarianization is the creation of 
a class dependent on selling labour power to survive, usually through 
dispossessing producers of their means of production. The other side of 
this is the concentration of these means in the possession of a separate 
class able to hire labour and set production in motion, i.e. the formation 
of a capitalist class. When the relations in production (Moment B) corres-
pond to these class relations, and to this system dynamic and reproductive 
context, (i.e. with all five elements of transformation noted above), the 
transformation is total. I will now examine tllese in more detail. 
4.i Commoditization. 
Linkage by exchange is the characteristic form through which different 
INTERNATIONAL CAPITALI~M' 
INTERNATIONAL ARTICULATION 
production relations articulate with the eMP (Foster-Carter, 1978:239). 
Non-capitalist structures must possess or develop some commodity production 
in order to articulate economically with the CMP (Amin, 1974:151). 
In 1899, Kautsky (1976:4/5) pointed out how commoditization (combined 
with commercialization) enabled the eMP in the towns to transform agricult-
ure before capital even entered directly into this branch of production. 
The effect of commodity circulation and commerce was to destroy peasant 
industry and make rural producers specialize as pure agriculturalists, 
dependent on the market. In this way, exchange can lead to a division of 
labour around the CMP. 
Articulation by commoditization is not inconsistent with non-capital-
ist relations. In fact, serfdom often accompanied this kind of articulat-
ion (see Dobb, 1962:6, Brenner, 1977:47, 68-73). However, commoditization 
may mean that the structure of Moment C in the non-capitalist production 
relations gets progressively undermined. Non-capitalist units of product-
ion are reproduced with deepening commodity relations in their reproduction 
cycle, and a dissolution of previous forms of acquiring inputs and distrib-
uting outputs (Friedmann, 1979:162). For a ""'peasantU household, for examp-
le, simple reproduction may come to depend on more and more commodities 
from outside - products that could not be easily produced on the basis of 
local socially necessary labour time (Bryceson, 1980:289). This can lead 
to the unit's gradual separation from most economic ties except from those 
of the market. (6) (Commoditization may also affect land, women and labour-
power in terms of giving them an exchange value (Cliffe, 1978:342).) In 
effect, comrnoditization means an artiCUlation that disrupts and divides 
internal distribution links between production and consumption in the non-
capitalist structures (Mamdani, 1977:77).(7) This alone does not necessar-
ily lead to capitalist relations of production, however. While it increases 
dependence on the market, it may also simultaneously increase the independ-
ence of non-capitalist producers in relation to the eMP (see chapter 
twenty-six), thereby blocking further development of capitalist relations. 
4.ii Monetarization. 
f'l1onetar ization presupposes commodi tization. The latter is not 
necessarily dependent on the former (as can be seen in the case of barter), 
but the two do tend to go hand in hand eventually.(8) The cash economy is 
broader than the capitalist economy, and it mediates extensive artiCUlation 
between the CfvlP and non-capitalist relations. 
Monetarization in the form of usury is seen by Banaji (1980:515) as 
being an important feature in the dissolution of pre-capitalist modes of 
production. Marx (1976b:1023) argues that usury does not constitute Tormal 
subsumption of labour under capital, as the capital involved does not 
intervene in production. However, as Banaji holds, it does constitute a 
form of initial subsumption of producers to capital. Usury usually relates 
to small producers possessing their own means of production and controlling 
their own conditions of labour. Production does not come under capital's 
direct control, and therefore this artiCUlation does not inherently require 
the separation of the producer from the means of production for its 
functioning (Howard, 1980:73; Joffe, 1980:23). But usury may still play 
an important part in transforming non-capitalist elements into the eMP 
proper by leading to extensive commodity production on a commercial basis 
(to payoff debts). It can even culminate in separating producers from 
their means of production. (In this way, Moment C can act upon and 
determine Moments A and B.) 
Monetarization is also significant in that it extends the commodity 
circuit (and indeed, in the form of taxes, it forces economic structures 
into this circuit) (Bernstein, 1978:423/4). The cash nexus can set in 
train a whole process of class formation. For example, lobola, inheritance 
and property transfers can become monetarized; mutual labour reciprocity 
through kinship can give way to wage-labour hiring (Cliffe, 1978:327). 
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4.iii Commercialization. 
Commercialization as an aspect of transformation presupposes commodit-
ization and monetarization. It can lead to transformation in the following 
way. The CMP~s system process of competition that leads to expanded repro-
duction, whereas the non-capitalist structures generally have simple repro-
duction. When the reproduction of the two structures intersect, and the 
CMP is dominant, then surplus generation on an increasing scale may become 
a feature of the non-capitalist structure (Bryceson, 1980:309). And a pre-
capitalist mode of production cannot considerably intensify its production 
without becoming modified (Dupr~ and Rey, 1973:157). 
Although non-capitalist producers may control the production 
initially, their integration into commodity relations tends to compel them 
to improve production. Credit relations and market pressures tend to become 
determinant (Bernstein, 1978:427). The non-capitalist units become increas-
ingly price responsive and market-oriented, and tend to use their surpluses 
accordingly (Kay, 1981:495). For example, in pre-colonial Uganda, trade was 
in surpluses and had consumption as its aim. As such it did not dominate 
and dictate production (Mamdani, 1977:35). However, in the articulation 
with the CMP under colonialism, the trade-production relationship became 
reversed - with trade becoming the purpose of production and the demands of 
the metropolitan market determining what could be produced (ibid:143).(9) 
Articulation to a capitalist market does not necessarily create a 
commercial dynamic in the non-capitalist production - especially not on its 
own. Commodity production by feudal estates was on the basis of a circuit 
moving from Commodity to Money to Commodity again; the aim being to obtain 
particular use-values. Despite cost-cutting by these feudal estates, they 
did not adopt a capitalist rationale - a spiralling circuit based on Money 
-> Commodities -> more Money. Consumption of use-values, rather than 
realization of profit, remained the aim and motive force of the economy 
(Banaji, 1976a:312; see also Marx, 1976b:1030).(10) 
4.iv Proletarianization. 
The market is wider than the labour market, and it is necessary to 
examine how transformative articulation extends the latter within the 
former. The CMP requires at Moment A a separation of the direct producers 
from the means of production - in other words, their historical dispossess-
ion.(ll) In modes of production with non-industrial means of production, 
this process is primarily the dissolution of ties to the land (Lewis, 
1976:7). (It also, however, applies to artisans and their handtools).(12) 
However, it is important to note that although the articulation may 
involve proletarianization in the sense of separating the producer from the 
means of production - and thereby the coromodi tization of labour-power - the 
CMP may not necessarily incorporate all such dispossessed producers as 
proletarians. Articulation may destroy the non-capitalist labour processes 
by transforming Moment A, but fail to develop alternative (capitalist) 
labour processes at Moment B. Those people in this situation tend to join 
the marginal pole of the economy (see chapter twenty). 
Another important aspect of articulation and transformation at the 
level of labour is that certain non-capitalist structures - for example, a 
commodity producing household - may articulate with the CMP by hiring 
labour-power from it in peak seasons, periods in the demoqraphic cycle and 
so on (see Friedmann, 1980:79). This type of articulation with capitalist 
possession/separation relations can be the beginning of a transformation of 
the non-capitalist structure into a capitalist one. However # the trends 
may be in the opposite direction altogether, where the non-capitalist 
structure is transformed to increasingly supply labour-power to the CMP as 
part of the articulation. Articulation here involves the destruction of the 
capacity of the non-capitalist relations and modes to be reproduced autono-
mously.(13) 
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Even where producers are fully proletarianized and incorporated into 
capitalist labour processes, it may be noted that the fully developed 
capitalist mode of Pl~Oduction requires ttlat labour power be mobile. Labour 
powel'l like all other commodities, must circulate within the CMP. 
4.v. Capitalist class formation. 
Frequently, producers in non-capitalist modes of production end up -
under transformation - relating to already-constituted capitalists in the 
dominant mode. To a lesser extent, there is a transformation of some non-
capitalist producers into capitalists themselves. Where this takes place, 
it is usually in relation to the previous exploiting class either being co-
opted into the capitalist class, or defensively transforming itself to 
capitalist status in the face of the threat of the pre-existing capitalist 
class in the CMP. Such transformation to capitalist status may occur for 
ex&nple, through kulaks and simple corMoodity producers expanding via Moment 
C articulation with the CMP to the pOint where they accumulate wealth and 
means of production and start to hire wage-labour. This type of transforr~ 
ation is much prized in developmental literature - but deliberate attempts 
to engineer it have generally been less successful (see Part J). 
5. CONCLUSION. 
To the extent that non-capitalist labour processes are transformed in 
respect of the five elements analysed above, and therefore in respect of 
ttleir system dynamics, reproduction, and class relations in their Moments 
of production, they become integrated components of the CMP. This 
integration may be deepened thereafter by a transition from the status of a 
formally subsume(j variant labour process within the CMP to a really subsurrr-
ed one lsee chapter eight). Such transformation is a process over time, on 
many ...... fronts" and development may well be uneven. It is also a process 
that is far from being universal. While the overall tendency of the CMP's 
external articulation is to total transformation at the centres, it is 
restricted and ambiguous in character at the periphery (see next chapter). 
This ctlapter has analysed some of the dyn&oics of artiCUlation on both 
the side of the CMP and the side of the relations it articulates with. I 
have focussed on articulation that transforms non-capitalist elements into 
capitalist ones. In the next chapter, I concretize this further by examin-
ing in detail how the CfvlP articulates in the periphery. 
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ENJf'.UrES 
1. In looking at ttle rise and spread of the Cf'VIP v ia external articula-
tion, it is necessary to distinguish between the different tendencies and 
counter-tendencies of capltal as a whole, individual capitals and branches 
ot capital if we are to avoid bland propositions about the nature of 
capitalism l8radby, 1975:127). It is also necessary to take account of the 
historical period (with determinate political conditions, development of 
productive capacity, etc.) and the duration of the articulation. In the 
discussion here, however, I have abstracted from specific empirical and 
historical processes in order to more clearly highlight the mechanics of 
articulation. 
2. Against his view, and as has been mentioned in the previous chapter, 
there are sUbstantial differences in the CMP in its character of existence 
at the periphery and at the centre, and these will be discussed further in 
the next chapter. 
3. It may be noted ttlat the transition in the articulation is not always 
from a non-market economy to the market of the CMP. The pre-capitalist 
economy is not necessarily a non-comrflodity economy (Amin, 1974:138). 
4. In Rey's view (1973), the capitalist-feudal articulation saw a 
temporary alliance between nascent capitalists and the old feudal ruling 
class, unlike the articulation of the CMP with other forms (Foster-Carter, 
1978:223; Bradby, 1975:142). 
5. These criteria are when the labour process functions according to the 
system dynamics of tile mode, when it is reproduced wi thin the mode, and 
when it is integrated with the mode~s class relations at Moments A, 8 and C 
of prOduction. 
b. Alternatively, economic relations may resist commodi tization. In trlis 
case, they may still specialize in comrflodity prOduction, but the inputs for 
reproduction would still be based on mechanisms like reciprocal kinship 
ties (Friedmann, lY79:1b3). (Thus two different households may be prod-
ucing for the market, but their total articulation with the CMP through 
tllis is not identical). The signif icance of resistance to corl'lulodi tization 
is discussed in terms of restricted development of the CMP in the next 
Chapter. 
7. Mamdani (ibid: bb) descr ibes flOW, for Uganda.l interna 1 trade in pre-
colonial times linked domestic production and consumption, but the 
articulation with the export-import trade divorced the two. 
8. rhe existence of such a combination 1s not, however, enough to 
constitute capitalization of the economy unless there is also commercial-
ization, capitalist class relations and the setting up of capitalist labour 
processes (see Amini 1974:138,142). 
9. In terms of the development ot commercialization, it is important to 
look at trends such as the individualization of land and its concentration, 
moditication of labour use to a caSh-exchange basis with alienation of the 
product, expansion and utilization of surplus (Cliffe, 1977:205). 
lU. lhis shows up Ule error in Wallerstein's pOSition (1974) tllat a 
commodity-producing feudal enterprise in the world market is actually 
capitalist. 
11 ~ Following Marx (1972.1 cl1apter XXV); this is sometimes t'ef erred to as 
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U-Ie real process of prinntive accumulation (Duggett, 1975:167; Bryceson, 
198u:28u; Brenner I 1977:66-7). 
12. The CMP is dominant in the world economic system not merely because it 
links units withln a single capitalist market. It must also be remembered 
ttlat °the unif ying process of the world system ot capi tal ism is the 
extension of the wage-labour system from the developed centres to the 
• underdeveloped' peripheries, for the purpose of gathering surplus on a 
world scale~ (Heilbroner, 1981:38). 
13. Rey (cited by Cliffe, 1977:204) points out here that the destruction 
of rural handicrafts has a different significance from that of destroying 
subsistence food production. The latter case can still mean that partially 
proletarianized labour-power can be reproduced by the non-capitalist 
structure. 
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5. Conservation-dissolution. 
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7. Articulation and new dependent production forms. 
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1. INTRODUCTION. 
Capitalist articulation often leads to the destruction and/or trans-
formation of non-capitalist structures~ but this does not always occur 
thoroughly~ unambiguously or universally. As a result, non-capitalist 
production elements are present as an organic component of the internation-
al capitalist system. Third World countries especially have combinations 
of non-capitalist, semi-capitalist and capitalist relations of production 
(Mandel, 1Y75:J65; see also Williillns~ 1977:290; Kollantai, 1970:4). 
The explanation for the existence of these non-capitalist elements 
rests on a number of intertwined factors that are only analytically 
separated in this chapter. Firstly~ non-capitalist features may persist 
due to the sheer fact of the ltmited development of the CMP in the 
periphery - especially in agriculture. A second factor is where transform-
ation has been prevented by the CMP itself, and where non-capitalist 
features have been conserved (with some changes) by the economic or 
political effect of the CMP. A third factor (cutting across those already 
listed) is that remnants of pre-capitalist production survive througll 
successf ul economic and poli tical resistance to the corrosive and trans---
formative effects of CMP articulatlon, or are deliberately maintained for 
political reasons by the CMP. A fourth tactor is where some non-capitalist 
characteristics and elements have grown and tlourished in tile interstices 
of a capitalist economic system or even been deliberately created by it. 
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This chapter analyses these factors in greater depth. Their significance 
for development is discussed in the next three chapters. 
2. LIMITED DEVELOPMENT OF THE CMP AT THE PERIPHERY. 
The question why articulation with the CMP does not always lead to 
total destruction or transformation of the non-capitalist relations of 
production cannot be analysed in general terms. Instead, the differences 
between the CMP at the centre and periphery mean that CMP articulation 
needs to be analysed according to its particular character in each. 
Historically, the CMP has ultimately been able to destroy and 
transform most non-capitalist structures at the centre. (1) At the 
periphery, however, the CMP predominates in the economic system, without 
becoming exclusive. This centre-periphery difference is in part because 
the CMP arose in the centre and has had a longer history there than in the 
periphery. It is also because the pre-capitalist structures of the 
periphery sometimes proved m9re resistant to the CMP than did the feudal 
mode of prOduction in the centres.(2) Another reason is the different 
character of the marKets in each. The centre is characterized by the CMP 
being based on the internal market. This tends to increasing transformat-
ion because capitalist relations there are dominant at all three Moments of 
production. In contrast, peripheral capitalist growth is based on the 
external market. It is a characteristic of peripheral economic systems 
that capitalist relations are not completely dominant at all three Moments 
of production, and the CMP there is often not integrated into a properly 
cohesive mode of production. 
In this light, it is easy to see why Mamdani describes the CMP in 
colonial contexts as dominant but not prevailing. For Baran (1952:143), 
Ule intrusion of capitalism into the now underdeveloped countries 
accelerated the maturing of some of the pre-requisites for the generalizat-
ion of the CMP, but blocked with equal force the ripening of others. 
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Because of the external market in the periphery, pre-capitalist 
structures are not fully commoditized, but rather partially transformed and 
subjected to the CMP of the centre as external structures. Transition to 
total transformation is blocked (Amin, 1974:38; Mouzelis, 1979b:38). (The 
concrete mechanisms of these processes - such as monopoly, dependence, etc. 
are discussed in the next chapter.) 
Consequently, the CMP in the Third World differs from the CMP in the 
First World, because it is -restricted and uneven~ (Taylor, 1979, cited in 
Mouzelis, 1980:361). Its growth is geared to the reproduction needs of the 
CMP in the First World, and it does not therefore have a tendency to become 
generalized locally. SUbstantial non-capitalist elements still articulate 
to the CMP in the periphery, and the CMP~s integration and subsumption of 
its own capitalist labour processes is uneven (ibid:363/4). 
Thus the dissolution of the pre-capitalist modes of production as full 
modes does not mean an automatic and immediate generalization of the CMP 
(Mamdani, 1977:141).(3) In Latin America, the transition in the articu-
lation led to the dominance of the CMP, but it was not completed (Kay, 
1981:487). Amin (1974:380) remarks that, particularly in agriculture, the 
transformation of pre-capitalist relations into capitalist relations in 
Egypt and Latin American countries often remained unfinished. Indeed, 
capital often seems to shun direct involvement in agriculture for reasons 
relating to the character of this branch of production (see chapter twenty-
five). Given the predominantly non-industrial character of much of the 
periphery, it is not surprizing that much non-capitalist production remains 
untransformed by the CMP. I turn now to the relationship between the 
(restricted) CMP and non-capitalist elements in the periphery. 
3. ARTICULATION WITHIN PERIPHERAL CAPITALIST ECONOMIC SYSTEMS. 
For Furtado (1964:36), the Third World is made up of hybrid economies 
where a capitalist nucleus co-exists with, and rarely modifies, archaic 
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structures. But this idea of simple co-existence is not shared by the 
majority of writers on the question. The fact that the CMP is externally 
oriented in the underdeveloped countries does not imply that there is no 
articulation with local non-capitalist forms. 
Dependency theorists argue that underdevelopment cannot be explained 
as a case of isolated and backward pre-capitalist structures (Dos Santos~ 
1969:75). The retardation of capitalist relations does not mean that non-
capitalist economic structures retain their pristine pre-capitalist form or 
function (Cliffe~ 1976). The Frank school's rejection of the view of 
enclaves of capitalist development amidst undisturbed pre-capitalist forms 
is correct in this regard. The situation is not a simple juxtaposition of 
capitalist and pre-capitalist elements~ and the latter is~ strictly 
speaking, no longer pre-capitalist. But, contrary to dependency theory, 
neither is it capitalist.(4) This is where articulation theory enriches 
dependency tlleory by drawing attention to the way that peripheral capi tal-
ism is characterized by a variety of relations of production, including 
non-capitalist elements externally articulated through heterogeneous 
relations to the CMP. It is thus important to distinguish between 
dependency within the CMP (the peripheral capitalist relations on the 
central capitalist relations), and dependency -across the board- of the 
underdeveloped social formation - i.e. including the dependency of non-
capitalist relations on capitalist ones.(5) 
Although not capitalIst, these non-capitalist elements still have an 
important relationsllip with a dependent CMP (Amin 1974: 159). While 
articulation theory enriches dependency theory as discussed above, the 
latter can now be shown to enrich the former through its arguments against 
-dual-economy~ perception of articulation. It does this by highlighting 
the linkages and the dominant-dependent character in the articulation 
between the GMP and non-capitalist structures. Fine threads link the 
difterent economic Nsectors'" and systems (Barratt-Brown, 1976:264). As 
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Mouzelis (1979a:351) is at pains to stress, this involves strong negative 
linkages such that resources are transferred from the non-capitalist to the 
capitalist structure, and from there often abroad. In my view, these 
linkaqes are what constitute a peripheral capitalist economic system.(6) I 
turn now to examining the tendencies and processes in this peripheral 
articulation. In this, I consider the way in which the CMP may conserve 
(with some changes) aspects of non-capitalist production; be unable to 
transtorm other aspects due to resistance by non-capitalist producers - and 
unwilling to change some aspects also for political reasons; and create new 
forms of non-capitalist production altogether. 
4. CONSERVATION OR DISSOLUTION? 
Numerous writers have analysed the role of the dominant capitalist 
mode of production in influencing and undermining the reproduction of non--
capitalist relations (see, for example, Long and Richardson, 1978:11). 
But there is controversy over the character of this articulation. 
Writers like Frank (1969-;, Arrighi (1971) and Kay (1975) contend that 
the CMP in the periphery tends to develop through rather than against non-
capitalist relations (see also Greussing and Kippenburg, 1975/6:127; 
Halliday, 1979:117). For Mamdani (1977:138), articulation is best seen in 
terms of the -substance~ of pre-capitalist structures being determined by 
the accumulation needs of the CMP. This tends to imply that it is the CMP 
itself which is responsible for the persistence of these structures. This 
general idea has been rejected by Banaji (1980:515) who holds that the CMP 
does not co-exist with, maintain, intensify or develop through non-capital-
ist structures. For him, the CMP~s inherent tendency is to dissolve and 
transform these structures completely into capitalist ones (ibid:514). 
Underlying Banaji's view is a particular type of analysis that is also 
evident in the work of Rey (1973). Both see the CMP as homoficent - i.e. 
as universally doing the same thing and having the same effect - in this 
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case, the CMP as inevitably destroying antecedant modes of production. 
(For- Rey, one can only call an economic structure by the same name if one 
accepts its homoficence) (Foster-Carter, 1978:230/1). I do not entirely 
agree with this homoficence argument, but the main question is: are Rey and 
Banaji correct about the particular homoficence that they attribute to the 
CMP, namely destructiveness?(7) Peripheral articulation does seem to be 
different to the ultimately destructive-transformative articulation that 
Rey and Banaji hold as essential to the CMP. But for them, there should be 
no fundamental difference between the CMP at the centre and the periphery. 
I argue that there is a difference, and I motivate this below. 
Bradby's position (1975:129) is to assume ""neither universal destruct-
iveness on the part of capitalism, nor a general tendency towards ttle 
preservation of pre-capitalist modes of production"". She says that one 
needs to discover what historical conditions lead to either of these 
tendencies predominating in particular cases. It is true that it is at 
this level that the question must be ultimately resolved. But a number of 
valuable observations and theoretical generalizations have been made from 
empirical analyses of this sort, and I turn now to considering them. What 
they show is that the CMP does not develop simply through or against non-
capitalist relations, and nor does it simply preserve or destroy them. As a 
general point, CMP articulation contradictorily comprises all aspects, and 
whether anyone tendency prevails is an issue linked to whether the 
articulation occurs in the centre or periphery. In addition, the generaliz-
ations also show - contrary to what the debate about "-'what the CMP does"" 
would imply - that although the CMP may be the most powerful force, the 
non-capitalist relations are certainly not passive in the articulation. 
I (These points are also analysed more concretely in Part H). 5. CONSERVATION-DISSOLUTION. 
In its external articulation at the periphery, the CMP has had an 
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ambivalent etfect. With its primary articulation being the CMP at the 
centre~ it is (as discussed above) limited in its articulation within the 
per ipt-,ery. It thus tends to involve simultaneous dissolution and 
conservation. Thus in the Third World, pre-capitalist forms have been 
undermined and perpetuated at the same time (Meillesoux~ 1972:103).(9) 
-Conservation-dissolution- (Bettelheim, 1972:297) is thus not a case of 
conservation juxtaposed with dissolution, but a combined process (with 
possible emphases in either direction).(10) 
Capitalist transformation involves imposing its system dynamics on 
non-capitalist elements, making their reproduction dependent on it~ and 
transforming their class relations (at all Moments) into capitalist ones. 
But especially in peripheral social formations, it sometimes happens that 
after transforming some features of the non-capitalist elements, capital 
has not gone on to transform the others. On the contrary, total 
transformation in some cases - and depending on the time period involved 
would even have been counter-productive for the CMP. (This is especially 
the case with non-capitalist production which may subsidize the CMP - as 
was the case with the early role of the African reserves in South Africa 
(see Wolpe, 1972; 1975).(11) 
Mamdani (1977:138) points out that instead of destroying pre-capital-
1st modes outright~ colonial capitalism restructured their class relations 
(without wholly transforming them)~ and conserved them in a dependent 
relation. Their new function within the whole - in the interests of 
capitalist accumulation - went hand in hand with them incorporating a 
capitalist system dynamic. According to Obregon (1974:399): 
the combination of imposed metropolitan capitalism and 
pre-capitalist relations happens under the hegemony of 
the former. Consequently, the relations of production 
do not just ..... persist U or "'survive"', but are continuously 
assuming new functions and characteristics within the 
whole. 
In Mamdani's study of Uganda, for example~ feudal forms of exploitat-
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I 
ion remained at Moment 8, but the serfs became tenants producing in a I 
heterogeneous relation of production for a merchant class involved in I 
export activity (a restructuring of Moment C). Although the process of 
production was the same physically (hoe cultivation) and socially (the 
family unit of production with possession of the means of production -
except land), the purpose was no longer for use, but for trade (a change in 
the system dynamic) (1977:138/9,143; see also Amin, 1974:3bO). 
fhese observations are important because, as Cliffe (1977:203) points 
out, there is a tendency to imagine that because much African farming still 
uses simple techniques and is on a family scale, that the relations of 
production have not effectively changed from pre-colonial days. But in 
East Africa, even those who seem remote and backward are not free of artic-
ulation with the CMP. Producers are often not free of paying cash for tax, 
schooling, means of production, food and clothing. For this they have to 
sell something - if not products, then labour-power. They enter into new 
(heterogeneous) relations of production by taking part in exchange. (12) 
The process has been described as the establishment of the dominance 
of the CMP -directly within the dominated social formation~ and as involv-
ing "systems of co-optationU in which traditional classes are conserved-
dissolved to execute the domination (Lewis, 1976:28). 
I ~ 
b. THE POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL IN CONSERVATION-DISSOLUTION. 
So far, I have concentrated on the economic level of articulation, but 
economic relations exist in the context of political and ideological 
conditions of existence in concrete social formations. Economic articulat-
ion certainly has ramifications on other aspects of society. For example, 
regarding labour mobility, usince immobility of labour is often politically 
enforced •.. and ideologically justified, the transformation of peasant 
production involves a comprehensive reorganisation of basic social instit-
utions~ (Friedmann, 1979:175). 
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lranstormation of a ~natural economy~ into a capitalist one is never 
adequately secured by economic mechanisms alonel and the state (particular-
ly the colonial state) often plays an important part (AminI 1974:143). This 
has been discussed in more detail in chapter fourteen. Thus the transition 
from feudalism to capitalism has involved a transformation in the represen-
tation at the political level (Hindess and Hirst, 1977:307). However, the 
pre-capitalist classes have also sometimes resisted articulation (or its 
terms) and attempted to use the state to defend and advance their inter-
ests. Thus small French peasants maintained their status between 1870 and 
1958 by political means. They would otherwise have been transformed 
(through capitalist competition) at a much faster rate (Dupre and ReYI 
1973:158). African producers have a long history of resisting articulation 
that threatens their control over production (see chapter thirty-six). 
The role of the state in articulation can be very significant because 
it can represent the CMP and establish capitalist dominance even when the 
mode is not physically present (Mamdani, 1977:147). The success or other-
wise of destruction and/or transformation of non-capitalist elements by the 
CMP is highly dependent on the social and class structures involved, the 
degrees of class organization and strength, class economic strategies, and 
class relations to the state. 
~Conservation-dissolution~ should not be seen simply as a function of 
the economic power of the CMP. Political (and economic) resistance of pre-
capitalist classes has often played an important part in the persistance of 
non-capitalist production f·eatures. Bettelheim (1972:297-8) holds that 
where the CMP is involved in external articulation with non-capitalist 
elements at the centre, it has tended to lead to their dissolution and 
complete transformation. In part this is a question of time-scale and 
historical period, but largely it is a runction of the historical constit-
ution of extensive capitalist class relations there. It is the case that 
transformation has not been complete and that domestic labour and simple 
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commodity production still persist in the centres (although certainly not 
separately from, and untouched by, the CMP). For a number of reasons (see 
chapter twenty-six), these production relations have been relatively 
resistant to the CMp1s dissolution-transformation tendencies - although 
increasingly they are being eroded by them. While this is not the place to 
enter into the issue, I would argue that it is not so much the case that 
the CMP has been responsible for conserving them, as they have been able to 
preserve themselves. 
Resistance has often led to articulation taking very violent forms 
as in colonial domination (Rey, 1973, cited by Bradby, 1975:147). CMP 
response to this resistance has often led to another dimension of conserv-
ation-dissolution whereby the dominant class in the CMP develops and 
supports allies within the pre-capitalist classes (Mamdani, 1977:41, 
Ranger, 1968:443). Thus the persistence of some ""pren-capitalist elements 
may be partly explainable in terms of the specific aims of the capitalist 
class in the articulation (Kahn, 1978:123). The colonial state has played 
an important role here (see chapter eighteen). Indirect rule has been the 
main form of this, and it has accompanied merchant capital1s role in 
conservation-dissolution, a role that is worth examining more closely. 
On the one hand, a merchant class affects production by giving it more 
and more the character of production for exchange. Through this, the 
effects of competition are brought to bear on production - enforcing a 
socially average labour-time for the production of the various commodities, 
and therefore influencing the rate of exploitation. All this tends to 
restructure the relations in production (Kay, 1975:94; Bryceson, 1980:285). 
On the other hand, however, merchant capital also has a conservative effect 
because it depends on the existing class structures for the execution of 
production (Marx, 1973:586/7, quoted in Banaji, 1976a:301; Kay, 1975:95). 
(The role of merchant capital is further analysed in chapter twenty-one). 
In this situation, the direct and indirect exploitation by the CMP is 
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disguised beneath the earlier institutional relations such as kinship, 
patronage and community spirit. Some survivals may thus be the consequence 
of the way these traditional cultural devices are deliberately preserved to 
increase the rate of exploitation (Smith, 1979:287). Other usuperstruc-
tural~ survivals are retained by the pre-capitalist classes because they 
perform new functions tor them - for example, tribalism in a modern urban 
context (Kitching, 1972:336). For Muratorio (1980:40,56), the concept of 
ideological articUlation enables one to see that the ideological and cult-
ural ""survivals"" are not pure persistence of tradition. Rather than compl-
ete incorporation or elimination of pre-capitalist ideological traditions, 
there is selective maintenance. 
7. ARTICULATION AND NEW DEPENDENT PRODUCTION FORMS. 
In peripheral capitalist economic systems, the generalization of the 
CMP has not only tended to be incomplete, but has also been accompanied by 
an expansion of dependent and even sometimes new production forms which 
result from the restructuring and subordination of former pre-capitalist 
relations <Kay, 1981:487). Obregon (1974:403) describes such a situation 
in his concept of the marginal pole of the economy (see chapter twenty) 
where antecedant production forms exist and expand in new modes of articul-
ation with the overall economic structure (see also Tsoucalas, 1979:-
126).(13) Kautsky (1976:204) went so far as to hold that the same economic 
elements may not only take on a different function from their articulation 
wi th the CfY1P, but assume a new lease of lif e (see also Cliff e, 1977: 204) • 
The CMP can sometimes create economic forms ex nihilio (Laclau, 1971, 
cited by Foster-Carter, 1978:213; 231/2). An example here would be slave 
plantations - created by the needs of capitalist industry and the growth ot 
the world market (Hindess and Hirst, 1977:151). Indentured labour would be 
another instance. In this vein, feUdalism in Latin America and slavery in 
North America - have been called upseudou modes of production created by 
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merchant capital in the service of nascent European capitalism (Amin 1974:--
361). 8ecause they produced for the world market they were not homogeneous 
relations of production and therefore they were distinct from true feudal 
and slave modes. (14) The dependence ot these non-capitalist forms on the 
CMP is evident in their articulation with it. This articulation constitut-
es them as heterogeneous production relations integrally bound up with and 
dependent on the CMP, despite retaining their distinct character. 
In CMP articulation tt1at creates new, non-capitalist structures, the 
state is often deeply involved. This has been touched on in chapter four-
teen, and it is the context for understanding the role of state development 
strategies as discussed in Part H. In the case of these strategies, like 
other new economic forms deliberately fostered by capitalist states, the 
idea is often that transitional torms are being created. 
Thus articulation may be planned as generating transitional forms 
which are expected to develop lthrough their own internal tendencies) into 
something different - usually capitalist relations. In fact, the reality 
seldom works out like this, and many purportedly transitional forms 
actually develop unforeseen tendencies or have their development blocked in 
some way or another {see chapters thirty-three and -four). 
8. CONCLUSION. 
In this chapter, it has been noted how the CMP has failed to become 
generalized at the periphery. This has been due to the difference in 
duration and historical period (compared to the experience in the centre); 
to the existence ot an internal or external market and also to resistance 
from pre-capitalist economic structures and classes. It is also, however, 
due to the CfvlP; s ambiguous conservation-dissolution articulation with non-
capitalist structures, where the conservation tendency (linked to pre-
capitalist resistance and to the role of merchant capital) has often been 
strong in peripheral articulation. Finally, the restricted extent of the 
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CMP is also a consequence of the way that the CMP has also led to the 
Subordinate growth of existing non-capitalist production, and the creation 
of new f or'rns altogether, both of which articulate to it through hetero--
geneous relations of production. 
All this is substantially different to the CMP;s articulation at the 
centre. The main reason for this difference has probably been the articul-
ation between the CMP at the centre and the CMP at the periphery i.e. 
internal articulation within the CMP on an international scale. The next 
chapters examine this in the context of articulation between peripheral 
economic systems with the central capitalist economic system. 
£N)N()TES 
1. This needs to be qualified: see previous chapter and below. 
2. Amin (1974:14) points out that the tributary mode of production is 
less easy to break up than the feudal mode of production. This is because, 
unlike the feudal mode, the tributary one has producers in possession of 
the land. (The same applies to primitive corrmunism). ""The continuing right 
of all villagers to use the land ••. renders ineffective (better: less 
effective - GB) the simple mechanisms of competition which played a deter-
mining role in the transition from feudalism to the central capitalist 
economies- (ibid:143). 
3. Under colonial articulation, the prior modes of production did not 
dissappear entirely: the CMP was not therefore built on the ruins of the 
old, but inserted into their remains with the consequence of preserving 
some of their effects (Szentes, 1978:9). In fact, in Uganda, the partial 
dissolution of the feudal mode of production was followed by an actual 
decline in capitalist units of production as petty commodity production 
gained ground rapidly (Mamdani, 1977:141). 
4. Thus while these societies did not become fully capitalist, they did 
become uparodies of their former selves .... (Kay, 1975:99). 
5. Both elements of dependence need to be borne in mind. The character of 
the CMP in the periphery as dependent on the CMP in the centre is taken as 
given here (although it is analysed in depth in the next chapter). The 
issue considered now is dependency in the articulation of non-capitalist 
elements with peripheral capitalist relations (which in turn are dependent 
on the central CMP). 
6. This discussion shows the value of integrating the dependency and 
articulation of modes framework. According to Foster-Carter (1978:230), it 
is the contribution of dependency theory to have shown that the progeny of 
the peripheral articulation is deformed. Foster-Carter seems to advocate 
INTFRNATIONAL CAPITALISM. 
PE"RTPHERAL ARTICULATION 
merging the UarticulationU framework with dependency theory, and, as shown 
above .. this does add clarity to the analysis, and it allows for specifying 
types of dependency (Mouzelis, 1979b:145). 
7. To be fair to Rey .. he sees destructiveness as the outcome of a three 
stage process. The first stage, involving articulation through exchange, 
sees the CMP reinforce the pre-capitalist structures. The second is where 
the CMP ~takes root~ and uses the pre-capitalist structures. The third is 
the total disappearance of these structures (Foster-Carter .. 1978:218; Dupre 
and Rey, 1973:160). But even with these qualifications, ReyJ s position is 
not reconcilable with the oPPosing argument that the CMP develops through 
non-capitalist structures, thereby conserving them. 
8. According to Bradby (1975) both LeninJs and LuxemburgJ s views of the 
capitalist expansion behind articulation imply a unilinear destructive 
tendency in relation to pre-capitalist relations. She says that WolpeJs 
analysis (1972, 1975) implies a conserving tendency (maintaining pre-
capi talist relations for supplies - especially "subsidizedu labour-power). 
As we shall see, it is not a question of either destruction or conserva-
tion, but a combination of the two which is generally relevant. 
9. Often this is difficult to assess empirically at a given instance 
especially because the real situation involves highly complex, incomplete 
and transitional features. However, it remains no less important to estab-
lish it as a general theoretical point. 
10. Moore (1969:55) says that the emphasis in capitalist articulation in 
France was conservation - infusing old arrangements with new life, while in 
Britain, rural feudalism was undermined and destroyed by articulation. 
11. Today the CMP in South Africa has encroached a great deal more on 
non-capitalist production in the reserves. In fact, in many respects, it 
appears that the CMP may be subsidizing this production now. 
12. Amin (1974:380) says of the incomplete transformation of agriculture 
(mentioned earlier) that the production relations are integrated into the 
world market by their Hessential function"" (i.e. their system dynamic), 
although they are clothed in pre-capitalist forms. Banaji (1980:515) like-
wise stresses that non-capitalist structures are not pure survivals or 
relics if they are linked to the capitalist market. 
13. Muratorio (1980:39) draws attention to the subordinate place of such 
activities in the articulation. For example, while petty corrmerce, 
artisanry and peasant agriculture may expand - these may also sometimes 
have to contract due to the loss of productive resources and markets. This 
has important implications for the role this production plays vis-a-vis 
development and underdevelopment (see chapter twenty-four). 
14. One feature of this difference is that while European medieval feudal-
ism was reciprocal and had customary limits to exploitation, in Latin 
America, it was a one-sided relation: the peasant had duties, and the lord 
had the rights; the former gave, and the latter took (Harrison, 1981:105). 
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1. INTRODUCTION. 
The previous chapters have provided a framework of economic relations 
in terms of which I now return to the question of economic development. 
This chapter distinguishes between a social formation being Jiundeveloped ..... 
and ~underdeveloped~. 80th attributes refer to productive capacity in 
peripheral capitalist economic systems. But -undeveloped'" designates 
merely the absence of expansion, while "'underdeveloped- points to the 
factors actively contributing to a blockage or regression. One such factor 
is the repressive and destructive effect of the central CMP's monopolistic 
character in its articulation with peripheral economic systems. Another 
factor is the structure of underdevelopment as regards extroversion and 
dependence. This chapter examines both factors.(l) 
2. DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT AS PART OF THE SAME REAL PROCESS. 
A large number of writers hold that development and underdevelopment 
(in the international capitalist economic system) are not sequential stages 
of growth~ but opposite faces of the same coin. By this they mean that the 
two concepts are not merely logically and semantically related (as 
discussed in chapter three)~ but that there is also an interdependence 
in reality. They argue that there is a single process producing "'develojJ-
ment" at one pole and "'underdevelopment'" at the other. (2 ) 
It may be noted that this conception originates from a series of 
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detailed studies conducted at the empirical level. Despite certain reserv-
ations which are not immediately crucial, I take the liberty here of 
assurnin9 a degree of validity in this.(3) Many writers within this 
perspective have noted that economic units (eg. First World unit X and 
Third World unit Y) in the international capitalist system are not separate 
independent entities heading in the same direction. They have also disput-
ed the assumption that the characteristics of unit X and unit Yare a 
result of indigenous tactors in each unit, and particularly challenged the 
view that Y is a natural and original condition of static productive capa-
city. Instead, they have pointed to the historical origins of different 
economic units and the interconnections between them, rather than taking 
them as separately given objects (past or present) (Datoo and Gray, 1979:-
249; Bernstein, 1978:25). The theoretical conclusion of their work is 
that "'underdevelopment" is not synonymous with the attributes of poverty, 
poor technology (or prOductive capacity for that matter), etc. - but these 
features as caused by the historical subordination of one economic unit 
leg. a national economy) by anottler (fVlamdani, 1977: b) • 
3. "UNDERDEvELOPElf' AS DIS T INC T F ROM ""UNDEVELOPED"". 
The conception outlined above tlas prOduced a useful theoretical dis-
tinction between ~undeveloped~ and ""underdeveloped~. Thus, ~undevelopedH 
has come to reter to a pristine, indigenous and original condition ot a 
given unit (Brett, 1973:18; Leys, 1975:xiv). On this understanding, 
there is clear ly no real interdependence between the undeveloped cllaracter 
of one un it, and the deve loplng character of anottler. ....Underdeveloped ..... , 
rlowever, is based on ttle transitive verb, ""to underdevelop"" (Berger, 1975 :--
21; Bernstein, lY78:25; Harris 1975b:b). An economic unit may thus be 
actively underdeveloped by exogenous agencies and forces, and hence be in 
the process ot underdeveloping. (The complex question of the interaction of 
external underdeveloping factors with internal undeveloped ones is discuss-
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ed in chapter twenty-one). fhis position is very dliferent to that of 
((loderrlizatlon theory wnlcrl reqards underdevelopment as ...... development manqueU 
(Fitzgerald~ 1~d3:14). 
fhe signiticance or this lnterpretation wlthin the context of an 
international caPltalist system is that economic units in the periphery 
srlould not be seen as late-developers that are simply behind the others and 
need to catch up. Nor should it be assumed that their problem is simply 
the changed world situation and overwhelming political, economic and 
military competition from established powers. Rather, as economic units 
being underdeveloped, they are on a qualitatively different trajectory to 
the developed units - and precisely because of their links to them 
(Mouzelis, 1979:34). Underdevelopment thus cannot be analysed in isolation 
from its creation by the developed economic units in the international 
capitalist system. 
This is a viewpoint shared by this thesis, but with two important 
qualitications. Firstly, the contribution of non-capitalist elements to 
underdevelopment also needs to be appreciated (see chapter twenty-one). 
Secondly, I do not accept that because underdevelopment is created (in 
part) by lcapitalist) development, that development can only occur at the 
expense of underdevelopment. I re ject the ""zero-sum" argument that the 
expansion ot productive capacity is only possible through its reduction 
elsewhere, and I motivate this in chapter twenty-one. For the present, 
however~ I turn to consider how the CMP does contribute to underdevelop-
ment, beginning with monopoly competition by the centre. 
4. MONUPOLY COMPETITION By CAPITALS OF THE CENTRE. 
For Warren (1973) and Cardosa l1972), the expansion of capitalism 
tends to foment industrialization - whereas in Frank's (1969) and Baran's 
(1962) views, it stunts it (Evans, 1977:43). In my view, the general 
situation is neither one nor the other, but a complex and uneven process 
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that in a contradictory way combines aspects of both. As far as stunting 
industrialization goes, however, it is clear that monopoly competition has 
served primarily to inhibit peripheral industrialization. This factor is 
traceable to the fact that the CMP at the centre articulates with the 
per iptleral social formations in the form of an external metropolitan 
economic system. 
The effect of monopoly competition has been to hamper the development 
of both the CMP and non-CMP in the periphery, even causing underdevelopment 
in the form of regression of productive capacity. Theoretically, we are 
here talking about the effect of competition as a system dynamic deriving 
from the dominant mode of production in the international Whole - i.e. the 
CMP in the international capitalist economic system. The focus is on the 
effect of this process on one of the parts of the whole structure viz. 
the peripheral economic systems. In this regard, the effect on both 
indigenous, and on metropolitan, capitalist development within the 
peripheral economic system can be considered. 
4.i. Monopoly and indigenous peripheral capitalist development. 
Various writers have noted how metropolitan competition has restricted 
indigenous capitalist development in the Third World (and indeed most kinds 
of development there). Mouzelis (1980:363) says that the reason why the 
expansion of the CMP in the underdeveloped countries is restricted is 
because imperialism operates against any capitalist development that would 
compete with U-,e West and reduce its control. Mamdani (1977: 142) po ints 
out that although the colonial state disrupted the original production 
systems, it specifically blocked and discouraged industrialization. Mandel 
(1968, cited by Sutcliffe, 1972) also holds that imperialism is an obstacle 
to development and he points to inter alia the political subservience and 
weak competitive position of tile Third World social formations (see also 
Wallerstein, 1971:380). For Baran (1962:340,295,312), it is of decisive 
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significance that development in the underdeveloped countries is inimical 
to the dominant interests in the advanced countries. Cardosa (1967:192) 
points out that the basic features of production and markets in the Third 
World are laid down by the developed countries. Third World entrepreneurs 
find opposition from the already-established foreign capitals and the 
options for them to develop privately are limited. 
Historically in what is today the periphery, trade disrupted Moment C 
and its integration with A and B. By breaking the indigenous circuits of 
production, circulation and consumption, it destroyed pre-capitalist 
artisanal industries (Mouzelis, 1980:362). The trade articulation in the 
genesis of the CMP at the centre was gradual and enabled some artisans to 
adapt and transform themselves into capitalist producers. In contrast, 
Third World countries have faced a fully-fledged capitalism imposed from 
outside (Cliffe 1977:197). 
From the point of view of local enterprise, both capitalist and non-
capitalist, this monopoly situation is a damper on development (Baran, 
1962:336). As Mamdani (1977:108) observes, colonial capitalism was never 
competitive. Instead of monopoly emerging out of a struggle between 
independent small producers, capitalist production was monopolistic Tram 
scratch and was maintained as such by the colonial state, with ~enormous 
consequences for the development of the productive forces~ (ibid:145). The 
absence of real struggle under competition means the absence of an internal 
tendency to revolutionizing the means of production. Lack of competition 
within capitalist relations also implies inefficient allocation of 
resources (Kay, 1981:494).(4) 
While the West benefited from exporting manufactured goods, the Third 
World today cannot compete on international markets in terms of 
manufacturing. This is one reason why much of the Third World remains semi-
industrial (see Ehrensaft, 1971). However, even more than this is that it 
is also - and importantly - difficult for Third World countries to compete 
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on their own horne markets because of the competition from imports (Szentes, 
1978:31).(5) Amin (1974:156) also points out that imports (besides 
destroying traditional industry) further smother fledgling industries 
because they cancel the accelerator effect (ibid:235). In chapter thirty-
six, I relate this to agriculture and specifically food production. 
Part of the monopoly picture is that established foreign-owned capi-
tals actively strive to restrict entry to the market (Mamdani, 1977:88). 
rhus, besides eXisting economic advantages such as scale, productivity, 
access to credit and expertise, the monopoly level tends to further secure 
its position by constituting itself as a ~formal~ sector. As such it wins 
tarift privileges and protections, state contracts, duty-free imports, 
investment credit, licensing and so on from the state. This makes it even 
more difficult for indigenous enterprises to compete (Weeks, 1975:89). Not 
surprisingly, therefore, the formal sector has little real interest in 
boosting the informal sector - such boosting would make for competition 
with it (Davies, 1977:66). 
Because the expansion of indigenous capitalist development is signif-
icantly blocked, local capital tends mainly to move into export, tertiary 
and light industry sectors. In this way, local industry (including non-
capitalist) does not compete with foreign industry, but complements it 
(Amin, 1974:147, 170).(6) Indigenous development of productive capacity in 
tIle per iphery via petty comrnodi ty production tends to take place wi ttlin tile 
limits of monopoly competition from the centre and is therefore subservient 
and prescribed development. Amin (1974:147) observes that it is precisely 
because this type of production is subordinate and occurs within the 
interstices left by dominant metropolitan capitalism, that - unlike its 
historical counterpart in Europe - it is held up in its attempts to develop 
into CMP enterprises. (For further discussion of subordinate petty 
cor~nodity production, see the next chapter in terms of the theory of 
"growth without development .... ) 
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What seems to confirm these arguments about the stunting effect of 
metropolitan competition is that Third World industrialization underwent a 
boom when the World Wars created international difficulties in exchange. 
With Moment C on a world scale blocked, national industries in peripheral 
social formations emerged temporarily, free of metropolitan competition. 
But they tended to collapse again once international trade was re-
established lDos Santos, 1969:63; Frank, 1969c; Barratt-Brown, 1976:262). 
4.ii. Monopoly and metropolitan capitalist development in the periphery. 
It is not necessary for capitalist development in the periphery to 
proceed via indigenous capitalists: foreign capital could do just as well 
(Ferner, 1979:280). Foreign capital could have developed the peripheral 
economies after destroying their craft industries - iF it had gone on to 
create generalized capitalist industry that was part of the local economy. 
But much of the foreign capitalist investment in the periphery has not 
replaced cornmercial competition of central capitalist comroodities. The 
CMP~s ~tentaclesH in the periphery have been unable to compete generally 
(except wi trl regard to wages) with the ""main body# based in the centre. 
Thus, historically, much of the CMP presence in the periphery has been to 
invest in production for the external market in limited products such as 
exotic goods, minerals and agriculture (Amin, 1974:161). 
Thus central competition tends to disadvantage even foreign capital 
with regard to establishing new industry in the periphery. Competitiveness 
in wage-levels has not been sufficient to stimulate integrated capitalist 
development by foreign capital. While it has led to capital underdevelop-
ing the centres in some cases (witt1 operations transferred to the low-wage 
periphery), these have tended to be in light industry, final-assembly 
stages ot production, and making use of unskilled labour. Heavier and more 
complex production is still generally located in, or at least geared 
towdrds, the metropolitan CJV1P. The development of advanced technological 
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means of production, and therefore of productive capacity over time, 
continues in the centre. 
5. TOWARDS THE STRUCTURE OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT I: DEPENDENCE / EXTROVERSION. 
The net result of the historical dominance of the central CMP is that 
the peripheral CMP has a particular character in its articulation with non-
capitalist structures there. The totality of these relations in the 
periphery constitute an economic structure and system of underdevelopment 
characterized by dependence on the metropolitan economic system. This 
factor underlies and perpetuates underdevelopment in a way that is distinct 
from the effect of monopoly competition per se. 
At the heart of the dependent character of underdeveloped economic 
systems is extroversion: the external orientation of the forces of 
production of underdeveloped economic systems. Historically, this derives 
from the peripheral economic systems being originally constituted by 
merchant capital integrating them into the world market. This form of 
capital articulated with peripheral producers through heterogeneous 
relations of production, reorganized them and tied them to external 
economic interests (see Kay, 1975:103). 
The dependence associated with extroversion is something experienced 
not only by the CMP in the periphery, but also by non-capitalist production 
there. To the extent that this latter loses its own reproduction and 
becomes dependent on exchange with the CMP, it loses its status as a mode 
of production, or as even a homogeneous relation of production. It becomes 
a heterogeneous relation through its articulation with capitalist 
classes. (7) 
In central capitalism, production units expanded gradually and may 
eventually become exporters. However, in the periphery, production was (and 
often still is) either restructured or introduced from the start to produce 
for export from an early stage (Amin, 1974:175). Thus ~while capitalism 
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generates commodity production, underdeveloped capitalism generalizes comm-
odity production for the metropolitan market"" (Mamdani, 1977:144; see also 
OIBrien, 1975:18; Baran, 1962:335; Le Brun, 1973:279). Extroversion per-
sists through the continued participation of the peripheral economy in the 
international capitalist system and the associated division of labour 
(Harris, 1975b:6). 
The result of this is that elements of the underdeveloped economy 
appear as extensions of the dominating advanced economy (Amin, 1974:17). 
The underdeveloped economy is thus an externally-oriented ""part-economy"" 
subordinated to metropolitan capitalism, and as part of this (as will be 
discussed later in this chapter) it is a distorted, disarticulated entity 
(Foster-Garter, 1978:230).(8) 
Extroversion is a structure where the relationships are characterized 
by a dependence operational through Moment C. There is no integrated 
circuit of distribution, but rather a dependent integration into Moment C 
of the central capitalist economic system. This integration rests on and 
reinforces the international division of labour in the world market. Thus 
underdeveloped countries specialize in particular fields which make them 
dependent on foreign markets and foreign supplies.(9) The balance of pay-
ments problem reproduces the subordinate extroversion (Amin, 1974:36). 
Thus underdeveloped social formations have characteristically special-
ized in unprocessed primary product exports (Lall, 1975; Szentes, 1978:20-
30). As Szentes (ibid:21) puts it, monoculture has been one of the 
IoIpillars of dependency on foreign trade"". For Amin (1974:292), the eco-
nomic domination from the outside is not simply because the underdeveloped 
economy exports primary products, but because it is only these that are 
exported. 
other forms of dependence, financial, technological and social (see 
below), are also with potentially negative significance for development of 
peripheral economic systems. To a large extent, they appear to rest on 
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this trade dependence, and the extroversion that underpins it.(10) 
First, there is dependence on foreign finance. Local finance tends to 
be used up in infrastructure and tertiary development, leaving social form-
ations dependent on limited foreign finance for directly productive invest-
ment tAmin, 1974:294/5). Dependence on the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) in this regard is often a negative feature for Third 
World countries' development (Williams, 1981a). 
Second, there is the issue of technological dependence. Development 
of productive capacity should involve the ability of an economic system to 
develop, copy or choose its technology: however, an underdeveloped economy 
is dependent on foreign skills and means of production (see O~Brien, 1975:-
18; Lall, 1975; Frank, 1979a). In addition, imported technology tends to 
be very capital-intensive (see Mare, 1977, Mouzelis, 1980:363, Lall, 
1975).(11) As Arrighi (1977:172) argues, this all tends to reinforce the 
lacK of a local capital goods industry_ Writing with Saul (1968b:290/1), 
he points out that this in turn helps perpetuate dependency on world demand 
for primary products, and therefore reproduces the situation where growth 
is no faster than exports (see also Amin, 1974:35, 170). One effect of this 
has been that those local capitalist enterprises that were set up by metro-
politan capital have tended to employ fewer people than those enterprises 
ruined by capitalism. As Baran (1962:144) describes people living under 
such conditions: ~they existed under capitalism, yet there was no accumula-
tion of capital. They lost their time-honoured means of livelihood ••• yet 
there was no modern industry to provide new ones in their placeu • Whereas 
once their labour was put to use, it now became idle. As such, this can be 
treated as a facet of potential surplus. 
Third, another aspect of dependence is its social dimension. This 
covers political, cultural, scientific and ideological aspects (Le Brun, 
1973:384). As Wallman (1976:103,106) observes, the political and ideolog-
ical aspects of dependence go hand in hand with the economic and are only 
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really analytically distinct. She notes that dependence can have effects 
at the ideological level which inhibit development. She cites pessimism 
and discouraged initiative among the Basotho. 
6. CONCLUSION. 
In conclusion to this chapter, it can be seen that underdevelopment, 
as distinct from undevelopment, is linked to monopoly competition and 
dependence/extraversion. These in turn are linked to the differences in 
articulation between centre and periphery. In the former, articulation 
developed with the development of the CMP, in the latter, it was in terms 
of a fully-formed CMP introduced from the outside. The CMP that came to the 
Third World was (and is) monopolistic and it created a dependent structure 
of extroversion that persists as (part of) a structure of underdevelopment 
(Foster-Carter, 1978:230). Ironically being the creations of the CMP (of 
the centre), monopoly, dependence and extroversion are an obstacle to both 
local and metropolitan capitalist development within the periphery - and 
indeed probably to the development of productive capacity there per sea 
Dependent capitalist growth within this context does not usually count as 
development, as will be discussed in the next chapter. 
ENDNOTES 
1. The next chapter considers dependent growth and the factor of 
disarticulation and its associated unevenness, and the consequent 
phenomenon of growth without development. Chapter twenty examines the 
three-tier character of the underdeveloped economic system, and the 
(related) role of surplus transfer. Chapter twenty-one looks at the signif-
icance of the internal class structure and struggles for underdevelopment, 
as well as the differing contributions of both capitalist and non-capital-
ist elements to underdevelopment. The various factors are all mutually 
reinforcing, and are only artificially separated in these chapters. 
2. For example, Mamdani (1977:5) sees the relation between modern prod-
uctive economic units and backward/stagnating ones as one of exploitation 
whereby the impoverishment of the latter is the condition of the enrichment 
of the former. Frank (1969b) similarly sees development and underdevelop-
ment as being linked through a process involving a structural transfer of 
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surplus. Developmellt is thus at the expense ot underdevelopment: they are 
ditterent outcomes or an ldentical process (see also BoothJ 1975:70; Kay~ 
1~j5:9b; Arrighi J 1971:1/2; Bundy~ 1972:388; Legassick, 1976:436). 
3. I cirque in chapter twenty-one that this is not the tull story of 
eittler development or underdevelopment. See also section three below. 
4. It should be noted that the absence of effective competition is in 
part a result not only of monopoly, but also of the existence of non-
capitalist structures that are not integrated into commodity exchange and 
theretor'e not dependent on the market to the extent that competitive press-
ure significantly affects them (see Dobb, 1962:26; Szentes, 1978:20-30). 
b. fhe same applies when metropolitan capitalism has direct production 
footholds in the peripheral countries and uses its production there to 
capture the local market. 
6. Kalln (1978:124) points out that the effect of the suppression of local 
capitalist industry is to reproduce the conditions necessary for a comple-
mentary petty production sector. 
7. For jt to become an internal part of the CMP, however, reproduction 
dependence is not sufficient. CMP system dynamics must come to prevail, 
and its class relations at all three Moments of production must become 
capitalist (see chapters twelve and thirteen). 
~. Because much of the economy is export-oriented, production units are 
often not articulated with each other, but instead vertically integrated 
with units in the metropoles (see Shivji, 1977:213; Beckford, 1969:119). 
See the discussion of disarticulation in the next chapter. 
9. Because of extroversion, underdeveloped economies became import-export 
oriented without any direct relationship between production and consumption 
(Mamdani, 1977:144). This leads to situations such as plantations geared 
to metropolitan requirements rather than local food demands, with the for-
eign exchange so earned being used to import food (at the expense of impor-
ting capital goods) (see Beckford, 1969:144). 
10. This assertion needs much more research and analysis to be establish-
ed as a valid generalization. However, to investigate it takes us away 
from social structure and development into the realms of detailed economic 
study, and hence outside the scope of this thesis. 
11. There are several reasons for this: 
(i) technology comes from high labour-cost regions (Kay, 1975:130). 
(ii) technology is often imported for use in import-substitution - and 
it reproduces the First World's methods of production (Weeks, 1975:92). 
(iii) high technology reduces turnover time with the effect of raising 
the rate of profit (see Kay, 1975:138/9,145,162; see chapter thirteen). 
(iv) the availability of relatively cheap imported capital goods dis-
courages their local development (Weeks, 1975:95). 
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1. INTRODUCTION. 
Extroversion and dependence are key structural factors for under-
development. However, reference to them alone does not wholly explain the 
phenomenon. They need to be linked to disarticulation and unevenness. 
These concepts make it possible to understand that much economic growth in 
the periphery is not only dependent, but that it also does not constitute 
development. 
2. THE LIMITS OF "'DEPENDENCE"" IN EXPLAINING UNDERDEVELOPMENT. 
For a number of writers, dependence has become the central distinction 
between development and underdevelopment. An unfortunate consequence of 
this has been that they have underplayed the other characteristics of a 
peripheral economic system (such as its disarticulation, unevenness and 
class character - see below and ensuing chapters). Dos Santos (1969:60) 
goes as far as arguing that the term "dependent societies" is a better 
characterization than "underdeveloped societies". When it comes to 
defining "development", these writers tend to see it primarily in 
opposition to dependence. ""'Development" is thus seen as the capacity 
for autonomous and self-sustained growth (see Amin, 1974:393; Rodney 
1977:108; Arrighi and Saul, 1973:293; Sutcliffe, 1972:174-6; Girvan and 
Jefferson, 1968:342). 
The logical outcome of this approach is the claim by Arrighi and Saul 
(1973:293) that development is a "'genuine self-sustaining transformation", 
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and underdevelopment is a Jlperverse pattern of growth ..... (ibid:2(j8). This 
implies that underdevelopment is a deviation from a norm of independent 
development. But many critics dispute that ttlis norm exists or has ever 
existed. They argue that First World capitalist units did not develop 
autonomously, but precisely through their exploitative interconnection with 
units in the Third World. If this is (in part) the case (and the history 
of capitalist development bears this out), then ~development~ as a process 
implying an autonomous, N own bootstraps"'" economy - as opposed to ""'under-
development~ which is a dependent economy - is not particularly usetul. 
This is brought home by LegassicK (1976:437) who aSKS if any capitalist 
development is ever autonomous.(1) 
If development itself therefore turns out to be dependent, then it is 
not in fact qualitatively different from underdevelopment - given that this 
latter is also dependent. The question that arises out of this is whether 
~autonomyJl and ....,dependence..... are of any value in studying the course of 
productive capacity in real economic history. This has been much debated in 
the literature. Kay (1975:104) criticlzes dependency theory, noting that: 
if underdevelopment is the result of dependence, that is 
the subordination of one economy to another, then cer-
tainly Canada, with halr its manufacturing owned by 
American firms and its agricultural sector dependent on 
the wor Id market over Wllich it has no control, must be 
considered underdeveloped. 
For Barratt-Brown (1976:259), dependency theory cannot explain why, 
despite the dependence of Canada on America, and Australia on Britain, 
these former colonies did develop their national productive capacity. 
In defence of ..... dependence u as an identifying feature of underdevelop-
ment and thereby as demarcating it from development, it has been argued 
that Uthe platitude that all countries are interrelated and dependent on 
eactl other does not mean that tllere are not dif f erent types and degrees of 
dependence" lMouzelis, 1~8u:3b0). O'Brien (1975:24) similarly says the need 
is to explain difterences between dependent countries. The issue is held 
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to be relative economic independence (Berger~ 197b:248/9). The problem 
with this defence is that while it is correct in one senSB, it is limited 
to reducing the differences between development and underdevelopment to the 
quantitative criterion of the extent of dependence. 
The lesson of all this is that ~development~ is not usefully under-
stood as the mirror-opposite structure of uunderdevelopment'" - especially 
if the difterentiating feature is simply that the one process is supposed 
to be autonomous and the other dependent. As discussed in chapter seven-
teen, the h·dependence~ approach is important in drawing attention to the 
links between economic units, and showing that they are located within a 
wider structure, and function as interdependent entities within this. It 
also shows that the interdependence is not symmetrical, and that this has 
negative consequences on the development of productive capacity in the 
subordinate unit. But in order to explain this, however, we need to go 
beyond dependence and examine how central and peripheral capitalist econo-
mic systems remain qualitatively distinct economic units with their own 
structural specificity, and with an autonomy which cannot be wholly 
explained by their relationship to each other. 
This is where other features are vital for understanding the issues. 
In the case of capitalist underdevelopment, these include features such as 
disarticulation, surplus transfer and class structure. As regards capital-
ist development, relevant features include ~he mobility of factors of 
production, competition, an internal market, an integrated class structure 
with homogeneous capitalist relations of production, and resolution of (or 
capacity to bypass) the Agrarian Question. 
In my view, then, although degrees of dependence are important differ-
entiating features of capitalist development and underdevelopment, this is 
not the whole picture. With a comprehensive framework, where dependence is 
put in context, one can begin to see that capitalist development and under-
development are not a directl y zero-sum process, al tlloUgh they are still 
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linked within an over-arching structure. While the development of one 
economic unit can involve the underdevelopment of another, underdevelopment 
is not indispensable for development. At the same time, underdevelopment 
at unit Y is not entirely explainable by the development at unit X. The 
causes of development and underdevelopment need to be considered and ex-
plained separately and in terms of their qualitatively different features 
- while at the same time keeping sight of their interconnection within 
the whole. The relation between development and underdevelopment is taken 
up again in chapter twenty-one. 
With this background, I now turn to a discussion of how dependence may 
involve dependent growth and argue that by going beyond this to included 
disarticulation-unevenness in the focus, one can evaluate this growth in 
terms of its significance for development (and underdevelopment). 
3. DEPENDENT GROWTH. 
A peripheral economic system is not necessarily stagnant. Despite 
monopoly competition, various Third World countries have seen some economic 
growth. This has tended to be subordinated and complementary to the metro-
politan CMP, and may be described as dependent growth linked to extrovers-
ion. Cardosa (1972) was one of the earliest development critics to argue 
that dependence, monopoly capitalism and ~development~ (in the terminology 
of this thesis - ~growth~) were not contradictory. He pointed to capital-
ist expansion in the monopoly levels of Latin American economies, describ-
ing it as (in preference to the term ~underdevelopment~) ~dependent 
development~, characterized by dependence on multi-national firms, techno-
logical imports, investment for a local elite market, unemployment and the 
destruction of non-monopoly local enterprises (O'Brien, 1975:19). 
However, it is also possible (and indeed more common) to have depen-
dent growth (of both capitalist and non-capitalist production) based on the 
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external market - rather than on a local elite market. In this situation. 
the rate or dependent growth is no higher than that ot export receipts 
lHarris. 1~15b). Dos ~antos ll9b9:J3) sees this in terms ot a relationship 
ot depenaence where one Slde can expand througn self-impulsion, while the 
other side - being dependent - can only expand as a reflection of the 
tirst. Dependence is thus not an external effect of the CMP at the centre, 
but an integral part ot the entire international capitalist system. It is 
a limiting situation where productive capacity in some economic systems is 
conditioned by its development in others (ibid). 
There are a number ot problems associated with dependent growth (see 
Harrison, 1981:339, 43Z). Fluctuations in demand play havoc with national 
planning and budgeting, while foreign protectionism limits the market. In 
developed economic systems, exports are at least diversified, and this 
serves as a form of insurance against problems in any single branch, but 
this is less possible in peripheral economic systems. The role of multi-
national companies (mnc's) in dependent growth is also problematic. rrue, 
mnc's do supply a package of capital, technology, expertise and market 
access that is ditficult for peripheral countries to assemble (Harrison, 
19(:)1:548). For some writers (eg. Warren, 1973), growth through investment 
by mnc's represents the end of the subordination of the underdeveloped 
economies - and indeed of underdevelopment itself. But such views have 
been widely criticised on the basis that mnc growth is not independent 
growth - on the contrary, it is fickle, exploitative and fluctuating (see 
Frobel, Heinrichs and Kreye, 1980, passim; Barratt-Brown, 1976:272, foot-
note b; lavlor, 19j~, cited by Mouzelis, 1981:3b4). O'Brien (1975:24) says 
that this criticism involves a circular argument: dependent countries do 
not have independent growth because their structures are dependent. He is 
correct, but the reason why this is a circular argument is because it 
describes a vicious circle. 
Action by the peripheral state may "alleviate U the problems of depen-
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dent growth somewhat (see chapter twenty-eight). The weak character of 
local capitalist groups in peripheral social formations tends to lead them 
to attempting to develop through state capitalist ventures (Amin, 1974:-
390). For the dependent petty bourgeoisie facing the obstacles in immed-
iate private accumulation, public accumulation is a means towards this goal 
(Mamdani, 1977:288). State capitalism becomes a necessary stop-gap 
(Mafeje, 1977:417). In the post-independence context of multi-lateraliz-
ation of dependence (Warren, 1973), Third World states have a degree of 
leverage previously denied them. 
Evans (1977:44, 63) says that these factors - which he accuses Baran 
and Frank at underestimating - allow for some measure of genuine expansion 
of national productive capacity in peripheral economic systems. He describ--
es how the 8razilidn state arranged joint ventures with foreign capital to 
develop petro-chemicals - a rather fundamental form of industry. This 
industry is not an enclave type with solely export links. Nor is it of a 
light industry or final-stage assembly type. He concludes that capitalism 
of the periphery, in part precisely because of the role of the state, must 
be different from capitalism in the metropole. It is true that certain 
social formations, classically Japan, have with vital state involvement, 
historically been able to absorb toreign capital and improve on foreign 
technology to their own national advantage. But in the case of Brazil, 
such development is often still not autonomous, but dependent on 
international exchange, financial dependence, and balance of payments 
factors lAmin, lY74:384). 
I would therefore tend to argue that despite the efforts of peripheral 
states, dependence has not generally been transformed by growth (see Kay, 
1975:125/6). Indeed, industrialization "is now such an integrated part of 
underdevelopment that it can no longer be regarded as its solution~ (ibid). 
In ttle Frankian outlooK, dependent 9rowtll is not development, but the 
development of underdevelopment. In my view, these observations are broadly 
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correct, although I preteI' to use the term growth without development (see 
below). However, such an evaluation of dependent growth cannot be made 
simply on the basis of identifying continuing dependence. Instead l it 
needs to be based on showing exactly why such growth may not constitute 
development. As demonstrated in the next two sections, the concepts of 
extraversion and disarticulation are highly relevant to this. 
4. uDEVELOPMENTN AS DISTINCT FROM JlGROWTH"". 
I s economic growtll per se necessar il y the same thing as development 2' 
Certainly, underdevelopment is usually associated with the attributes of 
stagnation, and growth is taken as an indication of development (Amin, 
1974:b03). Especially when Ilnked together in an overall exploitative 
process, the attributes of underdevelopment are seen as those traditionally 
regarded as characterizing ubacKwardness u , while development is seen to 
equate those associated with ~advanced~ economic units.(3) 
But such assumptions have been radically questioned by Amin 
(1974:b03,35) who emphasizes the importance of structures to make the 
point. He argues that an underdeveloped structure is not necessarily 
associated with low/decreasing production per capita (ibid:8). In his 
view, to make this association obscures the specificity of underdevelopment 
as a structure qualitatively different from that of economic units charac-
terized by development. Thus underdevelopment is ""manifested in certain 
structural characteristics wrlich oblige us not to conf use the underdevel-
oped countries wi til trle count I' ies now advanced as they were at an or iginal 
stage ot development" (ibid:392, myernPhasis).(4) 
I would go still further than Amin and note that development and 
underdevelopment refer in the first instance not to specific historical 
attributes, nor even to structures, but to the course of productive 
capacity. Structures and attributes are relevant, but only in relation to 
this key issue. In this light, 1 would argue that While certain structures 
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may point towards (thOUgtl not equate) development and underdevelopment ~ the 
attributes of growth or stagnation do not necessarily do so. 
Against this background~ I would argue that a process ot expanding 
means ot production~ output per capita and so on does not signify develop-
ment as such~ unless it serves to raise the overall productive capacity 
within a particular economic unit. My point is that in an peripheral unit~ 
expansion of the means of production does not constitute enhancement of its 
productive capacity~ but rather that of another economic unit within the 
overall structure that links the two together. This understanding allows 
tor an economic distinction to be drawn between Ndevelopment U and .... growth""'. 
Expansion of the means of production in both developed and underdeveloped 
units is development for the former. However~ for the underdeveloped 
units~ it is growth without development. (5) 
Modernization theory fails to understand the possibility of growth 
without development because it operates with the wrong units of analysis. 
It takes the distinction between units such as national economies as 
primarYI and their interconnections as secondary~ and thereby leaves out 
the over-arching structure of the all-important whole. While there is no 
doubt an economic etfectivity on the part of many contemporary national 
economic systems l and while such entities do theretore constitute legitim-
ate economic units~ it has to be remembered that they also fall within a 
far wider economic unit as well. It is this unit of analysis l i.e. the 
totalitYI which must take priority (though not exclusivity) of account. 
(See chapters one and fifteen). 
As Bernstein (1978:16) sees the distinction, ""'growth"'" in an under-
developed economy is a quantitative extension of established structures of 
production~ while Ndevelopment~ (i.e. of productive capacity) involves a 
qualitative change in economic (and non-economic) structures. It is true 
that quantity may develop into quality - i.e. growth into development. But 
until such transition occurs - especially at the level of structures - the 
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distinction is valid. For Baran (1962:292), ...... growth~ .. is an increase over 
time of per capita output of material goods, and ~development""" requires a 
departure from a ulopsided u economic structure. It follows from tllis that 
an economic structure can grow industrially without developing as an eco-
nomy.lb) This can be analysed more concretely by looking at the factor of 
disarticulation-unevenness in underdevelopment. 
5. TOWARDS THE STRUCTURE OF UNDER(JEVELOPMENT II: DISARTICULATION / 
UNEVENNESS. 
The dependent character of growth in underdeveloped economies is bound 
up with the extroversion of the peripheral economic systems. In this sec-
tion, 1 argue that it is because of the disarticulation and unevenness of 
these economic systems that such growth does not add to their development. 
Thus, not only do peripheral economies have dependent growth, but this 
growth is growth without development. These two distinct issues are thus 
linked respectively to extroversion and disarticulation. 
Disarticulation is in a sense the other side of extroversion. The 
phenomena that these concepts represent are closely linked, but - contra 
Amin (1974:288) - they remain distinct. Disarticulation refers to the way 
that an extroverted economy does not gear its resources to its domestic 
market and indigenous economic needs, and is therefore characterized by 
unevenness: extreme imbalances and inequalities in productivity between 
sectors lMouzelis, 1980:3bl; Amin, 1974:393). Extroversion on its own may 
not preclude growth trom counting as development of productive capacity, 
but in coniunction with disarticulation, this seems to be the result. 
As part of disarticulation, difterent branches of the economy do not 
develop in conformity with each other, but become adjusted to external 
factors. fhis makes for a distorted, disiointed and biased structure, with 
little or no sectoral or industrial integration ,Szentes, 197~:9; Shiv ii, 
19i/:Ll.3). rhe "upstreamU and "downstrearfj"'''' links of econom1.C units and 
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sectors are not with each other, but with entities abroad, and there is 
only marginal exchange between them locally (Amin, 1974:292, 16).(7) (Non-
capitalist production that retains some of its own reproduction relations 
may have fewer up-or down-stream links with the CMP). 
Disarticulation as a concept can also apply to a situation within 
regional economic systems. For example, while there is much trade among 
the islands of the Caribbean, this occurs indirectly by being routed via 
the United states (Girvan and Jefferson, 1968:351; Oxaal, 1975:37/8). By 
contrast, 80 percent of the trade of the advanced countries is directly 
with each other. There is a grossly unequal trade dependence between the 
First World and the Third (Amin, 1974:17,67). 
The concept of disarticulation should not be taken to mean a total 
lack of linkages between all the various production structures and pro-
cesses (both capitalist and non-capitalist) in the peripheral economic 
system. (Both chapter seventeen and the next chapter stress what Mouzelis 
(1979b:35) terms the strong negative linkages that still exist.) 
6. GROWTH WITHOUT DEVELOPMENT. 
The phrase "'growth without development ..... is used by various writers to 
characterize growth in the context of extroversion and disarticulation. (8) 
For Seidman (1978:64), the phrase refers to continuing or increasing depen-
dency, as well as a lack of internal specialization and exchange. In a 
similar formulation (but which in my view goes too far), Berger (1976:66) 
and Furtado (1972) see "'growth without development'" as a dualism involving 
enclave capitalist growth alongside sectors of permanent stagnation. 
In a developed capitalist economic system, high productivity in one 
sector tends to diffuse through the economy due to competition and the 
tendency to equalize wage and profit rates. This system is an integrated 
coherent whole with complementary sectors (Amin, 1974:16). However, the 
CMP in the periphery has marginal exchange between its sectors because 
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these are integrated with external economies. ConsequentlYI there is 
minimal ditfusion and the development of one sector has little mObilizing 
etfect on the rest (ibid:17). As a result l for the CMP as it exists at the 
centre, growth is development (it has an integrating effect), While at the 
periphery it is not necessarily so (ibid:1~/9). The same unevenness 1n 
productivity between sectors applies to the whole economy - including the 
non-capitalist structures (ibid:263;267). In this regard l Amin (1977:155) 
also argues that average growth rates often conceal the existence of rapid 
growttl areas alongside stagnation and recession. 
Looked at more closelYI it is clear that growth in an externally-
oriented economy can reinforce rather than change internal sectoral 
disarticulation (Leys, 1975:14,17,18). The structural context means that 
growth tends not to have any integrating economic effect (Amin, 1974:18/9; 
Seidman 19J8:14). And the multiplier effect is transferred abroad, rather 
than increasing articulation locally (ibid: 35 1 170; Geertzl 1963). (rhis 
same result also comes from actual surplus transfer abroad, as will be 
discussed in the next section -- see Beckford, 1969:46, Amin, 1974:231). 
Growth without development is also linked to import-substitution and 
the lack of an internal market (Szentes, 1978:20-30; Baran, 1962:335/6). 
The consequence of tllis is that growth occurs in import substitution, Wllich 
has a limited potential (Sutcliffe, 1972:186). For these reasons l I 
believe the phrase ~development of underdevelopment~ to be misleading. 
Dependent growth does not mean a furtherance of underdevelopment in the 
sense at reduction of productive capacity (although it also, as I have 
shown, does not mean expansion of capacity in the context of disarticulat-
ion and unevenness). 
7. CONCLUt)ION. 
This chapter has argued that extroversion and dependence alone are 
insutficient to explain development and underdevelopment, although they do 
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highlight the dependent character of peripheral growth. It has then looked 
at another factor associated with underdevelopment - disarticulation-un-
evenness, and argued that growth in the context of extroversion, dependence 
and (especially) disarticulation and unevenness is not development. It is a 
quantitative phenomenon that does not qualitatively alter the structures of 
a peripheral economic system, nor underdevelopment as such. While there may 
be expansion in the productive capacity of the parts of the peripheral 
economies, this conclusion would be false for the whole. This conclusion 
is evident generally, and, as the next chapter shows, also specifically as 
regards the growth of the marginal level of a periphral economic system. 
ENJNOT£S 
1. Warren (1973:4 footnote 1) provocatively asks if the USA is not high-
ly dependent on Saudi Arabian oil. One could also ask about Japan and her 
export markets. 
2. The debate with Warren (1973) by McMichael et al (1974) centres around 
whether Third World industrialization conforms empirically to Sutcliffe's 
criteria (1972:174-6) for independent industrialization. But the debate 
takes these criteria as given, and proceeds on an empirical not conceptual 
basis. 
3. This is often the assumption in the zero-sum view of ""'development"" and 
""underdevelopment". 
4. To add to Amin1s point, it can be noted that the structures of 
"development", and ""underdevelopment"" are actually substructures that are 
part of a wider structure constituting an over-arching effective internat-
ional capitalist economic unit. This structure and its substructures under-
pin development and underdevelopment at different points within it, and 
there is no direct relationship between these phenomena and wealth or 
poverty .. 
5. Amongst many others, Arrighi and Saul (1973:293) and Girvan and Jeff-
erson (1968:342) speak in this sense of ""growth without development", - a 
sense distinct from the moral one described in chapter two. 
6. It is useful to examine how the distinctions drawn so far are high-
lighted by reference to Marxist philosophical principles. Marxism holds 
that change and movement can be distinguished.according to whether it 
continues within the terms of its structural contradictions; or whether it 
changes the contradiction itself (Cornforth, 1968:107). In this light, 
"underdevelopment" can be said to undergo quantitative movement insofar as 
it occurs within the terms of its substructures. It becomes "developmentl.l 
when it qualitatively changes these terms. It may be noted that a qualit-
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ative change is sometimes I but not alwaysl the cumulative effect of a 
myriad of quantitative changes. Quantitative change can break up old 
qualities and bring new ones into being (Cornforth, 1968:107). A change in 
quantity - within certain limits - does not necessarily transform quality 
(Afanasyev 1 1980:97). 
7. Amin (1974:606) notes that Latin American analysts tend to stress 
dependency rather than disarticulation as the main feature of the structure 
of underdevelopment in their region. According to Amin, Latin American 
countries tends to have disarticulation at a national level between 
industry and agriculture - rather than throughout the economy, and depend-
ency is primarily on imports such as technology. 
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2. Levels and sectors ot the structure of underdevelopment. 
3. rtle inf ormal sector and growth. 
4. The marginal level as a reserve army of labour. 
5. Marglnal structures and growth without development. 
6. Profit drain: the geography of exploitation. 
7. Surplus transfer through trade. 
8. Surplus transter and urban bias. 
9. Conclusion. 
1. INTRODUCTlON. 
This chapter takes further the analysis ot factors contributing to 
underdevelopment. I look at the structure of underdevelopment in terms of 
three levels of the relations of production~ and compare them to the for-
mal/informal sector structure. I also show how they relate to the theory 
ot growth without development. I then discuss surplus transfer as another 
contributing factor to underdevelopment~ and analyse the outflow of surplus 
through the three levels ot the peripheral economic system. 
2. LEVELS AND SECTORS OF THE STRUCTURE OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT. 
Dr~wing from Obregon (1974)~ an underdeveloped economy can be seen in 
terms of three ditferent levels: the monopoly capitalist, the competitive 
capitalist, and the non-capitalist marginal levels. For Ubregon, the three 
form a hierarchy ot structural dependence. The dominant monopoly level is 
cllaracterlstically an extension of the CMP at the centre. The competitive 
level occurs in the areas of production, circulation and realization (i.e. 
Moments B and C) not yet encroached on by the monopoly level. It consists 
of small capitalist traders, tarmers and artisans and their wage-labourers. 
I lhe marginal level in turn operates within areas not yet taken over by the competitive level. It comprlses the lumpenproletariat, petty commodity 
producers, and the reserve army of labour (Legassick and Wolpe, 197b:92). 
The marginal level thus involves the artiCUlation of non-capitalist 
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structures with the overall structure.{l) The three levels that Obregon 
iuentif ies dIe lief ineu in teems of their' relations of production (and are 
not - as Legassick and Wolpe~ 197b:92~ allege - simply sectors). 
TIle irlt or mal/fonnal sectul' model is not identical to the levels trlat 
Obi-eqon iclent if ies. It is inst i tut ionall y tief ined - the eli vis ion between 
its parts being constituted mainly by political and legal factors. Thus 
the informal sector is separated from the formal through the action of 
pressur'e groups in tt-le lat ter who cl'eate a protective superstructur'e of 
political, moral and legal relations around them (see Davies, 1977:56). 
The informal sector exists under these relations within parameters that 
escape qovernment recognition, enumeration, regulation and - support 
(International Labour Organisation, 1972:68; see also Davies, 1977:59). 
Unlike the marginal level, the informal sector includes not only no~-
capitalist relations, but also wage labour and incipient capitalists 
(Davies, 1977:66) - something ignored by the International Labour Orqan-
ization study of KenyaJs informal sector (Leys, 1973:427). The ~infonnal 
sectorU therefore spans both the marginal and, at least partially, the 
competitive levels. This may be diaqrammatically represented as follows: 
LEVELS SECTORS 
Monopoly For'mal 
Competitive 
Marqinal Informal 
It can therefore be seen that the formal/informal division cannot be 
simply mapped onto Obregon's levels. While there is overlap between the 
two, they also highlight different aspects of the underdeveloped economic 
system. Obregon's hierarchy of levels highlights that non-capitalist 
activities of the marginal sector have a certain resilience because of the 
way that they subordinatelv complement the competitive level (Long and 
Richardsonl 1978:187). The formal/informal classification draws attention 
to features such as the articulation of tIle political-legal with the 
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economic which Obregon~s levels do not do. But on its own, this classifi-
cation has the disadvantage of implying a context less condition rather 
than a determinate process, and a corresponding dualism rather than a unity 
(with the informal as externally and separately constituted from the for-
mal). Some writers have stressed the unity of the sectors pointing out how 
the informal is dependent on the formal for tolerance, and also for markets 
and supplies (Davies, 1977:56, 68; Leys, 1973:427). They have also seen 
that the informal sector is not the ucinderella of future growth'" (Leys, 
1973:425). But the sectoral classification still tends to blur the exist-
ence of dominant and subordinate economic levels in both sectors: the mono-
poly and the competitive in the formal; the competitive and the marginal in 
the informal. Development theory has concerned largely the informal/formal 
sector division, and I turn now to analysing this, complementing it with 
insights from ObregonJ s model. 
3. THE INFORMAL SECTOR AND GROWTH. 
Within the modernization school, the expansion of the informal sector 
is frequently advocated as the way forward for underdeveloped social form-
ations (see for example, Black, 1977; International Labour Organisation, 
1972). It is true that the -informal sector'" can be a source of training 
and capital accumulation for budding entrepreneurs. But the criticism is 
made that once such people succeed and are formalized in their new posit-i ion, they begin to lose the informal sector's much-praised features of 
growth, employment and local ownership (Leys, 1973:428). Nonetheless, 
insofar as the "'informal,u sector remains informal, it is still often pres-
ented as (monolithically) aiding the growth of the formal sector. It is 
argued that the informal sector keeps wages low, provides social security 
outside the CMP, and supplies goods and services cheaply (in some cases) or 
in irregular or neglected markets (Davies, 1977:69). 
In my view, this argument needs to be refined by distinguishing the 
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role at the capitalist and non-capitalist li.e. marginal) levels within the 
lntormal sector. For example~ While it has been argued that the informal 
sector involves high waqe-labour exploitation (Leysl 1973:4Lb), this is 
only in that part ot it that exists in the CMP (at the competitive level). 
A rerined perspective is better able to grasp how, within the informal 
sector, the marginal and competitive levels have differing roles in rela-
tion to growth in the competitive and monopoly levels of the tormal sector. 
In the sections below, I analyse this in terms of the role of the marginal 
level as a reserve army of labour facilitating increased capitalist exploi-
tation, and in terms of the provision ot a subsidy to capital through 
heterogeneous relations of production. 
4. THE MARGINAL LEVEL AS A RESERVE ARMY OF LABOUR. 
Marx held that under competitive conditions a relative surplus pop-
ulation can be conducive to capita~ist expansion. It serves as a reserve 
army of labour which is on tap when needed, and which otherwise competes 
wi th workers who have jObs -- thereby lower inq the wages that they are 
prepared to accept from the capltalists (see Marx, 1972, chapter xxv se0-
tion q). Where the reserve army secures its reproduction through non-
capltallst relations, the CMP otten benefits from the consequent subsidized 
labour-power. 
This may be true of the history ot developed capitalist countries, but 
in the context of underdevelopment, things have worked out somewhat ditfer-
entlv. The relative surplus population (located in the marginal level -
outside the CMP) may serve as a reserve army tor the competitive level, but 
not qenerally tor the dominant monopoly level. Ihis is because the capital 
intensity of the latter means that productivlty and expansion is predicated 
on advanced means ot production rather than on low wages. (2) Furtllermore, 
expansion of the monopoly level involves not only relatlvelv tew labourers, 
but also a particular quality of labour. Obregon argues that the skill 
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level required excludes much of the relative surplus population from 
tultillinq eitt-Jer ot the Ngrowtt)u tunctions of a reserve army.(3) The 
marginal level is thus unlikely to aid growtll at the monopoly level. 
[he role of the marginal level regarding the competitive level is not 
as simple as a reserve army of labour. fhe subservience of the competitive 
level to the monopoly level gives it an unstable character with a changing 
range ot activities, a fluctuating labour force and an unsteadY growth rate 
tNlcol, l~77:H). Most importantly, it has limited scope for expansion 
because of the dominance of the monopoly level. Consequently, marginal 
people do serve to lower wages in the competitive level, but they do not 
entirely constitute a reserve army of labour. They are better seen as a 
tloating and intermittently employed reserve for a sector whose expansion 
is strictly l~ited. Many of them are compelled to spend the greater part 
Ot their existence in subordinate non-capitalist activities. In this way, 
the marginal level may aid growth in the competitive level, but this growth 
depends on the opportunities lett over by the monopoly level. 
5. MARGINAL SfRUCTURES AND GROWTH WITHUUT DEVELOPMENT. 
In some cases, marginal economic structures have grown spectacularly 
in the peripheral economic system (Tsoucalas, 1979:126; Muratoria, 
19BO:39). Whether this in itself constitutes development, however, is 
another question. In my view, it does not, and this can be seen using 
Dbregon~s model. 
Obregon's concepts highlight that these non-capitalist activities are 
in part the outcome of the monopoly level which both excludes labour from 
itself and limits the expansion of the competitive level. Because it owes 
its existence, and its incentive and capacity to expand, to these factors, 
the growth of the marginal pole cannot be seen as economic development that 
integrates the economy and energizes it. It is an instance of growth with---
out development - economic movement within the terms of the structures of 
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underdevelopment, and which is unlikely to transform these terms. 
6. SURPLUS OUTFLOW AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT. 
As mentioned above, the informal sector provides a subsidy to the 
formal through the exchange of commodities and labour power. Focussing on 
the existence and articulation of Obregon's levels, one can identify 
surplus flow (in various and fluctuating degrees) from the marginal to 
competitive level, and from the informal competitive to the formal competi-
tive. Each of these levels may also involve a flow directly to the mono-
poly level. So significant is this surplus flow, that several writers have 
stressed it as a major factor of underdevelopment, and underplayed the 
roles of monopoly competition and the structures associated with under-
development (extroversion-dependence and disarticulation-unevenness). Thus 
Frank (1969a) says that the most underdeveloped areas are those that were 
once part of a flourishing mercantilism (Dos Santos, 1969:75). For him, 
surplus transfer is part of a metropole-satellite network extending from 
the far corners of the periphery to the skyscrapers of the centres. Amin 
(1974:136) goes so far as to say that it is this surplus outflow that 
blocks development at the periphery. For him, it is the underdeveloped 
countries that supply the centres with capital, not vice versa (see also 
ibid: 178). (4) 
In my view, surplus outflow is but one of the factors of underdevelop-
ment, albeit a very important one, and while it is a distinct dynamic, it 
is related to the very structures of a peripheral economic system. It may 
be noted here that in terms of the discussion of ~surplus~ in chapter 
eleven, I am dealing here with '''actual'' surplus, i.e. the (changing) 
proportions of what is left aver for investment after simple reproduction 
of the existing production system. This surplus derives from surplus 
labour, although surplus labour (as defined in chapter five) also includes 
labour necessary for simple reproduction. The ~surplus- discussed in this 
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chapter is thus over and above the surplus labour that goes into simple 
reproduction. In other words~ it is exploited surplus labour. To the 
extent that this exploited surplus is transferred out of an underdeveloped 
economic system, it becomes Npotential U surplus in relation to that system. 
At the same time~ it may be noted that such surplus extraction may often 
cut into labour necessary for the simple reproduction of the whole, thereby 
undermining the entire production in the longer term. 
It is admittedly difficult to operationalize the concepts of surplus, 
and therefore of surplus transfer/outflow. In addition, there is an unre-
solved controversy about whether non-capitalist production can yield 
surplus value to capital. (5) I leave these debates aside here in order to 
focus on the broader question of the significance of surplus outflow for 
development and underdevelopment. This means that I take as given a 
surplus transfer through the various levels of the peripheral economy to 
the CMP at the centres. My aim in the rest of this chapter is to examine 
its diverse forms and their significance for underdevelopment. 
5. PROFIT DRAIN: THE GEOGRAPHY OF EXPLOITATION. 
Surplus drainage is manifested at Moment C i.e. in the relations of 
distribution, and this can be explained partly by the geographical location 
of classes involved in exploitative relations. Kahn (1978:136) says that 
exploitation is between classes and classes cannot be defined geographic-
ally. Bettelheim (1972:301) also argues that, strictly speaKing~ countries 
cannot exploit each other - only classes can. These points are taken -
exploitation is a relation of production that is constituted by a structure 
of classes~ rather than by countries. But it is nevertheless the case that 
class exploitation does empirically have an important geographical dimen-
sion (Arrighi, 1971:3). Roxborough (1976:122) is therefore correct in 
saying that spatial transfers of surplus need to be analysed in terms inter 
alia of the foreign location of capitalists. 
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Foreign investment is the clearest case of surplus transfer. The 
rationale for such investment is to make money and send it back home 
(Harrison, 1901:349). Tile drainage of surplus through the repatriation of 
profits is regarded as an important cause at underdevelopment by Goncharev 
(19JJ:1B2); Baran (1962:336); Sutcliffe (1972) and Mandel (1968). It has 
been calculated that multinationals take out each year three times what 
they put in (Harrison, 1981:350). Amin (1974:231) points out that this 
profit export cancels the multiplier effects of investment. (6) 
Foreign investment need not always be at the level of actually setting 
up new enterprises in the periphery. It is often investment through 
finance. This is primarily at the level of lending to governments and 
capitals .. although it may be directly linked with producers themselves. 
Finance capital can dictate certain of the conditions of production. This 
is particularly true of the International Monetary Fund. While this may 
lead to growth, and even partial development, much of the surplus from this 
is channelled out of the social formation in the form of loan and interest 
repayments. Brazil and Mexico are the classic cases here. 
Surplus drainage is not solely from exploitation within the monopoly 
investment level of the CMP at the periphery. Through a number of mechan-
isms, the linKs of this level with the competitive and marginal levels add 
to the surplus that gets exported. Through savings and the reduced costs 
at labour-power in the competitive level, surplus flows from the lowest to 
the highest level (and from there, outside) - despite there being no direct 
production links between these levels. For example, througtl ioint ventures 
with state capital twhich comes tram the competitive and marginal levels), 
multinational firms can raise 40 percent of their capital from local 
sources, invest another 40 percent from their own profits and only 20 
percent is contributed-+rom outside (Cardosa (1972, cited by Barratt-Brown, 
1976:269). For Latin America, four-fifths of multl-national finance comes 
from local savings (Harrison, 1981:348). This arrangement may in some 
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cases lImit ttle ['epatriation at pr-ot-its out at the countl-y~ but this is not 
always automat1cally the case. In a word, whlle much surplus may tlow out 
as a result at tore1l;Jn investment, not '[hat much need actually flow in. 
lurning to reduced costs of labour power as another part of the chain 
ot surplus flow, this may result from the use by the CMP of labour-power 
trom non-capitalIst structures tor WhICh it does not have to bear the costs 
ot repr'oduction (see Wolpe~ 1975:2L4; Jotfe, 198U:18,18b). Surplus outflow 
here 1S dependerlt on the capacity of the non-capitalist structures to 
reproduce themselves to some extent. This use of Uoutside'" labour-power is 
mainly in the competitive level of the economy, and only to a lesser extent 
the monopoly level - except wllere the latter is in "agr ibusiness u or 
mining. Ot course, this extraction undermines the productive capacity of 
the non-capitalist structures ~8ernstein, 1979a:423, 426/7). 
7. SUR~LU~ lRANSFlR fHkUUGH TRADE. 
Iranster at surplus is not only through toreign investment, savings, 
cheap labour power and the consequent profit export. It also occurs 
through commodity exchange between all levels w1thin the peripheral econ-
amy, and between these and the capitalist centres. It is evident through 
inter alia the declining terms of trade whereby the underdeveloped 
countries receive progressively fewer lmports tor the same amount of 
exports llong and Richardson, 197~:177, Mouzelis, 1980:3b2; 1979a:351, 
Harrison, 1981:343).( /) One of the meChanisms whereby surplus gets 
transf er red tllrough trade has been ret erred to as "unequal exchange". 
(See [rnrnanuel, 19/2a; Amin, 1974:55-84; Bettelheim 1972; Friedmann, 1979:--
174; Kitching, 19~2:1b7-70). This complex and controversial theory is not 
dealt with here tor reasons of space, and also because the concepts I have 
developed have no special contribution to make to the debate. 
Another mechanism of surplus transfer via trade is the role of 
merchant capital which operates by monopoly control at exchange (Amin, 
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1974:90). A large number of theorists have focussed on this mechanism (for 
example, see Baran, 1962; Frank, 1969; Kay, 1975; Rodney, 1972). Merchant 
capital does not make its profits by revolutionizing production, but by 
controlling markets - and the greater the control, the greater the rate of 
profit (Kay~ 1975:96). For this reason, merchant capital tends to cen-
tralize and concentrate itself into monopolies more so than productive 
capital (ibid=96,123). Dependence in an international division of labour 
is clearly an important aspect underlying and facilitating mercantile 
exploitation of underdeveloped social formations (Dos Santos, 1969:76/7). 
Dependence on exports and imports - i.e. on an extroverted economic system 
- can provide a base for a commercial class to exploit, even though 
dependency in itself does not automatically mean surplus extraction. 
Merchant profits are inversely related to the profits of the units 
that it articulates with (Godelier, 1972:349: Kay, 1975:90). Surplus 
transfer is based on control of Moment C here, and this in turn depends on 
unequal bargaining power and the outcome is determined by the strongest 
party (Harrison, 1981:421). According to Kay (1975:97), mercantile 
capital dominated this relationship with both First and Third World sides 
of its operation in the period of mercantilism, and reaped profits from 
both. With the rise of industrial capital, however, the predominance of 
merchant capital was broken in its articulation with the CMP in the 
developed countries. This was not achieved in the underdeveloped countries 
because of their weak political status as colonies. It was also because 
the dominant industrial capital of the centres began to use this merchant 
capital in the latter~s monopoly form in the periphery (ibid:100). 
Squeezed by industrial capital in the First World, merchant capital 
put a greater squeeze on the Third (ibid:123). As an agent of productive 
capital now, it organized whole economies to the requirements of external 
interests - thereby forging the structures of dependence/extroversion 
- and drained them through its adverse terms of trade (ibid:100,103). 
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Kay {ibid:1L4-b) argues that a profitability crisis for merchant 
capital was reached in the early 1900s. By 1930, it had begun (alongside 
direct investment by the productive capitals ot the centres) to enter 
production so as to improve declining profit rates. Although this was the 
introduction of the CMP proper (i.e. in all its Moments - GB) into the 
periphery, tile industrialization was partial. It was limited to import and 
export production and was also partial with regard to employment. At the 
same time, a quasi-independent merchant capital persisted, as did non-
capitalist production. 80th serviced the import-export economy. Through 
• 
this merchant capital, industrial capital today is able to acquire surplus 
from non-capitalist production (Roseberry, 1978:13).(8) 
8. SURPLUS TRANSFER AND URBAN BIAS. 
Up till now the question of spatial surplus flows has been discussed 
primarily in terms of centre and peripheral economic systems. However, it 
is also important to bear in mind that these relationships are reproduced 
within economic systems as well (Weeks, 1975:96). This applies to both 
developed and underdeveloped countries - although the situation is 
exacerbated in the conditions of the latter. 
Hegarding unevennesses resulting trom investment-derived surplus 
flows, it is evident that multi-nationals have - at all levels - an unequal 
geographical hierarchy involving dependence and surplus flow to a concen-
trated centre (Hymer, 1972:38). Regarding savings, rural savings are 
channelled through banks to urban investment (Carlsen, 1980:83). Regarding 
unequal exchange, a chain of metropole-satellite structures exists within a 
peripheral social formation between sectors with inequalities in produc-
tivity wage rates and/or market control (see Amin, 1974:15). The conse-
quences tend to be a declining terms of trade ratio. 
fhe urban blas ot economic growth in a capitalist economic system 
tends to be reintorced by polltical means too: pricing policies, taxation, 
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credit availability~ destination of state investment and so on (see 
Muntemba~ 1978:74; Kay~ 19B1:496/7; Weeks, 1975:95; Harrison, 1981:135; 
Arrighi and Saul~ 1968b:291). (The issues of capitalist urban and rural 
development and underdevelopment are analysed in greater depth in Part G of 
this thesis). 
9. CONCLUSION. 
The past few chapters have looked at various factors in underdevelop-
ment: the system process of competition, the character of the forces of 
production (extroversion-dependence; disarticulation-unevenness), and now 
the three levels of the economy and surplus transfer. However, the respec-
tive roles of all of these are still not the whole explanation of under-
development (or development for that matter). As discussed in the next 
chapter, while these dynamics are significant, their role needs to be 
placed within the internal social structure of the social formations of the 
periphery. Within this structure, class is arguably the most crucial 
factor. 
ENJNJTES 
1. The marginal level is not simply the outcome of articulation between 
the CMP and the pre-capitalist structures. In addition~ it comprises 
groups who are actually excluded - i.e. marginalized, as former workers or 
capitalists, from the peripheral CMP itself. Marginal structures are 
therefore partly created by the internal action and character of the 
peripheral CMP, as well as by its conservation-dissolution relationship 
with antecedant relations. 
2. There are - to an extent - some exceptions to this, such as monopoly 
construction, textiles, clothing, mining and agribusiness. 
3. Arrighi (1977:172) argues that capital-intensive technology tends to 
involve high level manpower and semi-skilled labour, while more labour-
intensive technology involves unskilled and skilled. Braverman, 1974, 
also focusses on the ~deskilling~ component of capital-intensive technology 
(although see Elger, 1979, tor a critique of Braverman). These arguments 
tend to weaken ObregonJs view that skill levels preclude the ~marginal 
masses~ from acting as a reserve for this level. Even so, Obregon's model 
still has general validity - at tile very least with regard to the low 
labour requirements of capital-intensive technology. 
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4. Amin claims (rather reductionistically) that this is the essence of 
articulation on a world scale (1974:3). While it is no doubt an important 
phenomenon~ it is questionable whether it constitutes the ~essence~ of 
articulation -- or whether there is a single "essence N anyway. For instan-
ce~ Amin himself~ in the rest ot his book~ gives much attention to the role 
of extroversion and disarticulation. 
5. I touch on this debate in chapter twenty-six in discussing simple 
commodi ty production. Tilis is just one of several areas that the debate is 
relevant - others include domestic labour and pre-capitalist production. 
b. This is why the multiplier effect theory cannnot be extended in a 
mechanical way to the periphery (Amin, ibid:392). 
7. This creates problems for development because if a country wishes to 
import less~ it may first have to import more, and the balance of payments 
is placed under great strain (Griffin and Enos, 1978:220; Lange, 1960:221). 
8. When merchant capital articulates with non-capitalist enterprises, it 
can have a very high rate of exploitation and profit at the expense of the 
enterprise. This is especially if the enterprise only needs simple repro-
duction and is therefore not as vulnerable to going out of business as is a 
capitalist market-dependent venture (see Banaji, 1976a:306). 
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CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE 
CLASS AN) OEVELOPiVENT-UNJEROEVELOPt-£NT 
1. Introduction. 
2. The role of internal factors. 
3. Which is more important: class or the structure of underdevelopment? 
4. Mutual determination with class as primary. 
5. Class" surplus and underdevelopment. 
b. Merchant capitalists and utilization of surplus. 
7. Class struggles and the use of surplus. 
8. Capitalist or non-capitalist relations to blame for underdevelopment? 
9. Conclusion. 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
In the account of this thesis so far, underdevelopment tlas been 
analysed in terms of competition, extroversion-dependence and disarticula-
tion-unevenness, Obregon's three levels of tile economy and surplus outflow. 
Two issues are discussed in this chapter: firstly" the internal character 
ot these factors, and secondly, the role of classes in relation to them. 
Z. THE ROLE OF INTERNAL FAC10RS.(1) 
Poulantzas (197bb:22) argues that in the current international 
context, 
there is really no such thing as external factors on the 
one Iland, actinq purely from the "outside", and opposed 
to internal factors Uisolated~ in their own ~space~ and 
outclassing the others. 
Rather, the ~external~ forces only act on a country ~by way of their 
internalization, i.e. by their articulation to its own specific contradict-
ions~ (ibid, see also Bettelheim (1972:290»).(2) 
Because competition, the structures of a peripheral economic system, 
levels of the economy and surplus outflow are (in part) a function of the 
whole internatlonal system, it is lmportant to highlight the extent to 
which they still have an internal dimension. 
For example, the differing roles of the reserve army of labour 
regarding monopoly and competitive capital (see previous chapter) show that 
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the specifics of the internalization of competition in the periphery are 
important to look at. And the differences between dependency structures 
are closely tied to the internal structure of each peripheral social 
formation and the varying relationships between economic sectors, classes 
and the State in each case (Kay, 1981:485/6; Mouzelis, 1980:360; 1979b:46). 
Dependency implies that economic decisions are made outside the country in 
the interests of outsiders (Berger, 1976:68). But it is also necessary to 
look at these decision-making processes internally (see Poulantzas, 
1976b:21; Datoo and Gray, 1979:263). To ignore internal class formation, 
misses the way in which what begins as an external relation becomes inter-
nalized (Legassick, 1976:439; see also Lewis, 1976). According to Petras 
(1983:217), the problem for the periphery is not external dependency, but 
imperialist exploitation located in the class structure of the periphery. 
These arguments clear the way for a discussion about the relationship 
between the various internalized factors of underdevelopment. 
3. WHICH IS MORE IMPORTANT: CLASS OR THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESSES OF 
UNDERDEVELOPMENT? 
Writers dealing with the issue of the relationship between the struc-
tures (and system dynamics) of the periphery on the one hand, and the class 
structure and struggles on the other may be divided according to which of 
the two they see as primary.(3) 
Taking first those who see the peripheral structures and dynamics as 
primary, the dependency theorists loom large in this category. For Dos 
Santos (1969:78), dependency is a conditioning situation that determines 
the limits and possibilities of actions and behaviour. Frank (1969a) goes 
further and sees classes as derivative of surplus outflow processes. In 
turn, surplus outflow and the role of the peripheral State are seen as 
being determined primarily by the dependent economic structure and the 
international division of labour, and only secondarily by classes that are 
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formed in this context. Mamdani (1977:145) likewise says that the import-
export monopoly structure of underdeveloped countries dictates the process 
of class formation there: classes such as cash crop agriculturalists and 
commercial capitalists develop within this structure - and have objective 
interests in maintaining it. Obregon~s analysis (1974) of the classes in 
the competitive and marginal levels of the structure also fits into this 
perspective.(4) 
The opposite emphasis stresses the other side of the relationship -
broadly, arguing for classes as primary in relation to the structures and 
dynamics of the periphery. For example, Ferner (1979:270) says that while 
the phases of Latin American development are related to connections to the 
international capitalist system, the precise form of development in a 
particular country depends on its class dynamics. Dos Santos (1969:76) 
attributes the fact of post-colonial Latin American economies remaining 
export-based to the class character of the anti-colonial revolutions. 
While the above two writers see class and underdevelopment structures 
as distinct, others come close to reducing the latter entirely to the 
former. For Cardosa (1972, cited by OIBrien, 1975:13), dependency is 
(simply) part of an internal system of social relations between classes. 
Mouzelis (1980:365/6) holds that sectoral imbalances and technological 
backwardness should be explained by the articulation of economic struc-
tures, which link these phenomena to class factors. 
Kay (1981:498) reduces the question to class entirely. For him, 
although udifferent social classes exist within each economically or geo-
graphically defined sector, the main contradiction in society is not 
between sectors, but between social classesll • And according to Luton 
(1976:577) lithe satellite/metropole contradiction (i.e. the contradiction 
of unequal exchange) is a manifestation of the expropriation/appropriation 
contradiction (i.e. the class contradiction) in the sense that the former's 
existence is secondary to the operation of the latter~. Similarly, Booth 
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(19/5:79) holdS that it is relations between classes which produce as an 
effect interreq~onal transters at cap~tal and thereby contribute to uneven 
development. 1 hus ~ ln tilis perspectlve, the spatial "conveyor bel to of 
surplus is composed ot and dependent on class relations l8arnett, 1977:23). 
Among otller wr'lters wll:nin this perspectlve~ weeks (1975:9j) points to 
tr-Ie role ot class political power relations. He says that surplus outf low 
is intlerent in an elite-consumption development strategy, and that surplus 
is channelled to where political power is greatest. Leys (1975:20-1; 
19~j:3j) argues that dependency theory percelves classes as passive, and 
ttlat consequently reslstance to underdevelopment gets underplayed. In this 
light~ surplus transfer (and its underlying structure of dependence-
extroverS10n) needs to be seen in terms of who it is advantageous for - and 
not only in terms at the centre or periphery, but also within the periphery 
itself (see O'8rien, 1975:16; Berger, 1976:68; Dos Santos, 1969:78).(5) 
Lonsequently~ the question of surplus diversion through and utilization by 
the State becomes an important issue of conflict (see Kaplan 1977:104,111). 
Thus~ Brenner (1977:27) for example, criticizes the dependency tt180rists 
tor see~ng class as determined by the market, the development of trade and 
internatiunal division at- labour ti.e. ultimately by Moment C). Instead~ 
"the way in which the class structures themselves emerge is the outcome of 
a class struggle where results are incomprehenslble in terms merely of 
market torces~ (ibid). 
4. MUTUAL DETERMINATION WITH CLASS AS PRIMARy. 
It seems to me that the thrust of this second approach above is 
correct, but that it is important to see the situation as dialectial, and 
not to reduce the perlpr-Ieral economic system' 5 structure and its dynamics 
to class relatlons, despite the llnks between them. 
In this llght, I would follow Raikes (1'::778:301) who argues that 
~reglonal inequality cannot be consldered as separate trom or alternative 
241 
UNDERDEVELOPMENT, 
CLASS FACTORS 
to social differentiation and the formation of classes. u I would add that 
nor can the two issues be seen as identical. As Raikes in fact says, it 
has been a ucomplementary processu (ibid). I would also follow Mouzelis 
(1979b:35) in arguing that underdevelopment and development need to be seen 
in terms of the policies and interests of classes operating within a frame-
work of limiting structural constraints (and within limiting system 
dynamics toO). 
Arrighi (1971:10) has made a valuable contribution to the debate. He 
says that it is necessary to invert Frank, and see the class structure in 
the metropole-satellite structure as the dominant element in the relation 
of mutual determination of the two structures. For Arrighi, Frank's 
metropole-satellite model must be built into the (primary) analysis of the 
class structure. In his view, class is the more important because it 
determines the places of entry (and exit see also Bettelheim, 1972:290) 
in the international metropole-satelli t.e chain, and it also accounts for 
variations in the chain (Arrighi, ibid:3). 
From this contribution, it can be argued that while there is a dialec-
tic between class on the one hand and structures-dynamics on the other, it 
is not symmetrical. Taking this further, I would add that it is important 
to clearly distinguish system dynamics from the structures of social relat-
ions, and within the latter, to distinguish the different types of relat-
ions. Competition is a system dynamic deriving from, but not reducible to, 
a structure of capitalist class relations. Both dependence-extroversion 
and disarticulation-unevenness involve structures of social relations 
(within the forces of production). These are linked to the structure of 
class relations (eg. merchant capital, imperialist investment), but they 
are definitely not synonymous with it. Surplus outflow must also be broken 
down into its constituent elements. Outflow based on geographical class 
location rests on (and reinforces) a particular structure of class relat:-
ions. Surplus outflow based on merchant exploitation is a form of class 
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explOitation based on a heterogeneous relations of production structure.(6) 
In fact it lS only Obregon's model of three levels of the underdeveloped 
economy which are identical to class relatlons, comprising as it does three 
qualitatively different kinds ot class relations. But class is also a sig-
niticant teetor in underdevelopment (and development) in a direct way that 
is dlstinct from its links to the factors listed above. I now turn to 
investigating this. 
5. CLASS, SURPLUS AND DEVELOPMENT. 
It is in regard to mercantile surplus flow that the class structure is 
relevant tor Frank (Luton, 197b:574). The relation of classes to the 
control at spatlal surplus drainage is the way this school looks at 
classes. 1his is no doubt an important element of development and under-
development, but the issues are also far more complex. By seeing class as 
relating only to the dependency structure and spatial surplus control, 
Frankians tend to concei~fr Lt. in market rather than production terms 
(Joffe, 19C:$O:b). Indeed, in lacking distinctions between Moments A, Band 
C, they have an unrigorous conception of class (see Mouzelis, 1980:361). 
For them, exploitation occurs at Moment C - and it is here that they see 
classes as belng based. This is true for merchant capitalists, but not 
other classes. The Frankians misunderstand this limited situation as the 
general essence ot class relations, and indeed the general relationShip 
between development and underdevelopment as being in zero-sum terms. 
Underdevelopment is represented by deprivation and poverty; development as 
the accumulation of wealth at the opposite pole. 
Without wanting to reject everything in this view, it is important to 
to note its limitations. For example, Barratt-Brown (1976:268) observes 
that a combination of increased dependency and "'development" (i.e. 
Ugrowth"'" in the terminology of ttlis thesis) In parts of the per iphery is 
not qUlte the expected result of 400 years of Frankian exploitation and 
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underdevelopment. At the same time, it is also important to see that 
(ievelopment is not simply a function of being at the receiving end of sur-
plus transter. Class is significant not only for the structure of under--
development and surplus transfer - but also for another vital issue: the 
use or surplus. 
This can be seen as regards the particular significance of surplus 
transfer tor development. It has been argued that while exploitation was a 
factor, the major causal factors of western capitalist development were 
indigenous (Berger, 1976:71). Accumulation under capitalism involves the 
constant creation of new means of production (Oobb, 1962:23-30). But in 
earlier times, accumulation involved piling up bullion and building chat-
eaux. Rather than aiding capitalist accumulation, this diverted wealth from 
productive investment. In this light, therefore, mercantilism was not the 
essence of capitalist development. While foreign cornmerce enriched some 
areas at the expense of others, the Whole story of capitalist development 
cannot be written in these terms. Enrichment was only instrumental if it 
was realized as means of production. (See also chapter eleven). 
Dobb (ibid:27) distinguishes mercantile surplus transfer from the 
transfer of ownership of land. This latter concentrated the means of 
production at one pole and dispossessed producers at the other - with the 
significance of restructuring class relations to form the basis of a cap--
italist class structure. To sum up, mercantilism laid the groundwork for 
the industrial revolution by concentrating capital in the metropolitan 
areas, but the driving force came from capitalist class relations, in 
particular from emerging small-scale capitalist enterprises (Hymer, 1972:-
40). ( 7) 
It has also been pointed out by Brenner (1977:85) that, as regards 
Frank, it is not simply that the peripheral economies were structured to be 
primary product exporters that caused them to be underdeveloped. Rather it 
was the class relations through which tllis exporting took place which 
L44 
I 
! 
I" 
II 
IJt-JDERDEVEI .. OPMEJ-··IT I 
CLASS FACTORS 
deterro.lned such an OUl:come aflfJ whlCt-1 precluaed the emergence or an internal 
J ynamic Ot deve lopmen t (Jot fe, 198u: <;7/ 1U ) . 
rhus, surplus transrer may have been necessary, but it was not a 
sutticient conditlon for development lLegassick, 197b:479). Surplus 
transter (by whichever manner) is also not a sufficient explanation of 
underdevelopment. As a quantitative issue, surplus transfer should not be 
isolated trom qualitatlve questions. The important question therefore is: 
who controls what happens to surplus that is not transferred out of the 
Third World:' As lVlamdani \1977:7) says "'it is the use a society makes of 
its economlC surplus that determines the character of future development.~ 
As noted in chapter eleven, this r~quires looking at the political issue of 
who controls and in whose interest surplus is used (ibid). Baran (1962:164) 
has shown here that underdevelopment is not so much a lack of surplus as a 
consequence of the way in which it is used - namely, unproductively and 
wastefully tsee also Amin, 1974:9). 
TI1US, distinct from their significance regarding other factors of 
underdevelopment, it can be argued that classes may directly be a factor in 
underdevelopment. This is particularly where their structure, interests, 
practices and projects hinder effective use of resources (see Mouzelis, 
197~b:35). Class structures, once established, can determine the course of 
economic development or underdevelopment over an entire epoch (Brenner, 
1977:2). The role at classes is closely bound up with the role of the 
state (see chapter tourteen), and this is important for understanding rural 
development as discussed in Parts G and H in this thesis. 
b. MERCHANT CAPITALISTS AND UTILIZATION OF SURPLUS. 
A Drier examination of merchant capital highlights the direct signifi-
cance of class relations of underdevelopment. Through trade I merC/lant 
capitalists drain surplus out of underdeveloped economic systems. However, 
1t 1S not only tllat tnere lS an outflow of surplus: even ttlat wt-lich is 
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retaine{j wi U-lin an economic unit gets ctlanneled into the further develop-
ment of trade ratrler than prOduction l Mamdani" 1977: 145; Kay" 1975: 95). 
And" as Mamdani (19Tl: 144) comments: 
ThlS lndeed is why industrial capital at the centre had 
to subordinate merchant capital to it in order to treely 
develop. But in the underdeveloped capitalist countries" 
this unproductive merchant capital tends to dominate 
production. 
Even when merchant capitalists branch out into productive capitalist 
investment" this tends to be in export-orlented production (ibid:108). 
Where merchant capitalists articulate with non-capitalist production" 
trley affect productivity by bringing exchange value to bear" by disrupt-
ing the division ot labour, causing a re-allocation of labour-time" and by 
stimulating specialization lKay" 1975:94/5; 8ryceson" 1980:285/8).(8) 
While merchant capitalists tend in this way to dissolve social relations 
and stimulate comroodl ty production" they also block development (Kahn" 
1978:126). This is because they not only tie up surplus in exchange" but 
because they also remain dependent on the classes in control of production 
- classes WhlCh often have an interest in maintaining their non-capitalist 
status (Kay" 1975:93/4 ... 98; see chapter seventeen). For Dos Santos 
(19b9:74)" in modernizing Latin American export structures" foreign 
capitalists allied themselves with the internal commercial and exporting 
ollgarchy" tllereby preserv ing backwardness in a new stage of dependency. 
Thus despite their corrosive effects" merchant capitalists may bolster 
archaic political and economic forms through alliances with pre-capitalist 
elements lKay ... 1975:104). Trade may therefore lnitially conserve rather 
than weaken the traditional social structure lDupre and Rey" 1973:162) (see 
chapter seventeen). It class relations in this example have this economic 
signif icance" one can also point to trle character of class struggles as a 
factor in underdevelopment. 
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6. CLASS STRUGGLES AND THE USE OF SURPLUS. 
Kay (1975) argues against the Frankians that capital underdeveloped 
the Third World - not because it exploited it - but because it did not 
exploit it enough. But, as pointed out (in a different context), the con-
cept of ~more exploitation- risks a return to a linear and gradualistic 
view of development: underdevelopment becomes a question of ""how much'" 
rather than ""how is it used'" (Tsoucalas, 1979:127). Closer analysis of 
Kay, however, shows that what he is really getting at, as Bernstein (1976) 
has seen, is in fact the qualitative form of exploitation. 
Roseberry (1978:12) has pointed out that a combination of merchant 
capital with userers' capital enables a more efficient and higher rate of 
exploitation of producers, than either form of capital achieves when 
operating separately. But even this is not as much as properly productive 
capital can achieve. Thus when Kay says that the Third World was not 
exploited ""enough""', what he means is that it was not exploited by produc-
tive capital, on the basis of relative surplus value exploitation (which in 
turn is based on raising productive capacity in wage-good related sectors). 
Relative surplus value exploitation enables u rnore'" exploitation to be 
carried out than absolute surplus value exploitation. 
Thus one of the keys to the poverty of the Third World is the high 
rate of absolute surplus value exploitation that has prevailed there 
(Bernstein, 1976). Capitalists in the periphery are able to take advan-
tage of exploiting by absolute surplus value methods, because of the 
weakness of class struggle in limiting this avenue (see Fine, 1978:92, 
94).(9) As Kautsky has noted, u a holding where the workers can be driven 
to any limits does not require the latest technical equipment, as do 
holdings where the workers may impose limits on the intensity of their 
labour. The possibility of increasing the labour time of a given workforce 
is a serious obstacle to technical progress'" (1976:26).(10) 
T~le weakness of the proletariat and the peasant classes is closely 
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linked to the way 1n which they have formed in the context of under-
development. The class structures of the periphery involve a diversity of 
relations of production, and therefore of classes and class fractions. Add 
to this, semi-class formation, and the consequence is disorganisation 
amongst the peripheral exploited (Fine, 1978:94).(11) 
The problem of Third World development today is that in the context of 
an international capitalist system, organised class struggle limiting 
absolute surplus value tends to drive capital away, rather than compel it 
to industrialize (Mouzelis, 1979b:41). Simultaneously, monopoly compa-
tition and the structure of the peripheral economic system inhibits the 
indigenous development of the CMP from below. The result is the blocking 
of capitalist development in the periphery. 
9. CAPITALIST OR NON-CAPITALIST RELATIONS TO BLAME FOR UNDERDEVELOPMENT? 
Any answer to the question of whether the CMP will ultimately develop 
the underdeveloped economies depends very much on where the ublame u for 
underdevelopment is placed. 
Many writers have blamed non-capitalist relations. The argument 
advanced by Fine l1978:94) (see previous section) ultimately lays the blame 
on weak class struggle in the periphery, in turn tracing this to the 
existence of non-capitalist relations and associated class heterogeneity 
there. Kahn (1978:110) - for different reasons - also feels that unde~ 
development is the result of the incomplete penetration of capitalist 
relations and the persistence of pre-capitalist economic forms. 
Other writers have also blamed non-capitalist relations; citing a wide 
range of reasons. According to Cliffe (1977:333); Palmer and Parsons 
(1977) see underdevelopment as a lack of capitalist relations - the pre-
capitalist system was destroyed, but not transformed into capitalist 
production. Kaplan and Davies (1977:103) speak about feudal and peasant 
classes constituting an obstacle for capitalist economic development. And 
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for Friedmann l1979:174/5)~ what makes for development under capitalism is 
the mobility of factors of production~ whereas the existence of pre-
capitalist classes like the rent-exploiting landlords and the various 
peasant classes limits mobility and competition. T11eir existence is there-
fore an integral part of underdevelopment - or at least of the lack of 
development. 
Another argument for blaming non-capitalist relations concerns the 
link between proletarianization and the internal market. Capitalism at the 
centre has benefited from its internal market - the latter being a function 
of extensive proletarianization there (see chapter sixteen). The compar-
atively limited expansion of the CMP at the periphery has meant less 
proletarianization~ and hence less of an internal market. 
This general outlook parallels 1950#5 development theory which held 
that the underdeveloped countries would progress towards development by 
eliminating the Uobstacles'" of Utraditional societiesU~ ""feUdal residues .... ~ 
etc. (see Dos Santos~ 1969:58). However, as Dos Santos pOints out, the 
survival of pre-capitalist forms is not fundamentally due to their own 
persistence, but rather to the very process of underdevelopment in the 
dependent countries (lbid:60). This squares with Obregon's theory (1974) 
of the CMP contributing to the existence of the marginal sector. 
In an entirely different view then, the issue is not so much the 
stubborn continuation of pre-capitalist classes and structures~ as the 
restricted development of the peripheral CMP which not only fails to absorb 
and transform them into capitalist relations, but which sets up a process 
of conservation-dissolution. All this is bound up with the subordination of 
the peripheral CMP to the central CMP~ the structure of the peripheral 
economic system, and surplus outflow. To sum up tl-tis view, the obstacle to 
development is the lack of generalized capitalist relations in the 
periphery, and the cause of this is nothing other than the CMP itself! 
There certainly is much truth in this conclusion, but it would be 
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wrong to crudely blame everything on the CMP (central or peripheral), 
leaving no autonomous role for non-capitalist elements in explaining the 
underdevelopment of productive capacity. There is also no guarantee that 
an expansion of capitalist social relations in the context of monopoly 
competition, dependence-extroversion, etc. would actually engender economic 
development. It has been claimed that capitalist relations in the Iranian 
countryside did not lead to a mobilization of natural resources consonant 
with the needs of the economy (Halliday, 1979:105). As in India since the 
1960s, an agricultural bourgeoisie may not invest elsewhere in the economy, 
and may even withhold output (ibid). Obviously, each social formation has 
its own specific explanation, and this is not the place to pursue particu-
lar examples. The general point emerging from this analysis is that the 
factors accounting for underdevelopment are several, complex and linked to 
specific combinations of capitalist and non-capitalist features. How to 
break the logjam in the underdeveloped periphery is a vexed issue defying 
easy prescription. 
10. CONCLUSION. 
This chapter has stressed the internal dimension of underdevelopment 
and focussed especially on how class issues are significant for the factors 
of underdevelopment as discussed in previous chapters, as well as having 
their own direct importance. It may well be that development for the 
social formations in the periphery of the international capitalist economy 
requires a complete restructuring of the class relations that breaks with 
both ""preN-capitalist and existing capitalist relations and the three tier 
character of the underdeveloped structure identified by Obregon. In 
addition, the transformation of the forces of production, especially as 
regards extroverted-dependent and disarticulated-uneven relations would 
seem to be crucial. Finally, the class relations and class struggle as 
such would need to be of a kind that would ensure prOductive use of 
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available surplus. 
This implies a transition to qualitatively new relations of product-
ion. Ttle issues this poses are transition through internal changes and 
through articulation with an external "superior"" mode of production (see 
chapter ten). Class structure and struggles and the role of the state are 
crucial for both. I leave aside here the fascinating question of what 
alternatives there are to the capitalist and -pre-"capitalist relations. 
However, many development strategies have tried to come up with alternativ-
es, often combining elements from both sets of relations. I will return to 
these in Part H. The next chapters examine the issues raised so far in 
terms specifically of rural development. 
EN:lNOTES 
1. The internal-external distinction discussed here is not the same as 
that discussed in chapter eighteen. There, for ease of exposition, under-
developing factors are equated with external, and undeveloping with 
internal. Here, however, we are looking at the internalization of 
underdeveloping factors. 
2. According to Althusser (1976:80), 
the explanation of any phenomenon is in the last 
instance internal: it is the internal "contradiction'" 
which is the motor. The external circumstances are 
active: but -through" the internal contradiction which 
they overdetermine. 
3. These differences are not explicit in most of the literature, and 
indeed, some writers make claims that would fit in with both approaches 
(for example, Dos Santos, 1969). 
4. See also Amin (1974:383) - who regards the "lumpenbourgeoisie" as 
created by the structure of underdevelopment. 
5. For ex~nple, metropolitan capital is usually interested in the repatria-
tion of surplus or in using it locally for its own development. Its local 
agents - usually in finance, banking and commerce - are often comprador 
capitalists (Poulantzas, 1976b:42). Indigenous national capital is that 
wanting the surplus for its own local activities (or indirectly for its 
benefit through infrastructure expansion, for example). The class here is 
a "domestic bourgeoisie~ - dependent on foreign capital for technology, 
subcontracting, etc. - but cheated out of surplus value by foreign capital. 
It has an interest in more nationally-oriented industrialization, tariff 
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protection and extension of the home market (Poulantzas~ 1979b:42~ 44). 
b. To the extent that one accepts Emmanuel's theory of unequal exchange 
(1972) (but see previous chapter)~ this form of surplus outflow as linked 
to the ~transtormation mechanism~ would be a system dynamic deriving from 
capitalist class relations - especially at Moments 8 and C. 
7. It is in this light that one can understand Marx's remark that "the so-
called primitive accumulation of capital therefore is nothing else than the 
historical process of divorcing the producer trom the means of production ~ 
(Marx~ 1972:668). 
8. The developmental effect of this is linked to the issue of whether the 
extra and/or specialized commodity production could be accommodated by 
replacing leisure time J or whether it reduced the production of items 
necessary for immediate consumption. Some production for exchange may be 
beneficial~ such as where an item can be got for less comparative time and 
effort than would otherwise have been spent on producing it. But this is 
not always the case (Bryceson, 1980:185/6). 
9. As discussed in chapter thirteen, the limits on absolute surplus value 
exploitation also include the mobility of labour, and capital's own need to 
reproduce its labour force. Neither of these limits would seem to have 
much weight in the periphery (see Emmanuel, 1972a; Harrison 1981 passim; 
Elkan 1978:137; Tzentes 1973:192). 
10 . According to Kautsky (1976:26), na holding, which cannnot compete on a 
technically superior basis, is forced to exact the maximum effort from its 
workers". One can add to this that where an increase in exploitation is 
not based on continual technical improvement of the means of production, 
every ~traditional~ cultural device is used to increase absolute surplus 
value exploitation (Smith, 1979:287). 
11. The other side of the coin to this is the predominant role played by 
the petty bourgeoisie in the periphery (see chapter twenty-eight). 
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1. RURAL DEVELOPMENT. 
~Development ,... has been defined and analysed in earlier chapters. 
What, however, is meant by rural development? Rural is not synonymous with 
agriculture. And chicken factory farming indicates that some kinds of 
agriculture are not necessarily non-industrial. A Further complication is 
that ""urban-rural'" are not dichotomies but ideal-type ends of a continuum 
of intermediate forms (Galeski, 1972:78). In my view, the term ..... rural"" is 
based largely on relative population density and comparative social 
structure characteristics, which have come to be associated with agricult-
ure. I take rural development therefore to refer - in general terms - to 
agricultural, as opposed to industrial (i.e. manufacturing), production. 
This chapter investigates the role of agriculture in development as well as 
agricultural productivity, in terms of the theoretical framework of this 
thesis (Moments of production, economic system, productive capacity, etc.). 
2. INDUSTRY OR AGRICULTURE? 
All too often, rural development is seen as a self-contained phenomen-
on, instead of being analysed from the point of view of development as a 
total process that spans both the rural/agricultural and the urban/indust-
rial sectors. From a holistic perspective, however, the pertinent question 
is not ..... rural development ..... , but the role of the rural areas in the overall 
development of productive capacity, and in particular the development and 
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adoption ot advanced means Ot production in a glven economic unit. It is 
thIS broader perspective which underlies the issue contronting development 
planners as to whether development should proceed via industry or agricult-
ure lbaran~ 19bL:271). In the view ot one wr1ter, Brietzke (197b:b37), 
this depends on the country involved. Development in Ethiopia, he argues, 
is synonymous with agrlcultural development because of the predominance of 
agriculture in the economy. But this is a narrow understanding of how 
prOductIve capacity develops. 
The expansion ot agriculture usually requires investment in means of 
production - and only industrial expansion can provide the teChnology tor 
thlS l8aran, l~5~:l4U; Langa, 19bB:Zu9). Even in the Maoist experience, 
there were llm1ts to ra1sing agr1cultural productivIty by changing only the 
relatIons and torces of production w1thout intrOducing new means of 
proouction l al ttlOUqt-J changing ttlese economic relations may be a prerequis---
1te ror the latter). As discussed in chapter eleven, what is crucial for 
development is the channell1ng of surplus into expanSIon ot the means of 
pro1juction. W~lat tllis means is U-Jat one cannot fully evaluate development 
in agriculture as an Isolated branch of production. Rather it 1S necessary 
to examIne I-lOW agr lcul tural expansion relates to Industr ial expansion, and 
vice versa.(l) 
lhe expansion or agriculture 1S necessary tor industry, in that the 
latter needs not only raw materials and foodstut ts, but also the labour 
supply released by such development. lhere thus needs to be some kind at 
qeneral balance between Industry and agr1culture in development tas well, 
oi course l a balance between these and other areas of economIC significance 
- commerce l mining, energy, Infrastructure, education, transport, and 
communications). fhis balance need not - especially in the present world 
system - be present In eactl soclal formation, although such a case can 
uf"JuuL,t8uly raCl.lltate V-Ie development ot a social tormation's own product--
ive capac1ty. ClearlYI the relationship between industry and agriculture 
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may be successfully mediated through international trade. The respective 
contributions of the different sectors to economic development may thus 
rlave to be measured with in a unit that is wider than a single social form-
ation - although it is still necessary to evaluate how productive capacity 
within each social formation fares under such arrangements. 
Thus as Griffin and Enos (1978:2b8) argue~ it should not be a case of 
agriculture versus industry, or vice versa. Seen in terms of the 
development of the productive capacity of a given economic unit, the issue 
is rather about whether the problem of agriculture in development needs to 
be resolved or whether it can be successfully bypassed. 
For the purposes of conceptual discussion and theorization, this 
thesis works with the assumption of agriculture as having to playa role 
within a definite economic system. It is in this context that rural 
development arises as an issue in relation to industries that produce means 
of production~ as well as to other complementary areas of development. 
This is development seen in macro-terms, and in terms purely of the forces 
of production. However~ the way that investment is allocated in a society 
is affected not so much by this kind of one-sided general theorizing about 
development~ as by the relations of production and the role of classes, 
ideology and the State amongst other factors. Thus it is quite evident 
today that the State in every society has an important role in the select-
ion, initiation, and direction of development in various sectors of the 
economy (Griffin and Enos, 1978:216).(2) From the point of view of devel-
opment, what is important is how this works out for productive capacity. 
Subsequent chapters will go into this in greater depth. 
3. THE AGRARIAN QUESTION. 
The specific role of agriculture in development has been conceptual-
ized as the ~Agrarian QuestionH (see Byres, 1977). The Agrarian Question 
refers to to the way in Which agriculture as a sector in the forces of 
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production relates to the expansion ot productive capacity in an economic 
system - anG flOW it relates to tile needs or industry within this. From the 
pOHlt or view ot agr lcul ture lone could equally pose the issue ot the 
"Industrial Wuestlon". While agriculture cannot service industry without a 
reciprocal relationShip, hlstorically the emphasis has been on what it 
offers U-Ie industry" rather tt-,an Vlce versa. While there is nothing natural 
about this l in terms ot my focus on development in terms at advanced means 
ot productlon, it maKes sense to continue posing the industry-agriculture 
relationst-lip as the "Agrar lan Question". fhis is not to take an Uindustry-
centric-- viewpoint, but rather to investigate the contribution of agricult-
ure to the development ot the whole, and in particular to the production of 
new means of production. 
Expanding upon Beckford (19l~:142/j) and Halliday (1979:126-134), the 
role ot agriculture in development can be broken down as follows:(3) 
(i) Providing tood and raw materials. Obviously, this depends on physical 
limitations" methods at production, and the percentage of societal invest-
ment in agriculture. 
(ii) Subsidizing industrial development through surplus transfer. This 
depends inter alia on latent, hidden and actual surplus in agriculture, on 
the urban-rural terms at trade l the comparability at exchange-values and 
labour-time I and the structures and strengths of classes in each branch. 
(iii) Facilitating torward linkage. Agriculture is a precondition for the 
processlng and (partly) for the transport sectors. 
(iv) Functioning as backward linkage - as a market for industry with regard 
to agrarian inputs and consumer manufactures. This depends on consumption 
patterns l the buying power of classes involved in agriculture, and the 
degree of articulation between agriculture and industry. 
(V) Serving as export goods earning foreign exchange to finance imports. 
~vi) Releasing labour-power for industrial development, or productively 
absorbing labour-power where industry is unable to dO so. 
It should be clear trom all this l that the Agrarlan Questlon lS not 
simply a tectlnical questlon concerning the place at agrlcultural products 
in an economy_ Also signlricant, and crucially so, are the agrarian torces 
anCI rel.atlons Ot pr-oductlon as tl"ley relate to issues SUCll as consumption 
patterns, empluyment, surplus generatlon and transter, and the progressive 
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expansion of productive capacity in agriculture. The latter is clearly a 
key factor in the whole Agrarian Question, and I turn now to analysing it 
in the context of agrarian forces and relations of production. 
4. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY. 
Productive capacity in agriculture is a complex phenomenon, located in 
the first instance in agrarian forces of production. Here it is bound up 
with issues around the intensity of labour, scale of production, and 
character of the means of production (encompassing both instruments and 
objects of labour). All of these clearly exist within particular surplus 
labour relations, and in the second instance, therefore, productive 
capacity in agriculture is also a function of agrarian relations of 
production. This can be seen in the discussion around the relationship 
between productivity and scale of production. 
-For over a century, economists have concerned themselves with the 
question of which is best - the big or the small holding,- wrote Kautsky in 
1899 (1976:2). The problem with this question is that it is impossible to 
argue in any general way about the comparative efficiency of large and 
small-scale agriculture (Mouzelis, 1975/6:488). The question needs to be 
re-phrased in terms of the relations of production, encompassing the issues 
of when, under what social conditions, and for whom large or small farms 
are more advantageous (Galeski, 1972:182). For my purposes, ~which is 
best- also needs to be clearly posed in terms of the criterion of 
productive capacity. 
Seen in this light, it is almost impossible to analyse the question 
independently of the production relations because of the way in which these 
affect the available supply of labour and means of production, and the 
possibility of viable production. (4) The scale of production - a feature of 
Moment B (the labour process) - thus needs to be seen in relation to 
Moments A and C (relations of possession and separation, distribution and 
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utilization), and all three Moments need to be placed within the context of 
both the forces and the relations of production. 
In much Marxist theory, it has been assumed that resolution of the 
Agrarian Question requires that the limits of small-holding production 
based on family labour have to be transcended (Harrison, 1981:92). The way 
forward has been seen to lie in the creation of large-scale capitalist or 
socialist farms. However, it is important to look more closely at such 
claims, and analyse what is actually meant by small and large holdings. By 
breaking the issue down into the scale of use of land, labour and means of 
production, we can begin to see how these issues are significant only 
within determinate agrarian forces and relations of production. Leaving 
aside the question of labour and means of production till sections 6 and 7 
below, I will now investigate the arguments over land-size and its impli-
cations for productive capacity. 
5. LAND SCALE AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY. 
Among the arguments for large-scale farming, there is the claim that 
they offer the benefit of economies of scale (Kautsky, 1976:21/2). It has 
also been argued that large-scale agriculture can profitably utilize -
unlike its small-scale counterparts - modern implements and machinery 
(Baran, 1962:166,275; Kautsky, 1976:23). Other advantages in large-scale 
units are greater specialization in the division of labour, and scientific 
management being cheaper than on small plots (Baran, 1962:23). 
In criticism of these arguments, it may be pointed out that increased 
scale may sometimes mean that production inputs can rise disproportionately 
to the output generated. Secondly, small land-size does not preclude 
economies of scale in the use of means of production. For example, small-
scale farms can remain small yet still take advantage of co-operation 
within a larger unit. This is evident if one places the means of product-
ion within the wider context at relations and forces of production - in 
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particular in Moment C with regard to utilization. There is no reason why 
50 small plots each require their own plough, etc. - because means of 
production can be shared on a co-operative basis, for example in a moishav 
model (see Halliday, 1979:113). It is even possible to have completely 
collective relations of possession of means of production combined with 
private small-scale use in a rotational manner (Muntemba, 1978:64). 
Separate small producers may use common means of production mediated by a 
capitalist servicing organisation such as processing units, tractor hire, 
etc. lHarris, 1980:90).(5) 
From these points, it emerges that land-size is not a fundamental 
determinant of agricultural productivity (Patnaik, 1979:400; Kautsky, 
1976:33). Small plots do not mean that the Agrarian Question is irresolv-
able. But it is important to note that even if land-size is small in 
scale, productivity can only rise with an expansion in the scale of means 
of prOduction and/or labour-power input. Productivity rises thus require 
particular conditions in the overall forces and relations of production 
within which the small-scale unit exists. 
6. PRODUCTIVITY AND THE SCALE OF LABOUR INPUT. 
If land-size on its own makes little difference in terms of utilizat-
ion of the means of production, let me now turn to the question of how this 
variable affects the use of labour-power. Certainly, it has been argued 
that usmall"" is better than NbigN with regard to utilization of labour. 
This is motivated in a very special way. "'One of the most passionate advoc-
ates of small cultivation, John Stuart Mill defines as its most important 
characteristic the untiring labour of its workers~ (KautsKY, 1976:26). 
This characteristic is usually linked to family ownership and operation of 
(necessarily) small-scale farms. 
Writers here point out that private plots in socialist countries have 
a higher output per unit area than large collectively-operated plots. For 
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example~ in China each peasant·s private plot - though totalling only five 
percent of the arable land area - produces up to half the family income 
(Sklair, 1979:333; Nolan and White, 1979:14). 
Against such examples, however, it has been pointed out that product-
ivity in this instance is not a function of labour-inputs in the abstract, 
but once again a consequence of the context of very specific forces and 
'i 
relations of production. In the Chinese case private plots are used for 
higher-income earning products (Nolan and White, 1979:14); work on collect-
.. 
ive production is sometimes neglected in favour of private plots; and the 
plots also benefit from a socialist environment of guaranteed prices, mark-
et stability~ membership of co-operatives, provision of old-age security, 
etc. (Patnaik, 1981:245/6; Sklair, 1979:333).(6) 
But leaving these counter-arguments aside, it is still necessary to 
consider the basic point of the argument that productivity on small farms 
is high because small producers own or have an attachment to their land.l 
and have a direct stake in raising productivity since they are working for 
themselves (Stavenhagen.l 1964:91). The assumption in this argument is that 
family ownership and family labour input is most conducive to agricultural 
productivity.l and that these are associated with small farms.(7) 
The crucial characteristic of such production.l however, is - on closer 
inspection - not so much the size of the forces of production, nor the use 
of family labour (which even share-croppers use). Rather, it turns out to 
be the particular family-ownership (i.e. possession) relations of product-
. ion at Moment A. Certainly.l where peasant families have gained possession 
of the means of production following land reform, they have been motivated 
to invest added labour time since they and not a landlord reap the benefit 
(Buckley, 1981). In contrast.l there is little incentive for a feudal 
tenant to work harder (Keddie, 1968:168; Brietzke, 1976:640). 
However, suctl motivational explanations.l signif icant as they are.l are 
of limited value. In Africa, unlike Asia and Latin Americ~, where there 
., 
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has been no feudal exploiting class generally, it is questionable whether 
private tenure per se will inspire increased production effort - despite 
assumptions by many development planners (see Thomas, 1975:39). Further-
more, as Galeski (1972:159/60) points out, ""to restrict the source of moti-
vat ion solely to the explanation that farmers are usually owners of the 
land is surely an oversimplification; in general, motivation cannot be 
reduced to the operation of a single factor u • As was discussed in chapter 
four (as part of the discussion on base and superstructure), labour prod-
uctivity cannot be subjectivized. Indeed, there are strong coercive 
pressures affecting motivation and strong material factors conditioning and 
tempering it. Thus, as Friedmann writes: 
the more "commercial"'"' behaviour of simple commodity 
producers relative to peasants stems not from motivat-
ional differences, but from the individualization of 
each household which accelerates commoditization, and 
the resulting transformation of communal and particular-
istic relations, both horizontal and vertical, into 
competitive and universalistic ones (1979:174). 
The fact that a small-scale family labour farm can intensify effort 
and absorb a lower income and therefore persist in the face of adverse 
natural or market conditions is one reason why small is not always 
beautiful for the small farmer (Harrison, 1981:91). The ""self-exploit-
ation"" of the family labour farm is therefore frequently not a voluntary or 
a natural feature, but the outcome of the need for money for tax or necess-
ary goods for reproduction (Ennew et aI, 1977:304).(8) The question 
remains, however, as to how this factor affects the question of develop-
ment. 
Certainly, an increase in labour-intensity on a family labour farm 
would realize what would otherwise be latent surplus. But development of 
productive capacity is ultimately predicated on decreasing the labour time 
needed to produce an item by introducing advanced means of production 
(Cohen, 1978:56). Thus, while an increase in family labour time in itself 
may contribute to development, it does not count directly as development in 
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the longer term. This is not to rule out the possibility of the distinctly 
different situation of small holders increasing their labour time in 
relative terms through advanced means of production. (As argued by Fried-
mann (1980) and Vergopoulus (1978), simple commodity producers in the 
capitalist centre have been able to do this. See chapter twenty-six). 
The point that emerges from this discussion is that producer possess-
ion of the means of production may (due to ideological and structural 
factors) increase labour intensity absolutely, but development of product-
ive capacity via advanced means of production does not universally follow 
from this. Categorical claims about the developmental significance of 
small-scale farms are clearly problematic. The wider context of relations 
of production at Moments A and C, as well as the specific characteristics 
of Moment 8, are crucial for explaining the intensity of labour and the 
utilization of advanced means of production. 
7. ADVANCED MEANS OF PRODUCTION AND PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY. 
Within the framework of agrarian forces and relations of production 
discussed above, advanced agricultural means of production may influence 
both land and labour productivity, singly or jointly. Prior to the Green 
Revolution, it was argued that raising agricultural productivity referred 
not so much to raising output per acre, as to reducing the cost of product-
ion per unit output through labour-saving techniques (Galeski, 1972:26; 
Kay, 1975:495; Byres, 1981:409; Baran, 1962:xxxii). Clearly, through 
mechanizing production, labour output can be increased - even if this does 
not necessarily raise yields per hectare. Since the Green Revolution, it 
is apparent that land productivity can also be raised, and to some extent 
independently of labour, through technical advances such as high yield 
variety crops. These advances allow for an increase in the number of crops 
grown each year - which is equivalent to an extensive expansion of land and 
labour output (Harrison, 1981:97). 
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8. CONCLUSION. 
As chapter four argued, the social and not the physical dimension is 
primary in explaininq development, and this is evident in this chapter. 
Agricultural productivity, and long-term resolution of the Aqrarian 
Question throuqh the use of advanced means of production, is not guaranteed 
by expanding Ule land-size scale of farming units" nor by family-labour 
farms increasing their labour input. What is required is a particular type 
of economic context that will foster social relations suited especially to 
the qeneration and transfer of agricultural surplus to industry, as well as 
the industrial development of new means of production and the adoption of 
these in agriculture. This is the background to the analysis of agrarian 
social structure and social classes in the next two chapters. 
El'Ur-.l)TES 
1. Althouoh this thesis discusses primarily development and underdevelop-
ment with reference to capitalism, it is instructive to look at the role 
that agriculture is supposed to have in socialist development. The social--
ist development path is aimed at transforming agriculture into a type of 
industrial production, and developing it as -an organic part of a single 
national agro-industrial complex~ where aqriculture is not an independent 
branch of the economy, but only one of several different production spheres 
under the manaqement of the entire complex (Nikiforov" 1975:80; see also 
Galeski, 1972:152,191). 
2. A very specific example of this is clear in the work done by Kaplan 
(1977) who shows that the question of agriculture-industry relations is 
not a technical or a self-determining one. Rather it is at the centre 
of conflict between classes and class fractions trying to win state 
policies to direct development in their own particular interests. 
3. As will be evident on reading the list, factors like monopoly competit~ 
ion, extroversion-dependence, disarticulation-unevenness, and the role of 
the CMP in marginalizing people - block or retard the fulfillment ot many 
of these facets in underdeveloped social formations. This is elaborated on 
in later chapters. 
4. For example, in the United States, labour beyond that which a family 
could provide was needed historically for ~economically viable~ cultivation 
of tobacco, rice" cotton and suqar. Historically, slavery and capitalist 
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relations Served to till in the labour gap .. Such crops were not economical 
wi-len qr'own on r 8mlly plots - unlike cereals l. Hlndess and Hirst I 1977: 159/-
b()). Clear 1 y I tile context ot specif ic relations of production I as well as 
wor 1(1 trade, market pr ices, and the particular means of production avail-
able l are crucial to the plcture of viable productivity in agriculture. 
5. Suetl pOlnts torm lin part) the basis for claims directly in favour of 
small-t-arms lfor example l see trlose of World Bank's Robert MacNamara t1973 .. 
quoted by Markovitz l 197b:185)). 
b. Claims lauding trle economlC p8rf ormance of small-size family-run t arms 
often ignore the way that these farms are integrated into a scale unit much 
wider than their land-size in which relatively few of the functions at 
Moments A .. 8 and C are actually performed by them (Galeski .. 1972:160/1; 
vogoler I 1981). 
7. It can be pointed out here that small-scale production does not 
despite oft-held assumptions - preclude capitalist relations (see Ennew et 
al, 19TJ:304; Patnai\.<, 1979:40U).Small farms are not necessarily non-
capitalist. 
8. lhis is analysed in more depth in terms of the insights of articula-
tion theory in chapter twenty-six on simple commodity production. Ttle same 
chapter also dlscusses the arguments about the higher marginal costs of 
wage labour compared to family labour. 
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CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE 
AGRARIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
2. Critique of characterizations of rural producers. 
3. Conceptualizing rural classes. 
4. Analysis of each Moment of production. 
5. Reproduction and rural differentiation. 
6. Conclusion. 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
To understand how social relations develop in agriculture and their 
significance for development, it is necessary to look at the various rural 
classes and at what distinguishes them from each other. A large number of 
studies have been made of rural producers, many without clear concepts to 
guide the analysis. This chapter examines some of these studies in order 
to illustrate both their inadequacies and insights in terms of the theoriz-
ation developed in this thesis. This serves to clear the way for the next 
chapter's detailed theorization of agrarian classes. 
2. CRITIQUE OF CHARACTERIZATIONS OF RURAL PRODUCERS. 
Non-capitalist classes in agriculture are very often lumped together 
as ""'peasants"'. However, this generic term disguises a large number of 
differences between rural classes, and this problem is exacerbated by the 
cross-historical generalization associated with its use.(l) Another 
problem is the way that "'peasants'" are often defined primarily by the 
forces, rather than the relations, of production. For instance, "'peasants'" 
are seen as having low productivity, and as being somewhere between total 
integration into the market and no integration at all (Friedmann, 1979:-
164). But low productivity is not universal to "'peasants U , and different 
and antagonistic class relations can also still exist at a low level of 
sUbsistence (Cliffe, 1978:335). The feature of semi-integration into the 
market defines producers only in terms of commodity exchange, and locates 
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them negatively from the pales of full and no integration (Friedmann, 
1979:158,166). While differences at Moment C are important, they should 
nat be the sale paint of focus.(2) 
Hobsbawm (1973:3/4) has suggested that "'peasants"" are on a continuum 
between two ideal types that derive from the mid-19th century French peas-
ants on the one hand, and the 19th century Russian communal peasantry on 
the other. He cautions that at a certain point of socio-economic differ-
entiation beyond this continuum, the term ...... peasantry"" is no longer applic-
able because the differences outweigh the common features of the constit-
uency (ibid:18). I would argue that Hobsbawm's stricture about the 
concept of the ~peasantry""" applies not only to such obvious cases, but to 
the use of the concept in general. ~Peasants~ should be studied within 
their historical contexts to see to what extent they constitute a unified 
social force (Hilton, 1973:208, 218), and whether significant class differ-
entiation among them is nat disguised by the concept of the upeasantry"'. 
In general analytical terms, I would fallow Ennew et al (1977:308, 
29b), and argue that there is no peasant family labour farm in general, and 
that it is necessary to distribute the components of the diffuse category 
of the -peasantry ...... into differing classes.(3) It should also be borne in 
mind that there is no concept of a -peasant mode of production-, but rather 
specific forms of agricultural production worked and managed to a greater 
or lesser extent by household units within a particular made (or heterogen-
eous relation) of production (ibid:310).(4) 
More than this, ~peasant- agriculturalists also need to be seen in 
relation to urban groups. Indeed, rural relationships can only be under-
stood in relation to the class structure of society as a whole (Cliffe, 
1977:219/20). Rural differentiation should be studied in terms of its 
links with national class formation, the development of commodity product-
ion and the state (Raikes, 1978:285). (This is important for analysing 
rural development strateqies - as will be evident in Part I). 
J 
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,~ 3. CONCEPTUALIZING RURAL CLASSES. 
How does one rigorously distinguish social relations in agr icul ture'? 
In many studies, rural differentiation is not firmly located in the 
relations of production (Cliffe, 1978:335/6). Allan (1949) uses criteria 
such as amount sold, and on this basis identifies three groupings: subsist-
ence producers, smallholders and farmers (Cliffe, ibid). Brandt et al 
(1973) use the method of cultivation as their criterion, and distinguish 
hoe cultivators, two-oxen plough users, and more-than-two-oxen plough users 
(Cliffe, ibid). 
But classes making up the agrarian social structure should be identif-
~. ied holistically, and in relation to all Moments of production, as well as 
j 
reproduction and the system dynamics of the three Moments combined as a 
whole (see chapters one, five and six). Some writers do try to have a wide 
focus, taking into account all these aspects. Thus Post (1977:249) advoc-
ates looking at who extracts labour power in the form of agricultural 
produce from whom, and how, as well as looking at land tenure, the extent 
and nature of absorbtion into world markets, and relations to the state. 
For Sklair (1979:330), it is necessary to look at who owns and controls 
land, labour-power, implements, livestock and workshops; who decides what 
will be produced and how, and what will be done with the products; and how 
distribution is organized. The problem is that while trying to be compre-
hensive, neither Post nor Sklair have a clear theoretical overview of the 
Moments of production to assist in linking the different elements together. 
4. ANALYSIS OF EACH MOMENT OF PRODUCTION" 
At the other extreme to Post and Skair are those writers who have a 
narrow focus, taking only one aspect in isolation of the entire three 
Moments that make up a relation of production. While this is clearly 
limited, certain insights may be gained from critical examination of their 
analyses of particular Moments. 
,
'",1, 
' I 
:y, 
l 
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As one at trle wrlters who foc.usses on Moment A~ Cabral t 19b9:4~) says 
that small tarmers dl"e petty bourgeois on the basis ot the tact that they 
own ,i.e. possess) means of production. In his approach~ lana is seen as 
the key means or proauction~ and therefore land-possession is viewed as the 
I-<,ey rjifrerentiatlng tactor. ::'imilarly~ the 1'770 lanzanian census also 
divides up agricultural classes in terms of size of holdings lCliffe l 
1~7b:j3b). Byres l19bl:42S) uses land as a stratifying variable for India 
- although he concedes that it is less applicable in cases of capitalist 
ancl/ur lntensive cultivation. ~5) 
But land-size is a complex criterion. Like income I it is a purely 
quantitative lndicator, and it does not give the structured relationships 
between the qroups (Howard l 19~O:72.). Land is obviously a very important 
means of production (especially In a non-industrial soclety). But it is not 
the only one, and it is also capable of having a varying stratifying 
signii icance. For example ~ soils (not to ment ion climates anel topoqraphic-
al features) may - and do - vary in fertility, and therefore equal-sized 
plots dO not mean equivalent worth (Leo, 19IY:Lb7J. lb ) 
Ott-ler writers (eg. Howard 1980:I2) study stratification among tile 
"peasantr y" pt-1mar 11y In terms at Moment C regarding tile buyinq and selling 
or lat)our -power. :::>ometuo8s I rlowever, such study is done in isolation of 
the relations of possession/separa~ion (Moment Al, and looked at only in 
terms of exchange lfv10ment L). T tle problem 1S, however, that Wl tllout 
considerlng relations or possession, distribution and utilization, evidence 
of exchange ut labour between classes is not in itself a sufficient index 
for class dirterentiation (see Bernstein, 1979a:431).(7) 
5. REPRODUCTION AND RURAL DIFFERENTIATION. 
~everal writers have tocussed on ~he ditterent systems of class 
reproduction. Althougn reprOduction is tnrough material goods and 
services, it is also linked to social relations through wnlch the product-
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ion and distribution ot such items occurs. rhUS reproduction is articulat-
ed through Moment L~ which in the literature is often seen as depending on 
Moment A. Whlle this underplays Moment B (relations in production)~ as 
well as system dynamics" it still 11a5 prOduced some insights. There are 
two emprlBses here: one on fv10ment L, ttle other on Moment A: 
~i). i"he first emphasis focusses on how reproduction relates to the market. 
Frledmann l1979:1b3) suggests that the best way of conceptualizing the 
cJifferences between rural groupings is through the concepts of cornmoditiza-
tion and resistance to it in the reproduction of households. Her approach 
looks at differences in the way that the social relations characteristic of 
rvloment C may penetrate and structure the relations in rvloment B and Moment 
A. According to Friedmann (ibid): 
The development of the productive forces (i.e. increas-
ing the productivity of labour and/or land" and increas-
Ing the scale ot production), ttle relation between agr i-
cultural households and markets for their prOducts {mar-
ket "'I.-esponse") and class relations all dif t er accordinq 
to corrll7lo(jitization or resistance to it (ibid). (8) -
rt1e cleqree of comrnodltizatlon is a userul concept tor it enables us to 
(jistinguistl inter alia B9rar ia.n capitalism and simple commodity production 
~ the latts!.- belng completely commodltized Wlttl reqard to inputs and outputs 
- except tor r'egular labour-pOwer). (9) Commodi tizat ion is also usef ul 
in that it clirects analysis to the articulation between different product-
ion relatlons. With regard to tile commoditization of labour power, in 
particular" lt tocusses attention on the rise of the CMP. faken alone, 
l'lowever ~ commodi tizatlon does not give us Ule dif ferenees between rural 
classes wt-,ere relatlons are not commoditized, nor does it direct us to 
system dynamics and the way that classes may exhibit these differently. 
til). In the second emptlasis oi the "reproductlon" approacll, Moment A ~s 
rocussecl on as a way ot distlngulshlng classes. for example, a capitalist 
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farmer and a teudal peasant are seen to differ in regard to the dependence 
at the peasant for security and subsistence on rig~lts to the land, compared 
to a capitalist tanner who 1S not so dependent 
tor example lSaul an(j Woods, 19i1:lU~). 
being able to hire land 
Anotrler example is the method of AWl ti (19 J j) wtlO distinguisiles two 
bas1C classes in lsmanl, fanzanla: one possessing means of production, and 
one separated tram them. The fanner- comprises capitalists and petty-
capitalists tibld:219). He identities as capitalists those wrlO qet tlleir 
income solely from hlring labour to work their means of production 
(ibid:Ljl). Petty capltalists are those who only get one-third of their 
income t l~orn I-tired-labour l ibid: L23 ) • 
In o1:I-ler words, their reproductlon does not 1nvolve t~le same extent 
ot drtlculatlon with another class, as does tne reproduction ot the 
capitallst class. \ However I their role within fVloment 8 - the relat10ns in 
prOduct1on also needS to be analysed in order to understand them fully, 
ane.l tlli s ttle °repr OCllIctlon" approacl-l does not give us J. In the other class, 
Awiti locates "poor tanners" wno tlave to sell their labour-power in order 
to surVlve. Tne1r reproductlon 1S primarily dependent on relations with the 
possessing capltallst class. 
Steeves (1978:124) distinguishes a similar structure ior Kenya between 
l~bU and 10J2, as does 8ernste1n l1979b:31/2) in Tropical Africa in 
general. lI0 ) GaleSki l19j~:15-b) identities similar classes in Poland. In 
tact. all these are Slm1lar to Lenln's classlc schema ll9b0a) of farmer 
capltal1sts, mlddle peasants, and poor peasants lthe latter increasingly 
secur inI;J subsIstence ttll'Ougll waqe-labOur). 
Cleally, tIllS critBl-ion ot dltfering reprocluction systems is useful in 
Ijlstln9Ul.slllng certain rural classes. However, lt misses not only the 
relatl.orls ln prOduction, but also tile extent to wrt1ch trte entire structure 
gives r1se to system dynamics WhlCh slgniticantly aitect class characters 
and class practlces. These teatures are necessary to comprehensively 
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understand~ for example, the differences between capitalists~ simple commo-
dity producers and landlowners, as well as the similarities between capit-
alists and rich peasants. 
b. CONCLUSION. 
To conclude this chapter, it is worth noting that it is false to 
assume that the Moments of production - even when seen in relation to each 
other, and to the issues of reproduction and system dynamics - alone 
determine effective class formation and existence. The entire socio-
political structure is relevant (Dias, 1978:182). At the conceptual level~ 
however, it is legitimate - and essential - to develop clear general 
economic criteria for analysing the rural social structure. Having now 
looked at some of the pitfalls - and some of the insights - in studying 
agrarian classes, I now turn to my own analysis. 
EKlNOTES 
1. For example, there are differences between i.lpeasantsU in a feudal mode 
of production, and ~peasants~ in a heterogeneous relation of production 
that articulates with the CMP through commodity production. 
2. This paint also applies to the stratification of the peasantry accord-
ing to income. The danger of the terms ;"rich~, ~middle- and -poor n peasants 
is that they can be interpreted as distinctions based only (or primarily) 
in Moment C~ and only one dimension of this Moment at that. 
3. For example, in Iran the following components have been identified by 
Keddie (1968:156/7): small-holders~ heads of work-teams with means of prod-
uction~ heads without means, sharecroppers without means~ labourers in 
work-teams (with cash and land-use payment), and casual seasonal labourers. 
4. The idea of a -peasant moden, npeasant economy- or ~peasant society-
should be rejected not only for obscuring differences within the ~peasant­
ryu, but also for ignoring other groups besides direct agriculturalists 
(Hilton, 1973:208). ~Peasants- have rights and obligations in a wider 
economic system which includes non-~peasants-. In rural Iran, for example, 
such -non-peasants~ include usurers, peddlers~ artisans, teachers~ mullahs~ 
absentee landlords, rentiers, village officials and lessors of means of 
production (Keddie, 1968:156/7). 
5. However~ Byres incorrectly says that value of output is a better var-
iable in this latter instance~ but this seems inadequate for understanding 
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the actual direct relationships among the various groups. 
6. It is admittedly possible - albeit difficult - to have data that grades 
soils, and on this basis to establish a scale for the worth and size of 
land parcels (ibid:bL'.7/8). However, there are still problems if this is the 
only criterion for rural differentiation. 
7. This narrow focus aside, a different problem that this focus reveals is 
that of identifying wage-labour empirically when payment is obscured. 
Exchange of labour-power can be concealed by non-money wage payments and 
traditional forms of co-operation and reciprocity (see Spiegel, 1979). 
Attention to other Moments of production is needed to identify disguised 
wage-labour. 
8. On this basis, she distinguishes four categories of ~peasant~ production 
(ibid:176): a. household production; b. sharecropping and related rents; 
c. poor, middle and rich peasantry; d. hacienda. What is common to all 
these is the possession of land and absence of a labour market. 
9. Simple commOdity production only uses labour-power from outside on an 
ancillary basis. Capitalist relations require continuous use of ~outside­
labour power. (See the next chapter for a fuller discussion of this). 
10. Bernstein notes that although poor peasants have access to a plot, 
they should rather be seen as rural proletarians. This claim needs to be 
evaluated in terms of rigorous criteria for each class (see next chapter). 
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CHAPTER fWEN1Y-FOUR 
HUHAL CLASSI:..S IN J HE. IN"' EHNA 1 IONAL CAP 11 ALI!:> J SYSTEM 
1. Introduction. 
L. lxplolted classes. 
3. Middle and rich peasants. 
4. Rich peasants and farmer capitalists. 
5. Capitalists" and teudal-landowners. 
b. Simple commodlty producers. 
7. Conclusion. 
1. INTROuuCTION. 
This chapter takes for granted that the agrarian social structure in 
the international capitalist system is characterized by a multitude of 
production relations and classes. Rural classes as real historical forces 
in formation are far more complex, indistinct and transitional than the 
concepts developed in this chapter. However, the way to try to begin 
sifting this reality is to develop clear (though not inflexible) concepts 
as a starting point. Accordingly, this chapter takes on the task of high-
lighting some of the more important differences between agricultural wage-
labourers: share-croppers, feudal tenants, and metayers; between poor-
middle- and rich peasants; and between capitalist farmers, feudal-land-
owners and simple commodity producers. The criteria used for highlighting 
the distinctions are (i) character at different Moments of Production; (ii) 
reproduction, and (iii) system dynamics (see chapter six). 
2. ExPLOlfED CLASSES. 
Starting with the producers, it is usetul to distinguish share-
croppers from their exploited counterparts in the CMP, i.e. proletarian 
wage-labourers. Like the latter (see chapter twelve), share-croppers are 
also separated trom the means of production, and only gain access through 
another class which exploits them. Relations of possession/separation are 
not therefore enough to distinguish the two classes. It may also be 
diff icult to distinguish these classes in ~Ioment C, especially where 
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payment of proletarians is in kind, and does not therefore have a visibly 
distinct form from the remuneration of share-croppers. It is thus necessary 
to look elsewhere than Moments A and C for the difference between these two 
classes. Here, we can turn to Moment B, focussing on the control of the 
means of production (see Byres, 1981:435; Morris, 1977:301). The share-
cropper - unlike the proletarian - controls the means of production within 
the labour process. Thus if the land-owner controls Moment B, then the 
producer is a wage-labourer in at least semi-capitalist relations. If the 
producer controls the means of production, then he is a share-cropping 
tenant paying rent in a semi-feudal relationship (Byres, 1981:431). 
However, it is not enough to look at exploited rural classes only in 
terms of separation from the means of production and control of the labour 
process. Reproduction - seen in terms of the articulation of Moments A, B 
and C - has to be taken into account as well. This enables one to note 
that while share-croppers are responsible for producing their own subsist-
ence, proletarians depend on capitalists to pay them the value of their 
labour power. A similar difference in reproduction distinguishes feudal' 
tenants from proletarians (Morris, 1976:100). There are shades of grey 
between feudal tenants and share-croppers, but I would characterize the 
major distinction as being in system dynamics. While feudal tenant 
production is typically limited by its use-value to feudal lords, share-
croppers surplus crops are often destined for sale by their landowners. 
The three classes described so far are also distinct from metayers. 
The major point of difference is in Moment A. In metayage, a tenant 
supplies labour (including family labour) and part of the means of product-
ion. The landlord supplies the land and the rest of the working capital 
(see Marx, 1972:694). In other words, the producer is partially separated 
from the means of production. The product is divided between the two. What 
the landlord gets is not pure rent (Hindess and Hirst, 1977:337, footnote 
183) - but partial capitalist surplus value. (Where the tenant hires 
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outside labour, not to supplement but to replace family labour, he becomes 
a capitalist producer paying rent to the landlord (ibid:245». 
Metayage is a structure of relations similar in certain respects to 
those found on development settlement schemes (see chapter thirty-one). It 
is distinct from another system on many such schemes - that of piece-work 
wage-labour (see chapter thirty-two). Piece wages appear as if the 
producer is paid for the products produced rather than the labour-power 
sold. However, as Marx argued, such payment is actually for labour-time 
spent on the products, and the value ot a day"'s labour-time is the daily 
value of labour-power (1972:518). This analysis flows from consideration 
of Moment A, namely that the piece-worker - unlike the metayer - is depend-
ent on the capitalist advancing all the means of production. Compared to 
time-waged wage-labour, piece-work enables the capitalist to increase the 
intensity and quality of labour without direct supervision because piece 
wages mean that "'it is in the personal interest of the producer to strain 
his labour-power as intensely as possible;' (ibid:519). Such a labour 
process involves formal subsumption in the sense that conditions at Moment 
A subsume producers to capitalist production, though the capitalist still 
controls Moment B indirectly through the piece-rate remuneration. 
The difference between sharecroppers, feudal tenants, metayers, and 
proletarians on the one hand, and the poor peasantry on the other, is 
complex. It lies in the latter having partial access to some means of 
production, and being in partial control of the related labour process, but 
being unable to secure reproduction on this basis. As a result, the poor 
peasant is compelled to articulate with a possessing class for survival. 
Often this means that he becomes a semi-proletarian. 
Poot' peasants are thus involved in a dual set ot relations of product-
ion (one of WhlCh is exploitative) and, as SUCh, they are subjected to the 
particular articulation of these relations. For example, should the artic-
ulation with the capitalist relation prove dominant, the poor peasant 
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becomes a full proletarian. (Alternatively~ the poor peasant may become a 
full srlare-cropper; feudal tenant or metayer). Clearly; this is an un-
stable class, pulled in various directions, and susceptible to transition 
into a single class relation. 
3. MIDDLE AND RICH PEASANTS. 
The middle peasantry is another distinct rural class. The primary 
difference between it and the poor peasantry lies in reproduction -- middle 
peasants are capable of securing reproduction on the basis of their own 
means of production. Neither inherently exploiting, nor exploited, middle 
peasants may articulate with each other in a non-exploitative relation of 
production. Self-sufficiency of each middle peasant household is often 
unrealistic" given the objective limits imposed by the capacity of the 
existing forces of production to overcome natural obstacles to this goal. 
Self-sufficiency is also unrealistic because of the advantages of a societ-
al division of labour whereby there is some specialization in production. 
Finally, and demographic variables are significant here, each family-labour 
farm - at least at some stages - tends to need outside labour. Thus 
whether it be for labour, food, or means of production, each middle peasant 
household tends to articulate with production relations external to it. 
This of course does not mean that the articulation be in commodity, rather 
than, for example, kinship distributive" terms. 
Middle peasant external articulation may involve both performance ot 
labour and the circulation of use-values in external relations. It may 
become a structured articulation with different classes - thereby constit--
uting a heterogeneous, and possibly exploitative, relation of production. 
The peculiar position of the middle peasantry in this situation, and its 
possible development into other classes is analysed in more detail in 
cllapter twenty-six. 
The differences between middle and rich peasants (also known as 
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kulaks) need to be analysed. Regarding Moments A and B of production~ 
these two classes - like agricultural capitalists - both possess and 
control means of production. What distinguishes rich from middle (and 
poor) peasants is not a quantitative issue such as income or size of means 
of production~ but the qualitative issue of exploitation. For example, 
rich peasants often exploit poor (and middle) peasants by leasing them 
land~ renting out equipment~ lending cash~ or hiring their labour (Stand-
ing, 1981:204~ footnote 33). Middle peasants~ production units are large 
enough to ensure their reproduction, but not large enough for steady hiring 
of labour (Galeski~ 1972:110). In contrast, rich peasants exploit labour, 
and at the s~ne time~ they also take part productively in the labour 
process. Thus as simultaneous producers and exploitative owners of the 
means of production, this class combines features of both capital and 
labour and is sometimes called petty bourgeois in consequence (see Duggett, 
1975:160). As discussed in chapter six~ they exhibit dual and contradict-
ory class practices.(l) 
4. RICH PEASANTS AND CAPITALISTS. 
What is the difference between the rich peasantry and agricultural 
capitalists'? It has been argued that the distinction lies in Moment B: 
that unlike capitalist farmers, kulaks participate in the labour process 
(see Marndani, 1977:10). Using the criterion of taking part in the labour 
process as significant for class differentiation, Awiti identifies as 
capitalists those who do not take part in production, and who get their 
income solely from hired labour (1973:231). However, it may be noted~ 
that the criterion of participation in the labour process is not in itself 
an indication of non-capitalist relations. As discussed in chapter twelve~ 
at the stage of formal subsumption of labour to capital, the capitalist 
still often participates in production - without this altering the capital-
ist-proletarian class relationships. It is therefore important to look at 
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other factors if we are to distinguish kulaks from capitalists. 
Some writers have drawn attention to the differences in the extent of 
hit'ing labour as a way of distinguishing kulak and capitalist classes. But 
in isolation of other factors, this is very problematic. For example, 
middle peasants may hire labour at certain periods, but this does not 
necessarily make them either capitalists or rich peasants. (2) This 
criterion can also lead to highly formal and artificial analysis. Thus, 
some writers have tried to draw the line between capitalists and kulaks by 
identifying exact quantitative differences in hiring or selling labour-
power. For example, Galeski (1972:18) identifies as capitalist those 
farmers who hire labour for more than 200 days a year. Official Polish 
statistics use the criterion of 150 days (ibid). Lenin held that capital-
ist relations existed when hired hands worked for more days than the 
members of the household (ibid:122; see also Patnaik, 1979:376). The 
problem with such quantitative assessments is that qualitative distinctions 
in relationships are difficult to perceive. 
So far, we have looked at Moment B - at owner-participation and at 
hired labour in the labour process - as criteria for distinguishing kulaks 
and captalists. For some writers, this is almost irrelevant. For Polly 
Hill (19b3:107), Ulabour employment is not the crux of the matter: many 
capitalist (sic) farmers who over the generations have been accustomed to 
invest their surpluses in the expansion of their businesses have never 
employed labourers".(3) The similarity between this and Banaji"s theoriz-
ing (see chapter five) is evident - there is a blurring of the distinctions 
in different Moments into the primacy of the overall dynamic and rationale 
of the production cycle. 
At the same time, it is true that to identify a capitalist labour 
process and therefore a capitalist class, it is important to examine the 
system dynamics of the Whole in this case, if production is geared to 
making profits and increasing capital accumulation, rather than towards 
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consumption. Hill (l9b3:l10) describes some farmers who hired workers as 
Hemployers proper" because they were thus able to release themselves for 
management. At the same time, they did not reinvest in expanded reproduct-
Ion (Howard, 1~~U:1bO). In my view, even with continuous hiring of labour 
li.e. with capitalist relations at Moment 8), an Uemployer proper" does not 
become a capitalist, unless he exhibits a dynamic of capital accumulat-
ion.(4) What we have here is the distinction between the circuits of 
Commodity -.> Money -> Commodity, and Money -> Commodity -> More iVloney -> 
More Commodities -.> Still More Money -> etc., as a distinction between no~-
capitalist and capitalist commodity production liVlarx, 1972, chapter IV; 
Banaji, 1976a:315). 
A posslble objection to this distinction is evident in the argument by 
Raikes (1978:319-20) that there is little difference between rich peasants 
and capitalist farmers in Africa since even the largest of the latter class 
have only a very short-term investment pattern (1978:319/20, footnote 7). 
fhe implication of this is that rich peasants and capitalists may be 
ditferent in certain ways, but that they are not distinct with regard to 
accumulation. Against this, however, while rich peasants may have a tend-
ency to develop into capitalists, they remain distInct until they can 
accumulate enough to initiate and maintain a capitalist cycle of extended 
reproduction based on hired labour and with the purpose ot accumulation -
i.e. until they become proper capitalist farmers (Bernstein, 1977:67,75; 
Howard, 1980: 75/b). Kulaks are therefore an unstable class, tending 
towards full participation in one, rather than two, relations of product-
ion, and in particular, the capitalist one. In the periphery, however, 
this tendency has frequently been distorted or frustrated - with signifi-
cant consequences for development (see chapter thirty-three). 
5. CAPITALISTS AND FEUDAL LANDOWNERS. 
The ditterence between capitalists and feudal land-owners is partially 
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in terms of the difterences between these classes in terms of relations of 
distribution. However, feudal land-ownership does not preclude commodity 
exchange at the level of distribution and reproduction. The key different-
iating factor between these two classes lies in the relations of possess-
ion, methods of exploitation and relations of utilization. 
Land as a non-reproducible commodity means that land-owners are not 
subject to the system dynamic of competition in the same way that capital-
ists are. As a result, accumulation is not a structural imperative for 
feudal land-owners relations of utilization. Exploitation being based on 
land-ownership, and its motive being consumption, does not on its own lead 
to revolutionizing production. rhis has been touched on in chapter six, and 
is further investigated in chapter twenty-five. 
6. SIfVlPLE COMMODI TY PRODUCERS. 
Simple co~nodity production is production where the direct producers 
possess the means ot production and work wlthout the intervention or claims 
ot a class ot non-producers who have ultimate possession of the means of 
production. lhe typical unit of production is the household with family 
management lLong and Richardson, 1978:179).(5) 
Middle peasants are also characterized by household possession of the 
means of production and famlly labour. Where simple commodity production 
ditfers is ttlat it has a circulation of commodities in both directions -
inputs and outputs of production, unlike middle peasants who are not fully 
integrated into the commodity circuit (Friedmann, 1978:161). 
A middle peasant, or a share-cropper, may have complete specialization 
in cash crop production, but this is not simple commodity production if the 
inputs are not all commoditized - i.e. if they remain based on non-market 
ties (eg. kinshlp) for land, non-family labour, means of production and 
credit. lb ) 
Simple commodity productlon is commOdity production by a family labour 
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farm without capitalist wage-labour or profit. Its logic is Commodity -/ 
Money -/ Commodity (C-M-C)~ and not Money -> Commodity -> More Money, with 
market integration aimed only at meeting the needs of simple (rather than 
expanded) reproduction (Bernstein~ 1979a:423-5). (Hence the term s~le 
commodity producers). Like kulaks and middle peasant households~ simple 
commodity producers produce for the market in order to realize use-values 
through exchange, whereas a capitalist enterprise does so to realize a 
monetary profit (Hunt~ 1979:281, footnote 3; Friedmann~ 1978:80). Nonethe-
less, many features of commercialization (see chapter sixteen) do develop 
in simple commodity production. 
For eXillnple, simple commodity producers become governed by competition 
which sets the average means of production and labour required for repro-
duction. As long as the C-M-C market-dictated technological conditions set 
labour requirements which are still predominantly within the demographic 
range of households, non-capitalist labour relations can continue to char-
acterize production (Friedmann, 1978:95). But very often, the demographic 
cycle of the family means that the supply of labour is periodically below 
that required for reproduction of the simple commodity producers (Fried-
mann, 1978:76). (This produces a synthesis of contradictory elements: 
competition forces a constancy in labour requirements; the household has a 
demographic variation in labour supply (ibid:9b). The tension here is 
between the relations and forces of production. If the forces do not 
change, some modification of the relations is necessary.(7) 
This means that for simple commodity production to be viable, addit-
ional labour has to be obtained from articUlation with a labour supply from 
different relations of production. For middle peasants, such ancillary 
labour is often obtained through non-market mechanisms. However, where it 
is obtained through the market, i.e. through hiring and paying with wages, 
the enterprise is approaching simple commodity production status. (Where 
hired labour comes to predominate over family labour, the enterprlse is 
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clearly moving towards capitalist status). 
Pure simple commodity production, then, requires a labour market - and 
to this extent it cannot exist independently of suitable relations of 
possession-separation which provide this, and the CMP is pre-eminently 
suited to this. But such hiring of labour is not equivalent to capitalist 
hiring tFriedmann, 1978:96). Firstly, it tends to be periodic hiring. In 
this, simple commodity producers are distinct from kulaks who hire external 
labour permanently. Secondly, it is different to capitalists who hire 
labour not to supplement their own labour, but to make money. Thus, 
despite labour-hiring, the objective of simple commodity producers remains 
simple reproduction. The relations of utilization are not capitalist 
relations despite the fact that hired labour may generate surplus value. 
7. CONCLUSION 
This section has contrasted a range of agricultural classes, and shown 
how they can be distinguished by taking into account differences in Moments 
A, Band C of production, as well differences in reproduction and system 
dynamics. I now turn to look in more depth at the dynamics of some of 
these classes with regard to the development of productive capacity. This 
is the overarching theme of the next two chapters. 
E~TES 
1. Bernstein (1979b:31/2) identifies kulaks as tending towards reinvest-
ing such that extended reproduction occurs, thereby developing into a 
category of capitalist farmers. However, in peripheral capitalism, such a 
transition often fails. (See chapter thirty-three). 
2. Brass (1980:451, footnote 15) found in Peru that all producers hired 
labour at certain junctures. For this reason, he decided to use different 
criteria for distinguishing class differentiation fertility of land-hold-
ings and ownership of means of production. 
3. Hill describes how farmers were reluctant to waste savings on hiring 
labour - although once they had developed (using family labour) to the 
point where they could pay wages f rom sales income (rather than wor~<ing 
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capital) .. they did tend to hire (ibid:110). 
4. Entrepreneurship similarly does not mean that the producer involved is 
a capitalist (Howard .. 1980:75/6). For example .. a poor peasant remains a 
poor peasant even when in cash crop production .. and exhibiting an Nentre-
preneurial dynamic u .. if - inter alia - the objective is only to meet family 
needs (Charlesworth .. 1980:262). 
5. Clearly .. simple commodity production is not restricted to agriculture. 
However .. its greater persistence in this sector in comparison to industry .. 
is partially ttle consequence of the obstacles that the CMP faces regarding 
development in agriculture (see chapter twenty-five). 
b. It is easy to see .. however .. that a middle peasant household engaged in 
commodity production can eventually transform itself into simple commodity 
producer status. This has been analysed in terms of commoditization in 
chapter sixteen and is further discussed in chapter twenty-six. 
7. Friedmann calculates the labour-time necessary at a particular histor-
ical juncture for cultivating an acre of wheat in the United States, and 
concludes that a single household could not supply this labour at a partic-
ular historical period (ibid:7b). However, with increasing mechanization .. 
the requisite labour-time dropped, and a single household with a man and 
one son could operate an expanded unit of production (ibid:78). 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyses the conditions for the development of capitalist 
relations in agriculture~ and how these relate to the Agrarian Question. I 
argue that agrarian capitalism is inhibited by the nature of agriculture 
itself~ as well as by the factors of absolute and differential ground-rent. 
Finally, I argue for studying the development of capitalism in agriculture 
within the framework of the international capitalist economic system. 
2. THE AGRARIAN TRANSITION. 
Historically, resolution of the Agrarian Question has been bound up 
with ~agrarian transition~. In terms of my theorization of transition (see 
chapter ten, this would refer to a change in agrarian relations through 
either internal or external dynamics (or both)~ which would enable agric-
ulture to meet the needs of industrial development. 
In the literature~ however, the open-ended character of agrarian 
transition has been replaced by a purely capitalist transition~ and 
referred to in capital letters as ~Agrarian Transition~. This is seen to 
refer specifically to the development of capitalism in agriculture in a 
context where an urban bourgeoisie is hegemonic in the society (Kay~ 1981:-
486). As I argue later, agrarian transition need not in fact be capitalist 
in order to meet the needs of capitalist industry - non-capitalist 
relations have sufficed in certain circumstances. For the present~ however, 
I proceed to analysing these two elements of capitalist transition. 
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In the Agarian fransition schema .. the hegemony of an urban bourgeoisie 
is seen as being necessary on the grounds that a dominant rural class 
(whether capitalist or not) can block the movement of surplus to the 
industrial sector. In Chile, landlord political power limited the extract-
ion of an agricultural surplus for industry (Kay, 1981:499), and likewise 
in Egypt (Taylor, 1984:171).(1) Monopoly rent can be extorted by landlords 
from agricultural production with the effect of reducing profits there and/ 
or retarding urban capitalism and draining resources away from the non-
agricultural sectors. Therefore, any strong agrarian class, such as big 
landowners, or a big agrarian bourgeoisie, can form an obstacle to the 
growth of capitalism.(2) In much development theory, kulaks and middle 
peasants are also seen as an obstacle to industrial capitalist development 
because they too are landed classes, and therefore a problem for outside 
classes making demands on them (Williams, 1976a:170). Either way, whichever 
class is blamed, it is clear that far from being a technical issue, the 
Agrarian Question contains class political dynamics right at its centre. 
Moving on to the second element, i.e. the development of capitalism in 
agriculture, it is held that where capitalist transformation in agriculture 
is absent or incomplete, the surplus is too low for industrial capital 
(Kay, 1981:489). The resolution of the Agrarian Question is seen to 
require capitalist agriculture because the latter is assumed to generate 
agrarian development and the creation of a surplus. This view is faulty on 
two counts. Firstly, non-capitalist relations in agriculture may produce 
adequate surplus for development (as in the case of simple commodity 
production; see next chapter). Secondly, for the CMP (or any other 
relations) to develop productive capacity in agriculture, a wider context 
is needed with an articulation to industrial relations and forces of 
production that can supply the advanced means of production for develop-
menta In this regard, the hegemony of an urban bourgeoisie is not simply to 
extract surplus tram agriculture, but to contribute to its generation. In 
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other words, agrarian capitalism is neither a necessary condition for 
resolving the Agrarian Question, and nor is it SUTTicient for this. 
These two elements of Agrarian Transition (as qualified above) prompt 
an examination of what is entailed in meeting them, and quite how they are 
expected to resolve the Agrarian Question. As they stand, these elements 
are clearly very general and with limited relevance to the diverse, uneven 
and often stalled experiences of transition to agrarian capitalism. For 
example, what are we to make of them in relation to the British pattern 
where agrarian capitalism was a precursor of, rather than an equivalent 
condition to, the rise of an urban bourgeoisie (see Mouzelis, 1979b:75,-
81/3). Likewise, the Brazilian case where, it has been argued, a structur-
al pact between urban bourgeoisie and rural landed class was possible 
because the non-capitalist latifundia-minifundia relations in agriculture 
provided adequate surplus to industry (de Oliveira, 1972, cited by Goodman 
et aI, 1984:190).(3) 
It is unfeasible to review these experiences here, although the 
Agrarian Transition ultimately needs to be analysed more historically if it 
is to account for the different ways in which the CMP has developed (or 
not, as the case may be) in agriculture as compared to its path in 
industry, and the varying roles of each in broader economic development 
and underdevelopment. I would argue that there is still value in the two 
elements identified by the theory of Agrarian Transition, provided they are 
recognised as an ideal-type highlighting two key problems that face a 
capitalist resolution of the Agrarian Question, and not as a model about 
real historical experience. As it is, much analysis of the peasantry 
teleologically assumes that the features of inequality, wage-labour and 
dependence on the market indicate a process of transformation to capitalist 
relations, when in fact these characteristics represent the perpetuation of 
peasant householdS in the context of an articulation wittl the CMP (see 
Williams, 1984:3). In this regard, agrarian change in non-capitalist 
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relations may be not so rnuctl a phase of transition as conservation-
dissolution (see chapter seventeen). 
In the light of ti,ese points ~ we can dispense with the claim that 
capitalist agricultural transformation is inevitable or necessary for the 
Agrarian Question's resolution l and move on to the question of what role l 
potential and conditions are associated with agrarian capitalism in 
relation to the Agrarian Question. In this regard, one can point to the 
fact that several factors severely inhibit the development of capitalism in 
agriculture. These are: the nature of agriculture, absolute rent~ and 
differential rent. So significant are these obstacles that it is pertinent 
(as Williams (ibid:60) suggests) to ask how capitalist agriculture emerged 
in cases where it did~ rather than wonder why it has not done so in others. 
These obstacles~ however, place the Agrarian Transition in context, and 
highlight the conditions needed for it to be successful. 
3. CAPITALIST AGRICULTURE. 
Several general factors concerning the nature of capitalist 
agriculture contribute to making it difficult for capitalist relations to 
develop in agriculture. These are: 
i. Agriculture is influenced by environmental, climatic and seasonal 
factors~ and it is not conducive to orqanizinq and rationalizinq like 
capitalist industry (see Cox, 1979:38;-Banaji: 1976a:301).(4) Ii is also 
less amenable to absolute surplus value exploitation than capitalist 
industry because dependence on natural variables like daylight and weather 
impose limits on the extension of labour-time (see Marx, 1969:20). 
However, the other side of this is that agricultural wage-labour is known 
for its intensive exploitation of labour-time - which would help explain 
wi,y capitalist agr icul ture commonly suf fers from a shortage of labour, and 
conco~nitantly, why strong political mechanisms have often been needed to 
counter this shortage (see Williams, ibid:7/8). 
ii. One of the major features of agriculture is delayed production 
(Meillassoux, 1973:82). For capitalist agriculture, this means that 
returns on capital invested tend to materialize slowly (Baran, 1962:166). 
Because time affects the rate of profit (see chapter thirteen), this factor 
can be an obstacle to agrarian capitalist development (Mann and Dickinson, 
1978).(5) 
iii. Low returns in relation to the high capital investment in agri-
culture discourage small and competitive capitalist investment in this 
branch. Investment tends to wait on whether it suits the profit rates of 
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monopoly capltal (Mouzelis~ 1975/6:484; Amin and Vergopoulos, 1974; Thomas~ 
1975:40/1). (This is one reason why State involvement in agriculture (via 
inter alia development projects) has occurred - the State is able to raise 
the necessary capital and sustain low returns (ibid)). 
iVa Another speciiic teature of capitalist agriculture is its relation 
to capitalist accumulation. In industry ~ accumulation can occur independ--
ently of the centralization of production units. Indeed~ centralization 
often follows directly from accumulation. But in agriculture where land is 
fragmented, centralization may sometimes be a precondition for accumulation 
(Kautsky~ 1976:30; Marx 1972:715).(6) The problem for capitalist develop-
ment is that centralization can be delayed or even prevented indefinitely 
by the very nature of land as a commodity - that is, by its immobility. 
Properties which come on to the market through economic mechanisms may not 
be spatially conducive to centralization into a sinqle consolidated 
production unit (Kautsky, 1976:31).(7) Another cons~quence of land being a 
relatively immobile and non-reproducible commodity is a weakening of the 
system dynamic of competition - thus retarding agricultural development. 
In addition to these general reasons, one can point to two other 
factors absolute and differential ground-rent. As non-capitalist 
phenomena impeding capitalism, they lend some support to the Agrarian 
Transition view that sees a strong rural landed class as a problem for 
resolving the Agrarian Question. These two rents affect not simply the 
transfer of surplus from agriculture to industry, but its actual generat-
ion, and the development of agrarian capitalist relations per sea 
4. ABSOLUTE GROUND-RENT - AN OBSTACLE TO CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT. 
Whereas almost all means of production in industry are reproducible on 
an extended scale~ agricultural land is in limited supply (Tribe, 1977:77). 
A consequence of this is that land can be monopolized comparatively more 
easily than industry and absolute rent charged for its use. This is effect-
ively an element of monopoly price depending on the control of the supply 
of land (Hindess and Hirst, 1977:187; 295). Absolute rent means that pric-
es of agricultural produce may be above value (Kautsky, 1976:21). (The 
reason is that the prices include all the costs of production - even though 
not all these costs represent proportionate labour time).(8) In this way, 
absolute rents may be passed on through high prices to industry - represen-
ting a surplus transfer into~ rather than out of~ agriculture. 
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Absolute rent is a heterogeneous relation of production spanning 
Moments A, Band C, and may articulate with the CMP (even through the 
medium of a single person).(9) Where a capitalist owns the land - or 
politically dominates a landlord at the level of social classes - he may 
charge a price for the produce that includes a monopoly-based land price, 
and therefore receive the absolute rent himself. Alternatively, the state 
may sometimes appropriate this rent - an important consideration in 
analysing state involvement in rural development projects. But in neither 
case is this a capitalist relation of production. Indeed, its existence may 
be contrary to the development of such relations. 
This is evident in the way that absolute rent sustains a non-capital-
ist rationale in agriculture. As a monopoly income, absolute rent is 
unlike profit which requires saving and reinvestment. Absolute rent is 
relatively free of competitive constraints and there is no imperative to 
reinvest it in improving the quality of the land (Friedmann, 1979:179). 
This rent can be spent entirely on consumption - an obvious limit on the 
development of production (Amin, 1974:177,195). 
5. DIFFERENTIAL GROUND RENT - AN OBSTACLE TO CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT. 
Capitalist agriculture is characterized by uneven profit rates, based 
on the differences in fertility of land under cultivation. Fertility 
confers an advantage known as IIdifferential rent'" (Marx, 1969:17/18,240). 
The costs of production (and therefore price) will be set by the least 
fertile capitalist enterprise surviving in the market at anyone juncture, 
i.e. one which still secures a sufficient rate of profit (Kautsky, 1976:-
17,19; Hindess and Hirst, 1977:293/4). By selling at this price, a surplus 
profit can be made from goods produced on land of better fertility (Hindess 
and Hirst, 1977:184). This too may accrue to a capitalist, or indirectly 
to the state or a landlord (ibid:186). The significance of this rent for 
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agrarian capitalist development is negative. Because differential rent 
unlike super-profit in industry - is relatively permanent, capitalist 
competition is less effective in agriculture than in industry.(10) As 
such, the CMpJs tendencies to develop through modernization of the means of 
production are less pronounced in agriculture - which is another reason why 
agrarian capitalist development lags behind industry. 
6. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM IN AGRICULTURE. 
Within Marxism, writers often draw from Lenin (1960a) and assume that 
the development of agrarian capitalism follows a model of the growth of a 
class of landless proletarians and a class of yeomen-kulak (ultimately 
capitalist) farmers out of a polarizing middle peasantry (see Njonjo, 1981; 
Taylor, 1984). Indeed, not only Marxists but British colonial officials 
have seen this as -a normal step in the evolution of a country~ (KenyaJs 
Swynnerton Report - cited in AnyangJNyongJo, 1981:115). 
But this perspective ignores not only differences at the centre 
(between for instance, the British, French and nprussian/Junker u routes to 
rural capitalism),(11) but also the vast difference between the centre and 
the periphery. In the centre, agricultural capitalism has generally 
developed internally (if unevenly and in cases haltingly) to each central 
social formation. At the periphery, external dynamics have played the 
major part. 
In studying capitalism and agriculture and their significance for 
development, these different experiences need to be taken into account as 
the basic framework of analysis. It is within this that one may analyse 
whether capitalist industry, trade, finance or agriculture has been the 
leading force in the process; what the articulation between these has been; 
and what the dynamics within each have involved. For example, in agricul-
ture, whether capitalist relations have come through a revolution from 
above, below or outside; in industry, whether capitalism developed from 
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merchants, userers or artisans, or from external mercantile/industrial/fin-
ancial capitals; whether urban or rural capitalism developed first, and 
with what effect on each other.(12) 
It would be - to borrow a phrase from Leys (1980) - -indefensibly 
schematic"" to discuss these here, given that an in-depth analysis would 
require not one, but several theses. One thing is clear, however: within 
the international capitalist economic system as a whole, the development of 
capitalist relations in agriculture has generally been far slower than in 
industry, even if in instances it preceded it. According to Galeski 
(1972:28), capitalist farms have never developed anywhere on a massive 
scale except in the United States.(13) Although capitalist relations are 
now dominant and tending to exclusivity in central agriculture in the form 
of monopoly capital (Such Hansen and Marcussen, 1982:177), generally speak-
ing this is taking place much later than industry. In the periphery, the 
situation is extremely varied, and agrarian capitalism, while often predom-
inant, is by no means generally prevalent. (See Part J). 
7. CONCLUSION. 
This chapter has analysed capitalist agriculture and reviewed some of 
the conditions advocated for its contribution to the Agrarian Question. 
The theory of Agrarian Transition implying agrarian capitalism and an urban 
bourgeoisie has been shown to require sUbstantial qualification. In this 
regard, I have examined the issue of the nature of agriculture, and 
absolute and differential groundrents, and shown how they inhibit both the 
development of capitalism in agriculture, as well as capitalist agrarian 
development. I have then discussed the terms under which Agrarian Transit-
ion needs to be discussed, pointing especially to the differences between 
centre and periphery. 
With a view to the analysis of planned rural development in the 
periphery later in this thesis, the next chapter analyses - at a general 
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level - the agrarian transition models of the rich peasant road to capital-
ism and the alternative of simple commodity production. The chapters 
at ter that l in Part H) examine tlOW the exper ience of rich peasants and 
simple commodity production in the Third World, particularly Tropical 
Africa, has been closely linked to state and agri-business strategies of 
agrarian transition. The rich peasant and simple corrrnodity producer models 
are both directly relevant to tropical Africa where the absence of a large 
landed class historically has precluded a HJunker~ type of transformation 
lAmin~ 1974:364; Byres~ 1977~ cited by Kay, 1981:486).(14) 
£K)N)TES 
1. In Chile, this was not too great a problem in that the Chilean 
industrial bourgeoisie and the landlords reached a compromise whereby not 
agrlculture but copper mlning would subsidlze industrial development (kay, 
1~dl:4~j). In other countries there have been similar compromises 
involviru~ oil or gold tHiro, 1978:2d9; Halliday, 1979:129). 
2. Mouzelis t1975/6:4d9) disputes this, arguing that the Iberian Peninsula 
exper ience snows that lndustr ial capital can pr'osper with or wi thout the 
eXlstence ot big agrlcultural landed property. He further argues that as 
agrlculture becomes an increaslngly subordinate part of the economomy, it 
makes little ditterenee for the overall development of the CMP whether 
landed property perslsts or is destroyed (ibid:488). Mouzelis may be 
correct in all this, but in the absence of a detailed analysis of the 
specitics ot the Iberian case {inclUding a critical look at the claim that 
industrial capital has prospered there), it is difficult to evaluate these 
points. It may be that a far-sighted landed class has embarked on a nJunk-
er'"' route enabling both agrarian development and a transfer of surplus to 
lndustry in a manner not unlike Japan's experience (see Geertz, 1963:47/8; 
Baran, 1962:289; Moore, 1969:246,251). More likely, however, the situation 
may be externally-induced and dependent industrialization with no relation 
to the local Agrarian Question (see Poulantzas, 1976b). While more 
research is clearly needed, it can be stated that while landed property 
does not preclude either scenario from developing prosperous capitalist 
industry, it appears more likely to obstruct rather than facilitate this. 
3. The detailed argument behlnd this is that non-capitalist agriculture 
was able to expand through continuous extension of agricultural frontiers, 
and on this basis was able to supply goods that reduced the reprOduction 
costs ot urban labour as well as the transfer price ot rural migrants into 
capitalist relations. fhere was also enough for export. The fact that the 
r-Ul a1 sector did not serve as a home market was not an impediment to indus-
trial capltal because at the large urban mlddle class market (ibid). 
4. The Grundrisse (Marx, 1':J7):72b), using the term mode or production in a 
tect1nical sense says that agriculture torms a mode of pr-oduction sui 
generis t8anaji, 1976a:3ul). 
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~. Peleiman ,1~j9:i1~) disagrees on the basis that there is no difference 
to capltal concerning this. However, it is clear that the possibilities of 
a capital be.lng able to reduce turnover time in agriculture through innova-
tIon~ mect-Ian.lzation .. etc.. are more limited than in .lndustry. 
b. I t would be wrong ~ t-Iowever, to see accumulat10n as impossible in agr i-
cultur'e w1tllout centra1lzation. Land size is not necessarily a limiting 
tactol in all cases. As Patna1k l1979:40U) points out, physical area is 
not an accurate index ot productivity because ttlere can be increased con-
stant and variable capital within a given area. Thus land centralization 
15 not 1nd1spensable to agricultural capitalist accumulation. However, in 
the context of the CMP .. larger land-holdings have greater accumulation 
capaclty than small ones in that - at the very least - they have greater 
access to credit. 
7. Property ownership is also otten governed by laws and traditions that 
can 1nhibit capital accumulation through centralization. An example here 
would be the Roman-Dutch code that prescribes equal inheritance in intest-
ate estates. As Nancy Charton has pointed out in a personal cornmunication 
l5 September 1985) .. this is part of the way that the complicated merging 
and melding of modes of production may affect development. 
8. ::;uper-profit based on absolute rent exists irrespective of the prod-
uctIvity ot the land - and in this regard is distinct from super-profit 
based on another type of rent Which is tound only in agriculture .. and which 
is discussed below (see Hindess and Hirst .. 1977:18b). 
9. Only in the feUdal mode ot production is absolute rent effective in 
Moment B - i.e. in the relations in production. When a capitalist tenant 
steps in between the direct producer and the landlord, the nature of rent 
is transformed since the capitalist is now the direct exploiter of labour 
(Hindess and Hirst, 1977:296). 
10. In industry" super-profits may be made by capitalists who use except-
ional machinery and can produce below the normal costs of production. On 
this basis, they can sell at the going price and through the relative 
increase in the surplus value they realize (see chapter thirteen)" achieve 
a super-profIt. But capital mobility means that this super-profit is 
usually transitory (Kautsky, 1976:16/7). Through competition, such 
industrial super-profits are constantly erased as more capitalists catch up 
and the super-rate becomes the new average (Tribe, 1977:78). 
11. On the British road" see Dobb, 1962:10; Banaji 1976a:317/8; Moore, 
1969:10/11,39/40; Standing, 1981:186; Morris, 1976:339, footnote 14; Hind-
ess and Hirst" 1977:245; Kautsky" 1976:44. On France, see Moore, 1969:43; 
Duggett, 1975:169, on the Prussian \Junker) path see Morris, 1976:130; 
Joshi .. 1981:457; Moore, 1969:296,246" 251; Hindess and Hirst .. 1977:34; 
Brenner" 1977:73-4; Standing, 19b1:1B9; Baran 19b2;27B-b3; Baran .. 1972:157, 
Moore" 19b~:440; Geertz, 19b3:47/b). 
1~. Mouzelis (19J5/b:4B0) is a~so correct to argue that 
.It one W1Shes to account for the dlfterent ways in which 
agr.lculture is artlculated to industry, one must pay 
less attention to any intlerent trends at the CfvJP and 
more to the class structure ot the societies under 
cons1deratlon. . .. J i-ends and laws only make sense wilen 
they take a less unlversal torm and are seen in context. 
13. Hey slInIldrly ~lolds tnat transtormation of agriculture into capital-
ist relatlons has only really been completed in the United States (8radby" 
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1~;5:lQQ). But even these claims overestimate the extent of CMP relations 
In American agriculture. In l~OU, nearly 80 percent of American agricultur-
al protjucers were selt -employed and used unpaia family labour; and this had 
only decllned to bj percent in 19bO (Frledmann 1978:93). In the economy as 
a whole, thlS status was 51 percent in 1900 and it dropped to 17 percent by 
l'JbU. 
14. In view ot this, I therefore leave aside other Third World 
experiences, including the ~strategic~ path as in Talwan and South Korea 
~Harrison, 1981:103; Hamilton, 1983)0 passim; Hiro, 1978:289); the Latin 
American experience ~Kay, 1981:487; Amin, 1974:362; Harrison, 1981:112/3); 
the Middle East and Gulf region (Keddie, 1968:152; Halliday, 1979:117-9; 
Greusslng and Kippenburg, 1975/6:12b; Amin, 1974:1b8); and South East Asia 
(Harrison, 19~1:79/80). 
294 
RURAL DEVELOPMENT" 
PEASANTS~ COMMODITY PRODUCERS 
1. Introduction. 
CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX 
PEASANTS AND COMMODITY PRODUCERS 
2. The rich peasant route to capitalism in agriculture. 
3. The development of simple commodity production in agriculture. 
4. Simple commodity production subsidizes the CMP. 
5. Simple cornmodity production and advanced means of production. 
6. Conclusion. 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
The relative autonomy and bargaining power of middle peasants (see 
below) makes this class a ~problem- for state and capitalist industry 
intent on resolving the Agrarian Question (Williffios, 1981a:34). As such, 
middle peasants are usually seen as needing to be displaced, destroyed or 
at least subordinated by the CMP (Buch-Hansen and Marcussen, 1982:18). 
Two processes of agrarian transition have a bearing on this. Firstly, 
transformation to rich peasants (kulaks) and ultimately farmer capitalists 
with a proletarianized counterpart serves to convert middle peasants into 
elements of the CMP, fulfilling one of the classic requirements for 
resolution of the Agrarian Question. Secondly, middle peasants may be 
transformed into simple commodity producer status articulating with the 
CMP. While kulaks and farmer capitalists may still pose problems at 
control for those wanting resolution of the Agrarian Question (though less 
so if they are dominated politically by industrial capital), it appears 
that simple commodity producers may bypass these in certain situations. 
The discussion in this chapter is at a very general level, and risks a 
degree of simplification. However, it sets out important dynamics for 
analysing rural development more concretely. (See Parts H, I and J). 
2. THE RICH PEASANT ROUTE TO CAPITALISM IN AGRICULTURE. 
As opposed to the "'Prussian" road, the rich peasant transition to 
capitalism takes place from below (Standing, 1981:189). It has developed 
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in widely varying forms in Britain, the United States, Bolivia, Venezuela, 
Peru and Rwanda (ibid), and is often associated with places where feudal 
estates have either not existed, or have been dismantled (through reform -
in Taiwan, South Korea, or revolution - in Mexico). In such conditions, 
there are fewer obstacles for rich peasants to develop into capitalist 
farmers (Morris, 1976:339, footnote 14; Hindess and Hirst, 1977:259).(1) 
The rich peasant road in the centres may be described as a form of 
economic transition through "'internal articulation"" (see chapter ten). 
However, in the periphery, the development of kulaks has been largely a 
consequence of both internal and external articulation. This difference 
between centre and periphery has important consequences for development, as 
discussed in chapter thirty-three. 
In general terms, the kulak route to capitalism implies a polarization 
whereby middle peasants are progressively divided and transformed into rich 
and poor, and these groups in turn tend towards developing into capitalists 
t and proletarians.(2) In classical Leninist terms, once the rich 
peasantry has begun to transform itself by permanently hiring labour and by 
enlarging the commodity market, the middle peasantry is affected by a new 
competitive environment, and new social and technical needs. 
Middle peasants involved in commodity exchange are vulnerable to 
market fluctuations: falls in prices drive them into debt, while population 
growth and inheritance pressures reduce the size of holdings (Wolff, 1973, 
in Charlesworth, 1980:263). The middle peasant, therefore, is faced with a 
"simple reproduction squeeze"'" (Bernstein, 1978; Williams, 1981a:34). This 
means either keeping in step with the market and producing more cheaply 
(thereby converting the family farm into an enterprise) - or falling behind 
and losing independence to become a semi-proletarian. Those unable to keep 
up increasingly sell their labour-power and eventually their land and other 
means of production too, while those on the other side begin accumulating 
and reinvesting and hiring labour to these ends (Cooper, 1978:158/9). Thus, 
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in this scenario, one section of the middle peasantry is seen to move 
....... downwards u - changing into poor peasants and ultimately into semi-
proletarian and proletarian status with partial and eventually total separ-
ation from the means of production. The others are seen as becoming rich 
peasants, ultimately capitalist farmers (Brass, 1980:446).(3) While the 
-reproduction squeeze- reflects producers J dependence on the market, one 
should not ignore the fact that -the market~ (especially capitalist 
industry and the State) also needs the producers. In other words, while 
participation in the market increases dependence on the CMP, it also may 
accompany a relative independence, especially in cases where producers 
benefit from advanced CMP means of production, but supply the market only 
to the extent that this benefits them, and have the capacity to withdraw 
from co~nodity production to greater or lesser extents. 
If the middle peasantry has tendencies to split, then what determines 
which fractions of this class will become rich and which poor'? The process 
is not a simple working out of inherent tendencies, but a matter of 
politics, the state, and resistance, and is consequently uneven and 
unstable. In this situation, inequalities among the middle peasantry may 
be significant. These may be due to differences in technical knowledge, 
managerial ability, experience of education, access to fulltime work off 
farms, and especially in relationships to political power. Also signifi-
cant is the issue of family size. In this regard, Chayanov (1926) saw that 
what influences output on a family farm is the ratio of producers to 
consumers in the family unit - i.e. a demographic consideration. In his 
view, the more able-bodied producers in a household, the higher the potent-
ial productive capacity and output. At particular junctures, the different 
positions of households in this cycle may serve as a basis for upward or 
downward mobility (Hunt, 1979:249).(4) 
The question of the rich peasantry becoming fully-fledged capitalist 
farmers has to be seen against the obstacles to capitalization of agricult-
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extent or other (usually with the aid of State supplies of labour, 
subsidized production costs and guaranteed prices and markets [see 
Williams, 1984:57]), and where a supply of advanced means of production is 
available, there is every reason for farmer capitalists to raise productive 
capacity (see Amin 1974:155). The degree to which this feeds back into 
industry depends largely on the class political dynamics involved, in 
particular the second element of the Agrarian Transition model - the 
hegemony of the urban bourgeoisie. 
Using the English case to briefly illustrate the rich peasant road,(5) 
it may be argued that a stratum of middle peasants resisted feudal exaction 
and successfully improved their situation to enter into petty commodity 
production for the market (Dobb, 1962:10; Banaji 1976a:317/8). As a class, 
the 16th century yeomen were located between the smaller gentry and the 
less prosperous peasantry (Moore, 1969:10/11). Starting as capitalist 
tenants on landlords~ farms, they eventually gained political supremacy 
over this class (Standing, 1981:186). As capitalists, they hired wage-
labour not to supplement, but to replace their family labour, and they paid 
ground-rent to the landlord (Morris, 1976:339, footnote 14; Hindess and 
Hirst, 1977:245). In some cases, the landed upper class followed their lead 
and turned to capitalist agriculture (Moore, 1969:39/40). 
It was this kulak-cum-capitalist class who formed the main force 
behind the enclosures whereby land was centralized and poor peasants 
ultimately proletarianized, and who pioneered agricultural development in 
the 18th century (Standing, 1981:186). Faced with increasing competition 
on the world market, this class could either introduce tariffs, go 
bankrupt, or improve their productivity (Kautsky, 1976:44). The first 
option was ruled out politically by the urban classes, and it was the last-
mentioned which took place. This was possible because of the articulation 
of fledgling industry and agriculture in the national economy, with the 
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former able to produce new agricultural means of production tibid:47). 
There is, however, another route that the better-off members of the 
middle peasantry may take - that of simple commodity production. 
3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SIMPLE COMMODITY PRODUCTION IN AGRICULTURE. 
The importance of simple cornmodity production lies in the fact that it 
appears in some circumstances to be able to develop agriculture by intro-
ducing new means of production. In other words, it solves the Agrarian 
Question without requiring capitalist Agrarian Transition. 
Simple commodity production presupposes an independent household 
production unit. It therefore requires a break with bonds of servitude with 
landlords or state, and the separation of producers from each other - i.e. 
the dissolution of communal property rights, work organisation and distrib-
ution (Kahn, 1978:113/4). Typically, simple commodity production grows out 
of middle peasant production. 
By participating in commodity production, a middle peasant production 
unit often finds itself on a road which leads to the growing commoditizat-
ion of household reproduction. The demand for means of production and 
subsistence incorporates each household into a market where it becomes 
logical for it to specialize and thereby become ever more dependent on 
exchange to secure its reproduction. This in turn implies a decline in 
control that the producers have over the disposal of the product with 
regard to the exchange value that can be realized for it. 
The middle peasant household then has to try to keep in step with the 
economic requirements of the market, as well as satisfy socially-accepted 
living standards. Ownership of the means of production and productive 
organization of labour remain based on the household, but the production 
exists under conditions of competition in the market (Friedmann, 1978:97, 
footnote 1). The movement from middle peasant production to simple commod-
ity production is thus from the market place to the market principle (Post, 
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1977:243). To the extent that the market principle comes to prevail, the 
peasant household becomes not simply a domestic economy, but a commercial 
enterprise as well (Galeski, 1972:12). This requires that simple commodity 
producers specialize, enlarge scale, and produce more cheaply. If they do 
not, they fall behind and lose their positions as independent producers and 
the classical polarization scenario is played out (Galeski, 1972:116). 
However, there are circumstances under which they may continue to exist as 
simple commodity producers. Before analysing these, however, it is 
necessary to first clarify the status of simple commodity production, about 
which there are very different opinions (Mouzelis, 1979b:177, footnote 58). 
For Meek (1956) this form of production is only an analytical tool used by 
Marx to highlight the properties of the CMP. For Lange, (1963), simple 
commodity production - although never dominant in a social formation 
constitutes a specific mode of production, and is found in most contempor-
ary social formations (see also Marx, 1972:166/7). In my view, simple 
commodity production is distinct from the petty commodity production by 
middle peasants or other classes. It comes into its own and constitutes a 
heterogeneous production relation when it articulates with economic ele-
ments that can supply its inputs as commodities - and as noted in chapter 
twenty-four (and see below), the CMP is most suitable here. It is under 
these conditlons in central capitalism that simple commodity production is 
capable of developing productive capacity in agriculture. 
The persistence of simple commodity production articulating to the CMP 
can be traced inter alia to: i. the tenacity of simple commodity producers 
and transfer of their surplus to the CMP. ii. the supply of technology and 
labour from the CMP to simple commodity production. 
4. SIMPLE COMMODIfY PRODUCTION SUBSIDIZES THE CMP. 
Writing alone (1975) and also with Amin (1974), Vergopoulos refers to 
the ..... self-exploiting ..... and ""tenacious" character of the family farm, plus 
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other characteristics, to explain the persistence of small-scale ownership. 
They argue that rather than the CMP establishing itself in the countryside~ 
it articulates with simple co~nodity production there and develops at the 
expense of the rural producers involved (Mouzelis, 197 /6:482-4). 
The CIVIP may certainly benef it from simple commodity production. Simple 
commodity producers work for survival and not profit, and they can often 
still continue despite low agricultural prices, and despite having to pay 
high industrial prices (Mouzelis, ibid: 484). They are often willing to 
let merchandise go to market at a price lower than a capitalist producer 
would have to charge (even with equivalent techniques). This is because 
they can relinquish their claim to a part of the value that would otherwise 
be due to them~ and still reproduce themselves (Perelman~ 1979:120). 
In this regard, a simple commodity producer is similar to a middle 
peasant. Both can absorb 'paying a proportionately higher rent than a 
capitalist can, because the latter has to achieve an average profit rate to 
remain in business~ while the former do not (Patnaik~ 1979:388; Kautsky, 
1976b:35). For Kautsky {ibid:40)~ the middle peasant is therefore always 
the Ufirst to endure overwork and underconsumption under the pressure of 
competition".(6) In addition both forms of production may have a lower 
marginal cost than (time-waged) wage labour because they dispense with the 
need for external supervision (see MarxJs Capita1, 1976a:450, footnote 16). 
Like middle peasants, simple commodity producers have a lower cost of 
production than capitalists because they have no profit category and a 
flexible level of personal consumption (Friedmann, 1979:169). And because 
simple commodity production has no profit~ it is not governed by the aver-
age rate of profit. Its highest limit is set by the average rate - at that 
point capitalist entry would be induced (Friedmann, 1979:181, footnote 14). 
Its lowest limit is the simple reproduction of the household. The 
ability of simple commodity producers to undercut capitalists is one reason 
why agriculture experiences a slower development of capitalist relations 
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than other economic sectors (Galeski, 1972:114, 158). The vulnerability of 
simple commodity producers to this situation is linked to their general 
weakness as a class, which in turn stems from the atomized character of 
their produc~ion. They tend to lack the organisation to demand monopoly 
rent from capitalist purchasers. 
The economic significance of the tenacity is that simple commodity 
production can provide a surplus transfer to capital (Perelman, 1979:120). 
Controversy about whether this ~subsidy- is in fact surplus value need not 
detain us here.(7) Likewise with the controversy about whether any such 
~subsidy~, i.e. appropriated surplus labour time embodied in a product, is 
provided at all.(8) I take it that there is a surplus, and move on to 
analyse its signficance. 
Surplus labour provided by simple commodity producers to capital may 
initially be premissed on a relative increase in the intensity of their 
labour. It constitutes the realization of a -latent surplus- (see chapter 
eleven). When it cuts into the labour-time necessary for reproducing the 
unit of production, the dissolution of that unit is likely to occur. Such 
a situation, combined with market fluctuations, can compel the simple 
commodity producer to become a semi-proletarian or to fall into the 
clutches of userers - hence there can be a tendency towards class differen-
tiation under simple commodity production (Patnaik, 1979:393). Ultimately, 
simple commodity producers cannot survive by only working harder. The key 
to their continued existence is their ability to mechanize. 
5. SIrvlPLE COrvlMODITY PRODUCTION AND ADVANCED MEANS OF PRODUCTION. 
It is largely through raising productivity that households have been 
able to retain their position in advanced capitalist economies (Friedmann, 
1979:159). Unlike industry, successful competitors in agriculture can 
become highly mechanized simple commodity producers using fffioily labour. 
This has been the pattern in several First World countries. 
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According to Kautsky, -the intensification of labour on the peasant 
holding independently of any moral or other constraints cannot pass for an 
advantage of small-scale production .. even from the purely economic point of 
view ...... (197b:26). This is true insofar as a high rate of absolute exploit-
ation reduces the incentives for rural exploiting classes to mechanize 
agriculture. But with simple coromodity production, absolute exploitation 
may be an incentive for the producers (as opposed to the exploiters) to 
raise agricultural productivity through advanced means of production. In 
this event .. the exploitation of the direct producers raises rather than 
lowers their productivity (Mouzelis, 1975/6:487). 
The simple commodity producer is in fact constantly pressured to 
modernize and increase productivity - not in order to maximize profits, but 
in order to cover rising expenses and to meet rising debts. In this regard, 
the ability of industrial capitalism to meet the need for means of prod-
uction for these producers is most important. The other side of this is 
that simple commodity production in this way may contribute to capitalist 
industrialization by widening the internal market. This corresponds not 
only to the needs of the simple commodity producers, but also to their 
ability to buy new inputs in other words, an increase in their incomes 
despite the high exploitation. Industrial capitalist development may draw 
off surplus at their expense, but it may simultaneously enhance their 
incomes by raising their productivity.(9) 
It is not only means of production that simple commodity producers 
require from the CMP to survive. They also need a supply of labour when 
demographic or seasonal variables rule out self-sufficiency in their own 
household labour. Such labour may be found in relations other than 
capitalist ones - for example, among poor peasants or (Up to a point) among 
their simple commodity producing peers. However, where capitalist 
relations are widespread at Moment A in a society, this offers an eminently 
suitable context from which to draw labour. 
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Simple commodity production use of hired labour and advanced means of 
production does not mean an automatic transformation into a capitalist 
enterprise. The process involves an accumulation of means of production l 
rather than of capital (Goodman et aI, 1984:202). Related to this, simple 
commodity producers retain a simple reproduction momentum, aiming at 
meeting household reproduction requirements, not capital accumulation as an 
end in itself. Income goes on wages, household consumption, and renewing 
means of production (Friedmann, 1978:80). 
Thus the ~incorporation- (Mouzelis, 1975/6:485) of simple commodity 
production into the CMP, does not mean that this type of production becomes 
an internal part of the CMP. It is articulated to capitalist relations 
at Moments A and B (labour) and Moment C (means of production inputs l 
agricultural produce outputs) through its reproduction. But it also 
retains distinct relations at all three Moments. Furthermore, it remains 
distinct because it does not share the CMP's system dynamics to the extent 
that a capitalist enterprise does. According to my framework (see chapter 
eight), simple commodity production is an external labour process 
articulated to the CMP in a heterogeneous relation of production. 
It has been argued that ~(t)he reason for the persistence of family 
farms is not to be found in the capacity of family labour for self-exploit-
ation, nor in the application of technology per se; rather, the secret of 
this anomaly lies in the logic and nature of capitalism itselfU (Mann and 
Dickinson, 1978:468). This argument is much too one-sided, although it does 
remind us that alongside the factors on the non-capitalist side (self-
exploitation and technological advancement), there is the contribution of 
the capitalist side, viz. the intrinsic obstacles to capitalist development 
in agriculture (see previous chapter). I would argue that the survival of 
family farms as simple commodity producers articulated to the CMP is 
related to all these factors, and that if there is any primary factor, then 
it is probably none of these, but rather the balance of political power 
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between the classes in these two forms of production. 
What this overall model means is that industrial capital may continue 
to articulate with, rather than destroy, simple commodity production 
(Mouzelis, 1975/6:4~5). This is premissed on the possibility of simple 
cownodity producers surviving through the CMP's labour and material inputs 
into their relations and forces of production. While this has been the 
case in the centre, the peripheral C!VIP does not articulate with simple 
commodity production in the same way. (See Part J). 
6. CONCLUSION. 
Having analysed the kulak-capitalist and simple commodity producer 
routes to resolving the Agrarian Question, it is worth noting that there is 
nothing inevitable about either trajectory. Peasant classes may polarize 
into farmer capitalist and rural proletariat; they may become simple 
commodity producers articulated to the CMP. I would be surprised if middle 
peasant dynamics, especially in articulation with the CMP, produced what 
one writer describes as an ~ossification- of peasant classes (Anyang'-
Nyong¥o, 1981:118). However, it is the case that middle peasants may -
rather than develop along the kulak or simple commodity route - "continue 
to reproduce themselves as peasant households and maintain some degree of 
control over the disposal of their produce~ (Williams, 1984:60). This 
presupposes, however, successful opposition to the pressures to follow a 
different path - not least pressures from other classes opposed to the 
relative autonomy of middle peasants. 
It would be wrong to see any of these options as mutually exclusive. 
Middle peasants articulated to the CMP may (even within the same middle 
peasant household to an extent) exhibit aspects of all three of these 
options (as well as others) in varying and changing degrees. In this 
chapter, I have attempted to elucidate the dynamics of the kulak and simple 
commodity paths, and their significance for the Agrarian Question. Both 
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are particularly relevant to agrarian transition in Tropical Africa where 
they have been the intended development strategy in many instances. 
This brings me to the next part of this thesis, a focus on rural 
development in the periphery. Middle peasants, kulaks and simple commod-
producers (in formation or fully-fledged) in Africa have not developed 
endogamously, but rather in response to, and sometimes at the behest of, 
an articulation with an external CMP and subject to the colonial state. 
Post-independence, none of these classes has been strong enough to direct 
state power or even to win an untrammeled right to develop autonomously. 
Instead, their development has been controlled and restricted, especially 
as -rural development- as a deliberately interventionist state policy has 
increasingly come to the fore. In this context, agrarian relations 
continue to be the subject of orchestrated restructuring, with middle 
peasants, kulaks and simple commodity producers at the centre of intensive 
social engineering. 
ENDNOTES 
1. Thus, in 1907, Lenin argued that the rich peasant stood for the progr-
essive capitalism of free petty producers rather than the reactionary 
capitalism of the Junkers and the Tsarist bureaucracy. For this reason, 
the demand for land by peasants was supported because it meant the dissolu-
tion of feudal relations and support for capitalism (Harrison, 1979:94). 
2. One writer argues that NEP (New Economic Policy) in the Soviet Union (a 
semi-peripheral social formation at the time) began with the majority of 
agricultural producers being middle peasants, and within ten years had 
resulted in intense class polarization between rich and poor peasants 
(Nolan, 1976:205/6). With the Hmong of Thailand, a similar rapid develop-
ment took place (Cooper, 1978:158/9). 
3. There are sometimes countertendencies to this polarization .- such as 
impoverishment caused by the sub-division of rich peasant farms among 
family members. Likewise with certain systems of land tenure, inheritance 
laws, land shortages, marketing restrictions and legislation. 
4. The problem with Chayanov's theory is that it sees family size as a 
biologically autonomous variable, with farm size and production output 
being the adjusting one (Patnaik, 1979:381). This (as Patnaik, ibid, corr-
ectly notes) is contrary to the Marxist position that different relations 
to means of production (i.e. Moment A) ultimately determine different 
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inequalities (i.e. Moment C). Patnaik says that Chayanov~s correlations 
are, in fact, consistent with the Marxist proposition that it is economic 
variations in land-size and scale of production which cause variations in 
family size, rather than vice versa (ibid, see also Hunt, 1979:277, 280). 
Richer peasants can support a larger family (Galeski, 1977:63), and in 
Africa and the Middle East also acquire more wives (see Raikes, 1978:291). 
While we can conclude from this that demographic variables are not an 
alternative to class factors as underlying causes of social differentiation 
(ibid:Z90), family structure and size still clearly playa role in 
determining inequalities among middle peasants. 
5. Williams notes that England was arguably not a peasant to capitalist 
transition, given the role of manorial farming in this historical develop-
ment (1984:6/7). This is a complex question that I cannot enter into here. 
I would merely note that the account which follows is not intended as a 
comprehensive historical rendition. Rather, its purpose is simply to draw 
attention to certain key historical dynamics. 
6. Not only agriculture has this feature - the lot of any simple commod-
ity production can deteriorate below that of wage-labourers. 
7. Kautsky (1976: 1L~) has argued that such a subsidy is not surplus value. 
For him, there can be no surplus value when the labour that generates 
the surplus product is not commoditized and does not itself possess a 
value. This much can probably be granted. As against an ahistorical 
IIlabour theory of value"', I would argue that it is only meaningful to speak 
of labour-time creating value where this is evident in exchange-value. In 
other words, only where there is commodity exchange can one talk of value, 
and only where labour power is a commodity, of surplus value (see also 
Williams, 1981a:32). However, I leave aside a detailed discussion of these 
issues, as they are not fundamental to my argument. 
8. Friedmann (1979:169) disputes any subsidizing role by simple commodity 
production. She argues that a capitalist and a simple commodity producer 
exist in the same price market in their relations to merchant capital, 
finance capital, and land-owners - because of the mobility of factors of 
production, and because of competition, in a capitalist economic system. 
Like capitalists, simple commodity producers only pay capitalist rates of 
interest, rent and merchant costs (ibid:172). Friedmann acknowledges 
however that simple commodity producers may experience unequal exchange, 
and that an indirect subsidy to the CMP can be transferred in this way. 
This is especially possible in the periphery where there are not standard-
ized prices, because of the lower capital mobility there and the presence 
of non-capitalist relations as well. Further, in the periphery, the 
strength of finance, merchant and landlord capitals in relation to simple 
commodity producers, is greater than that in relation to capitalists, and 
monopoly based exploitation is hence more likely for the former. 
9. Where rent, interest and the cost of means of production are market-
determined, a simple commodity producer can pay the going rates (just as a 
capitalist does) and increase household income (Friedmann, 1979:172/3). 
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PLANNED RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter investigates the general character of planned rural 
development, highlighting some of the economic, political and ideological 
issues that inform the more detailed analysis in subsequent chapters. 
2. AGRARIAN QUESTION AND DEVELOPMENT PLANNING. 
Development planning cannot be simply taken for granted. Its exist-
ence needs to be explained in terms of the fact that it often tends not to 
suit governments or capital to let endogamous rural dynamics unfold in 
their own way. 
The Agrarian Question cannot thus be treated simply as an economic 
issue. rhe political significance of resolving it is always important. 
This is particularly so when social classes and the state take it upon 
themselves to attempt to channel rural class formation in a particular 
direction. They prefer to orchestrate an agrarian transition U',at corres-
ponds to their interests, and this is typically presented as being in the 
interests of rural producers as well. Against this background, the phrase 
"rural development" characteristically refers not to the ongoing internal 
process of development in rural areas, but to planned agrarian change by 
outside agencies such as governments, international organizations and 
intervening capitals (Heyer et aI, 1980:1).(1) 
The idea of planned economic development is underpinned by a social 
engineering ethos (see Berger, 1976:36), although it uses the language of 
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participation to legitimize its manipulation (Heyer et aI, 1980:4; Seidman, 
1978:319). Ironically, the language of participation co-exists with 
unspoken assumption that rural development is impossible without external 
development agencies. In fact, rural development is primarily the activity 
of governments and other outside agencies, not of rural people - it is 
undertaken for the latter, not by them (Heyer et aI, 1980:1). Many advoc-
ates of development see their role as animating rural people who are 
regarded as being an obstacle to their own welfare and unable to grasp the 
benefits of development until persuaded of their interests (ibid:4). For 
example, according to Williams (1981a:29), the World Bank conceives of 
rural development as a solution to a peasant problem. From the viewpoint of 
development planners, the Agrarian Question is an Agrarian Problem requir-
ing their intervention. Because of such assumptions, development planning 
is - and almost intrinsically so - a problematic and top-down activity from 
the very start, as will be evident in this and subsequent chapters. I turn 
now to a number of issues confronted in planning, considering them relativ-
ely independently of this factor. This is not to represent them as neutral, 
technical and unproblematic issues - indeed, subsequent sections of this 
chapter highlight the ideological and political dimensions involved. 
3. SOME ISSUES IN DEVELOPMENT PLANNING. 
If development planning is to adequately facilitate the expansion of 
productive capacity, it clearly needs to take into account the mobilization 
and orchestration of the forces and relations of production to this end 
(see Lange, 1960:208). To achieve this objective, development policy 
should aim to counter factors contributing to underdevelopment (see Part 
E). The other side of this is the need to promote a homogeneous national 
i 
economic system with generally average productivity; cohesion through 
integrated and complementary economic activities to form a balanced, 
organic whole at Moments A, Band C of production; and an independent 
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economic dynamism whereby the economy is not dependent on foreign impulses 
(see Amin, 1974:28/9). Development planning also needs to unite macro and 
micro levels. Individual development projects should aggregate into an 
overall development programme (Lea and Chaudri, 1983b:18). This requires 
defining an overall strategy, setting up sectoral objectives that flow from 
this, and planning detailed projects and policies consistent with these 
objectives (Amin, 1974:29). Against this background, the overall challenge 
to development planning is achieving a balance in the allocation of surplus 
and surplus labour for the most rapid growth of productive capacity. This 
involves several crucial issues: 
(i) The question of time-scale is significant for planning. What 
degree of economic sacrifice in the short-term is IIjustified ..... by its long-
term benefits'? (Berger, 1976:97, 124). Decisions have to be made about 
which development problems are the most urgent, and which will have to be 
postponed for later action (Kollontai, 1970:6,8). This reguires the 
establishment of a sequence of problem solving (ibid:6).(Z) 
(ii) Another issue is whether investment should initially be in agric-
ulture (or other primary industries), so as to provide a base for subseq-
uent advance in manufacturing industry, or whether the latter should have 
priority (SO as to provide a foundation for later improvements in agricult-
ure) (Dobb, 1951:80).(3) Besides the question of overall priority, there 
is the question of relations between the two sectors, both at the level of 
the forces of production (the distribution of use-values) and the relations 
(the allocation of surplus labour). The Agrarian Question in this regard 
is highly complex for planning. 
(iii) There is also the issue whether industrial investment should be 
in light consumer goods or heavy capital goodS?(4) While investment 
matures more quickly in light industries, the rate of development of light 
industry depends in the long-term on the rate of development of heavy 
industry (ibid:81). 
(iv) A further issue concerns the need to balance the different 
Moments of production. This is particularly in terms of Moments Band C -. 
between distribution and production, and between surplus-utilization and 
production. Income distribution and wages have to be balanced with 
consumer goods through availability and price mechanisms (Lange, 1960:213). 
Regarding finance, investment targets must be balanced with available 
inputs (including foreign inputs which are difficult to calculate) (Amin, 
1974:34). Budgets and state expenditure have to be matched, and a balance 
of payments realized. The availability of means of production must also 
balance with the demand for investment (Lange, 1960:213). 
(v) In addition to the above, there is the issue over the role of the 
state in the planned development. To advocate that .... laissez-faire .... autonom-
ous endogamous rural development should take place (Williams, 1985:175), 
(leaving aside questions of its desirability), is to underrate the class 
and structural reasons for the interventionist character of the capitalist 
state in general and the peripheral state in particular. Capitalist econom-
ic systems by their very nature involve state policies that significantly 
intervene in and affect agriculture. This is not to ignore the significant 
range of interventionist policy options that may be adopted within this 
framework. For example, McCall and Skutsch identify four different 
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strategies for the role of the state in development in Tanzania: (a.) where 
the state mediates capitalist penetration; (b.) where the state becomes a 
direct producer, bypassing peasants; (c.) where the state controls market-
ing l prices~ and credit policies; and (d.) where the state mobilizes 
peasants towards self determination - (they cite the example of ujamaa) 
(1983:24b,256). 
State strategies can also be distinguished as to whether their emphas-
is is towards additive planning, growth-centres or structural transformat-
ion (Datoo and Gray, 1979:258-61). Additive planning is an incrementalism 
within a given structural context, and does not in itself ensure sectoral 
integration. Growth-centre strategy derives from diffusionist theory, and 
sees development as spreading from selected growth poles. In contrast to 
this approach, structural transformation implies a holistic approach that 
encompasses qualitative change in relations as well as forces of product-
ion. 
The selection and implementation of a development strategy and the 
emphasis given within such a framework is not a technical issue. It 
depends on the ideological assumptions on the part of planners, on the 
social structure and political conditions of the social formation, and in 
particular, on what is economically possible and politically feasible. 
4. THE IDEOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING. 
Many ideological assumptions go into the drawing up of a plan. Some-
times there is an explicit ideological orientation such as in strategies 
following a reformist model, a free-market model, a technocratic model, and 
a collectivist model (Lea and Chaudri, 1983b:19).(5) Ideological ditferen-
ces lie behind diametrically opposed development plans, such as the exclus-
ion of kulaks from co-operatives in socialist agricultural plans (Sajo, 
1979:223), or stimulating them as ~progressive farmers~ in capitalist 
planning. Ideological assumptions can influence the very role of develop-
ment officials. Agricultural extension workers can be seen as technical 
advisers only, or as organisers of rural class struggle aiming at socialist 
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relations in agriculture (Harris, 1980:96). 
But ideological assumptions are often not explicit. As discussed in 
chapter one" there are basic assumptions in every world view which influen--
ce what problems and solutions are selected, and what thereby are excluded. 
As noted in section 2 above, the major and almost inherent assumption in 
planned rural development is that rural classes are a problem: ~They are 
unable to develop. They must be developed .... (Williams, 1976a:144). The I' i I 
belief is that state intervention can achieve more than peasants on their 
own (ibid:155).(6) 
Another assumption that often exists is that development means large-
scale, capital-intensive, technically complex, and mechanized production 
(Wallace" 1981:283). As Adams (1981:343) writes: ~(p)easants as producers 
are invisible; they don't exist. Machinery is progress; peasants can only 
become worthy of machinery, hence progressive"". An ideology of development 
comes into being that identifies progress with advanced technology, commod-
itization and bureaucratic administration (Williams, 1986b:19). The form of 
development is fetishized, and the content (i.e. the process of expanding 
productive capacity) is lost sight of. 
There is usually an implicit correlation between the type of explanat-
ion of underdevelopment and the prescriptions that are recommended for 
development (Datoo and Gray, 1979:257). For example, idealist premisses 
tend to blame cultural factors for underdevelopment and accordingly 
prescribe plans that emphasize the role of education in changing tradition-
al beliefs and practices (for example, Eisenstadt, 1968, cited by Berger, 
1976:55). A more specific example can be seen in Niger where it was assumed 
that rural development was a general problem, not tied to the specific 
conditions of life of the rural classes. The latter were seen in terms of 
stereotyped notions, and the choice of cooperatives that flowed from this 
derived from a romantic view of African society which failed to recognise 
the divisions in the rural social structure (Roberts, 1981:216,213). 
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The unit of analysis in the explanation of underdevelopment also 
affects the planning prescription. For example.l regional explanations and 
prescribed regional planning imply that the problems originate - and can be 
solved - within that unit (Datoo and Grey.l 1979:257). (Much development 
planning based on modernization theory uses the wrong units of analysis, 
not the determinant whole). 
Ideological assumptions about social structure also affect whether a 
development plan stresses centralization or decentralization. The same 
assumptions also affect whether the emphasis in agrarian reform should be 
on redistribution of large-holdings to small farmers and the landless, on 
better use of means of production within existing tenure patterns, or on 
improving transport, co~nunication, and marketing facilities (Petras and La 
Porte, 1970:232). Ideology also influences whether land reform means an 
incremental increase in output within existing production relations - on 
, I 
I 
the assumption that landowners will become "'modernizers from aboveu • An 
alternative is for land reform to be structural change and ""'modernization 
from below"'.1 as advocated by "'redistributionists"'" opposed to inequalities 
in land-ownership (Petras and La Porte, ibid:233/4). 
Cultural premises also influence development plans - right down to the 
very torm of specific projects - including what is seen as appropriate to 
people and how it is presented to them (Foster, 1969:108/9). For example, 
land reforms that allot individual title from communally-held land usually 
apply to men only - on the assumption either that women automatically 
benefit, or forgetting that in many cases, women do twice as much work as 
the men (Harrison, 1981:442).(7) 
Elitist assumptions that go into planning often result in inegalitar-
ian growth-centre strategies being adopted. This is revealed by the 
example of Z~nbia before independence, where the colonial government assum-
ed that only a minority of Zambians could be superior farmers. The result 
was that tive percent of the people got farms of 400 acres each, While the 
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remainder of the people were allocated mere five acre plots (Foster, 1969:-
110). Likewise in Kenya, where it was assumed that skilled and experienced 
farmers were better performers than novices and accordingly were settled on 
low population density settlement schemes and given every opportunity of 
success. The inexperienced farmers settled on the high density schemes 
were almost progrm«ned for failure (Leo, 1979:632). This assumption was, 
however, made in a vacuum and without knowledge of the situation. As it 
turned out, the high-density inexperienced farmers were far better perforr&-
ers than the low-density experienced ones.(8) The lesson that one writer 
draws from this is that ""'most experts in rural development do not really 
know about whom they theorize" (Leo, ibid:635). 
A microcosm of the effect of ideological assumptions on the planning 
of development projects is the Gezira scheme in Sudan. Firstly, the 
British government assumed the existence of Western nuclear-family units 
among the tenants who, ironically, were expected to be content with a 
..... native" standard of living. It was also assumed that such a family unit 
could viably work a tenancy of a certain size (Barnett, 1977:195, 205). 
None of these assumptions proved to be correct. Secondly, the formal 
organization of the scheme was based on assumptions about how groups act 
(ibid:199). From the British milieu was brought the belief that workers 
need to be strictly supervised and controlled (ibid:201). Coupled with 
stereotypes about "'native"" labour, the scheme was thus planned to be hier-
archical and authoritarian (ibid:200). Thirdly, the homo oeconomicus 
assumption was made that tenants would act to maximize their consumption by 
maximizing production (ibid:170). In fact, "'satisficing'" behaviour - i.e. 
manipulating limited choices within organizational constraints - was the 
more common behaviour. 
4. THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING. 
It would be wrong to see ideological assumptions underlying develop-
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ment planning as free-floating, and as a self-sufficient explanation for 
development policy and practice. Plans emanating from the capitalist state 
(see chapter fourteen) - although conditioned by the internal dyn&nics of 
the state -- are not neutral and removed from class issues. 
Every development plan inevitably affects the interests of all social 
classes and strata, because it entails the mobilization and allocation of 
resources (Kollontai, 1970:13). (See the discussion ~politics and surplus~ 
in chapter eleven). Public versus private strategies for development 
have obvious class relevance; the development of large-rather than small-
scale industry can consolidate the position of monopoly capital or the 
urban proletariat rather than that of small capitalists (ibid:13/4). It is 
not surprising then that a necessary myth is created whereby rural develop-
ment plans are constantly presented as being in the interests of all (Heyer 
et aI, 1980:3). This is part of the ideology of development. But, despite 
such myths, the 
problems pertaining to the scale of projected activit-
ies, to the specific nature and place of construction, 
to the relations among branches of the economy, etc., 
give rise to an intense class and political struggle 
around the issue of planning programmes (Kollontai, 
1970: 13). 
Development strategies are not a field within which governments make 
free choices between different means to the same ends. Different develop-
ment ideologies suit different social interests and social classes 
(Rudebeck, 1979:30/1; Dos Santos, 1969:62). Different classes even have 
contradictory definitions of development and different measures to achieve 
it (Dos Santos, ibid). Thus, although the capitalist state has a relative 
autonomy from classes (see chapter fourteen), development plans at least in 
part reflect the political outcome of class struggles (Taylor, 1981:384/5; 
Barnett 1977:6-15). The way that a development plan sets up priorities in 
resource allocation depends on complex political and socio-economic factors 
such as the internal class struggle and the international situation (Dobb, 
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1951:80). Development plans and programmes thus "'bear the heavy imprint of 
numerous political considerationsU (Kollontai, 1970:13, Bates, 1981, 
pass~). As Harrison (1981:331) notes: 
Development policies have been biased against the poor, 
the backward, the rural, and skewed in favour of the 
rich, the westernized and urban, for a very simple 
reason. It is politics that determines the direction of 
development, and the privileged groups have infinitely 
more access to political power than the poor. 
It is also important to note that irrespective of how a development 
plan is drawn up and adopted, many of the most effective political 
decisions are often actually made in the implementation (Baran, 1952:-
200). If the plan did not intend to give resources to the powerful, 
this is what may well happen anyway (see chapter thirty). 
The significance of this is that planned rural development is not 
just external intervention into rural affairs, but a particular type of 
intervention reflecting to a large extent an attempt to direct product-
ion in accordance with inter alia state and ruling class priorities (as 
well as fashions in international agencies) (Dutkiewicz and Williams, 
1987a:42). This is why much development planning is (correctly) seen by 
rural classes as against their interests, and why - far from being the 
lauded participants of development - they may well become its adversar-
ies (Williams, 1986b). 
6. CONCLUSION. 
Like the Agrarian Question, rural development needs to be analysed 
in terms that go beyond its economic significance. This chapter has 
argued that ttlat no development strategy can be taken on its own terms. 
To do this it has teased out some of the technical issues and investig-
ated the ideological and political dimensions involved in planned 
development. These will be analysed in more depth in the discussion in 
316 
PLANNED DEVELOPMENT. 
PLANNED RURAL DEVELOPJV1ENT 
chapter twenty-nine on development strategies adopted in Tropical 
Africa. The next chapter also demonstrates these points in its discuss-
ion of the state and rural development in the periphery. 
ENJNOTES 
1. For example, rural development for the World Bank, while not 
conceived in terms of the Agrarian Question, is seen explicitly as a 
strategy aimed at people in rural areas (World Bank, 1975a:3) (my 
emphasis) . 
2. The difficulties in this are illustrated by land reform, which 
involves dealing with a whole constellation of factors which -defy 
piecemeal and partial tinkeringu (Herring, 1981:135, 148). Tackling 
these factors sequentially may be necessary, but problems can arise such 
as a policy failure in one district demoralizing another one still 
awaiting its implementation (ibid:154). The fundamental problem is how 
to plan for the whole by starting with only a part of it. 
3. The history of western capitalist development was largely from 
agriculture to light industry (consumer goods such as textiles), and 
only ultimately in heavy industry (Dobb, 1951:83). This is sometimes 
held to be the natural model for development planning. However, it has 
had little success in the Third World because international trade has 
discouraged the growth of capital goods industries there (ibid). In 
contrast to the Rostow recommendation of Utextiles first U , Soviet 
industrialization was led by heavy industry (ibid:107). 
4. -In practice of course it will always be some mixture of both . ... 
But there will be an important question of priorityU (Dobb, ibid). 
5. According to one development consultant in SA;s Ciskei bantustan: 
Planning is conditioned by implementation policies and 
national ideologies. So with the Ciskei. Community 
identity, the importance of the capitalistic ethos, the 
traditional structure of rural society, and so on, have 
been recognized in the planning process (Venn, in 
Proctor-Sir~ns, 1978:55). 
6. The depth and strenqth of this assumption is evident in SanoJs review 
of a book by Heyer, Williams and Roberts (1981). Sano fails to see the 
significance of the book"s critique of such a view. Acknowledging the 
problems of much development policy, he writes that -(t)o set rural 
development in motion might in every case be to set a process of contra-
dictions in motion, to which there can be no perfect solutions, but only 
relatively ;good; policies, i.e. policies that to the greatest extent 
possible seek to compensate for the fact that they are initiated by agenc-
ies based outside the rural areas~ (1982:115). One could point out in 
response to this, that it is not possible to -compensate~ for a view which 
implies that no rural development takes places until it -is set in motion-
and indeed that contradictions wait upon such input to be activated. 
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7. Thus in Africa ~male-dominated ministries produced anti-feminist 
programmes. Land reform in Kenya. for example, simply lodged title in the 
owner, who was almost always a man. In fact, women worked the land 
(Seidman, 1978:298). In colonial Zambia, only men were considered farmers, 
and women could not jOin state schemes which were the backbone of the 
authorities' ~progressive farmer- policy (Muntemba, 1978:83). This 
persisted after independence and although women began to receive some 
acknowledgment of their economic role, this was in terms of training them 
in handicrafts and poultry keeping (ibid). In Niger, the animation develop-
ment strategy was conceived with men in mind and without reference to 
women's needs (Roberts 1981:217). 
8. At the same time, the prospects for loan repayment by low-density 
settlers were better than by high-density ones (Ruthenberg, 1966:132) (see 
chapter thirty-six). 
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CHAPTER TWENITY-EIGHT 
lHE STATE AN) D£VELOPftENT IN THE PERIPHERY 
1. Introduction. 
2. fhe colonial state. 
3. The post-colonial state. 
4. The debate over the Kenyan state. 
5. The politics of planning in the periphery. 
6. Conclusion. 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
Dutkiewicz and Williams (1987 :39) have painted out that while there 
is no common crisis across Africa, what is shared is the centrality of 
state activity in attempting to resolve the diverse problems - and the 
widespread failure of this intervention as well. This chapter analyses 
development planning in the periphery in terms of the character of the 
colonial and post-colonial state. The extent to which the capitalist state 
carries out the political and economic functions described in chapter 
fourteen is always dependent on the type of social formation and the 
international context in which it is located. As with the discussion in 
chapter fourteen, the analysis here is based on historical generalization 
and is not intended as a general theory of the peripheral state. 
2. THE COLONIAL STATE. 
The classic structural form of the colonial state has been described 
as ~overdeveloped~ (Alavi, 1972). This is attributed to the fact that its 
base was in a metropolitan structure, and it represented metropolitan 
dominance over almost all indigenous classes, and the dominance of the CJVIP 
over non-capitalist relations of production tAlavi, in Kaplan, 1977:98/9). 
The argument is that because the colonial state represented an absentee 
social system and ruling class, it performed functions which this class 
(the metropolitan bourgeoisie) elsewhere did privately (Mamdani, 19T}:148,-
312). It did not simply regulate production - it determined its very 
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nature. To achieve this politically and economically, an ~overdeveloped~ 
bureaucracy and coercive apparatus had to be built up (ibid). The relative 
autonomy of this apparatus - linked to internal dynamics within these 
structures - meant that the colonial state had a momentum of its own, and a 
degree of independence even from metropolitan classes and states. Politic-
ally, the colonial state had to smash the existing internal ruling class-
(8S). However, to overcome resistance, this state also had to use internal 
groups as allies - hence indirect rule: metropolitan domination that is 
mediated by local classes (Mamdani, 1977:143, 41). The difference between 
this and neo-colonialism (which is indirect domination based mainly or 
completely on local groups) is that it was primarily maintained by force 
through an overdeveloped apparatus of repression, administrative coercion 
and settlers (Cabral, 1969:81).(1) 
The colonial state, as an appendage of a metropolitan state and an 
agent of the CMP, provided for the domination of the CMP over pre-capital-
ist relations - despite the physical absence of this mode of production 
initially. This domination undermined and restructured the pre-capitalist 
economy (Bernstein, 1979a:423/4). Colonial state activity was increasingly 
devoted to military and unproductive expenditures, and the alliance with 
inefficient pre-capitalist groups meant that surplus was wasted (Hymer, 
1972:51). Empirically, there were a wide range of variations concerning 
indigenous co~nodity production - see chapter thirty-three. In many cases, 
however, the colonial state wanted to increase commodity relations in order 
to raise revenue for local administration and for imperialist investment. 
To this end it contributed to developing the structures of a peripheral 
economic system (see chapter twenty-five) (Bernstein, 1979a:427). 
Historically, it was largely due to political unrest and the Second 
World War, that the colonial state took on the specific role of respons-
ibilitv for promoting colonial development, and expanded its apparatus to 
control exports, imports and internal marketing {Dutkiewicz and Williams, 
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1987:41). But it failed to moderni~e the means of production as a means 
to generate revenue (Kay, 1975:106). In addition, the colonial state also 
directly and indirectly tended to suppress the development of an indigenous 
capitalist class (see next chapter). The development of an indigenous 
capitalist class via state accumulation was inhibited by the fact that the 
colonial bureaucracy was often comprised of foreigners and, in Africa, also 
by the absence of large landed-property (Amin, in 1974:363-6). 
3. THE POST-COLONIAL STATE. 
There is some controversy over whether the post-colonial state is 
characterized by facilitating the export and consumption of surplUS, or 
whether it appropriates this surplus for itself (Alavi, 1972:75; Leys, 
1976). In fact, to explain the use of surplus by the state, one has to 
look at the underlying class dynamics (Ziemann and Lanzensdorfer, 1977). 
Baran argues that in underdeveloped countries, ~it is only the state 
that is in a position to mobilize the surplus potentially present in the 
economic system and to employ it for the expansion of the nation~s product-
ive facilities~ (Baran, 1962:223). Likewise, Dobb holds that with 
independence, governments in underdeveloped countries have stressed the 
potential role of the state in consciously mobilizing resources under a 
national plan as a crucial impetus of development (Dobb, 1962:33). But 
both observations need to be reassessed in terms of the interests and 
capacities of the classes that have relations to the peripheral state. 
Thus, the economic role of the post-colonial state 
has to be located in relation to the possibilities (and 
contradictions) of accumulation by the ruling classes 
which have formed since independence, whether they are 
reproduced and seek to accumulate on the basis of 
individual or state property (or some combination ••• ), 
and in various alliances with international capitals. 
(Bernstein 1979a:433) 
In the context described above, it was often not an indigenous bour-
geoisie that led the struggle against colonialism and inherited state power 
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after independence (Cabral, 1969:57/8). The other side of the coin of the 
weak bourgeoisie has been the weakness of the proletariat and the peasant 
classes. For these reasons, the petty bourgeoisie - usually assumed by 
Marxists to be a lesser political force than other classes - has come to 
the fore in the Third World. 
Generally speaking, the class position of members of the state 
apparatus is less important than their function as part of a social categ-
ory actualizing the role of the state in the ultimate interests of the 
ruling classes (Poulantzas, 1972:246/7). In many peripheral economies, 
however, the absence of strong economically-based ruling classes places a 
large amount of autonomy on the governing petty bourgeoisie. This govern-
ing group has often tried to develop itself as a bourgeoisie by using the 
post-colonial state not only to erect the necessary conditions (infrastruc-
ture, credit, etc.) that would benefit private capital, but also as a basis 
for its own immediate accumulation of funds. 
Conditions have favoured this situation in some respects. Capitalist 
development can occur without a national bourgeoisie, if other local 
classes can use the state and international capital to this end (Ferner, 
1975:280). While a colony is tied to its metropole, a neo-colony is more 
responsive to the whole world market (Mamdani, 1977:48). As noted in chapt-
er nineteen, independence ends the monopoly control of a single power, and 
dependence becomes multi-lateralized (ibid:222; Warren, 1973). While over-
all dependence is not reduced, a potential increase in state power is the 
result (Barratt-Brown, 1976:273, 278). In a word, national independence 
combined with the internationalization of capital has meant that states can 
play multinational firms off against each other (Warren, 1973:138/9).(2) 
Nowhere in Africa, however, does it seem that such possibilities have 
been successfully exploi·ted to generate either national development, or a 
fully-fledged national bourgeoisie with an interest in and capacity for 
development. While related to the overwhelming character of factors 
J 
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contributing to underdevelopment, the failure ot this trend is also in part 
the result of the internal character of the post-colonial state - viz. 
inefficient, corrupt, wasteful, overly-bureaucratic. The formation of the 
governing petty bourgeoisie and its associated class character is another 
contributing factor. As an historical generalization, it has been argued 
that the petty bourgeoisie's aspirations under colonialism were not to 
change the structure of underdevelopment, nor to develop national product--
ion, but to be promoted within the existing structure (Hymer, 1972:58). 
Many had, in fact, been groomed to be intermediaries of imperialism 
(Mamdani, 1977:221). This petty bourgeoisie found itself unable to rule 
independently of imperialism (ibid:223). The weakness of its economic and 
political base rendered it a dependent ruling class (ibid:313). Although 
formal political rule was transferred to its members, economic mechanisms 
kept ttlem in the world capitalist system (Barratt-Brown, 1976:256). It was 
a dependent, underdeveloped and unconsolidated class dependent on state 
resources for financing its limited accumulation (Mamdani, 1977:315). The 
role of the post-colonial state in economic development remains prominent 
because ot the continued weakness of local petty bourgeois and bourgeois 
classes to develop privately (Amin, 1974:372; Woddis, 1977:276).(3) 
The overdeveloped features of the colonial state have remained, and 
actually proliferated. There is a hypertrophy of administrative activities 
as evidenced in the growth and direction of public spending (Amin, 1974:-
197). To an extent, the hypertrophy of the post-colonial state is attrib-
utable to public expectations and the corresponding institutionalized 
developmental role of the peripheral state, and is therefore also relative-
ly autonomous of class control motives. However, it is also in part due to 
bourgeois and petty bourgeois interests in widening their access to state 
resources and extending state control over the prOducers of these resources 
(see chapters thirty-three and thirty-four). 
llle same interests have also meant that the post-colonial state has 
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tended to devote considerable resources to combatting political instability 
-- at the expense of development. (4) Similarly, the post-colonial state has 
also rlali to meet the requirement of creating an ef fective terr i tor ial uni ty 
and ideological leqitimacy in the social formation (Saul, 1974). While 
these may be preconditions for development, in themselves they are not a 
productive use of resources. 
4. THE DEBATE OVER THE KENYAN STATE. 
The issues raised above have been the subject of a lively debate 
initiated by Colin Leys about the developmental significance of Kenyan 
capitalists and Kenyan state. A number of issues are confused in this 
debate, arising from the conflation of four distinct points: 
(i) the political and developmental character of Kenyan capital-
ists (comprador or national); 
(ii) the (broader) issue of the development of capitalist 
relations in Kenya; 
(iii) the development of productive capacity in Kenya; 
(iv) the role of the Kenyan state in development. 
Kaplinsky has criticised what he sees as Leys' emphasis on (i) and 
what he sees as Leys's implied conclusion that there is an indigenous 
national bourgeoisie successfully using the state for development in Kenya. 
He attempts to shift attention to the issue of (iii), where he argues that 
indigenous industrial accumulation by local capital is flawed due to its 
being based on an alliance with foreign capital that has only temporarily 
located production in the low-wage periphery (1980:104). 
In response, Leys has argued that his evidence showed only African 
entry into manufacturing, and that he was not characterizing this as an 
indigenous industrial bourgeoisie (1980:109). Yet, it does appear that for 
Leys, if Kenyan capitalists are not quite a -national bourgeoisie-, they 
are still part of a situation where Kenya is developing. This is evident 
in his criticism of Kaplinsky and dependency theory for minimizing 
peripheral development: ~when the fact of such development cannot be 
denied, it is decried as inegalitarian, unbalanced, anti-popular; and when 
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this is admitted ... it is finally dismissed as being at most short-lived and i I 
illusory~' (ibid:112). The nub of the issue is thus the character of this 
"'development .... , and how Kenyan capitalists and the state relate to it~ 
One pointer to analysing this is provided by Beckman's intervention in 
the debate. Like Kaplinsky, Beckman appears to have doubts about whether 
I 
Kenya~s growth amounts to development per se. He focusses attention on II 
" 
(ii) ... arguing effectively that capitalist relations (as distinct from the 
issue of national development) are not in contradiction with imperialism 
(1980:57). He points out that close links between domestic capital 
(private and state) and foreign capital (i.e. (i)) are compatible with the 
low employment and linkage generating capacity of Kenyan growth (i.e. 
compatible with a negative interpretation of (iii» (ibid:54). What Leys 
has done ... it would seem, has explained (i) and (ii) in terms of (iv - the 
state), and deduced (iii) as positive productive capacity from them. This 
is a false deduction, however, because attention to (iii) in Kenya shows 
that this is not so, and that the four phenomena (African capitalists ... 
capitalist relations, state and productive capacity) are actually quite 
distinct, and they do not add up to development. 
In my view, all four of these elements are significant, provided they 
are seen in terms of their relation to each other. I therefore disagree 
with Godfrey (1982:274) who scorns element (i), trivializing it as 
concerning the nationality of capitalists' passports. However, he is 
correct in noting that rather than a national bourgeoisie, Kenya has a 
local bourgeoisie within a (dominant - GB) international system of 
production (ibid:289). In this observation, issues (i) and (ii) are 
married, and it is possible to see that the progeny is not a positive 
interpretation of (iii). 
I would argue that Kenya's bourgeoisie is not #national" in that 
despite its use of the state ... it is still unable to develop Kenya's 
productive capacity because of its subservient place in the international 
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capitalist system. In this regard, Kitching has made a valuable contribut-
ion to the debate. He argues that the Kenyan state is not an agent of 
either international or local capital (or fractions of either), but a site 
of struggle which results in contradictory outcomes; and that the state 
itself fractures into contending forces in this struggle (1985:132). I 
would argue that in this struggle, Kenyan capitalists certainly are a 
factor, and they have a contradictory significance for both the development 
and the underdevelopment of productive capacity in Kenya. 
This is not the place to embark on empirical analysis of the Kenyan 
state, but the general points that emerge here are pertinent for analysing 
the role of rural development planning in the periphery. The Kenyan debate 
highlights that the peripheral state, indigenous capitalists, capitalist 
relations and development are distinct and not necessarily connected 
phenomena. While state development planning may therefore accomodate the 
interests of indigenous capitalists (and the capitalist aspirations of a 
petty bourgeoisie), and/or the interests of international capital, these 
are not necessarily geared towards, or realized in, developing national 
productive capacity. The point is that some development plans may aim 
primarily for one of these objectives, others at more than one, and some 
may combine all aspects. While this is not to say very much, it sets useful 
parameters that point to the ambiguous and variegated character of the 
develo~nental significance of the peripheral state and its social base. (5) 
5. THE POLITICS OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN THE THIRD WORLD. 
Prior to the 1960s, it was questionable whether there should be 
development planning for the Third World (Kollontai, 1970:3).(6) Colonial 
planning differed from both capitalist and socialist experience in that it 
did not plan primarily for production, but rather for infrastructure geared 
to extroversion of the economy (Seidman, 1978:301, Lea and Chaudri 1983b:8, 
Birnberg and Resnick, 1975). In addition, it was permeated by the broader 
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functions and character of the colonial state, and in this regard, politic-
al stability and domination was important. Post-colonial development 
planning takes place in the context of the politics of the post-colonial 
state, and stability and domination are still a major feature. As a result, 
both pre- and post-independence, development has often been first and 
foremost a political strategy with political goals, rather than part of an 
integrated national development strategy dealing with the Agrarian Ques-
tion, Indeed, in some instances, political goals and resolution of the 
Agrarian Question have been contradictory_ Rural social engineering has 
taken place for political reasons which are counterproductive to the 
development of productive capacity. (See chapter thirty-six). 
5. CONCLUSION. 
This chapter has described the state and political context of rural 
development planning in the periphery, and this is taken up again in Part 
J. I have argued that the overdeveloped character of the colonial and 
post-colonial state has underdeveloped productive capacity in the Third 
World. The colonial state also inhibited the development of indigenous 
capitalist relations, although the governing petty bourgeoisie post-
independence has used the state to try to develop these relations. However, 
in the case of Kenya, this has not been sufficient to develop the product-
ive capacity of the country as a whole, with the developmental character of 
the state being ambiguous rather than wholly negative or wholly positive. 
At the same time, it is clear that the development of the interests of the 
petty bourgeoisie through the state has not been the same as development 
as such. I also argue that development planning in the periphery has often 
been undertaken with political rather than developmental goals, and that 
this may be counterproductive to development. A more detailed account, 
drawing from development plans in Tropical Africa appears in the next 
chapter, highlighting many of these issues. 
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EHJNOTES 
1. Indirect rule was bolstered by the form of the eMP in the Third World: 
merchant capital acting as an agent of industrial capital (Kay, 1975:104). 
This merchant capital was dependent on - and it served to prop up - pre-
capitalist economic and political forms. Indirect rule could rest on local 
groups whose own power derived from non-capitalist relations (ibid:105). 
2. Thus the idea that imperialism stunts development underestimates this 
new potential of the state (Evans, 1977:44). For example, in Brazil, the 
state organized tri-pe ventures between itself, local and foreign capital. 
These ventures gave local classes access to and a degree of control over 
high technology and international finance (ibid:55). The nature of the 
mUltinationals did not alter, but the state's incentives and restrictions 
led to basic industries being developed (ibid:63). (See chapter nineteen). 
3. Taking all these factors into account helps to explain why Africa 
stands out as a prime case of the failure of peripheral capitalist develop-
ment. In Latin America, classes have been strong enough to constitute 
authentic ruling (as opposed to merely governing) classes. In these cases, 
the character of the state has been given more by the influence of the 
dominant class(es), than by the class composition of members of its 
apparatuses, and the autonomy of the bureaucracy is far more limited. In 
Peru, for example, contrary to some interpretations that the military 
government was creating - against the interests of the "'dominant", landed 
and mercantile classes - an industrial bourgeoisie ex nihilio, this govern-
ment actually represented the interests of an already existing and powerful 
industrial bourgeoisie (Ferner, 1979:272/3). 
4. In 1976, the Third World spent four percent of its GNP on defence, and 
although this is not higher than the Western rate, it is a serious drain in 
a situation of underdevelopment (Harrison, 1981:384). 
5. In the literature, the debate over the Kenyan state concerns largely 
the question of industrial capitalist development, unlike the focus in this 
and the next parts of this thesis which is on rural development. However, 
the same arguments about the distinctions between class character, class 
relations, the state and development apply equally to agriculture. 
6. While capitalism has always featured social engineering in establish-
ing and maintaining capitalist relations of production, economic develop-
ment planning was alien to much of its genesis. Western planning began in 
France, and has always differed fundamentally from socialist planning in 
that it regulates capitalist production and exchange rather than replaces 
it (Seidman, 1978:301; Kollontai, 1970:18). It is the case that many 
capitalist planning policies do involve direct state initiation of, and 
participation in, production itself, but this is still within the broad 
context of private capitalist relations. 
328 
I ., 
I 
:;. 
PLANNED DEVELOPMENT. 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES 
CHAPTER TWENTY NIt£: 
RUHAL D£VELOPI"ENT STRATEGIES 
1. Introduction. 
2. State~ capital and planned agricultural development. 
3. Plantations and settler agriculture. 
4. Progressive farmers. 
5. Control of Moment C: marketing. 
b. Contract farming and outgrowers. 
7. Settlement schemes • 
8. Conclusion. 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
This chapter analyses a variety of development strategies~ drawing 
examples from Tropical Africa. Although the region covers over forty 
countries and four agro-ecological zones (La-Anyane, 1985:1), its national 
economies have shared many similar historical experiences, and they have 
also differed significantly from those elsewhere. Colonialism and neo--
colonialism are important factors in this. Occasional cases from other 
situations are cited where appropriate. All examples are intended as 
illustrative rather than sUbstantive points, and not as an historical 
political economy of African agriculture. Kenya, the most frequently cited 
case (here and in the subsequent chapters) is used because external inter-
vention into agriculture has been pervasive in the country~s modern history 
(Heyer, 1981:90), and because this intervention has - in certain respects 
- been the most successful in the region (Carlsen, 1980:11). 
2. STArE, CAPITAL ANU PLANNED AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT. 
The initiation of development plans by state and capital in Africa has 
varied in terms of rationale, time and type. The common economic purpose 
behind these plans has sometimes been not so much development of national 
productive forces as development ot the interests of governments, 
international capital and (post-independence) a local bourgeois/petty 
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bourgeois class. As argued in the previous chapter, the post-independence 
rlvper'trophy ot state development planning and development pro jects in the 
Thlrd World needs to be seen in thlS light. 
Rural development planninq in most of the examples below may emanate 
trom the state, but it is clearly interlinked with the demands and 
capaclties ot prlvate (usually international) capital. The shortage of 
state funds and technical/managerial skills ensures a major role for 
foreign aid and investment in development programmes (Bernstein, 1979a:-
433/4). This is in infrastructure for development of commodity relations 
(communications, energy, storage, processinq, health and educational 
facilities), and in direct planning and financing the programmes (ibid). 
Accordinq to Bernstein, this often leads to an alliance of state and 
(internatlonal) capital: the former organizes primarily the political, 
ideological and administrative conditions for the penetration of capital; 
the latter organizes the technical and financial means of penetration (via 
productive capital, financial capital and development agencies) (ibid:434). 
However, it would be wrong to underrate the actual financial involvement 
(via budget grants, shares or loans) by the state in many development prog-
rammes -- an involvement which usually benef its pr ivate capi tal (see chapter 
thirty-six). Nonetheless, even state-owned schemes are still often control-
led ultimately by international capital via export crops and inputs (Raik-
es, 19/B:31/). In such cases, control of Moment A is formally vested in 
the qovernments, althouqh in reality the international firms possess most 
of the means of production. To greater or lesser extents, control of 
Moments Band C is almost entirely vested in international capital. 
The ability of international capital and local ruling classes to 
appropriate and accumulate is closely related to the development of 
corrrnodity production, and rural development projects and programmes are 
lmportant stimuli in this regard (Bernstein, 1979a:433). State development 
plans have generally aimed to increase and control commodity prOduction by 
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the peasantry, who in much of tropical and central Africa are the bulk of 
the population and who post-independence earn a significant portion of 
foreign exchange (Hill, 1977:25). Peasant production has the advantage of 
providing cheap food and raw materials, as well as revenue (Heyer et al, 
1981:5). But while governments and the ruling interests want a productive 
peasantry, they also want one that remains under secure control and which 
does not use its productivity to wrest economic concessions (ibid). An 
independent peasantry is difficult to tax, and its economic power gives it 
control over local decision-making bodies. Peasant commodity producers have 
a degree of independence deriving from their ownership of means of product-
ion and subsistence (Heyer et aI, 1980:5). They can set the terms of 
supply of produce, or they can refuse to supply altogether (ibid). 
In order to benefit from cheap peasant production therefore, govern-
ments - and multi-national corporations - need to control the conditions of 
sale and even of production. In certain cases, particularly when pre-
capitalist production is not commodity production, and where conditions 
inhibit the transformation of tribesmen into the various peasant classes, 
governments and capital have also confronted the ""the peasant problem'" by 
introducing wholly capitalist relations of production. 
3. PLANTATIONS AND SETTLER AGRICULTURE. 
Prior to World War II, the production of cash crops in tropical Africa 
was in many instances dominated by two forms of capitalist farming: 
company-owned plantations and individually-owned settler farms. The latter 
played a key role in securing colonial state intervention against peasant 
commodity producers who competed in the produce market, and who had an 
alternative to working as wage-labourers for the settlers (Muntemba, 1978:-
61). The plantations too made use of state controls to secure and control a 
labour force, although they also engaged in buying, processing and market-
lng peasant produce (Dinham and Hines, 1983:49). 
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For several reasons~ both forms ot capitalist farming have failed to 
spread across agriculture in tropical Africa. Concomitantly, there has 
been no wholesale activity to separate local producers from their means of 
production and transform them into full time wage-labourers owning only 
their labour-power. In addition, it has not been easy for an indigenous 
class to accumulate sufficient wealth and means of production to be able to 
hire t ull time wage-labourers. I f resistance by rural producers to proletar--
ianization is one factor constraining agrarian capitalism in Africa, the 
cheapness of their production helps to explain why capital stays out of 
direct agricultural production. In Nigeria, for example, state and capital 
rejected plantations because peasants were already developing cheap export 
production (Williams, 1985:145). As regards plantations, direct investment 
in this type of capitalist farming has declined, with companies relating to 
African farming through several other strategies (see below).(l) 
4. PROGRESSIVE FARMERS 
A strategy of planned development that is different to plantations and 
settler agriculture is that aimed at the -peasantization~ of pre-capitalist 
producers. Taxation, land and education policies played an important part 
here in raising the cash needs of pre-capitalist producers, and compelling 
a degree of cor«noditization of agricultural produce and labour power. In 
parts of East Africa, colonial merchant companies supported the development 
of African commodity production - even against the settler capitalist farms 
(Mamdani, 1977:bO; Van Zwanenburg, 1974:445; Williams, 1984:16). 
In this context, Tropical Africa has seen the use of the~progressive~ 
or ~master~ farmer development strategy by both the colonial and post-
colonial state. Larqely hladditive"" and .... growth-centred''' in character (see 
chapter twenty-seven), this strategy has aimed to increase peasant output 
through upgrading agricultural methods and diffusing improved means of 
production. Associated projects have ranged from extension services, 
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teaching agriculture in the schools, and the provision of roads and 
railways. Growth-centred features are evident where a particular programme 
(eg. extension advice) is aimed at selected areas and farmers reckoned to 
have developmental potential. Known as a ufocal point .... approach, this 
orientation began under colonialism and has continued in many forms since 
independence (Coulson, 1981:58; Williams, 1985:153). 
The .... progressive farmer .... strategy has also involved attempts at a type 
of land reform - as in Kenya under the Swynnerton plan which involved 
registering title to land, and the consolidation of scattered plots. In 
this regard, the strategy may also have a transformative dimension. 
Credit schemes are often part of Umaster farmer u development 
strategies, though they also represent a different kind of intervention 
into agriculture than that focussing on farm methods and physical infra-
structure. Such schemes are intended to raise productive capacity by 
affecting relations of utilization: facilitating and indeed stimulating the 
acquisition of improved means of production. Bates (1981:109) sees it as a 
paradox that African governments subsidize production through this credit 
mechanism, at the same time as taxing farm output. But this ""paradox"" is 
quite logical in fact: in order to tax output, it is first necessary to 
ensure that there is the output at all. 
To the limited extent (see next chapter) that the ~progressive farmer .... 
approach has raised rural productivity, this strateqy has characteristic-
ally benefited a minority of farmers, assisting their development into 
middle peasants, simple commodity producers and kulaks. However, this 
development has a negative side in it for the initiators of these progr-
ammes, particularly as regards kulaks. While the strategy is intended to 
supply bureaucrats and the class/es they represent with peasant surplus, it 
is difficult to secure this from a rich peasantry engaged in private accum-
ulation (Raikes, 1978:299, 314). Where there is competition among traders, 
rich (and middle) peasants are not wholly subordinated to the prices that 
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suit state and capital (Williams, 1984:59). A conflict of interests may 
arise between government and peasants, with the former attempting to 
restrain middle peasants and simple commodity producers from developing 
into kulaks and to restrict the development of kulaks into farmer capital-
ists (Heyer, 1981:92). This has commonly led to state and capital exclud-
ing indigenous capital from investment in marketing, and using co-operativ-
es and parastatals to control this arena (see below). For this and other 
reasons, there has been a thrust in some state and capitalist circles 
against the elitist character of the master farmer emphasis. Thus the same 
I 
i 
social forces that helped to block the full and generalized proletarianiz-
ation of African producers as desired by settler capital, and which helped 
I to develop middle peasants and to set a stratum of this class on the road to kulak or simple commodity producer status, have sometimes acted to 
restrain the growth of rich peasants and simple commodity producers, and 
thereby the growth of an indigenous capitalist class. 
5. CONTROL OF MOMENT C: MARKETING. 
Regarding intervention that affects relations of distribution, much 
development planning has involved the institutions of co-operatives, 
marketing boards and crop authorities. A common mechanism for appropriating 
peasant surplus labour is through the unequal exchange of their produce via 
these institutions (Bernstein, 1979a:434). Marketing boards were set up 
under colonialism, sometimes by commodity producing farmers themselves, 
with the purpose of benefiting producers (Bates, 1981:12-14). However, the 
state soon found ways to divert surplus from the boards to itself, and this 
increased greatly after independence (ibid).(2) Kitching analyses this as 
the state functioning as merchant capital, extracting surplus through mark-
eting board price mark-ups between the buying and selling of commodities, 
and he analyses how various taxes also achieve this indirectly (1980:414,-
416-7). For these reasons, it may be misleading to portray marketing boards 
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as if they were all part of a developnent strategy as such. In Kenya, 
in tea and coffee production, boards did playa role in encouraging output, 
but in Nigeria they have taxed produce to the extent of threatening exist-
ing production and marketing levels (Williams, 1981:49). 
Since the 1930s, various African governments have also set up co-
operatives and incorporated them into centralized state marketing systems. 
Originally, this involved export crops, but since independence it has 
spread wider to encompass local food commodity producers who previously 
escaped the controls (Heyer et aI, 1981:5/6). Co-operatives have thus 
found favour not for their collective values, but due to their use as an 
instrument of public administration (Williams, 1981a:25). 
However, these controls involve only the level of the market, and they 
are not very effective - generating massive smuggling and hoarding in 
response (Bates, 1981:82). At any rate, this control does not affect the 
conditions of production. Farmers can (and do) resist by switching crops 
or even withdrawing from the market in the face of low prices (as in the 
case of small-scale coffee growers in Kenya) (Bates, 1981:82). As against 
this, rural development settlement schemes are one means of forcing or 
soliciting peasants to directly conform their production to the require-
ments of outsiders (Heyer et aI, 1981:8).(3) 
Crop authorities do, however, affect production through policies that, 
in addition to the restrictions on volumes and prices of marketed produce, 
limit what should and should not be grown, how, when and where (Raikes, 
1978:295/6; Mamdani, 1977:142; Muntemba, 1978:60). 
6. CONTRACT FARMING AND OUTGROWERS. 
Contract farming by outgrowers represents a joint strategy by capital 
and the state for intervening in production. Control of peasant production 
is achieved through a contractually enforced heterogeneous relation of 
production which transforms producers into outgrowers. 
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Cuntr act fanninq focusses on ['idleC fanners producing cash crops for 
dqru-industries. COfltraLt producer's are tied to multinationals through 
cleJits that tldve to be paid for in produce. In Kenya by 1978, there were 
abuut 1.5 million small farms, twelve percent of which wer-e producing 
thirty percent of smallholder marketed produce through contracts in this 
way (Dint-lam and Hines, 1983:92; O'Keefe, 1984:162). 
An interesting Kenyan case illustrates some of the dynamics involved 
in this strategy. Brooke Bond Liebig Ltd has been active in Kenyan tea and 
coffee for 60 years, and through contract farming has now adapted to 
independence and been able to expand its investments. After independence 
and the rise of African smallholding cash crop producion, Brooke Bond was 
prevented from expanding its agricultural holdings. However, it still 
remained in charge of processing, and insisted on high standards - with 
many government extension officers having been seconded from the company 
(Dinham and Hines, 1983:102). Initially thre-atened by this smallholder 
production, the company saw that this development was not only inevitable 
politically, but also that it could still influence and profit from it. 
Consequently, the company won strict standards over the quality of peasant 
tea, which enabled it to blend high quality tea bought cheap from small-
holders with its own lower quality tea picked on the estates (ibid). 
Brooke Bond still makes much of its money from its own plantations, but now 
also from the manufacture and marketing of tea produced by smallholders 
contracted to the Kenyan Tea Development Authority. (4) 
On capital's side, contract farming is often a strategy of vertical 
integration to supply processing plants (Raikes, 1978:286,307; Goodman et 
aI, 1984:209). To this end, it is (like many settlement schemes) often 
combined with a nucleus estate, as in the case of the Mumias sugar scheme 
(Mulaa, 1981:89). By 1979, there were 13 000 outgrowers at Mumias. The 
company does the ploughing, harrowing, furrowing and also - if farmer 
defaults - weeding. It also supplies fertilizer and transport to mills. 
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These services are given on credit, and deducted (plus 8 percent interest) 
at harvest (ibid:91). The Booker McConnell company involved in the design-
ing of the scheme initially had low expectations from the outgrowers, and 
wanted the emphasis to be on the nucleus estate (i.e. treating the project 
like a plantation venture) (Buch Hansen and Marcussen, 1982:25). While the 
outgrowers have proved to be successfully productive, the nucleus estate 
means that the enterprise is not totally dependent on the small holders 
(Williams, 1981a:25). Booker McConnell makes its money by holding five 
percent of equity, managing the factory and nucleus estate, and getting 
part of the profit (Dinham and Hines, 1983:86). In addition, a subsidiary 
supplied the technology for the factory (ibid:87). 
7. SETTLEMENT SCHEMES. 
Settlement schemes characteristically involve changes in land tenure 
and correspondingly, producer control of this key means of production is 
typically weakened, if not wholly excluded. Such schemes enable outside 
control over all Moments of production and especially over Moment B, 
concerning the timing, quality, and use of inputs, as well as Moment C 
concerning payment systems and channels for distribution (see Raikes, 
1978:308; Heyer et aI, 1981:8). This approach is often dubbed a transform--
ation approach as opposed to the -single-focus- approach in the ~progress-
ive farmer- strategy because its total control facilitates comprehensive 
development measures (see Williams, 1981a:24; Cliffe, 1978:337). 
While peasant agriculture under other forms of intervention is un-
reliable because peasants are - up to a point - capable of withdrawing 
into subsistence, agricultural settlement schemes eliminate this possibil-
ity (Hill, 1977:27). It has been argued that development schemes aim 
to generate the development of an undifferentiated 
middle peasantry, producing high-grade export crops 
under controlled and increasingly technically advanced 
methods of production and to avoid the uncontrollable 
aspects of rich peasant differentiation (Cowen, 1976, 
quoted by Raikes, 1978:286). 
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One example of this arrangement in Kenya is the Million Acre settlement 
scheme Qegun in 1962. Independence made way for 70 000 small farms on this 
and other settlement schemes (Heyer, 1981:107). Settlers became tied into 
controlled cornmodity production through their need to generate cash to 
repay the state loans they had received to buy land on the scheme. 
Elsewhere, settlement schemes (often combined with irrigation) have 
involved a package of tight production and marketing controls where 
settlers only have tenure on the basis of performance. They may also 
involve a package of incentives such as water supplies, housing, health 
care, and schooling (Heyer et aI, 1980:9). On these projects, a scheme 
authority not only supervises peasant production, but also runs a 
capitalist nucleus estate. The latter often provides transport, processing 
and marketing facilities, and labour for extra work on settlers' plots. 
The role of international capital in this development strategy may be 
analysed as withdrawing "upstream", and controlling production through 
management, with the state taking responsibility for everything else (Buch-
Hansen and Marcussen, 1982:35). Although direct private capitalist 
investment in production is absent, companies provide information and 
advice, and become managers and consultants in large developments, 
influencing and controlling the choice of particular cash crops, and the 
markets that these are sold in (Oinhffio and Hines, 1983:158). The strategy 
also enables companies to glean surplus through supplying advanced means of 
production such as fertilizers and machinery (see Heyer et al~ 1981:8). 
8. CONCLUSION 
The development strategies discussed in this chapter, as well as other 
strategies such as moishavim (see Halliday, 1979:113), may be exhibited in 
a given social formation both singly and in combined form. Thus Nigeria's 
third development plan (1975-80) included setting up large irrigation 
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projects, supplying extension and inputs to capitalist and progressive 
farmers, promoting high yielding crops, and bypassing peasants with state 
companies (Williams, 1985:153-5; see also Riddell's recommendations for 
Zimbabwe as discussed by Williams, 1982). 
This view of development strategies as facilitating exploitation and 
control over rural producers by governmental or commercial agencies 
(or both) is corroborated by what happens on many projects. But one 
important factor limits the applicability of this view: many strategies are 
too unviable to realize such goals. This is discussed in the chapters 
thirty-three and -four. 
ENlNlTES 
1. Plantations continue in some cases. The Del Monte company was hired by 
the Kenyan government in the 1960s to manage a scheme where smallholders 
produced pineapples. Del Monte initially won stringent government controls 
over existing producers and strict licensing of newcomers. By 1968, the 
company decided to phase out smallholders altogether in favour of estate 
production which would give them control over the quality and size of 
production and suit their need for simultaneous harvesting. The company has 
the right to remit its profits (Dinham and Hines, 1982:105-7). 
2. Thus instead of cushioning producers against world market price 
reductions, boards in both Ghana and Nigeria passed the burden directly on 
to the producers (Bates, 1981:15). This strategy prevailed in the 1950s 
and ensured marketing board monopolies over sales (Williams, 1985:148). 
3. Bates defines agricultural policy as government actions that affect 
prices and income through intervening in markets for agricultural produce, 
farm inputs, and manufactured goods consumed by rural households (1981:3). 
Quite why he ignores policy interventions in production is unclear, but it 
means that his overall argument misses the significance of other develop-
ments in African agriculture (see sections 7 and 8 below). 
4. Another company engaged in direct contract farming in Kenya is BAT 
Kenya Developments Ltd which since 1976 has a strictly controlled contract 
chicken growers scheme. Twenty contract farmers take 10 000 chicks a week, 
rear them and return them to BAT (K) for slaughtering, processing, packag-
ing and marketing (Dinham and Hines, 1982:109). BAT (K) also contracts 
small producers to grow tobacco at a set quality using company loans and 
technical inputs - and is also the sole buyer of leaf tobacco in Kenya 
(Buch-Hansen and Marcussen, 1982:94). 
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1. INTRODUCTION. 
Development strategies concern the allocation of resources l and this 
immediately raises the issue of inequality and development. Criticism of 
much development policy from the "'humanist ...... perspective (see chapter two) 
has focussed on the moral dimension of this issue l and the economic signi-
ficance has been relatively neglected. This chapter therefore analyses the 
inequality in rural development from the standpoint of productive capacity_ 
2. PLANNED DEVELOPJVIENT AND INEQUALITY. 
Rural development strategies tend to accentuate inequalities l whether 
intentionally or not. There are important exceptions l for example as noted 
by Cowen (1981a:122; 1981:71). Kenya"'s central province has seen a trend to 
egalitarian middle peasant status rather than polarized capitalist/wage-
labourer relations l and one could argue that rural development strategies 
have contributed to this (see also Such Hansen and Marcussen l 1982:130). 
However I even this example is disputed (see Anyang"'Nyong"'ol 1981:118/9; 
Njonjo, 1981:37; Carlsen l 1980:219). The general situation is therefore one 
of inequality. 
This can be traced in the first instance to budgetary allocations. 
Tanzania, in contradiction to its stated policy of promoting peasant 
agriculture I spends only 12 1 5 of its national budget on agriculture. And 
within this allocation l inequality is again characteristically reproduced: 
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eighty percent of Tanzania~s agriculture spending goes on large farming 
projects. Consequently~ it is estimated that only two percent of the 
natjonal budget goes to small farmers (Dinham and Hines~1983:120). In 
Malawi~ government spending on agriculture has increased since 1964 in 
favour of a few large projects. From nil in the 1964 budget, these proj-
ects accounted for 25 percent of the 1967 budget~ and 50 percent in 1971 
(Thomas, 1975:38). The Sudan's Gezira scheme has been hailed for distrib-
uting income to the 30 000 tenant families, the 2000 permanent technicians 
and supervisors, and the 150 000 labourers, as well as benefiting the 
commerce of two towns and providing~ via tax, the salaries of many civil 
servants (Grove, 1979:118). Yet Gezira's privilege is still relative to 
the deprivation of other areas (Barnett, 1977:21). 
The content of development programmes further tends to emphasize 
inequality. In Tanzania, colonial settlement schemes aimed to develop a 
class substantially better off than the majority of rural dwellers (Raikes, 
1978:307/8). The idea was to create a farming bourgeoisie from "'yeomen""-
graduating to 30 - 50 acre farms worked by wage-labour (Coulson, 1981:70). 
In Western Nigeria, schemes were intended to create what Hill (1977:28) 
calls a -public sector rural bourgeoisie-. To this end, each of the 50 
settlers on a scheme were given 30 acre farms - ten times larger than the 
average peasant holding. With the use of advanced techniques, settlers 
were expected to earn two-thirds more than ordinary producers outside of 
the settlement (ibid).(1') In Zambia, a colonial agricultural scheme 
set up 200 -outstanding farmers- with 200 - 400 acre plots who received the 
bulk of state agricultural help and credit (Foster, 1969:110). The 
remaining 95 percent of local people were left with five acre plots and 
very little aid (ibid). The same strategies aimed at a minority of 
,uprogressive farmers'" have been used in Uganda (Seidman, 1977:164), Kenya 
(Leo, 1979), and Tanzania (Bryceson, 1980:306/7). 
Even where inequality is not the aim, it has frequently been the 
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effect.(2) Tanzanian land reform meant that wheat plots of 10 to 40 acres 
were alloted to worthy applicants. But local officials secured much larger 
plots for themselves (Raikes, 1978:302). A similar phenomenon occurred in 
Zambia (Cliffe, 1978:337). The use of state dairy facilities by Ugandan 
farmers, and the functioning of Senegalese co-operatives, worked out in a 
similarly unequal way (Seidman, 1978:166; Kom, 1977:162).(3) 
In many of Kenya~s development programmes, the same inegalitarian 
development strategies can be observed. For example, government agents 
offering agricultural services were selective in whom they contacted, and 
inequalities in literacy status and access to radios between rural groups 
exacerbated the way the services benefited some and not others (Hunt, 
1979:283, footnote 26). Kenyan loans, theoretically available to all, were 
only used by three percent of the rural classes (Leys, 1977b:352). In 
effect, state credit is accessible only to those making large purchases -
which excludes poorer producers from benefiting (Steeves, 1978:126). 
Under the Special Rural Development Programme (SRDP), a credit scheme was 
aimed at poor farmers in Vihiga, but the rich were the first to benefit 
(Oyugi, 1981:171-4;186). Twelve percent of smallholders accounted for most 
of Kenya~s smallholder marketed output, reflecting (in part) the fact that 
only a minority group of wealthier smallholders were able to risk cash crop 
production without jeopardizing household subsistence, and to use extens-
ion, processing and marketing facilities to this end (Oinham and Hines, 
1983:92; Williams, 1984:14; Kitching, 1980:374; Hunt, 1979:271). 
Benefits of extension in Kenya have been consumed by larger farmers. 
The SRDP aimed to experiment with ways of diffusing innovations to farmers, 
but, as it happened, innovations tended to be directed to the people who 
had already accepted them (Oyugi, 1981:185). One evaluation of the 
programme concluded that SRDP model farmers should not just reflect 
emergent progressive leadership. ~Indeed the challenge is to help the less 
progressive and not just the progressive farmers~ (IDS 1972:B-4). Benefits 
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linked to Kenyan co-operatives have similarly been uneven: all members pay 
equal subscriptions, but the benefits have been consumed disproportionately 
by larger members (Bates, 1981:60, footnote). The Million Acre settlement 
scheme was especially inegalitarian. The 5000 ""'progressive farmers"" select-
ed in 1960 for specially beneficial low-population density settlement were 
to be experienced farmers who had "proved their ability and accumulated 
some savings" (Harbeson, 1971:240). The purpose of this was for white 
farmers to subdivide and sell their farms to buyers able to pay for them 
(ibid). Thus, the aspirant low-density farmers had to be already privil-
eged to qualify, and the colonial government gave them extra privileges 
once they were settled (Leo, 1979:619). This was repeated in 1975 in the 
Mwanza settlement scheme in Tanzania (Cliffe, 1978:337). In Kenya, low-
density farmers received double the extension services that the high-
density farmers did - even though far outnumbered by them (Leo, 1979:269). 
Kenyan farmers on irrigation schemes have incomes twenty percent higher 
than their counterparts off the schemes (Bates, 1981:48). 
Foreign aid to Malawi was also channelled into this type of elitist 
project: six years" worth of foreign development aid to the Salimi 
Lakeshore Project gave 750 privileged farmers incomes seven times higher 
than those of the 20 000 surrounding poor farmers (Thomas~ 1975:38).(4) 
Where settlement is involved in a development project, social 
inequali ties may be exacerbated by the eviction (without adequate cornpens--
ation) of the people formerly on the land and who have been forced to make 
way for settlers. In Kenya, 1000 families were evicted to make way for the 
Mumias nucleus sugar estate, and this was repeated at two subsequent 
projects (Buch-Hansen and Marcussen, 1982:25/6). (For West African examples 
see Wallace, 1980:61; Williams, 1986a:3 and Bondestam, 1974:430). Not only 
do producers lose land under such schemes, but the conservation of water 
has negative effects on dry season farming downstream (Bates, 1981:49). In 
many cases, protected markets for the products of development schemes are 
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set up at the expense of external producers4(5) 
A great many African projects share the features of a development 
programme in Colombia. This programme benefits only a tenth of the local 
peasantry, and is characterized by: 
model pilot proiects with prosperous, neatly dressed 
workers, which visiting dignatories are ferried around while 
carefully hidden down the road the many are ragged and 
starving. Expensive settlement schemes provide the lucky 
few with everything: land, roads, clean water, supplies, 
credit, schools, health clinics - while the unfortunate 
majority are left with nothing (Harrison, 1980:135). 
Clearly, rural investment has been spread unevenly, with the lion's 
share going to a few favoured areas and farmers (ibid). 
34 CRITIQUE OF THE ARGUMENTS FOR INEGALITARIAN DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES. 
According to Williams (1981a:41), it is of the nature of rural 
development itself, that it distributes resources to the better off. How 
is this whole situation to be explained? It is not simply a case of 
neglect and oversight concerning the majority of people outside the 
projects4 In many cases, it is a consequence of wealthier groupings 
hijacking egalitarian programmes for their own development4 But it is also 
frequently the result of deliberately inegalitarian development strategies. 
I now turn to reviewing the arguments made for these. 
3.i. Technical success. 
Elitist growth-centre strategy is sometimes justified in terms of 
agricultural investment being allocated on the basis of expected success, 
and not on the basis of need (Harrison, 1981:98, 416)4 For eXffiople, the 
projects promoted by the Malawian government are in areas of highest 
agricultural potential and this may in fact be necessary if national 
productive capacity is to be enhanced (Thomas, 1975:38). But this is not 
always true. The Ugandan group farms benefiting from the agricultural 
budget only contributed three percent of national cotton production 
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(Seidman~ 1978:165). In fact~ agricultural projects typically consume a 
large portion of the agricultural budget, although they often produce only 
a small fraction of total marketed output (Bates~ 1981:49). 
3.ii. Elitism as a -transitional- phase. 
The rationale for elitist growth-centre projects is typically that 
they are a necessary~ but temporary~ phase. As such, inequality is 
promoted as being in the long-term interests of all (Heyer et aI, 1981:4). 
In some cases, the inequalities and social groupings planned for are 
expected to be intermediate transitional forms (see chapter ten) that will 
inherently develop into something more acceptable over time eventually. The 
inequality involved in a growth-centre strategy is supposed to be ended 
eventually through diffusion and up-and down-stream linkages. However, far 
from the "trickle effectn distributing benefits beyond the Ugrowth 
centresU , it has been a slow drip at best, and a reverse flow at worst 
(Harrison~ 1981:416). The economic failure of growth-centre strategy has 
been acknowledged by MacNamara (1973) during his World Bank period, leading 
him to advocate general investment in small-scale agriculturalists in its 
place (Markovitz, 1976:180). As will be discussed in chapters thirty-three 
and -four, the obstacles to development confronting growth-centre projects 
often thwart their success, and what initially was to be temporary 
subsequently becomes permanent. 
3.iii. Inequalities as facilitating the productive use of surplus. 
Elitist growth-centre plans are sometimes justified in terms of the 
alleged role of social inequalities in fostering development. They are 
seen as being conducive to economic development because, the argument goes, 
equitable distribution would lead to consumption of surplus, whereas 
concentration leads to reinvestment (Harrison, 1981:417).(6) 
For example, in land reform .. the decision to distribute land unequally 
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is often justified on the grounds that there is too little to make an 
egalitarian distribution feasible. The best way to boost the rural economy 
is held to be by giving land to experienced peasant farmers, rather than to 
the Jignorant J and Jilliterate J peasantry. The assumption is that 
experienced farmers will contribute to developing the forces of production 
in a way that will eventually benefit the national economy and thereby 
other classes in the social formation. 
However, whether such assumptions hold in every situation is doubtful. 
These inequalities may sometimes involve ~hidden- (i.e. consumed) rather 
than -actual"'" (i.e. invested) use of economic surplus, and may therefore be 
counterproductive for economic development. In this respect, it has been 
argued that economic growth can flourish (and has done so) in conditions of 
relative equality and a wider consequent market structure (Mouzelis, 
1979a:355; 1979b:84).(7) Relations of distribution and relations of utiliz-
ation are distinct things: concentrated wealth in the former does not 
necessarily mean productive investment in the latter. 
3.iv. Inequalities as productive incentives. 
In some cases, social inequalities have played a role in fostering 
growth (Arrighi and Saul, 1968a:284).(8) For example, one can cite the role 
of inequalities linked to production incentives which reward producers who 
save more/ take risks/ work ha.rder than their fellows/ or grow certain 
crops. Lagemann (n.d.:139) for example, writes that °technical solutions 
are very important requisites for a change in the farming system, but their 
implementation requires institutions and policies which make it attractive 
to small farmers to increase their production" (quoted by Richards, 1979:-
270). EXillnples are guaranteed markets or inflated prices serving as 
incentives. As Bates (1981: 60, 92-95) points out, while it is usually 
only the wealthier and stronger farmers who win advantages such as inf"lated 
prices, other producers may also benefit from such "'"'incentives'"'. Inequalit-
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ies do not therefore automatically follow from incentives, and where they 
do, the kind of inequalities discussed here need not become permanent or 
class-based (Kollontai, 1970:9). Such inequalities may affect productivity 
negatively or positively, depending on a range of other factors. But where 
incentives do not work, they may involve a drain on national resources 
through a surplus transfer to farmers who do not use the income or 
opportunities productively. 
3.v. Elitism as a demonstration model. 
Another rationale for the inequality of elitist growth centre projects 
is that ""progressive farmer ...... and settlement schemes are models to be 
emulated by non-participants. For eXffiople, it has been argued that the 
purpose of a South African irrigation scheme in the Ciskei bantustan is to 
serve as a demonstration model in the region: 
Most people's image of agriculture in the Ciskei is that 
it is a sort of drop out occupation; that it is not for 
people with any brains. It is necessary to show people 
that you can actually earn a living by engaging in an 
activity related to the land and this is what the Keis-
kammahoek irrigation scheme tries to do (Godden, in 
Proctor-Simms, 1978:88). 
It is true that such projects do shaw what could be done (Harrison, 
1981:123). But it is not enough just to provide demonstration models: 
outsiders have to be willing and able to emulate them (Markovitz, 1976:-
194). Because the ability to emulate depends on resources, however, there 
are severe objective restraints on it. The typical fact is that, like the 
case of a Ugandan settlement ranch in 1966, state spending per farmer is 
much more than can be sustained at a national level, and therefore the 
projects are inherently limited to benefiting a minority (Seidman, 1977:-
166). Thus, given the capital and management-intensive nature of most of 
these projects, they tend to have only an isolated impact on rural develop-
ment as a whole (Cliffe, 1978:337, Heyer et aI, 1980:13). As one 
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it is highly unlikely that the Keiskammahoek scheme will 
influence development in surrounding areas. Farmers 
would be justified in claiming that they too could 
follow the example of the Keiskarrmahoek settlers 
provided they were given irrigation water and subsidized 
to the extent of over R1200. The diffusion effect of 
INEQUALITY 
the scheme is therefore limited (McI. Daniel in Proctor-
Sirrms, 1978:75). 
4. CONCLUSION. 
This chapter has analysed and criticized some of the arguments behind 
inegalitarian elitist and growth-centred development strategies. One of the 
broader reasons underlying the failure of growth-centre strategy has been 
the nature of the strategy itself. It rests on a confusion about the 
relationship between the parts and the whole. Besides the difficulty in 
changing the (ultimately) determinant whole by means of tinkering with a 
few of the parts, very often the actual existence and functioning of the 
whole is lost sight of. The ""wood"', so to speak, is overlooked, and only a 
few selected Utreesj>" are focussed on. This methodological error is based on 
a lack of clear units of analysis and a lack of understanding the inter-
relationship between them (see chapter three). In the context of a 
disarticulated, extroverted economy, this can only lead to economic 
failure. Growth-centres may grow (though this is often not the case - see 
chapters thirty-three and -four). But their capacity to diffuse or inspire 
greater productivity seems limited and unable to develop the productive 
capacity of the whole qua whole. 
In view of all this it is necessary to concur with Saul (1977:139/40) 
that while class inequalities affect economic development, the relationship 
may sometimes hinder, and in other cases facilitate, the expansion of the 
productive capacity_ Writing with Arrighi, Saul says that "'the existence 
either of some necessary dichotomy between ... "development .... and ""equality"''' or, 
on the contrary, of some necessary link between the two cannot be postulat-
ed a priori .... (1968a:284). What one can conclude is that in terms of 
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channelling surplus for most effective development~ elitist growth-centre 
strategy does not seem to work. On the contrary~ it may become a drain on 
surplus and part of what Hughes (1977:220) calls ~hidden surplus~. To 
explain its failure~ one has to look beyond the role of inequalities in 
relations of distribution (Moment C) and possession/separation (Moment A)~ 
towards the significance of the social structure as a whole (i.e. all 
Moments, and including system dynamics and reproduction). In the next two 
chapters~ therefore, I analyse this social structure of planned development 
in these terms. 
Ef'.Ut.UTES 
1. Another example of inequality in Nigeria is the Kana River Project 
expected to take all the agricultural graduates from Kano state for the 
next twenty years (Wallace, 1981:291). 
2. This was the case in India, where irrigation infrastructure, roads, 
electricity, credit and Green Revolution inputs were available in two 
states (Hiro, 1978:88). Socially, rich peasants were best placed to use 
these due to having the basic resources that were needed to take advantage 
of these inputs (Byres, 1981:426-7,410-12). Thus, the Green Revolution had 
an unequal application and ended up enabling rich peasants to consolidate 
themselves as capitalist farmers (ibid:443, Brass~ 1980a:395). 
3. Even in pro-socialist Mozambique, the Eduardo Mondlane co-operative 
consists of a small minority of the village and constitutes a distinct 
social group with the best land and irrigation, in contrast to outsiders 
(Harris~ 1980:341/2, 344). The Chaimite co-op members also make up a 
distinct social group whose high accumulation and distribution different-
iates them from the village. They even have their own separate literacy 
classes, and consumer co-operative (ibid:349). 
4. Although not geared solely to development projects, rural investment in 
Uganda between 1962 and 1967 was still biased towards privileged farmers. 
One quarter of the budget over this period went to group farms and to 
tractor services which benefited only one percent of farmers (Seidman, 
1977: 165). 
5. The control over the marketing of milk in the Ciskei bantustan by the 
Ciskei Marketing and Development Board is a case in point here - see Daily 
Dispatch~ 13/4/79. In Gezira~ the need for wage-labour for settlers on the 
scheme led to banning cotton production in places regarded as labour-supply 
areas (Mulaa, 1981:132). 
6. ~Resources for development are currently dissipated in diffuse, broad 
spectrum programmes, the impact of which is neither effective nor adequate. 
It follows that there is a case for partial concentration of resources in 
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selected areas where prospects for success are greatest~ (Venn l 1979:5). 
Indeed l -an element of ruthlessness is necessary if the trap of dissipation 
of effort is to be avoided~ (ibid:9). 
7. Kay (1981:503) describes how Allende~s socialist strategy for Chile 
saw a massive re-distribution of wealth as compatible with - and in fact a 
pre-condition for - economic development. Harrison (1981:417) and Heyer et 
al (1980:4) argue that Taiwan and South Korea successfully combined egali-
tarianism (the result of land reform) with rapid development. 
8. In factI excessive zeal for egalitarianism can hinder economic devel-
opment in certain conditions (Kollontai, 1970:9). This raises problems for 
the -humanist- development theorists concerned with growth plus equity. 
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1. introduction. 
2. Peasants or proletarians? 
3. -Proqressive tarmers~. 
4. Outqrowers as proletar ians:' 
5. Outgrowers as capitalists? 
b. Out9rowers as simple cornrnodi ty producers~' 
7. Multi-class characteristics and relations of prOduction. 
8. Conclusion. 
1. INfRuDUCTluN. 
fhe social structure ot the producers involved in various development 
strategies is important to investigate in terms of the perspective outlined 
in this thesis. As Steeves (1978:1L4) notes with regard to Kenyan tea 
schemes, but with wider relevance, development projects both show - and 
serve as a catalyst ot - class formation, the generation of class 
interests, and the emergence of class-motivated activity. This chapter 
examines the class character of Uprogressive farmers u and outgrowers. The 
next chapter lOOKS at settlement scheme tenants. Neither is intended as a 
comprehensive analysis. Rather they point to how the concepts in this 
thesis help to elucidate the complex class issues in planned development. 
2. PEASANTS OR PROLETARIANS'? 
That the class character of contemporary rural producers is a complex 
phenomenon is evident in a debate relevant to the Kenyan experience. The 
issue is the extent to whictl Kenyan agr icul turalists are peasant or prole-
tarian in character.' 1) 
On the one side ot the debate is Njonjo who notes that almost 50 
percent of income to small-holders in KenyaJs central province comes from 
wages and remittances. He aSKS whether this class is thus a peasantry or a 
proletariat with patches of land (19(jl:37).(2) His position tends towards 
the proletarian characterization, and it has come under fire tor ignoring 
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both the rural labour process and the question of ownership of land (see 
Gutto~ 1~~1:44). Indeed difterent conclusions have been reached by takinq 
these two consideratlons into account. 
With regard to the rural labour process, OJKeefe's argument (19~4:1bO) 
is pertinent. He studied a Kenyan village and found that 44 percent of 
smallholders depended on off-farm sources for more than half their income. 
He rejects calling these producers ~farmers~ in consequence, and says that 
their production relations more clearly reflect those of a ~lumpen rural 
proletariat-cum-peasantry~ functioning as a labour pool for capitalism. 
fhe reason why he stops short at calling this class simply a proletariat, 
appears to be based on its relation to rural non-capitalist labour process-
es: its members take part in wage-labour in order to support a family-based 
production system (ibid:lbl). 
With regard to land ownership, Amin (1974:30) (writing in general 
terms) holds the view that the possession of land means that rural produc-
ers are not tull proletarians; instead he characterizes them as semi-prole-
tarians. Taylor (1~84:18.5) similarly finds it significant that Egyptian 
rural producers retain some control of land, and also argues accordingly 
that they are not a rural proletariat. 
So it, in the light of these considerations, and contra Nionio, 
smallholders are not a true proletariat, to what extent are they then 
peasants? Analysing the Kenyan case, Cowen sees rural producers not only 
as not proletarians, but as actually resisting proletarianization 
(1981b:139). He argues that the peasantry has been regenerated, with 
workers able to leave agricultural wage-labour, and wage remittances 
becominq secondary to income from comrnodity prOduction (ibid:124).(3) 
'fet as Cowen observes, peasants' patches of land are not used for 
direct consumption" but tor comrnodity exchange (although still aimed at 
reproduction of the household). For this reason, ~producers do not escape 
either the circuit of capital or the capital/labour relation" (Cowen, 
1';181a:69). In Cowen's view~ no less than any other place of production, the 
smallholding is now subiect to the control of capital. 
Cowen stops short ot saying that peasants participating in ttle 
capital/labour relation are proletarians. But it is exactly this scenario 
which has led Brazilian writers (amongst others) to describe the modernized 
tamily tarm as new form of worker/capital relation, with the new peasant as 
a worker for capital - i.e. as a proletarian (Goodman et aI, 1984:194). In 
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t other words .. the debate comes tull circle to Nionjo's conclusions (albeit 
for different reasons). And indeed .. like Njonio, this perspective has been 
criticized for missing the fact that the rural labour process itself is not 
capitalist (Goodman et al .. ibid)a fhe approach focusses on the whole 
relation .. but neglects the heterogeneous character of the parts. 
The problem with the peasant/proletarian debate outlined above is the 
implicit blanket categorization involved. It is little wonder that there 
are such different positions, when not only are different producers being 
analysed .. but the diversity ot relations engaged in by any single rural 
producer is also not adequately appreciated. Njonjo's peasants are prolet-
arians through their off-farm production; Cowen"s are subiected to capital 
through their on-farm production. Are they referring to the same producers .. 
and if so .. how should this be characterizedl An observation by Willi~ns is 
pertinent to this problem. 
Williams notes that most small holders are neither independent 
producers (Outside the market) .. nor outworkers sUbjected to capitalist 
tirms that provide means of production, subsistence and markets (1981a:31). 
He argues for defining the diverse groups within this range by their 
incorporation into ~circuits~ of capital (ibid:32), but this method risks 
overstressing the articulation between the CMP and non-capitalist features, 
at the expense ot evaluating the specificity of the latter. Where the 
clrcuit of capital articulates with non-capitalist labour processes (not to 
mention non-capitalist relations ot possession/separation and distribution-
/utilization) .. this needs to be recognized. But following my arguments in 
this thesis .. this circuit does not render everything in it capitalist (as 
Banaji (1980) would have it). Add to this point the need to analyse 
producers in terms of all three ~Ioments of production .. reproduction and 
system dynamics and it becomes possible to cut through the confusion 
surrounding rural classes. 
There is little problem in analysing properly capitalist and proletar-
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ian classes as on plantations, settler farms, and on company/state-owned 
estates. It is also relatively uncomplicated to assess tenants who share-
crop, and pay rent to a landowner (see Williams, 1984:17/8). It is more 
difticult when it comes to other classes ana class relations. 
3. PRuGHlSSIVE FARMERS. 
~Progressive farmers- are made up of several distinct (though also 
overlapping) classes and cannot be attributed any single class character. 
H1.stor icall y, "'proqressive f armer u initiatives have contributed to the 
~peasantization~ ot pre-capitalist producers - i.e. creating and developinq 
the classes ot middle, rich and poor peasants. Althouqh there are a wide 
range ot permutations that occur within the Whole process (Saul and Woods, 
19~1:114), the emphasis has often been on fostering a middle peasantry. 
However, even when this is the case, the process still contributes to the 
development ot rich and poor peasants (see below). Developing commodity 
production is the most general goal of ~progressive farmer~ strateqies. 
For this purpose, they may involve land reform to develop peasant relations 
ot production, and the promo~ion of advanced means and methods ot 
production to develop peasant productive capacity. 
Ihe promotion of advanced means ot prOduction means in effect that 
producers are induced to rely more heavily on the market, and also to 
become increasingly dependent upon the bureaucracy for supplies and 
services (Heyer et aI, 1980:9). To the extent that these inputs are 
acquired throuqh credit, this locates ~progressive farmer~ producers l.n a 
relation (sometimes indirect) to the lenders ot the credit, and this 
applies to outqrowers and settler tenants as well.(4) This relation may 
well be exploitat1.ve, given that credit is co~nonly a means of appropriat--
inq surplus labour. for Roseberry (1978), credit is an exploitative relat-
1.0n with tt-le capitalist rat1.onale (i.e. system dynamic) ot converting money 
into more money. In his view, this relation means that many peasant produc-
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ers are actually proletarians. But this is to ignore the production relat-
ions of such producers at Moment A and B - which remain non-capitalist at 
both points. In my view l the articulation of p~asants (and again this 
applies to outgrowers and settler tenants) to a source of credit constitut-
es a heterogeneous relation of production~ While this may be the dominant 
relation ffinong the many they participate in l it is not necessarily so, and 
even where it iS I this does not obliterate the existence or significance of 
their other relations. 
I turn now to the effect of ..... progressive farmer"'" strategies on class 
character inasmuch as they increase the commoditization of production -
both inputs and outputs. At tile outset, it may be noted that more than 
half of smallholder output in Kenya is used for household consumption 
(Carlsen l 1980:37). While this statistic conceals sUbstantial variations, 
it does imply that as far as reproduction goes l many smallholders are 
far from full simple commodity producer or CMP class-status. 
Comrrloditization can playa part in developing middle peasants from 
pre-capitalist producers I but it also makes middle peasants an unstable 
class. They are under pressure to step up co~nodity production and become 
simple commodity producers, contract outgrowers or kulaks, or fall behind 
and become poor peasants or proletarians. Thus in Kenya l middle level 
smallholders involved in cash cropping l and neither hiring labour in nor 
out in significant quantities, are a -rapidly eroding group- (Kitching, 
1980:374,406/7). A detailed analysis by Carlsen (1980:191) points to grow-
ing differentiation into rich and poor rural households. Such polarizing 
peasants need to be analysed in terms of the various class relations they 
are likely to engage in. 
-Progressive farmer..... strategies may also directly facilitate the 
development of rich peasants out of the upper strata of middle peasants. 
Combined with the pressures and opportunities of the market, these 
strategies can generate both the need and capacity to hire steady labour. 
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Kulakization is not the same as becoming a capitalist tarmer, however. 
~Wage employment, like inequality, may be integrated into peasant product--
ion r'ather than become a feature at the 'self ev ident J transition t rom 
peasant to capital1st tarmingN (Williarns, 197b:lb7). Capitalist relations 
require linter alia) wage-labour, commodity production and capital accumul-
ation. However, in Kenya the development of farmer capitalists is, as 
discussed in chapter thirty-three, otten blocked by means of marketing 
boards and monopolies operated by the very same agencies that promoted 
middle peasant and kulak commodity production in the first place. 
Commoditization and Uprogressive farmer u strategies may also stimulate 
the development of simple commodity producers. Hill (1970:21-29) observed 
this in Ghana, although she incorrectly characterized the producers as 
rural capitalists because of their commercial behaviour and treatment of 
land as an investment, ignoring the fact that they did not hire labour. 
Although "progressive farmer"'" development strategy does not always 
envisage this, comrnoditization may involve selling not iust agricultural 
goods, but labour power as well. Contrary to Nionjo, however, this latter 
relatlon does not in itself render such producers proletarian. It impl1es 
certain proletarian characteristics to be sure, but it depends inter alia 
on the significance of this labour as to whether the producer is wholly 
proletarian. And this varies according to what other relations the producer 
is involved in, and what the wage labour means for household reproduction. 
These remarks enable us to interpret a survey of 70uO farmers in Kenya 
which found that non-tarm cash income exceeded farm cash income, and that 
this was the main means at repayinq loans made to farmers entering settle-
mellt schemes (Kitch1ng, 198D:357). In other words, all these producers tor 
at least some members of their households) shared some proletarian charact-
eristics and some peasant characteristics. lhere is substantial variation 
1n tile latter, whicll at f eets the signli icance at the former. Thus, the 
survey found that at the higher levels, otf-farm income was used to buy 
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land and labour and it facilitated capital investment. Paid employment at 
lower' levels ser'ved to take the strain off peasant Ilousetlold SUbsistence. 
In comparlson to "progressive tarmer'- strategies~ outqrower strategies 
restructure class relations much more clearly, because they intervene more 
extensively in the labour process (usually via control of Moments A and C). 
The issue I investlgate below is what this means in terms of the class 
character of outgrowers, and how it may combine ditferent features normally 
cllaracteristic ot the various disparate classes. The first section looks 
at proletarlan features, and subsequent ones consider capitalist, landlord 
and simple comrnodity producer characteristics. 
4. OUTGROWERS AS PROLETARIANS'~' 
On outgrower (contract-farmer) schemes, there are big differences 
between producers. And although they generally retain somewhat more 
control at production than proletarians, they do have some similarities 
with them. Some outqrowers not only resemble proletarians, but do in fact 
engage in extra-household production as wage-labourers for others. At 
Kenya's Mumias sugar scheme, some outgrowers - mainly those relying solely 
on family labour -- battle to survive from their agricultural production and 
consequently hire themselves out as workers in times of need (BuCtl Hansen 
and Marcussen, 1982:33/4; Currie and Ray, 1987:97). To this extent ... 
outgrowers may partiCipate directly as proletarians in off-farm wage-labour 
relationships. ['he argument for outgrowers as proletarians is based, 
however, more on the character of their on-farm activity ... and the relations 
involved in it. Thus ... in many outgrower schemes, multi-national companies 
(otten using estates) control the production ot plantation crops by small 
holders under conditions which~ accordinq to Heyer et al (1980:~), come 
near to relegating the producers to the position of wage-labourers. Indeed, 
there are similaritles that can be observed at each Moment ot production. 
For the purposes of exposition, 1 deal with these similarlties in the order 
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ot 8~ L and A~ and then go on to evaluate their signiticance atterwards. 
4 • i. fVlome n t 8. 
Concerning outgrower schemes at Moment 8, at Kenya;s Mumias scheme the 
operations ot the producers are closely controlled. Farmers contract for 
three years to sell cane, field supervisors monitor their work and the 
efficiency of the whole scheme is attributed by of~icials to the centraliz-
ed management there (Mulaa, 19B1:91,92). It is thus argued that their 
control over means ot production is increasingly nominal, and the extension 
officers effectively control the labour process (Currie and Ray, 1987:95). 
This has obvious parallels with a capitalist labour process. 
4.ii. Moment C. 
Outgrowers also resemble proletarians in that they have no control 
over the class relations of distribution and utilization. For example, at 
Mumias the scheme has a monopsony on buying cane (Williams, 1984:17/18). 
lhe producers become indebted to the company, and have little scope tor 
negotiating the price. When this is linked to the conditions at Moment B 
(see above), it has been argued that Uthe idea that the farmer ;sold; 
his/her crop becomes something of an illusion. The producer price could be 
seen as tantamount to a wage'"' (Currie and Ray, 198/:95).(5) 
4.iii. Moment A. 
At Moment A, outgrowers may be similar to proletarians where -- as at 
Mumias - their entry to or exclusion from the scheme is out of their hands. 
The fact that they do possess the land may not in fact be meaningful given 
their laCK of control on Moments Band C. lb ) 
4.iv. Evaluation. 
Against the v iew that outgrowers are in ef f ect proletar ians .. it migrlt 
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be argued that for the capitalist investor, contract farming means precise-
ly not having to enter a direct capital-wage relationship (Buch-Hansen and 
Marcussen, 1982:18). But this in itself does not preclude the possibility 
of outgrowers constituting an indirect capital-labour relationship, as is 
the case with piece-work proletarians. Both outgrowers and piece-workers 
may retain some control at Moment B, the labour process. Piece-work involv-
es wage-labour because the means of production are supplied by the capital-
ist, and it represents a partial proletarianization of the producer (Dobb, 
1962:22/3). Payments vary due to the different skills, strength, energy, 
and staying power of each producer - but they remain wages nonetheless 
(J'Vlarx, 1972: 520) (see chapter twenty-four). The labour process may be 
described as formally subsumed under capital, though it is not necessarily 
part of the CMP as such (see chapter eight). 
Another - though also erroneous - argument against the outgrower/ 
proletarian equation is based on the fact that outgrowers are not really 
subsumed to capital at Moment B through being congregated together into 
mechanized and socialized production (Bernstein, 1979a:432). Against this 
view, such a situation does not preclude capitalist relations of product-
ion. Formal subsumption may be capitalist without transforming the labour 
process (Cowen, 1981b:126; see chapter eight). It is therefore not signif-
icant that outgrowers~ relations in production do not have the same control 
over by the structure of the forces of production as characterizes real 
subsumption within the CMP. 
A different argument against seeing outgrowers as proletarians might 
be that land ownership by outgrowers is not merely formal. This would 
undermine Williams~ claims that outgrowers supply little more than their 
own labour power to production, and accordingly can be analysed as subsumed 
under capital (1985:171).(7) On the contrary, the fact that outgrowers 
supply land as well as labour power is what distinguishes them from 
settler tenants. It is significant that possession often constitutes 
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an obstacle to control by capital and state, and this is one reason why 
both agencies may try make tenure conditional on subordination to them 
(see discussion on settler tenants in the next chapter). 
In my view, it is difficult to decide one way or another on the 
significance of land ownership in the abstract. Where this factor is 
meaningful in terms of producer control over other Moments of production, 
the producers may be better described as simple commodity producers (see 
below). Where it is not, they resemble proletarians taking part in a 
capitalist relation of production. 
Also, against the outgrower-as-proletarian position, the claim that 
the producer price is a wage may be challenged. The point about outgrower 
farming is that the major risk is transferred from state and capital to 
the producer - unlike the case of a propertyless proletariat (see Buch-
Hansen and Marcussen, 1982:18; Curry and Ray, 1987:94). In addition to 
this, direct production of household subsistence means that unlike prole-
tarians, outgrowers' reproduction is not wholly dependent on what capital 
pays. (Indeed, this feature cuts capital1s contribution to reproducing 
labour power, and may be deliberately cultivated by capital for this 
very purpose - see Blume, 1971:29, 200; Dinham and Hines, 1983:27). 
What may be true for (some of) the parts (proletarian), is thus not 
true for the whole. Outgrowers may resemble proletarians in some respects 
and indeed articulate to the CMP in this. But it would be reduct-
ionist to describe them as proletarians in consequence. Instead, their 
production relations (to land and to payment) and their reproduction may be 
quite separate and distinct from proletarians. What is more, some out-
growers may even exhibit proto-capitalist and landlord characteristics. 
5. OUTGROWERS AS LANDLORDS AND AS CAPITALISTS? 
In this section, I examine claims for outgrowers as landlords and 
capitalists, evaluating each argument as I review it. 
SOC-TAL STRIJCTIJREI 
PROGRESSTVE FARIVIERS ____ OIJTGROWERS 
s. i. "'lament A. 
In a confused analysis~ it has been argued that there may be disguised 
wage-labour in Mumias in tl,at outgrowers could be considered as onl y formal 
and legal owners at means at production .. though 1n reality receiving a wage 
that is equivalent to the land rent (see Buch Hansen and Marcussen, 1~M2:-
50). In my view .. wtlere outgrowers in effect really own and supply only 
labour power .. then they come very close to being piece-work proletarians 
(see above). However, where they supply land but do not work it, they are 
clearly landlords, receiving rent. Where they supply land, but depend on 
other means of production from capitalists .. then (in some respects) they 
resemble the general structure of m~tayage. As such they produce surplus 
value for capital based on the means of production supplied by capital. 
uutgrowers at ~Iumias have been described as eftectively renting land (and 
labour .- sic) to the Mumias Sugar Company (Heyer.. 1981: 115 ). I would argue 
that this is a case of renting land in cases where the outgrower fails to 
undertake the work, and the company uses its own labour to plant .. fertilize 
and weed (Buch-Hansen and Marcussen, 1982:31). If the outgrower hires 
outside labour on the basis of his possession of land .. then he is in sem1-
capitalist relations at Moment A in this respect (see below tor the signif-
icance of labour hiring at other Moments). 
5.ii. Moment B. 
Like their counterparts on settlement schemes .. some outgrowers may 
resemble capitalists in hiring labour. However, this needs careful quali-
tication. At Mumias, one study found that 90 percent hired labour for 
weeding tBuch Hansen and Marcussen .. 1982:31). Another stUdy says that 46 
percent hired labour, and 3b percent depended exclusively on hired labour 
IMulaa, 1981:97). Ihe extent to which this is capitalist depends on its 
role in ttle reproduction of the enterpr ise tis it central;'), and on the 
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system (.iynamic in tI-le tlir ing (is it part of capital accumulation':'). l tS ) 
5. iii. fvloment (;. 
Analysis of Moment C shows that in terms of relations of utilization, 
some capitalist features are evident among a stratum of outgrowers. It is 
the case that, as at Mumias, all major activity is carried out by the 
company, and this limits the opportunities for outgrowers to develop into 
capitalists. Though some tarmers have 50 acres under cane, employ labour 
and receive high returns, they are unable to invest in aqriculture (Mulaa, 
ibid:92). At the same time there is a small capitalist farmer stratum 
where a capitalist rationality and investment pattern is developing amonq 
ten to f if teen percent of outgrowers, who (lave tligh incomes (also tram 
other occupations), and who invest to accumulate, especially in circulat-
ion, but also in agriculture (8uch-Hansen and Marcussen, 1982:33). There is 
also a middle qroup of outgrowers whose level of reprOduction has risen 
with income from cash crops. They use hybrid maize, but few technical 
innovations. rhey have marginal non-agricultural income and produce with 
mix of tamily and waqe labour {ibid). lhis group appears to be a middle 
peasant qroup with llmited similarities to capitalists. 
b. OUTGROWERS AS !::iIMPLE CUMMOOlTY PRODUCERS. 
Some outqrowers may resemble simple commodity prOducers as in the case 
ot Kenya's contract tea farmers.(9) This section reviews the arguments for 
this, commenting on them as ttley are dealt with. 
b.i. Moment A. 
It appears at first siqht that outgrowers differ from simple commocllty 
prOducers wnere aside teom land, they possess no means of production. 
However, some outqrowers do actually acquil~e ttlese ln trle course of 
production. In Kenva, the tea development auttl0rity (KfOA) licences 
~1."~~~~1j.-~ •. --~~-~-''"'~ ~"'~, ... -~ r ......... ---
SDCIAL STRUCTURE. 
PROGRESSIVE FARMERS ./ OIJTGROWERS 
growers, and administers a credit and fertilizer scheme funded by the 
international groups and the Kenyan government (Blume, 1971:88,101). 
Growers receive plants and materials from the KTDA. However, they pay for 
all the services, with the charges deducted as a standard levy on the 
monthly payment they receive. t10 ) In addition, the outgrowers elect 
representatives to the KTDA controlling board where they have a majority of 
one over government appointees (ibid:92). All of these would seem to 
buttress simple commodity producer status regarding possession of means of 
production. 
At the same time the producers do not have altogether unqualified 
possession. The Tea Act gives the KTDA legal rights to take over neglected 
outgrower land (Buch-Hansen and Marcussen, 1982:24). With tree cash crops 
in general (which take a long time to yield), Blume argues that -pressure 
can be exerted directly through control of production materials and credit 
securities" (1971:213). This is true, but it is quite compatible with 
simple commodity producer status. 
6.ii. Moment B. 
Simple commodity producers are more difficult to control than contract 
farmers, and -legal regulations have to be created so that disciplinary 
measures can be enforcedu (Blume, 1971:58). In Kenya, a law called the Tea 
Cultivation Order sets out rules amounting to directives for production 
under close supervision (ibid:93). Lists are drawn up of problem growers, 
who are warned in writing a few times. If the head office decides the 
grower should be punished, it can take him to court, where fines may be 
levied (ibid:100). Up to a point, however, this is not inconsistent with 
simple cornmodity producer status. 
6. iii. fvloment c. 
In addition to buying inputs, simple commodity producer status means 
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selling most ot tt-,e produce. In tr,e case of the "TDA prOducers~ tlowever~ 
many tarmers devoted only a small sector of their land to tea~ and 
cultivated subsistence crops on much ot tt1e remainder (Buch-Hansen ana 
Marcussen~ 1982:18; 81ume~ 19/1:88-102). This precludes them trom full 
simple commodity producer status~ and implies that in addition to ttlem 
partlcipatinq in a simple comrl'lodity relation~ they are also involved in 
middle peasant relations. 
t 
7. MULTI-CLASS CHARACTER AND RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION. 
Uproqressive farmers'; and outqrowers fit into the category of "'new 
J production forms~ created by articulation within peripheral capitalism (see 
chapter seventeen).(11) Production by these various largely non-capitalist 
producers stlould be seen as external non-capitalist labour processes 
articulatinq with the CMP (otten indirectly throuqh the state). The total 
relation does not involve the same classes at all ttlree Moments of pt~oduc-
tion. Nor can such non-capitalist relations be reproduced independently ot 
the LIV]P. Neither do they have definite system dynamics. As a result~ in 
terms of the cr iter ia advanced in chapter seven ~ they are not a rnode of 
production articulating with the CMP. At the same time .. however .. they are 
not an internal part of the CMP. They constitute heterogeneous relations of 
production articulated to it .. and sharing certain of its features in 
respect ot different Moments ot production .. reproduction and system 
dynamics. 
In consequence, these producers are not wholly proletarian or 
capitalist. In addition to being class-differentiated among themselves ... 
they also combine (in varying degrees) both characteristics (and possibly 
others - like simple commodity production and landlordism - tOO) in many 
cases. I t would appear ttlat tt-le best way to understand their class status 
is to recognize tilem as partIcipants in at least two (interactive) iletero-
geneous relations ot production. 10 the extent ttlat, tor eX8{l1ple .. ttleir 
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artIculation Wittl one side such as capital predominates" ttley would 
constitute a more definite class" with a sinqle and homogeneous general 
character. In such a case one could speak of their participation in the 
capitalist mode o¥ production as their primary relation of production (see 
Cohen, 19($1:100) .. Illis is a matter of conflict and struggle amongst other 
thIngs" and it depends on the dynamics of domination and subordination in 
articulation (see chapter ten). 
8 .. CONCLUSION. 
Class creation and formation under development planning is extremely 
complex .. For example" under 1 t, a single household may have tile man 
working as a waqe-latJourer on another's farm, wllile his wit e works the 
family plot and tlires casual labour using his wage remittances (Kitclling" 
19($0:445). Yet the concepts of three Moments of production" reproduction" 
system dynamics and homogeneous/heterogeneous relations of production 
enable us to grasp this analytically, as I have demonstrated in this 
chapter .. lhis opens the way to distinguishing which features (if any) are 
dominant. Chapter thirty-three looks at significance ot these issues in 
terms ot the economic failure of planned development in the periphery. 
----.---------
£I'IJNOILS 
1 .. SymptomatIc of the complexity at the issue is the tact that few of the 
participants seem conVInced and clear enouqh to spell out their position 
precIsely. preferring lnstead to skirt around the issue. Evaluating the 
debate therefore requires orawing inferences from their arguments about 
what theIr POSitIons actually are. 
2. His latter phrase is probably drawn from Lenin's designation of rural 
proletarians as "'allotment-holding wage workers" (1972:172-187, cited by 
Williams, 1976:165). 
j. 1 his trend shows up in tile decline of the wage-labour sector in agr i-
culture by 1./ percent annually between 1972-80 ... While output rose at 3 
percent annually over the same period (Currie and Ray, 19~}:94). 
4. Un the Uganoan qroup farms" tarmers become indebted through the use at 
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government credit~ marketing~ tractors~ and mortgages (Seidman~ 197B:lb4). 
In fvlozambique' s bjuardo Mondlane co-operative ~ ttle same t,appens tt,rough 
renting various means ot production trom the state (Harris~ 19~O:34L). At 
Mumias in Kenya~ services are given to outqrowers by the company on creait~ 
and are charged at eight percent interest IMulaa~ 1981:91). 
5. It appears that the only difference between outgrowers and proletar--
ians that proponents of this view like Currie and Ray (1987:95) are 
prepared to concede is an ideological one: for them, ...... whereas the wage 
relation conceals the expropriation of surplus value~ the producer price is 
a different ideological relation. It conceals the farmer"'s sUbsumption to 
transnational capi tal ~ and tl,e fact that ownership of productive property 
has become more formal than real~ (Currie and Ray, 1987:95). 
b. In post-1973 Ctlile, middle peasants became contracted to agro-export 
industries, having little control over their farms as a result. Despite 
still I,av ing t orrflal ownersl,ip of the land, they were; according to Kay, 
(1981:510) ultimately indirect wage-labourers for capital. Williams says 
that the dependence ot outgrowers on capitalist owners of means of prOduct-
ion is close to that ot the proletariat (1981a:34/5). 
7. That the control is difficult to sustain and subsumption therefore 
only conditional and partial (ibld) is not a criterion for saying that the 
producers are non-proletarian, as Williams seems to imply. These 
characteristics are evident in proletarians too. 
8. Possible pOinters to capitalist features are evident in the attitude 
ot workers tlired by the company to service outgrowers'" plots towards the 
outgrowers. At Mumias, they expect outqrowers to reproduce them while on 
the job (Mulaa, ibid:98). 
9. In the 1950s, smallholder tea cultivation rose from 6.5 percent to 
35.8 percent of the total land under tea (Blume~ 1971:83). 
10. A prev iaus payment sct,eme conf used growers and led to unrest. The 
current scheme closes the loophole of underhand practices such as growers 
getting their leaf delivered by someone who is clear of debt (ibid:103). 
11. The regeneration of the Kenyan ~peasantry~ is not the revival ot a 
pre-capitalist class, but ttle creation of a contemporary non-capitalist 
class that depends on its articulation with the CMP for its existence (see 
Cowen, 19<:slb). 
368 
1."'''---·--~''''-''--'''-
eOOXAL eT"UOTU"~. 
SETTLER TENANTS 
CHAPTER THIRTY-TWO 
TI£ SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF SETTlER TENANTS 
1. Introduction. 
2. Settler tenants as proletarians? 
3. Settler tenants as capitalists? 
4. Conclusion. 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
This chapter focusses on a particular rural group that is the creation 
of rural development strategies, and unravels its class characteristics in 
terms of the concepts developed in this thesis. Specifically, I argue that 
settler tenants combine proletarian and capitalist features in their 
various relations of production, and cannot be conceptualized as being 
simply one or the other. 
2. SETTLER TENANTS AS PROLETARIANS. 
Some writers have argued that producers who are tenants on development 
schemes may be seen as proletarians exploited by state or private capital. 
The cla1m is based on similar features between the scheme settlers and 
wage-labourers such as their mutual lack of control, their insecurity, and 
their remuneration. This can be usefully evaluated in terms of the 
concepts of Moments of production. 
2. i. Moment A. 
Agricultural settlement schemes typically create a new group of 
agricultural producers who are dependent on the government and bureaucracy 
for the right of access to means of production (Hill 1977:27). Control 
here is in terms of governmental control over the relations of possession 
and separation.(l) 
According to Wallace (1981:286), the most absolute form of control of 
rural producers is through ownership of land. This can be seen at Sudan~s 
SETTLER TENANTS 
Gezira scheme where tenants have access to land on an annual lease, 
renewable only if their performance is satisfactory (Barnett, 1981:313,-
150). Likewise the Ciskei bantustan schemes allow ufor the removal of non-
performers ..... in that '"'tenure is sub;ect to performance'" (Proctor-Simms, 
1978:72). Settlers on Tanzanian schemes also lack tenure security, and can 
be expelled for breaching cultivation rules (Raikes, 1978:307/8). Thus, 
notwithstanding the frequent rhetoric surrounding the development of a 
class of land-owning yeomen and their attachment to the soil, settler 
producers can be removed from h'their"" land for failure to follow rules or 
produce adequately (Raikes, 1978:307/8). Like proletarians, at Moment A 
then, settlers only have access to means of production through (state or 
private) capital. 
Not all settlement schemes involve control of land. In the case of 
Nigerials Kana River irrigation project, officials wanted an annual 
contract with tenants where the latter could be evicted in certain 
circumstances. However, political and economic considerations ruled this 
out, and land was re-allocated to original owners (Wallace, 1980:63). 
Control shifted to the issue of access to other vital means of production 
- water, seeds, fertilizers, tractors and knowledge, (and when these 
failed at the Bakalori irrigation scheme, it involved the violent use 
of means of coercion) (ibid:65). These forms of control are similar to 
those exercised over outgrowers, and the analysis in the previous chapter 
applies here. According to Blume (1971:138), the position of some scheme 
producers is similar to that of share-croppers. He makes this claim in 
reference to the arrangements on Kenya's Tana River irrigation scheme where 
family labour of planting, weeding and harvesting is supplemented by the 
scheme management hiring wage-labour for ploughing. 
In my view, this is not a sufficient basis to use the term share-
cropper. However, it does raise the question of what this division of 
370 
tt L ! Li.. 
SOCZAL STRUCTURE. 
SETTLER TENANTS 
labour means for class characterization. Without wanting to get bogged 
down in the issue, this situation can be seen as an additional element of 
the separation of scheme producers from the means of production at Moment A 
(and a lack of control at B). What some settlement scheme tenants may 
resemble are metayers (see chapter twenty-four). This is in situations 
where they supply (or come to possess) some of the means of production on 
the schemes. In this capacity, they may yield surplus to the state as both 
land-owner and provider of the remaining means of production, paying part 
rent and part surplus value. 
2. ii. Moment B. 
Settlers' lack of control at Moment A tends to mean that they also 
lack control of Moment B. Settlements on newly developed land with 
irrigation lend themselves ~to production under close supervision~ (Blume, 
1971:219).(2) On the Gezira scheme, tenants are subject to the control of 
irrigation by inspectors (Barnett, 1977:101-14). Government control of 
land, water and other inputs characteristically means that tenants have to 
obey a set of production rules concerning the t~ing and quality of their 
activities, and over the use of purchased inputs, choice of sales outlets 
and systems of payment (Williams, 1984:17/18; 1986a:3). In this regard, 
producers on schemes tend to be relatively undifferentiated internally on 
the question of control of production (Raikes, 1978:286). Such controls a~ 
at the standardization and rationalization of peasant commodity production 
(Bernstein, 1979a:428). The process is thus one of increasingly tightly 
controlled schemes - mainly for the production of specific export crops 
(Raikes, 1978:286, 307). For example, a condition of access to the Gezira 
scheme is that producers have to produce cotton, even though they would 
earn more from food production (Williams, 1984:16, Barnett, 1977). 
The regulations on such schemes 
typically dictate very precisely the forms of labour 
power to be employed and represent a more direct 
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intervention in the organization of production. They 
tie the producers in various ways to the use of 
particular techniques of cultivation (and sometimes 
first-stage processing as in the case of tobacco), often 
at a greater expenditure of labour time, and directions 
and sanctions by the development agencies concerned. 
(Bernstein, 1979a:428). 
An example of these may be seen in the irrigation rules at Kenya's 
Tana River irrigation scheme. The farmer receives a licence for one year 
(which is extended if he is free of misconduct), and he may not sublet or 
hire labour without the scheme manager~s permission. The rules also state 
that #a licensee shall cultivate his holding to the satisfaction of, and in 
accordance with the crop rotation laid down by, the manager, and shall 
comply with all instructions given by the manager relating to the 
cultivation and irrigation of his holding~ (Blume, 1971:143). The licence 
provides for producers to be given warnings, then to be prosecuted and 
finally to have their licence withdrawn. 
Often managers are appointed from the outside and have the power to 
fine or expel participants (Raikes, 1978:307). At Gezira, tenants 
considered negligent or careless have their cultivation taken over by the 
company, and expenses deducted from their share (Barnett, 1975:194). The 
continued dependency of West Nigerian schemes on government subsidies has 
led to increasing government control over daily operations, the organizat-
ion of labour, and decisions about production (Hill, 1975:30). On many 
supervised settlement schemes in Tanzania, the village development committ-
ee could only advise; the manager has de Facto control of all aspects of 
scheme life (Seidman, 1978:325; Cliffe and Cunningham, 1972:26). This has 
been described as resembling landlord-tenant relations (ibid) - which may 
be so, although I would hesitate to designate producers here as Feudal 
tenants, given that - unlike the feudal case - scheme settlers 
characteristically have no means of production of their own. 
Barnett (1977:72,77) concludes that the Gezira tenants resemble 
industrial wage earners due to their limited area of decision-making and 
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their lack of choice within the organizational constraints.(3) They ~seem 
like a herd of landless labourers signing on each year to get a dhurra crop 
and the pocket money and loans~ (ibid:122). There is some validity in this 
observation, and to be sure settler tenants share with many proletarians a 
lack of control of the labour process. 
2.ii. Moment c. 
As regards settlers' position in Moment C, they tend to have little 
say over the distribution or utilization of surplus. At Gezira, the board 
has a monopsony on the sale of cotton (Williams, 1984:16). As with 
outgrowers, this control over distribution is easier when the firm or state 
has a monopoly on necessary processing facilities for sugar, tea and 
tobacco (Williams, 1985:170). 
As regards the form of remuneration at Moment C, settlers are also in 
a similar position to wage-labourers. Thus, the Gezira tenants were not 
intended to be workers in the sense of being wage-earners (Barnett, 1975:-
194). But the basis of their remuneration implied this. Although the 
tenants contributed a few basic tools, their main input was labour-power 
(1977:169). Remuneration also needs to be looked at in terms of its 
relation to reproduction, the value of labour power and control of surplus 
distribution. On one Mozambican co-operative, members have been paid 
advances on a regular weekly/monthly basis: 
Formally these were an advance instalment of the final 
distribution of the co-operative's net revenue to its 
members. In fact, however, the amount paid was 
calculated as an hourly rate set at a level to attract 
labour to the co-operative in competition with the state 
farms and the rate bore no relation to the co-
operative's expected net revenue (Harris, 1980:347). 
In addition, the amounts distributed were determined by the co-
operative leadership and government officials rather than all co-op 
members. Thus according to Harris, elements of a wage-system existed 
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(Harris, 1980:347). Similar features exist in many settlement schemes' 
payment systems. In Tanzania, the development schemes: 
were considered by most settlers to be government farms, 
and with considerable justification, since control of 
their incomes was entirely in the hands of the manager, 
who could decide how the gross receipts should be 
divided between loan repayment, scheme investment and 
settler incomes (Raikes, 1978:308). 
2.iv. Conclusion. 
The argument for settlement tenants as proletarians implies that 
there are capitalist relations on the development schemes. Regarding 
Moment A, it is clear that these producers are similar to proletarians in 
their separation from means of production. Taking into account the specif-
icity of Moment B - the labour process - on these schemes, the designat-
ion still holds, but is more complicated. Compared to a labour process in 
which capital dominates directly and through real subsumption of labour, 
some scheme producers are only Tormally subsumed through Moment A alone 
(the relations of possession and separation). However, as discussed in 
chapter eight, formal subsumption does not preclude them from proletarian 
status. 
Moreover, on many schemes, producers are in fact subsumed at Moment B 
where they lack self-sufficiency and self-determination, and depend on the 
timing and inputs of fellow settlers and/or the scheme's management 
services (including the nucleus estate). The almost total control of the 
labour process on some settler schemes certainly lends itself to designat-
ing these producers as similar to proletarians in this regard. 
Concerning Moment C, the designation of settlers as proletarians may 
be legitimate in terms of an analysis of piece wages (see previous 
chapter). On Western Nigerian schemes, settlers receive hourly or piece-
rates for their labour (Hill, 1977:29). 
The issue of settler tenants' status as proletarians also needs to be 
examined in terms of relations of reproduction and utilization. And it is 
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here that certain non-proletarian features may become evident. On many 
schemes, settlers reproduce themselves to a greater or lesser extent 
through their own production activities on food plots, and in this they 
are distinct from proletarians. In cases where self-sufficiency is wholly 
excluded by the nature of the crops they are compelled to cultivate, and 
where their reproduction depends on buying commodities, then their status 
in this regard is similar to proletarians. 
SettlersJ relations of utilization may involve buying in labour-power 
to supplement or in cases replace their family labour on the tenancy. This 
brings me to the question of settler tenants' capitalist characteristics. 
3. SETTLER TENANTS AS CAPITALISTS. 
3.i. Moments A and B. 
Because settlers lack possession of the means of production at Moment 
A, they are certainly distinct from capitalists in this regard. However, 
at Moment B, they resemble capitalists inasmuch as they may hire labour. 
In the Gezira scheme at peak periods, it is necessary for each household 
to hire outside labour (Barnett, 1975:195; 1977:36). Gezira's tenants' 
relations with hired labour ranged from employer-employee to patron-client 
(ibid:58). Because of this, the Gezira tenants cannot be seen as homogen-
eous, and certainly - in terms of hiring and exploiting labour - they 
cannot be seen as pure proletarians (Barnett, 1977:177).(4) The situation 
varies on many schemes however, with greater or lesser hiring of labour 
possible. What is important to consider is the extent to which hiring 
accords with a CMP system dynamic of accumulation. This brings me to 
relations of utilization. 
3.ii. Moment C. 
Analysed in terms of the categories developed in this thesis, the 
hiring of labour does not mean that the settlers are consequently full 
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capitalists. This is not only because of the situation at Moment A 
described above, but also due to conditions at Moment C. Thus the control 
exercised by the scheme management over the Gezira settlers themselves 
limits their standard of living and causes their production to stagnate 
(Barnett, 1977:169-71,180). This is evident in considering the extent to 
which settlers differ from capitalists in terms of accumulation. Schemes, 
like co-operatives, can become an agency for monetary accumulation, 
provided that members receive enough <Harris, 1980:345). However, 
monetary accumulation is not per se capitalistic - only if it is invested 
in buying and combining labour-power and means of production under exclus-
ive control with the aim of producing more surplus so as to expand the 
process (ibid:346). 
The scope for capitalist agricultural accumulation is strictly 
limited on many development schemes. Tanzanian schemes, for example, have 
fixed acreage and enforced rules to keep individual producei"s in line with 
quality controls and technical criteria (Raikes, 1978:286).(5) Controls 
aimed at the production of export crops also limit the diversification of 
activities (ibid:314). Aspirant capitalists have to look elsewhere to 
invest their money. To the extent that they do so, they may engage in 
other capitalist activities, but this is not necessarily so (see chapter 
thirty-three). 
Relations of distribution, in particular the form of remuneration of 
settlers are also pertinent to the question of them having capitalist 
class characteristics. Gezira tenants may be regarded to some extent as 
shareholders in that they receive 40 percent of income, the remainder 
going to the state (also 40 percent -- in return for supplying irrigation 
and owning the land) and the Sudan Plantations Syndicate (20 percent for 
management contribution) (O~Brien, 1984:122). In fact, this percentage is 
based on a traditional Sudanese share cropping model, rather than a 
capitalist one. The share is not controlled by settlers as investment 
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capital because they do not possess it in the first place. It represents 
rather a fluctuating return on their labour power inputs, and probably in 
effect on the value of their labour power, i.e. a type of piece-wage. 
Settler income at the Ciskei Keiskammahoek scheme is labelled 
"profit ..... by the project managers, with the implication that settlers are 
no different from capitalist farmers participating in capitalist accumul-
ation through a co-operative scheme. However, on closer inspection, it 
emerges that 
the "'profit'" the settlers obtain through their 
participation in the scheme is regarded as part of the 
operating costs. The difference between income and 
operation costs i.e. profit ••• will go to the Ciskei 
government. The settlers may therefore be regarded as 
wage-earners rather than joint owners of the enterprise 
(Padri, 1979:12). 
3.iii. Conclusion. 
From all this, it can be seen that settler tenants share some super-
ficial similarities with capitalists in so far as they may hire labour and 
accumulate money. But these features are pertinent only at Moments Band C 
respectively; they do not accord with capitalist system dynamics, and are 
therefore not sufficient to designate settler tenants as capitalists. 
4. CONCLUSION. 
As with many other rural classes, settler tenants are involved in an 
admixture of relations of production. As participants in multiple relations 
(including relations off-scheme, too), it is difficult to attribute a 
single class character to them, except in that their practices may consist-
ently combine the practices of these diverse relations. Their class 
character even so is likely to be contradictory - just as is the case with 
several other social classes (see chapter six). 
One can ask whether such settlement projects constitute class 
creation. The small number of producers on the schemes does not, in itself, 
rule them out of this status (see chapter ten). Nor does the fact that 
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settlers on one scheme are likely to be isolated from those on others. 
Their economic and political class significance, however, is a different 
question, and I discuss this in the few next chapters. 
DOI)TES 
1. This control often needs to be seen in the context of widespread 
separation from means of production in the rest of the social formation. 
In these conditions (i.e. CMP relations at Moment A): 
the general peasant population can then be relegated to 
the political-economic position of an lIagrarian reserve 
armyll useful for maintaining discipline among and 
control over those who participate in the government 
agricultural scheme (Hill, 1977:27). 
2. Blune points out that with irrigation, management rules can be 
~lemented simply through control of water delivery (1971:200). 
3. He describes them as being like a cog in a machine and as lacking 
personal freedom, responsibility and interest in the land (Barnett, 
1977:122). One of the top colonial officials described the scheme as a 
huge plantation where individual tenants had to be driven for each detail 
of work along standard methods for dealing with wage-earners (ibid). In a 
word, the scheme is organized authoritarianly and hierarchically (Barnett, 
1975:200). Even post-nationalization, the basic authority and control 
relationships (plus the division of profits and determination of policy) 
have remained mechanistic and hierarchical (ibid:164). Most Gezira 
officials oppose devolution of power believing that this would detract from 
control and efficiency (ibid:205). 
4. For example, Peruvian co-operatives have -relied on seasonal migrants 
paid extremely low wages, so enabling their own members to reduce their 
workload" (Standing, 1981:205, footnote 53), but this is not the same as 
exploitation with a capitalist rationale. 
5. This is also the case at the Keiskarnmahoek Irrigation Scheme in the 
Ciskei (Fieldwork observation, May, 1979 - GB). 
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CHAPTER THIRTY-THREE 
THE ECONOMIC FAILURE OF PROGRESSIVE FARMER STRATEGIES 
1. Introduction. 
2. The problems of planning in the periphery. 
3. The limits of developing "progressive farmers". 
4. Simple commodity production in the periphery. 
5. Questions about endogamous capitalist agriculture. 
6. The class character of kulaks. 
7. Conclusion. 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
Planned development has not been very successful in peripheral social 
formations. In this chapter I assess why it has failed to meet the limited 
goal of economic viability, let alone engender the adoption of new means of 
production and be integrated into a development process that raises the 
productive capacity of the whole. I also focus specifically on the failure 
of "progressive farmer" development and the associated failure to develop 
simple commodity producer, kulak and capitalist farming. The next chapter 
looks at the problems of outgrower and settler tenant strategies. 
2. THE PROBLEMS OF PLANNING IN THE PERIPHERY. 
In general, agriculture is usually very dependent on natural 
conditions I and it is therefore not wholly susceptible to state planning 
and control. In the Third World, this is compounded by the fact that 
planning is still embryonic and formative due to the low level of the means 
of production and the complex tangle of relations of production (Kollontai, 
1970:5). Planning itself is not a well developed productive force.(l) Both 
its conception and execution are undermined by the broader context of 
underGevelopment and the (associated) character of the peripheral state and 
ruling classes. The structures and processes of extroversion-dependence, 
unevenness-disarticulation, and surplus transfer raise the following 
problems for development planninq: 
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i. There are many spontaneous forces - especially the market and private 
capitalist activities tKollontai, 1970:15). The state has little control 
over the division of the economy into monopoly, competitive, and marginal 
levels -- and this makes a coherent development strategy hard to devise 
(Mare, 1977:23). 
ii. Planninq options are limited by international dependence regarding 
export markets, balance of payments, foreign investment, and imperialist 
aid lKollontai, 1970:15). Fluctuations in world demand for primary 
products undermine planning and budgeting (Harrison, 1981:339). Also, 
loans have to be paid off regardless of slump years, and so development 
plans have to be cut accordingly (ibid).(2) 
iii. The national economy has no integrated internal market through which 
up-and downstream effects of planned development could be diffused by 
poles and growth points of development (Amin, 1974:289). Instead, sectors 
and forms of production are juxtaposed - their linkages being with foreign 
centres (ibid).(3) 
IVa The fact that underdevelopment usually involves a lack of accurate 
analysis and information compounds the external and interventionist nature 
of planning. Most development prograrrmes in Africa have been undertaken 
without adequate knowledge of population, land, income distribution, crop 
yields, consumption and marketed quantities (Heyer et aI, 1980:12). Simply 
put, development agencies (both state and private) lack knowledge and 
experience of local conditions (Williams, 1986b:19). Failure is also due to 
sheer ignorance of planners, rooted in their training and their 
transnational style of operation (Williams, 1986a:7). 
The character of the peripheral state adds its own contribution to the 
failure of planned development. The planners themselves are not necessarily 
willing or able to put aside their own (or other) class ideologies and 
interests in order to design e~cally effective programmes. Many 
projects are more about developing the political power of the state and/or 
sections of the petty bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie than about development 
(see chapter thirty-five). 
Furthermore, while a plan requires policies and measures to implement 
it (Seidman, 1978:285), these may often distort its structure and 
developmental intentions. Members of bourgeois and petty bourgeois classes 
in the periphery either directly or through family ties and corruption, use 
the state to channel surplus to their own ultimate benefit (Harrison, 
1981:369). Politics is increasingly a primary source of capital accumulat-
ion (Williams, 1981:28). The consequence is a "'soft state'" (Myrdal, 1968) 
where despite its "overdeveloped'" and hypertrophied structure, it is "'soft", 
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on protocols, bureaucratic impartiality, etc. - at least as regards the 
privileged classes (Seidman, 1978:383). 
As part of the ...... soft state'" there is also the tendency for .... absolute 
surplus'" to be converted into "'''hidden surplus"'" (see chapter eleven). In 
this, investment finance is channelled into private consumption through 
bribery, corruption and other mechanisms. The "'soft state'" means insuffic-
ient courts, an inappropriate bureaucracy, and the unaccountability of the 
parastatals (Seidman, 1978:288). A result of this is -soft development'" 
such that planning in Tropical Africa has had little success in achieving 
either its private or public sector aims (Seidman, 1978:286/7). 
The weakness of classes able to develop productive capacity means that 
plans to stimulate development contributions by private capitalists still 
require rapid enlargement of the state sector (ibid:291). This involves 
provision of credit, marketing and storage facilities, processing and 
transport, and other inputs (eg. fertilizer, tractors) (ibid:295). State 
spending on unsuccessful development may produce a revenue crisis and 
(through borrowings) a foreign exchange crisis as well (Dutkiewicz and 
Williams, 1987:44). 
3. THE LIMITS OF DEVELOPING .... PROGRESSIVE FARt-£RS"'. 
An illustration of the points discussed above may be seen in the 
experience of Kenya where, on the surface, the planned development of 
""progressive farmers'" seems to have had some success in the 1960s. On 
closer inspection, however, the significance of the country"s peripheral 
economic system and the character of its state and ruling classes can be 
shown to be crucial to facilitating - and limiting - the extent of this 
success. 
Kenyan "'progressive farmer H strategies entailed the lifting of 
colonial restrictions on African cultivation of cash crops and the 
expansion of African access to land, and these were important factors 
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behind the flourishing of smallholding production (Carlsen, 1980:218; 
Williams, 1984:9).(4) An added factor here was the the consolidation and 
registration of land (Williams, ibid:14). Ruthenberg (1966:100) argues 
that the increase in marketed output was related to government rural 
development policy, but he also notes that the increase cannot be seen 
solely as the consequence of public inputs (ibid:37). 
Indeed, while rural development factors played a role in stimulating 
non-capitalist commodity production, this latter has historically been 
dependent on its articulation with the CMP. This articulation made 
possible and indeed financed "progressive farmer'" corrmodity production, 
through the remittances of wage earners to these non-capitalist production 
processes (Kitching, 1980:3).(5) In turn, this articulation benefited the 
CMP in supplying it with cheap labour power and agricultural cOfllJlOdities. 
So, in addition to ~upplying finance, the CMP also provided the (world) 
market at an attractive price. This was probably a more important 
determinant than state development policy, as can be seen in the failure of 
a credit programme in the 19605. This programme, despite being substantial 
and generous, was unable to change the fact that the low monetary returns 
per acre and labour-time spent dissuaded smallholders from growing cotton 
(Kitching, 1980:319). Heyer writes that the growth in Kenya~s smallholder 
marketed output was linked to a good market and to sUbstantial inputs and 
that these conditions are unlikely to be available again (1981:117). 
If increased smallholding production was thus dependent on the CMP for 
finance indirectly and markets directly, it drew little in the way of 
technological innovation (Ruthenberg, 1966:134; Carlsen, 1980:76,83). The 
form this production took was mostly through expanding the area under cash 
crops, rather than by advanced means of production facilitating higher 
yields {Dinham and Hines, 1983:187). Kitching claims that there was a 
umassively expanded proqramn8 of researchu into hybrid crops, fertilizers, 
insecticides and planting practices. For him, this was Na prime factor in 
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raising the productivity of physical labour power on small holdings~, and 
it ~represented a powerful intervention by the state into production on 
smallholdings"'" (1981:381). However, the evidence seems to point to the 
conclusion that few technological advances were involved in (or evolved out 
of) Kenya~s post-Swynnerton expansion of commodity production (Such-Hansen 
and Marcussen, 1982:20).(6) The increases in output were from the exten-
sion of small family labour farms under cash crops. In addition, it appears 
that the majority of rural households were actually untouched by Kenya's 
"'agrarian revolution'" (Ruthenberg, 1966:120; Kitching, 1980:324). Sy 1970, 
less than 12 percent of peasant land was under high value cash crops or 
improved varieties of maize (ibid:328; see also Ruthenberg, 1966:25). If 
""progressive farmers"" and farmers affected by the "'revolution in product-
ion~ are defined as broadly as including any producer cultivating any 
quantity of one of the five leading cash crops, then only about a third of 
smallholders were affected (Kitching, 1980:329). The rest of the land was 
still used as in 1952 for basic food crops and pasturage (ibid). 
The continuation of "'progressive farmer"'-type strategies in the 1970s 
(associated with the World Bank and aimed at the rural poor) did not 
dramatically improve production, if at all (Williams, 1981a:31). According 
to Buch-Hansen and Marcussen, by the mid-1970s, "'progressive farmer"" 
development in Kenya had reached its limits in terms of both land avail-
ability and the productivity of family labour. Somehow, productivity 
increases were necessary if peasant production was to continue (ibid:21). 
In this regard, settler and outgrower schemes offered better prospects 
through their enforced use of new means and methods of production. Their 
success in this, however, has often been outweighed by their failure in 
other respects (see the next chapter). 
The limits of Kenya's planned rural development in the 1970s are 
linked not only to the structure of underdevelopment, but also to the 
character of the Kenyan state and the weakness of its planning. The 
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backwardness of planning is evident in reports by the Institute of 
Development Studies at the University of Nairobi that investigated the 
Special Rural Development Programme run in the early 1970s. These show a 
dire lack of agronomic and social research (IDS, 1972).(7) The IDS reports 
also reveal how the absence of integrated planning resulted in inappropr-
iate projects.(8) Political factors also played a major role in the 
failure of planned development. (See chapter thirty-six). 
Control over middle peasant/simple commodity producer production by 
state marketing boards has been another factor inhibiting ~progressive 
farmer~ development in Kenya and Tropical Africa in general. These boards, 
far from stimulating increased productivity, were notoriously inefficient. 
(For examples in Kenya, see IDS (1975:18-24); for Tanzania, see Coulson 
(1981:67-8)). While peasant tea production schemes under the KTDA in 
Kenya have been successful (Raikes, 1978:308), this has also been a depend-
ent and limited growth aimed at the external market, and more akin to an 
outgrower system than a marketing board (see next chapter). Acting as 
monopolies, boards have passed the costs of their weakness and corruption 
on to the farmers (Bates, 1981:27). In some cases, it is even worse where 
co-operatives have acted as marketing boards: Kenya~s -progressive" coffee 
farmers who developed under the Swynnerton Plan in the 19505 were forced 
into co-operatives that were tightly government controlled and which often 
had monopolies on marketing. The effect was that these growers received 
twenty percent less of the world market price than large plantations which 
sold directly to the State board (Bates, 1981:28; Cowen, 1981:137). With 
tea in Kenya, thanks to lobbying by Brook Bond company, the Kenyan Tea 
Development Board banned the sale of home-made sundried tea in Kenya. 
4. SIMPLE COMMODITY PRODUCTION IN THE PERIPHERY. 
The Kenyan experience of progressive farmers highlights the failure of 
middle peasants to develop into successful simple commodity producers. 
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What it boils down to is the fact that as producers in the periphery of the 
international capitalist system, they have articulated very differently 
with the CMP in comparison to their counterparts in the centre (Mouzelis, 
1975/6:487/8). In the latter case, simple commodity production develops 
and persists through increasing its productivity and establishing positive 
complementarity with industry_ Technical progress in the CMP is diffused 
to the simple commodity producers. 
In the periphery, however, disarticulation-unevenness and dependence-
extroversion means that the dynamism and high productivity of the CMP at 
the centre tends not to get transferred to small commodity producers. The 
relative immobilities of labour, incomplete commoditization of household 
reproduction, and the absence of competition has meant that there is little 
pressure to reinvest in agriculture (ibid). In consequence, these rural 
commodity producers in the Third World are not "modernized'''. Instead, 
there is a large productivity and income gap between them and large-scale 
capitalist farms as a result (Mouzelis, 1979:81; 1979a:353). Thus, in the 
periphery, simple commodity production by middle peasants has not become 
their primary relation of production. Instead of becoming generalized, it 
has co-existed with various other relations (Friedmann, 1979:178).(9) 
In the periphery, simple commodity production rather than developing 
endogamously from a middle peasantry was controlled and limited from the 
start. In Uganda, the colonial state tried to prevent production relations 
from developing into capitalist ones through banning land sales (Mamdani, 
1977:60,142). In Kenya, middle peasants and simple commodity producers were 
suppressed initially as a threat to settler production. Later, they were 
deliberately encour~ged, and industrial interests, trading compa~es and 
the colonial and post-colonial state all tried to regulate what was 
produced, how it was produced, the prices paid, and the marketing arrange-
ments. They left the immediate organization of production in the hands of 
the producers, although this became increasingly determined by commodity 
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relations and measures such as cultivation laws, credit, and extension 
services - all of which tied the producer to a very particular type of 
production (Bernstein, 1979a:427). The effect of these controls has been to 
reinforce the negative effects of the context of underdevelopment on the 
development of simple comrr1oditv production. Far from developing towards the 
CMP, simple commodity production has not even been successful in consolid-
ating and developing itself and its own productivity (Kahn, 1978:124; Amin, 
1974:147). Instead, its development has been constrained and it has there-
fore not provided an answer to the Agrarian Question. 
5. THE QUESTION OF ENDOGAMOUS CAPITALIST AGRICULTURE. 
If simple corrrnodity production has been limited in the periphery, what 
about the development of a class of KulaKs and, out of this, a class of 
farmer capitalists? 
While African co-operatives and marketing boards have channelled 
surplus away from peasant producers, this has been not only to the state 
and bureaucracy, but also to an extent to Kulaks who have dominated these 
bodies (see Raikes, 1978:297; Seidman, 1978:324-5; Cliffe, 1977:213/5; 
Harris, 1980:344). Kulaks are often merged with the local bureaucracy and 
interpret national policy and programmes in their own interests (Feldman, 
1975:176; Raikes, 1978:302; Kitching, 1972:345; Brietzke, 1976:658; see 
chapter thirty). 
An example of what tends to happen may be seen in the Ugandan co-
operatives, described by one writer as the lIorganizational vehicle"" of an 
advancing bourgeoisie (Mamdani, 1977:199). They served as a means of 
accumulation for the rich who controlled the corrmittees and the use of 
surplus funds (ibid:236). The post-colonial state not only gave the co-ops 
control of allocation of 75 percent of all crops, but continually 
channelled funds into them (ibid:231, 236). These funds ultimately came 
from the marKeting boards - in other words, surplus was transferred to the 
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KulaKS from the middle and poor peasants (ibid). The state tractor-hire 
service, which ran at a loss (i.e. subsidizing its users) was only 
available for large lands (ibid:230). In a sense, then, -progressive 
farmer'" development strategies may assist the rise of a kulak class. 
And yet, despite this "'aid~, African kulaks by and large have neither 
developed themselves into a class of farmer capitalists, nor developed 
productive capacity. A noticeable feature of the progressive farmer 
strategy has been its inability to change the obstacles facing the develop-
ment of capitalist farming: the cost of labour power and the lack of full 
command over it (due to incomplete proletarianization) (for Kenya, see 
Ruthenberg, 1966:27), the international determination of price and quality 
of produce, and the exclusion of private producers from the processing of 
crops (Cowen, 1981b:140). In Ghana, government subsidization became vital 
for capitalist rice farming to continue in the face of the dissappearance 
of cheap labour and land (Williams 1984:11). Likewise Nigerian capitalist 
grain farmers require government subsidies to survive (Dutkiewicz and 
Williffios, 1987:652). In Kenya, the one strategy which did develop an 
African capitalist farming class involved state credits that enabled well-
off African state employees to simply replace white capitalists with black 
ones. This hardly amounts to an expansion of capitalist farming or to a 
revolutionizing of production (Carlsen, 1980:80; Williams, 1984:9). On the 
contrary, a reduction of productive capacity by a third was estimated by 
the Department of Agriculture at the time (Ruthenberg, 1966:96). 
The obvious question is why, despite their access to the state, kulaks 
have failed to develop either productive capacity or themselves as farmer-
capitalists. The answer to this lies partially in the character of the 
post-colonial state, and the associated planning process (see section two 
above). The answer also lies partially in the fact that the benefits 
available to kulaks may not necessarily compensate for the losses they 
sustain in surplus appropriated from them. Their privileges are often only 
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relative to middle and poor peasants, and do not change their overall 
status as 10sers.(10) 
However, to complete the picture of why kulaks have failed to develop, 
one can also point to their class character and practices. In the face of 
of the obstacles to capitalist farming, especially in the periphery, kulaks 
have tended to invest outside of agriculture. 
6. THE CLASS CHARACTER OF KULAKS. 
It appears from experience in the capitalist periphery that while 
kulaks (and farmer capitalists) may accumulate, this is in a manner that 
does not develop productive capacity in agriculture, and nor does it 
contribute to the development of the whole (Raikes, 1978:319/20, footnote 
7). For example, there is a tendency among kulaks to amass wealth rather 
than capital (Mamdani, 1977:307). Thus in the Sukuma area of Tanzania, 
kulaks accumulated wealth in the form of enlarging cattle stocks, rather 
than qualitative development of means of production. Instead of develop-
ment, the outcome was underdevelopment resulting from overgrazing (Cliffe, 
1977:213). In other cases, consumption took precedence over saving - so 
that even in Ghana, Polly Hillis productive farmer ""capitalists"'" (sic) used 
their income for funerals, celebrations and housing (Hill, 1963:111).(11) 
There is also sometimes usury (Howard, 1980:76). In colonial Ghana, the 
incomplete institution of private property dissuaded rich peasants from 
becoming rural capitalists and their class relations were constrained into 
money-lending (Howard, 1980:72). The same occurred in Tanzania (Awiti, 
1973:231). Accumulation is also channelled into bribery, use of licences 
and local trading monopolies (Raikes, 1978:317). 
In some cases, kulaks have invested surpluses in enlarging their land 
(Hill, 1963:110). But in other places, such as the Tanzanian highlands, 
high population density and customary limits on the transfer of land have 
limited this (Raikes, 1978:300).(12) The general consequence has been that 
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gurplus has been invested in other channels suth as trade (ibid). These, 
plus transport activities, often yield better returns than reinvestment in 
farming tBernstein, 1979a:442). In Senegal, better-off cultivators gave up 
farming to become pure traders (Woddis, 1977:267). Although trading may be 
a stepping-stone to investment in agriculture (ibid:268), both trade and 
farming have more often served as a temporary further stepping-stone for 
speculation in commerce and transport (Hill, 1963:111). In Kenya, much 
rural income (from farms and from wage-labour) has gone on investment in 
circulation rather than production (kitching, 1980:27). These activities 
may well enhance the national economic system~ yet if they occur at the 
expense of developing production, their contribution to development becomes 
questionable. 
In kenya, kulaks have also not generally invested in agriculture. 
This has been partly explained by the relatively easier, less risky and 
more profitable investment opportunities opened up with Kenyanization 
policies after independence (Carlsen, 1980:83). In addition, their off-farm 
investment behaviour was a result of restrictions on land transfer and 
crop quotas in the 1960s (ibid:90). By the late 1970s, some kulaks were 
buying and renting more land, as well as improving it and investing in 
long-term crops. But there was still very little investment in farm equip-
ment, and most savings still went into non-farm business (ibid:188,191). 
Kenyan Kulaks have also found that bureaucratic jobs have been more 
remunerative than small-scale farming, and one-third of them have moved 
into these spheres, becoming absentee landlords (Leo, 1979:635/6). On some 
of the low-density settlement schemes, just under half are part-time 
settlers, hiring others to work their farms (Ruthenberg, 1966:73). But 
many of these do not have enough capital to invest on their farms, and for 
some the plot is reduced to a land insurance policy (ibid). To acquire 
bureaucratic jobs, Kenyan kulaks - like their counterparts in Ghana and 
Tanzania - have invested in education (Howard, 1980:196/7; Hill, 1963:111; 
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Raikes, 1978:300; Williams, 1984:15). 
Generally speaking, kulak investment in small businesses is, however, 
often unviable because of competition from imported goods. As in Ghana, 
this confines indigenous kulaks to investment in commerce and finance, 
rather than industry (Howard, 1980:76). Similarly in Zambia, industry is 
dominated by foreign capital, and local entrepreneurs had to remain in 
trade (Muntemba, 1978:75). State marketing board monopolies have blocked 
private bourgeois development in the area of marketing and processing 
(Heyer, 1981:104). All this squares with Mamdani's comnent (1977:145,166) 
that underdeveloped capitalism means the pr1mBcy of commerce, and the 
investment of agricultural surpluses in exchange rather than production. 
Summing up, then, one can note that kulaks, while often aspirant 
capitalists, have generally failed to become actual capitalists, and in 
particular farmer capitalists. Their capacity to participate in one 
relation of production rather than two is distorted and frustrated in the 
periphery. Their propensity to participate in a single relation is also 
questionable. One reason why small entrepreneurs expand out of agriculture 
is to avoid the risks of specialization in an extroverted and disarticulat-
ed market (see Long and Richardson, 1978:191, 205 footnote 7). 
As a result, kulaks often become not "pure" farmer capitalists 
developing one primary relation of production, but a hybrid group in many 
production relations (both heterogeneous and homogeneous). Accordingly, 
they serve as lIall-round'" agents of extending conrnercial relations, who not 
only operate as semi-capitalist farmers exploiting labour-power, but who 
also rent out machines, serve as local merchants and money-lenders, and 
deal in crops, retail business, and transport (Bernstein 1979a:431). The 
roles of landlords, merchants and userers have been discussed in earlier 
chapters and it is clear that such modes of utilizing surplus do not devel-
op productive capacity (at least not directly). Capitalist agriculture in 
the periphery has been stunted: kulaks emerging from middle peasant and 
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simple commodity production proceeded no further (ibid:152). 
7. CONCLUSION. 
It would appear from the above review, that the ~progressive farmer~ 
development route, with associated possibilities of simple commodity 
production, rich peasant and capitalist outcomes has not been a solution to 
the Agrarian Question in the Third World. On the contrary, the structures 
and processes of underdevelopment have interacted with the formation of 
these classes in such a way as to inhibit them from fulfilling any such 
historical role, and to divert them away from agriculture as a potential 
base for national development. 
According to Stavenhagen (1964:92), despite attempts by the most 
diverse governments at different periods, nowhere in the underdeveloped 
areas has there arisen a workable system of medium-sized family farms 
devoted to a rational diversified agriculture supplying the internal 
market. Malawi's experience of -progressive farmer~ policies is interest-
ing in this regard. Promoting this strategy in 1969, the Malawian govern-
ment gave a select group of farmers the bulk of extension, credit and 
subsidies. But only 260 "progressive farmers" - not the 3000 targeted _ 
actually emerged. EVidently, the particular mixture of social and technical 
reform in the context of Malawi's underdevelopment and articulation to the 
CMP was not suitable. Consequently, by 1972, the state itself was forced 
to intervene directly with a different development strategy, and large 
state farms began to be developed instead (Thomas, 1975:38).(13) Evaluating 
such state strategy in the form of settlement and outgrower schemes is the 
subject matter of the next chapter. 
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1. Planners also have to contend with vague guidelines. For example, in 
one African countrY~ ~the sort ot plan - epiphenomenal or directive, 
longterm or short, specific or general, public sector shopping list or 
detailed statement of economic linkages - lay in the planners i discretionU 
(Seidman, 1978:296). 
2. The biggest problem facing Korean agriculture today is that while 
export-led industrial growth was previously able to pay for rural develop-
ment, the instability of this growth in the early 1980s jeopardized future 
agricultural development (Douglass, 1983:208). 
3. Agribusiness has few links with local agriculture and often increases 
dependency on imports of raw materials, machinery, etc. (Dinham and Hines, 
1983:50). For example, a pineapple production and export plantation in 
Kenya earns foreign exchange, but it also involves imports of machinery, 
fertilizers and much else - including even sugar (despite the fact that 
Kenya grows sugar). The Del Monte company running the enterprise has the 
right to remit profits abroad (ibid:107). 
4. For example, in 1957 smallholders produced only 9 percent of marketed 
coffee, by late 1960s, they were growing over 50 percent, and their numbers 
also rose from 3 000 to 133 000 in central province over this period 
(Kitching, 1980:317/8, Blume 1971:83; Carlsen, 1980:11,37; Ruthenberg, 
1966: 12 ) . 
5. This articulation contributed to the failure of a state credit policy 
aimed at smallholders - it seems that households preferred the available 
option of remittances to the debt associated with the state scheme (Heyer, 
1981:113/4). (Other reasons for the failure of credit policies are 
discussed shortly in the text). 
6. In Tanzania in the 1950s, the progressive farmer experience while 
producing a rise in output in some cases, saw only very large capitalist 
farmers mechanizing, while the bulk of producers simply extended the land 
area under cultivation (Coulson, 1981:63). 
7. For example, they describe how the Mbere cotton blocks project was 
implemented (ibid:2b/7): 
Hi. Cotton blocks started in the absence of information on environmental 
suitability for cotton, and in face of expert advice against the 
project. 
2. Target acreage reduced from 500 acres to 280 acres due to unwillingness 
of the clans to lease land for the project. 
3. 178 acres cleared, 169 ploughed, and only about 48 acres planted. 
Despite lateness of the rains the ioptimal~ planting date was rigidly 
applied so (a) what was planted failed to germinate, and (b) clearing 
and ploughing stopped before it was really necessary. 
4. The project was declared a failure, and the land was left unused.#I 
The -Special 4K~ project at Tetu aimed to attract youths to farming and 
increase output through the demonstration effect on parents and neighbours, 
using hybrid maize. An earlier survey of the region, had it been 
consulted, would have shown that 60 percent of 4K members i families already 
grew hybrid maize (ibid:L9-30). 
8. uIn Vihiga, pigs were fed maize which was needed to feed the local 
population. Coordinated planning would have indicated that a livestock 
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project dependent on the generation of local crop surpluses was premature. 
In Mbere, hybrid maize and cotton production were introduced before 
adequate experimentation had been carried out on a spectrum of crops 
appropriate for dry areas, and the results were not successful.~ (IDS, 
1975:20-9). 
9. This restricted peripheral simple commodity production has also been 
different from the new centres in Canada and Australia. The latter were 
dominated by simple commodity production and therefore had the capacity to 
evolve independently into a fully developed capitalist mode of production 
(Amin, 1974:393, also Barratt-Brown, 1976:259). 
10. I thank Gavin Williams for this point (made in a personal communic-
ation, January 1988). 
11. In Ceylon, some of the wealthy peasants became petty rentiers through 
subletting rather than turning to productive capitalism (Herring, 1981:169, 
footnote 56) .. 
12. In Iran, middle peasants did not pass through the rich-peasant stage 
of continuing to take part in the labour process at the same time as hiring 
labour: instead they ceased work entirely because of the cultural value of 
non-labour, and also because of social pressures to provide employment. 
The overall effect was to reduce their incomes and therefore their potent-
ial to expand production (Keddie, 1968:160/1). A further reason why they 
ceased working was because of the lack of alternative investment 
opportunities in the face of monopoly competition (ibid). This has also 
been the situation in Ismani, Tanzania (Feldman, 1975:165). 
13. Similarly in Iran, land was distributed to richer peasants, and there 
was also the creation of moishavs and co-operatives (Halliday, 1979:113). 
Yet none of this was economically successful: the richer peasants' incomes 
rose - but these were used for consumption rather than reinvestment (ibid:-
129). Thus the state had to intervene at the point of production by becom-
ing directly involved in co-operatives, farm corporations, and joint vent-
ures with ~agribusiness~ (ibid:113). 
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1. Introduction. 
2. Settlement schemes: a catalogue of failure. 
3. Reasons behind the unviability. 
4. Class structure and development: settlers l capitalist characteristics. 
5. Settlers' proletarian characteristics. 
6. Outgrower schemes: continued underdevelopment? 
7. Conclusion. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter thirty-one argued that settlement and outgrower schemes - as 
with "'progressive farmer'" development strategies - are aimed at developing 
rural commodity producers generating surplus for the state and capital. In 
this chapter, I argue that while this may be the intention, many schemes 
often do not realize the planned economic goals. In addition to the effect 
of the backwardness of planning, the structures and dynamics of a 
peripheral economic system, and the character of the state, the specific 
social structure of settler tenants also plays a part in the failure of 
settlement schemes. Outgrower schemes have been far less negative in narrow 
economic terms, but of ambiguous significance for national development. 
2. SETTLEMENT SCHEMES: A CATALOGUE OF FAILURE. 
Among African settlement schemes, the economic record is typically one 
of failure - perhaps most notably the massive Tanzanian Groundnut Scheme 
and the Niger Agricultural Project (Heyer et aI, 1980:8; Williams, 1985:-
152/3; Forrest, 1981:233). Even the much-praised Gezira scheme made no 
profits between 1971-76 (Bates, 1981:48).(1) Listing the failures of 
development schemes in Africa could occupy several theses, and I do not 
intend to do this here. Rather, what follows is an attempt to show the 
extent of the failure, as well as highlight certain features within this. 
Characteristic of the failure of settlement schemes is the way in 
which they constitute a seemingly infinite drain on resources. In Mali, a 
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40 000 acre irrigation scheme continues to rely on state subsidies - the 
finance for which might be more profitably invested in smaller proiects 
(Grove, 1979:15b). Even the Salimi La!.<eshore Proiect in Malawi which met 
the obiectives of growth and an above-average rise in production, still 
absorbs development funding (Thomas, 1975:38). The Kenvan Tana River 
, I 
irrigation scheme has run at a loss due to long transport routes and high I' 
cost of irrigation, and has depended on a government subsidy for its 
survival (Blume, 1971:147). The large Richard Tull development scheme in 
Senegal -- li!.<e many other West Af r ican examples -- has also not iustif ied 
its high development costs (ibid:162). The cost of the Nigerian Chad Basin 
Development Authority in the 1970s was enormously expensive, and the amount 
is not being recovered (Bates, 1981:47). 
The Western Nigeria Farm Settlement Scheme absorbed fifty percent of 
total capital spending on agriculture between 1962-68, but ""'by any 
criterion, these schemes failed u (Bates, 1981:47). They produced too little 
and at exhorbitant cost, and earned too little to repay initial financing 
(ibid). After six years, there were 20 such settlements with 1200 settlers 
(Hill, 1977:28). The cost, however, had been 75 percent of the total 
regional agriculture budget. This cash could have gone on extension 
services for the non-settlement producers. The settlements were Unot 
merely self-contained failures, but also had a deleterious effect on the 
larger economic pictureO (ibid:30). 
Another feature of settlement schemes is the way that - while losing 
money - they may serve to subsidize settler tenants. In Zambia, many 
schemes were so unviable that they were eventually closed down. But even 
with those remaining Uthe returns to state agencies are such that the 
schemes are more a form of subsidization to selected settlers rather than a 
form of surplus extractionU (Cliffe, 1978:336/7). Similarly in Tanzania, 
the majority of schemes were unviable, and a number of pilot schemes were 
dropped in 1965 (Raikes, 1978:308). Those remaining still provide settlers 
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a higher standard of living than the average peasant - thanks to government 
subsidization - and they continue as a drain on public funds (ibid). 
Settlers on the West Nigerian development schemes were not intended to be 
wage-earners, but rather to develop into a rural bourgeoisie. They were 
expected to buy their enterprises over fifteen years (Hill, 1977:28). In 
fact, however, productivity was so low that settlers could not hope to 
become viable, let alone independent (ibid:30). They became a public 
sector salariat supported by the government - a privileged stratum in the 
public sector with better income and benefits than the government's 
agricultural field staff. The schemes also failed to either increase 
agricultural production or reduce urban unemployment (ibid). (For Kenya, 
see Ruthenberg, 1966:74,148). 
Irrigation schemes may actually reduce the productive capacity of the 
whole, as in Nigeria where people downstream from the Kano River project 
lost their dry season farms due to the project's ending of river flooding 
(Wallace, 1980:65). Thus, by 1980 there had been a loss of 20 000 hectares 
of radama (land flooded by river and often farmed all year round) and a 
gain of only 1000 hectares newly irrigated land. 
3. REASONS BEHIND THE UNVIABILITY OF SETTLEMENT SCHEMES. 
The reasons for commercial failure are several. The context of an 
underdeveloped economy in the international capitalist system is important. 
For example, in Uganda in 1966, there were 37 group farm schemes involving 
3500 members, but a slump in the cotton market cut the number to 30 farms 
with 1800 members (Seidman, 1977:164). Although the Gezira scheme is 
financially successful, it too is exposed to the instability of the world 
market (Barnett, 1977:15). Typically, the schemes are also overcapital-
ized, badly under-planned, and poorly managed (Hill, 1977:25, 32). I will 
ex~nine these features in turn. 
In terms of over-capitalization, the Ugandan Mubuku Pilot Irrigation 
396 
I 
DEVELOPMENT FAILUREI 
SETTLER TENANTS ./ OUTGROWERS 
project and its replicas, are a good example of heavy overheads preventing 
commercial viability (Seidman, 1977:163). In some cases, donors have 
supplied finance for the capital costs of the projects, and have uundoubt-
edly also favoured relatively capital-intensive projects which might 
involve the import of plant or machinery from the donor countryU (Peel, 
1982:21). Further, they have left the host government to pay for the 
running costs (ibid). In general, nearly all so-called Utransformation~ 
programmes require large-scale capital expenditure (Heyer et aI, 1980:8). 
It is, in consequence, 
frequently the case that high investment and administr-
ative costs of irrigation and settlement schemes, as 
well as other forms of intervention, have had the effect 
of making peasant production more expensive without 
bringing significant improvements in the peasants~ 
standard of living (or in their productivity - GB) 
(Heyer et aI, 1980:8). 
Settler tenant schemes (like state and capitalist farms) incur costs 
for equipment, spares, repairs, housing and social facilities and salaries 
of officials, managers, and technicians (see Williams, 1976a:168).(2) 
Irrigation schemes are hugely expensive (Williams, 1986b:15; Peel, 1982:-
21). The outlay simply cannot be matched by the value of the crops grown 
(Ruthenberg, 1966:101; Williams, 1984:44). In Ghana, 30 million dollars was 
spent on the 135 public-sector peasantry state farms that existed in 1966 
but with little tangible result (Hill, 1977:32). 
In terms of underplanning, many Tanzanian schemes were planned to have 
modern cultivation methods stressing maximum yields per acre. But yields 
per acre is not the most relevant measure of improved farming in (relative-
ly) land-abundant Tanzania (Raikes, 1978:298; Coulson, 1981:53/4; 82). 
Consultants and project managements assume that family labour can meet new 
style farming demands. But in the Niger Agriculture Project, this would 
have meant that each settler would have had to do 408 days work in a six 
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week period (Forrest" 1981:233). At the Kano river project, the expense of 
labour, seeds; water, tractors, and fertilizers has raised the cost of 
farming so dramatically that many tarmers cannot meet their financial or 
labour demands, and are forced to leave land fallow or rent it to others 
with a larger land and labour base (Wallace" 1980:67). 
Planning is also often based on flawed economic and political 
assumptions which contribute to unviability. The Kenyan Million Acre 
settlement scheme gave special favours to low-density settlers who were 
expected to be ~progressive farmers H able to payoff the loans for the 
land. Indeed, loan repayment was treated by the Kenyan government (pre-
and post-independence) as more important than the the successful long-term 
development of the scheme (Harbeson, 1971:248). 
In terms of management and administration, irrigation schemes are 
"'appallingly inefficient'" (Williams, 1984:46). Uganda demonstrates how 
inadequate management of schemes, beginning with the British managers' 
inability to establish an effective working relationship with scheme 
participants, can set schemes into decline (Seidman" 1977:164/5). The 
Ugandan schemes also exhibit wastage: tractors are idle except when 
planting and the charge to settlers hardly covers half of the recurrent 
costs (ibid:165). 
4. CLASS STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT: SETTLERS' CAPITALIST CHARACTERISTICS. 
The consequences of the social structure of planned development 
settlement and outgrower schemes are ambiguous. With regard to the 
settlers'" ""capitalistU characteristics, these have not led to development. 
Settlers' articulation with proletarians is such that they may be in a 
position to set production in motion and extract surplus labour from these 
employees. Indeed, this may be made necessary by their articulation with 
capital - in which they themselves are exploited. While all this may serve 
to keep some production in motion, it is not in itself a phenomenon that 
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can exponentiallY develop productive capacity. This becomes evident when 
one looks at the situation in more detail. 
Settler tenants I potential to develop productive capacity by 
capitalist expansion seems to be almost inevitably low. For example, 
Tanzanian schemes have been of fixed land size and they have not provided 
for expanding production on the part of their members (Raikes, 1978:308). 
Diversification of accumulation into other sectors and activities has often 
been precluded while other relations of production have been more appealing 
(ibid:286). Thus, some scheme participants have sometimes used scheme 
resources to develop their own private farms located outside the schemes 
(ibid:308). In cases where tenants have a home plot - as in the Ugandan 
group farms after independence - this tends to get their attention 
(Seidman, 1977:164). The same occurs on the Gezira scheme where tenants 
concentrate on their food plots rather than the cotton which they have to 
cultivate in order to occupy the tenancy (Barnett, 1977:107,113). 
The limits on monetary accumulation may limit settler's motivation to 
"satisficing", rather than maximizing incomes and therefore output on the 
schemes (Barnett, 1977:71). "Satisficing" behaviour at Gezira is, accord-
ing to Barnett, because tenants had a finite realm for expansion, and could 
only vary the type of labour input and the cropping input on a fixed size 
of land. Also, tenants lacked a clear appreciation of the relation between 
effort and reward because of the system of arrears payment and fluctuations 
of income caused by the world market (1977:75,171). 
Because capitalist development is blocked by the size of the tenancy, 
and because crop choice is restricted, some maximizing tenants develop 
their interests outside of agriculture. While retaining their tenancy, 
they no longer work it personally (Barnett, 1977:174). Thus a rich stratum 
of tenants has existed at Gezira which had shops and lorries, and which 
sometimes engaged in usury (1975:196). In some cases where scheme incomes 
are below those of rich peasants, participants use the schemes as stepping 
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stones to becoming a private rich peasantry (Raikes, 1978:308, 314). 
Although this is not conducive to the development of the schemes, it may 
have some positive effect on production in the social formation as a whole, 
5. SETTLERS' PROLETARIAN CHARACTERISTICS. 
With regard to the ""proletarian" characteristics, an important factor 
influencing development is their position at Moment A. At Kano River 
project, farmers do not own the land or the means of production. As a 
result, they have little commitment to the project - preferring to invest 
money outside it, displaying little initiative on it, and even acting as 
absentee landlords as well (Wallace, 1981:289). Given the lack of control, 
it is small wonder, comments Seidman (1978:325), that the attitudes of many 
settlers correspond to those of paid labourers. "Peasants regard state-
managed settlements and cooperatives as 'government farms" and consider 
work on these schemes as work for the government and subsistence allowances 
to settlers as low wages'" (Williams, 1976a:168).(3) 
Settlers" position at Moment A has direct effects on their performance 
at B. It gives rise to an ideology that is counterproductive to 
development. For example, on many Ghanaian schemes in the 1960s, the 
""public sector peasantry'" with public sector employee status worked "'civil 
t service hours'" - which meant that their productivity in relation to capital 
investment was below that of private peasants (Hill, 1977:33). On the Niger 
Agriculture Project, settlers resented the authoritarian management and 
lacked incentives under the share-cropping arrangements (Forrest, 
1981:233). While this particular attitude has not stopped capital in other 
places from developing productive capacity, it does not serve to stimulate 
labour to do this on many development schemes. It does, however, permit 
control of settlers, and this may maintain a level of productivity. For 
example, at kenya's irrigated rice settlement scheme at Mwea, high output 
is linked to the fact that "(t)enants are willing to follow the orders of 
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the Settlement Officers because their income is high and disobedience leads 
to eviction~ (Ruthenberg~ 1966:61). 
Settlers at fv10ment B are also frequently under real sUbsumption to the 
state or private capital controlling the schemes. This control may also 
increase productivity. The socialized labour process imposes l over and 
above that of the formal rules and regulations on the schemes, a form of 
production discipline. (4) For example l at the Mwea scheme, "the 
introduction of mechanical cultivation has made possible a degree of 
planning and discipline and extension unthought of in the past. 
(M)echanisation of puddling has produced an atmosphere in which strict 
discipline can be enforced without opposition" (Giglioli l 1965~ quoted bv 
Ruthenberg, 1966:58). On top of this, "(m)onoculture facilitates 
supervision. The high level of yields are attributable largelv to the high 
deqree of control exercised on tenants" (Ruthenberq, ibid:61). With regard 
to Moment C at fv~ea, the scheme's control of rice marketing makes it 
comparatively easv to collect pavment for water (ibid). 
Mwea's relative success, however, needs to be qualified: according to 
Ruthenberg (ibid:6u), it has still not introduced sound farminq practices 
nor siqniiicantiv increased marketed production. It appears that proletar-
ian characteristics on such settlement schemes, in the absence of other 
capitalist features such as productive accumulation by the scheme owners 
(state or private capital) - are not enough for exponential development. 
6. OUTGROWER SCHEMES: QUALIFIED SUCCESS. 
In contrast to the failure of most settlement schemes, outgrower 
schemes seem to have aChieved a degree of economic success (Hever et al, 
1981:8). They appear to be both able to be profitable and to provide 
smallholders with means of production (Buch-Hansen and Marcussen~ 1982:17). 
But their success must be qualified when evaluated in terms of the Agrarian 
Question and the development of productive capacitv in the social 
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formation. To a large extent, they exhibit the classic features of 
extroversion and disarticulation. Thus, even where they are operated by 
state institutions, they still tend to integrate vertically with the 
international capitalist economy, supplying its processing plants and 
markets (Goodman et aI, 1984:209). There are typically few links with local 
agriculture, although at the same time, there is often an increase in 
dependence on imports of materials (Dinham and Hines, 1983:50). Planting 
prograrrrnes are often dependent on credits from foreign capital and the 
state (Slume, 1971:101). For example, as noted in chapter thirty-one, the 
parastatal Kenyan Tea Development Authority (KTDA) depends on funds fram 
international capitalist institutions (Such-Hansen and Marcussen, 1982:23). 
State-run outgrower schemes are usually inefficient: the KTDA is specific-
ally noted as an exception to this (Blume, 1971:200). 
The strategy also needs to be evaluated in terms of its effect on and 
potential for producers. 0'" Keefe claims that the conditions of contract 
farming cause many outgrowers to go to the wall (1984:162). The tight 
control at Mumias facilitates efficient centralized management, but by the 
same token, it restricts the development of rural capitalists because all 
major activities are carried out by the company (Mulaa, 1981:92/3). And 
many schemes also compete adversely with small non-scheme producers. 
7. CONCLUSION. 
In many cases, settlement schemes have not only failed to meet 
putative goals as growth-centres for rural development, but also their own 
~diate production and commercial goals. They have either collapsed or 
remained as a drain on economic resources (Raikes, 1978:308). What begins 
as development, changes into underdevelopment. Because projects are often 
unviable, they may function more as a subsidization of settlers (and other 
interests - see chapter thirty-six), rather than as a means of direct 
surplus extraction by the state. 
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Outgrower schemes are much less of a failure, but their success needs 
to be qualified by their location in the broader economic system, and their 
dubious contribution to resolving the Agrarian Question. It would seem that 
contract farming is less than an ideal development strategy. 
However, governments continue to persist in promoting both settlement 
and outgrower strategies. This is not so much because of their need to 
respond to the Agrarian Question through rural development, nor because of 
ineptitude (Hill, 1977:25). Development planning continues partially 
because of the strength of the ideology of development which sees progress 
as advanced technology, commodity production and bureaucratic control, all 
introduced from the outside (Williams, 1986b:19). But a further factor in 
all this is that if economic control over a section of the peasantry does 
not always yield income for the state, there are still certainly political 
pay-offs. In addition, the drain that this udevelopment/' puts on state 
funds may constitute a surplus gain for capital in its capacity as 
management/marketing agent and input supplier of unviable public projects. 
I investigate these issues in the next two chapters. 
ENJNnES 
1. In South Africa, according to De Villiers (1977:108), the results on 
102 state irrigation settlement schemes '"'have been unsatisfactory". 
2. In comparison, outgrower and contract farmer schemes absorb fewer 
inputs. In the case of Kenyan coffee, small producers are only half as 
productive as estates, but they also have far fewer expensive inputs 
(Oinham and Hines, 1983:54). Likewise with outgrower tea farmers who plant 
about two thirds of the total tea area, although they produce only a third 
of the total output (tea plantations growing most of the remainder) (Such-
Hansen and Marcussen, 1982:22/3, 26). 
3. On the Keiskarrmahoek Irrigation Scheme, it is held to be "'conceivable 
that one day the management staff will work not for the Department of 
Agriculture and Forestry, but for a Keiskamma Farmers Cooperative" 
(Proctor-Simms, 1978:138). For this reason, "'it is intended that settlers 
be involved in decision making from the beginning and that increasing 
responsibility for the project affairs be delegated •.• " (ibid). However, 
as the scheme's management admits, there is no formal training to this end, 
and weekly meetings between management and settlers concern only immediate 
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production issues tibid:93). As one writer notes: ~decision-making is 
largely based with managers at central unit • ••. [The settlers'] 'wage' is 
dependent upon their co-operation with the central unit (management) in 
producing as they are told to do- (Padri, 1979:12). 
4. As Barnett (1977:175) notes about the Gezira scheme: 
The tenant has to operate in terms of the superior 
rationality of the total system. The organization, 
based on the elaborate irrigation scheme, is elaborately 
interdependent and ponderously "'other" than the tenant. 
It is as independent of him as is the factory for a 
motor car assembler. 
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1. INTRODUCTION. 
Agricultural schemes and peripheral rural development often reveal 
more about political control, than about the economics of agricultural 
development (Hill, 1977:38). For example, in the view of one consultant, 
there is a tendency to decide Oil or evaluate rural 
prograrrrnes or projects on purely economic grounds. This 
is invalid, especially in southern Africa where one of 
the most urgent requirements is to win the support of 
rural communities •••• (P)ositive rural development is 
one of the best bulwarks against communism and one of 
the best means of border defence (Venn, in Proctor-
Siums, 1978:57). 
This is the view of a development consultant whose company is involved 
in rural development projects in South Africa's bantustans. In his 
opinion, ~the flashpoint for instability in South Africa may lie in the 
towns, but the slow wick is in the rural areas" (ibid). In such statements, 
a number of assumptions are evident concerning the character and signifi-
cance of rural class politics and the significance of rural development in 
relation to them. This chapter investigates these issues, focussing on the 
political considerations that influence development planning. 
2. THE POLITICS OF RURAL CLASS STRUGGLES. 
According to one writer, "in all ages in all countries, reactionaries, 
liberals and radicals have painted their own portraits of small rural folk 
to suit their own theories~ (Moore, 1969:117). Some have characterized the 
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middle peasantry as involved in a defensive struggle, others see it as 
offensive (Lieberson, 1981:37). While one writer holds that peasants are 
both radical and conservative - depending on the principle of their secur-
ity (Joshi, 1981:69), another argues that radicalism is less likely than 
reaction (Charlesworth, 1980:261). Such generalizations are of contestable 
worth; what is clear is that rural class struggles can often take on 
national political significance. History has sometimes even put rural 
class struggles at the locus of broader political movements - such as in 
the Mexican and Cuban revolutions, and the Algerian, Mozambican and 
Vietnamese independence struggles (Stavenhagen, 1964:95). The agricultural 
situation has been dEscribed as the most explosive issue in Latin America 
(Harrison, 1981:116). In Africa, writers like Fanon (see Caute, 1975), and 
to a lesser extent Arrighi and Saul (1970), have dismissed the urban prole-
tariat as a labour aristocracy and focussed their political attention on 
rural classes. Even through a refusal to act in certain cases, rural 
classes have an enormous veto-power (Hobsbawm, 1973:20). 
While the entire rural corrmunity can act as a social force, sometimes 
its internal differentiation needs to be given priority of account 
(Galeski, 1972:118). Overarching peasant consciousness is conceivable 
primarily insofar as differentiation within the peasantry is secondary to 
the common characteristics of all peasants, and to their COMfiOn interests 
against other groups including the state (Hobsbawm, 1973:7). Even a single 
rural class can have national political significance independently of other 
rural classes (see Marx, 1977b; Duggett, 1975:169). Though it may not 
always be the primary focus of contradiction, rural class politics may 
involve conflict between rural classes, such as between tenants and land-
lords, or between kulaks and poor peasants.(l) 
3. RURAL CLASSES AS POLITICAL FORCES. 
The potency of rural classes as political forces varies somewhat 
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between each class. Historically, non-capitalist rural classes have 
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experienced - albeit unequally - the organisationally backward nature of 
rural life. Factors like illiteracy and ties to seasons mean that peasant 
movements are usually only conglomerations of local and regional revolts 
into a momentary unity «Hobsbawm, 1973:12,9). ~The great risings of the 
Middle Ages all radiated from the country, but equally remained totally 
ineffective because of the isolation and consequent crudity of the 
peasants~ (Marx, Ge~ Ideology, 1965:66, cited by Duggett, 1975:171). 
Regarding the political potency of the middle peasantry, Marx's 
Eighteenth Brumaire (1977b) argues that small-holding peasants live in 
similar conditions, but without manifold relations with one another. 
Unlike simple commodity producers, each individual middle peasant family 
has a degree of self-sufficiency in that it gets its subsistence from 
intercourse with nature rather than society. Middle peasants have a low 
~classness# (Shaun, 1966) because what they have in cOlJlllon is paradoxically 
a way of life that divides rather than unites them (Duggett, 1975:172). 
They are a class by virtue of negative status rather than positively 
through co-ordination of aspirations (Gallisot, 1975:427). Marx points 
out how they are consequently -incapable of enforcing their class interests 
in their own name, whether through a parliament or through a convention. 
They cannot represent themselves, they must be represented- (Marx, 1977b:-
170-1). 
It can be argued that the relative economic independence of the middle 
peasantry enables this class to be the most militant of the whole peasantry 
(Alavi, 1973, Charlesworth, 1980:261). However, the autonomy of this class 
is only relative to the rich and poor peasantry, and its ties to the land 
in fact allow it only minimal tactical freedom (Wolf, 1971, cited by 
Charlesworth, ibid). And in many instances, the middle peasant does not 
even have an autonomy - but is rather caught up in economic articulations 
and obligations with other classes (Charlesworth, ibid:265). 
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The potency of rural classes does not depend on numerical size. A 
Kulak class may be tiny, but as in Guinea Bissau, it still has a certain 
economic and political importance (Cabral, 1969:47). In Ismani, Tanzania, 
a minority of small farmer capitalists and kulaks controlled local socia-
economic relations, and "moulded the general political thought of the 
entire rural corrmunityU (Awiti, 1973:231). Clearly, the political potency 
of kulaks is linked to their economic position, and in particular to their 
ability to dominate specific levels of government - especially local 
government. (Lamb~s book on Kenyan peasant politics (1974) is a classic 
study here) .. 
Many of the above generalizations derive from Western history and have 
to be modified in the case of the Third World today .. As Cliffe (1977:197) 
reminds us, the African peasantry exists in a different historical 
juncture. It has arisen as part of an articulation with a fully-fledged 
capitalist domination imposed from outside, and which extends (in various 
, I 
i I 
forms) over the entire gamut of rural class relations .. Unlike their histor-
ical counterparts in the West, African peasants are linked to a world 
system via their varying forms of integration into a world market (which 
inter alia makes agricultural crises more national in scope), and via a 
centralized state in many cases (Friedmann, 1979:178). 
This new situation makes rural class politics a factor in the politics 
of any Third World social formation today, and it is therefore to be 
expected that development planning should be affected by this consider-
ation.. This point was made in chapter twenty-seven at a fairly general 
level, and it is now possible to analyse it with greater reference to 
rural class politics, in particular to planned rural development .. 
4. THE POLITICS OF PLANNED RURAL DEVELOPMENT .. 
In the light of the discussions above, it is not surprising that 
almost every regime, of whatever class nature, has a distinct interest in 
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rural stability and production (Herring, 1981:132).(2) This is especially 
the case in the periphery where regimes often represent an ambitious, 
though weak and frustrated, bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie trying to use 
the state for their own development. What is remarkable, however, is that 
the political interest in stability seems to take prominence over the 
econcrnic interest in production in so many cases. It is not too much of an 
overstatement to say that it seems that hardly a single rural development 
plan is drawn up without political aims being paramount - even though this 
is not always explicit.(3) The Agrarian Question, to the extent that a plan 
is even constructed with an eye to it, is treated mainly as an economic 
means to a political end. One consequence of this is that in practice the 
economic sense of udevelopment U is lost sight of, and the concept really 
does come to have a primarily political meaning (see chapter two). 
The politics of planned rural development are most evident in the case 
of land reform. This development strategy is often justified in terms of 
eliminating pre-capitalist structural obstacles to development. At the 
same time, however, it is also "'typically the model utilized by governments 
seeking to defuse rural unrest and rationalize agricultural production, but 
unwilling or unable to mount a full-scale confrontation with the landlord 
(or peasantry classes - GB)~ (Herring, 1981:134). Land reform has thus 
aimed at eliminating real or possible revolutionary threats from discon-
tented rural classes, and at creating new groupings in the rural areas that 
will support the government in power (Halliday, 1979:134). 
For example, the United states has promoted land reform in countries 
under its influence. The initial thinking behind this was derived from 
post-war Japan where American sociologists concluded that stability 
required a contented peasantry. Subsequently, US advisors helped supervise 
land-reform in China (pre-1949), Korea, Taiwan, the Phillipines and Iran. 
All these attempts had an explicitly conservative aim, even where there was 
no ~oediate peasant threat (Halliday, ibid). The effect of land reform in 
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Japan # South Korea and Taiwan was to create a ""politically conservative 
class of peasant proprietors"" as well as to raise food output (Buckley, 
1981:54). The US tried to replicate this in South Vietnam from 1955 on in 
order to defuse the war (ibid) - but as in China, the effort was too small 
and too late. These two cases showed that the failure to achieve proper 
land reform could produce an explosion (Halliday, 1979:123). After the 
1961 Cuban revolution, the US-backed ~Alliance for Progress~ pushed for 
land reform to counter agrarian unrest in Latin America (Harrison, 
1981:117). This was part of a general economic development package 
designed as "an antitoxin to halt the spread of cOtmiunism" 
(Buckley,1981:78).(4)(5) 
The role of political considerations in planned rural development is 
also evident in regard to sensitivities over the use of'land by plantat-
ions. For the Third World state as entrepreneur, plantations are an obvious 
form of development, but they are often precluded for political reasons 
(Blume, 1971:35; 0' Brien, 1984:122). Similarly, for agribusiness capital# 
plantations have become risky in the context of possible nationalization 
and land shortage - and it increasingly defines its strategies in terms of 
leaving land ownership and production in the hands of the direct producers, 
and exercising control through contracts, managing state settlement schemes 
or monopsonistic purchasing arrangements (Buch Hansen and Marcussen, 1982:-
16). As George puts it, "if you get rid of landownership, you can also 
eliminate a lot of fiscal# labour and political problems in one fell swoop 
-as well as the fear of nationalization" (1976:70). 
5. RURAL STABILITY AND THE AGRARIAN QUESTION. 
Conventional wisdom holds that .... a stable society thrives - as 
Aristotle, on the evidence of the Greek city states, was the first to 
notice - on a large# participating middle class acting as a buffer between 
the rich and poor" (Harrison, 1981:389). The reasoning underlying this 
410 
DEVELOPMENT FAILURE. 
RURAL POLITICS 
view is that ~where states are polarized into a rich elite and a mass of 
poor, the poor have nothing to lose from rebellion, while the rich have 
muctl to lose from reforrnu (ibid). 
These themes are echoed by American political scientists who lament 
the absence of a middle class in underdeveloped societies, on the grounds 
that its presence would enhance stability (Kitching, 1972:334, footnote 
15). Robert Macl~amara lformerly of the World BanK) believes that ruling 
classes will realize the danger of instability deriving from inequalities, 
and will consequently institute land reform for their own political 
survival lMarkovitz, 1976:185). 
The middle peasantry is often lauded as the rural form of a middle 
class that is conducive to political stability. For example, the World Bank 
favours the creation of a stable and conservative class of small producers 
in the Third World (see Hayter, 1981). This represents a shift away from a 
focus on a high rate of industrial development, and was initially based on 
inter alia the r~sistance by Vietnamese peasants to American involvement in 
their' country (Williams, 1981a: 37/8). 
Certainly the mlddle peasantry does lie between rich and poor 
peasants, and it is not wholly cauqht up in exploitative relations between 
ttle two. TI-Ie middle peasantr'y is also structurallv placed to act as a 
buffer in trlat it shar-es simultaneously some of the interests of these two 
class relatiorls Ulat traverse it. un the other- hand, tlecaLlse rich arId pour 
IJedsant inter re la te if uJepenclent 1 v of trle middle peasantr y, trli s but fer role 
is not as qr-eat as it rniqrlt initially appear. Another point to note is 
that the pressures on the middle peasantry to disintegrate give it an 
unstable class character. In the light of this, the reason for any 
politically stabilizing role may well lie more in the inability of the 
class to represent itself (see above), rather than any inherent stable 
character. 
In the politics of development planning, there is little distinction 
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made between the middle peasantry and simple comroodity producers. Both are 
lumped together as a °rural middle class"'- and kulaks sometimes are 
assumed to be part of this as well.(6) While all may have the potential to 
play certain political roles, clearly their economic roles vary greatly. 
However, because of the priority that much planning gives to the political 
role, too little attention is bestowed on this issue. Yet the political 
role cannot in fact be divorced from the economic. Not surprisingly in 
consequence, a focus on the political without the economic not only creates 
unpredictable political ~frankensteins-: it also has no necessary 
connection to the development of productive capacity. 
6. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A STABLE RURAL "'MIDDLE CLASS" IN AFRICA. 
While develo~oent strategies in Africa are usually motivated in 
economic terms, there have generally been strong political a~s as well, 
given the background of increasing landlessness and unemployment.(7) 
Colonial gover~nents in Africa have also sometimes tried to stratify 
rural society through creating a middle peasantry, precisely because of 
their dislike of pre-existing egalitarian systems. In East and West 
Africa, for example, there has been a historical levelling tendency which 
has led to subdivision and fragmentation of holdings of wealthy farmers. 
The end result was "fewer and fewer economically viable plots, thereby 
frustrating hopes for the creation of a rural "middle class" of "sturdy 
yeoman farmers'" (a vision particularly beloved of various colonial admin-
lstratlons)'" (Kitching, 1972:343). 
In pre-independence Kenya, 
the colonial adninistration saw in land consolidation a 
means of rewarding those Africans who had supported the 
Government in putting down Mau-Mau, and of encouraging 
the growth of a productive rural middle class which 
would be immune to the cries of militant nationalists 
and perhaps challenge their leadership in the rural 
areas after Mau-Mau. Administrative officers in the 
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field recognized that some such progress was needed to 
persuade rural Africans to abjure the insurgent 
nationalists (Harbeson, 1971:236; see also Heyer, 
1981:101). 
The 1950s colonial Swynnerton Plan strategy in Kenya was to develop an 
economic base to sustain the political purpose of rural stabilization. It 
aimed to promote small farms through individual registration of tenure, and 
consolidation and enclosure of land (Heyer, 1981:101). (In this it 
mirrored the economic and political thinking in South Africa's Tomlinson 
Corrmission recoomendations about "betterment schemes" - see Williams, 
1982:118). Swynnerton also advocated a change of emphasis in African 
farming from sUbsistence to cash crops (Ruthenberg, 1966:9/10). The 
provision of extension, inputs, credit, and processing and marketing 
facilities, was another part of the strategy. This was all to be concentr-
ated on the development of an elite of "progressive farmers" as a solid 
conservative bulwark against Mau Mau (Heyer, 1981:102).(8) 
The colonial government recognized that a political solution to Mau-
Mau would depend on a major change in the three-tier class structure of big 
farmer, small peasant, and landless poor peasant (Cliffe, 1977:198). Some 
aaainistrators urged an English two-tier class structure through some kind 
of enclosure act, in order to create a class of yeomen farmers "too busy on 
their land to worry about political agitators" (Sorrenson, 1963, 1967). 
The final solution was a modified three-tier one where small middle 
peasants retained their land, rather than being dispossessed by a totally 
free market in land (Cliffe, 1977:208). The consequence was that many of 
the landed peasants came to support the status quo - leaving the land 
hungry poor peasants isolated (ibid:209). 
A major attempt to change rural class relations in Kenya was the mass 
resettlement programme from 1962-6 in the former White highlands. These 
settlement schemes were auned to entice moderate tribes away from radical 
leaders and to pre-empt uncontrolled seizures of land in the context of 
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independence (Wilkinson, 1979:71/2; Kitching, 1980:326; Ruthenberg, 1966:-
64).(9) Indeed, an accelerated progra~ne (the Million Acre Scheme) did 
ease the thrust of rural insurgency (ibid). 
In Tanzania after 1955, colonial limits on African cotmlodity 
production were lifted as a result of an upsurge in political consciousness 
(Raikes, 1978:295). In doing this, the colonial authorities hoped to 
create a relatively wealthy rural class, rooted in property ownership, in 
order to provide a basis for moderate politics post-independence (ibid:-
296). As one writer puts it, the aim was to develop "a class of African 
farmers rooted in capitalized agriculture who would serve to stabilize the 
rural areas'" (Bryceson, 1980:306). To this end, settlement schemes where 
Africans worked with modern technology, under supervision, were also 
launched (ibid: 307). 
In Uganda, the creation of a propertied middle peasantry was advocated 
by the colonial secretary at an early stage < Mamdani, 1977:189). After an 
outburst of violence against colonialism in the 1940s, the administration 
began to move towards implementing this with a view to creating a class 
interested in maintaining the status quo, stability and property rights 
(ibid:192). A 1953-4 cotmlission advocated an increase in individual land 
tenure and encouragement of the ""'progressive farmer u (ibid:195). The 
purpose of this tenure was to stimUlate a political and economic sense of 
i" ' 
responsibility (ibid). In pre-independence Zambia, the colonial government 
set up a scheme modelled on Uthe sturdy British yeoman, a type to be I, 
created in Central Africa to give political stability to that country" 
(Foster, 1969:10). The colonial peasant and "improved farmer" schemes 
received special favours such as technical education, loans, and superior 
i I 
marketing facilities. The intention was to augment settler production and 
to blunt political agitation (Muntemba, 1978:61).(10) 
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7. CONCLUSION. 
This chapter has discussed the politics of rural classes and analysed 
their relevance to development programmes in the Third World. I show the 
political importance that attaches to many such programmes, particularly 
as regards the issue of rural stability_ Like chiefs in many African 
colonies (see Terray, 1974:319), classes formed under the auspices of 
development prograrrrnes have been intended as not only the creation - but 
also as the creatures - of the government. But things have not always 
worked out like this, as I argue in the next chapter. 
£N)N()TES 
1. Rural-urban class relations are also significant for political 
conflict. For example, where poor peasants have the option of migrancy, 
conflict between them and rich peasants may not come to a head since poor 
peasants can find economic alternatives outside the village (Galeski, 
1972:126). Middle peasants may also resort to migrancy rather than 
confront the adverse trade terms facing them (Cliffe, 1978:343). Urban-
based petty producers and wage-labourers who retain ties to the village may 
support small farmers against other rural classes (see Smith, 1979:308, 
footnote 6). 
2. Even in the USA, it is noteworthy that the Tennessee Valley Authority 
"was created in April 1933, at the crest of the wave of Roosevelt's New 
Deal - the nearest the USA has ever been to a social revolution~ (Sohn-
Rethal, 1979:187). 
3. This is evident in the case of the World Bank which despite its 
denials shows a strong political bias to pro-Western countries (George, 
1976:259-264; Williams, 1981a:27). 
4. In US ideology, the "'family labour farm" is used with overtones of 
"'democracy versus corrmunism'" (Friedmann, 1978:97, footnote 3). 
5. More recently, the US has promoted land reform in Thailand as a 
counter to insurgency (Time, 1981:27). "'Aggressive rural-development 
programs are being launched. To win peasants to its side, Bangkok provided 
new varieties of rice, and imported silkworms ••• '" (ibid). The US has been 
pressurizing El Salvador's landowner government to institute land reform as 
a means of reducing peasant support for the Left (Buckley, 1981:43) - with 
successful results according to the government (ibid:50). The CIA has 
promoted land reform in the Phillipines (Krinks, 1983:108/9). 
6. It is extremely difficult to give an accurate class character and 
location within relations of production to rural producers where the only 
information at hand designates them as a rural middle class. 
7. This context has been characterized by "'a growing class of men without 
property, without even a stable source of income, and therefore with no 
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interest in supporting the status quo •••• People become more susceptible 
to the appeal of millenarianism, nationalistic, ethnic or extremist 
movements'" (Harrison, 1981:392). 
8. From 1952-65, Kenya's entire rural development practice (i.e. 
including extension, settlement, etc.) was strongly motivated by political 
considerations. ~A prosperous middle class society of farmers, firmly 
established on the land, was expected to exercise a stabilising influence 
on politics in Kenya'" (Ruthenberg, 1966:14). 
9. Interestingly, large-scale irrigated farming was initiated in Kenya to 
resettle political detainees (Williams, 1986a:3). 
10. Other examples where political motives have played a part in 
formulating rural development plans have been colonial Mozambique (Harris, 
1980:344) and Senegal (Kom, 1977:161). 
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CHAPTER THIRTY-SIX 
THE LIMITS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPK:::NT 
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2. The political uses of rural development. 
3. The politics of who benefits economically. 
4. Rural class creation - political success or failure? 
5. Contradictions between politics and economics. 
6. Resistance to planned development. 
7. Conflict around the inequality of development. 
8. Conclusion. 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
Rural development persists in Africa because~ amongst other reasons~ 
it has its political uses and its beneficiaries. But many of the grandiose 
political intentions behind rural development are not necessarily realized. 
Instead~ they come up against the the failure of an economic base success-
ful or wide enough for their political purpose, as well as resistance by 
the people affected. And~ even where they achieve some economic and 
political goals~ development strategies tend to generate new political 
conflicts and contradictions. 
2. THE POLITICAL USES OF DEVELOPMENT. 
Rural development planning has a number of political uses in post-
colonial Africa -- one of which is the attempt to resolve the food 
crisis.(l) In the face of the power and political importance of urban 
constituencies, African governments have used development policies to keep 
food cheap, and have given this precedence over increasing prices to the 
local food producers. (2) According to Bates (1981:30)~ it is not that 
African governments only have to appease the demands of urban workers and 
employers - they themselves are major employers with a direct economic 
interest in cheap food (and raw materials). It is in this context that 
pricing strategies are adopted which fix food prices and outlaw marketing 
outside of state boards (Kenyan maize is an eXillnple here) (ibid:40). But 
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while such policies may be politically expedient in the short~term~ they 
have not been able to resolve the food crisis in much of Africa. Conseq-
uently~ governments faced with the political need to achieve results tend 
to turn to a different emphasis in development planning - viz. large-scale~ 
highly capitalized and mechanized schemes (Dinham and Hines~ 1983:143).(3) 
These initiatives have also not resolved the crisis~ yet the policies 
enable qoverments to claim they are doing their best. 
In this regard .. there are useful propaganda gains to be made from 
development. Governments characteristically use development proiects as 
symbols of tt-Ieir commitment and action towards modernization. (4) 
Agricultural schemes have been instituted as a -visible symbol- of a 
government's capacity to develop the country - as a "monument to modernity" 
tHill .. 1977:28). Accordinq to a South African development consultant: 
an innovative rural success can have social" political 
and economic impact out of all proportion to the size of 
the area or the number of people involved. This impact 
is upon the local economy.. upon traditional attitudes to 
agriculture, on the standing of the leaders .. developers 
and backers~ on the attitudes of the have nots to the 
developmental efforts of the haves" and last but not 
least~ on the image of South Africa internationally • 
••. What South Africa so desperately needs, what black 
leaders need, is a number of dramatic success stories in 
rural development whictl will stand out as shining exam-
ples of how the land can provide acceptable incomes; 
that will be the pride of the sponsors, and of the 
homeland cabinets (Venn .. 1979:7). 
The political uses of development affect the particular type of 
programme that gets adopted. Governments can raise prices to encourage 
producers to expand output, but not only is this politically costly in 
terms of urban constituencies, the political benefits of winning rural 
support are low relative to what can be achieved with projects. As Bates 
argues, governments prefer project-based policies to price-based policies 
because the former are more politically useful even though the latter yield 
better economic results (Bates, 1981:5,114). Development projects are 
useful politically because they extend patronage, authority and control by 
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governments over rural people (Heyer et aI, 1980:14). ~Patronage politics 
is central to understanding how development projects do or do not work u 
(Williams" 19(jba:4). Subsidy proqrarnmes are commonly used to build 
political support in the countryside for governments (Bates, 1981:109). 
Examples here are Ghanaian state farms favouring party activists for jobs" 
and Nigerian project allocations made on a political basis (ibld:115). 
Another political use of development policy is the way that agricult-
ural schemes have sometimes been seen as an answer not to agriculture, but 
to urban unemployment and the political threat posed by this (Hill, 1977:-
27). This was the case in Western Nigeria with regard to unemployed 
school-leavers whom the ruling elite thought would not support it politic-
ally (ibid:28). A similar situation occurred in Nkrumah~s Ghana (ibid:31) 
- which shows that a ~public sector peasantry~ has political appeal to 
regimes of varying persuasions (ibid:34). 
3. THE POLITICS OF WHO BENEFITS ECONOMICALLY. 
If rural development projects do not usually benefit the mass of rural 
producers (see chapter thirty), they still do benefit some groups. Bates 
(1981:121, 1983:133) has identified a ~development coalition~ of urban 
owners and workers" political elites" top bureaucrats, large farmers and 
tenants - all of whom reap benefits of development choices. Williams 
(1986a:6) excludes the urban workers from these beneficiaries, but the 
point still stands that there are strong vested interests in rural develop-
ment policies. Many of these exist independently of the economic success or 
failure of these policies. 
For example, development settlement schemes may end up subsidizing the 
tenants on them, and progressive farmer policies give advantages to kulaks 
and capitalist farmers (see chapters thirty and thirty-four). But in 
addition to such beneficiaries, there are also the fertilizer firms, 
construction companies, bureaucrats" international experts, and academics 
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who are provided with markets, management contracts and consultancies by 
rural development (Heyer et aI, 1980:14). 
Rural development programmes may in fact function to transfer surplus 
to entirely non-agricultural activities. Thus, uin the cases of irrigation 
projects and support for capitalist farming in northern Ghana and northern 
Nigeria, subsidies have simply drained money into the hands of contractors, 
military officers, politicians, civil servants and businessmen" (Williams, 
1986a:3). The costs of rural development do not fallon its beneficiaries. 
World Bank loans for example are not repaid from net returns on projects, 
but from government revenues and more borrowing (Williams, 1981a:41). In 
other cases, aid agencies effectively guarantee payments and therefore 
eliminate the financial risks to agribusiness (Oinham and Hines, 1983:144). 
Outgrower strategies which involve capital in upstream activities 
especially benefit international firms who can reap rewards of agricultural 
production without having to invest in it or take on the political and 
commercial risks involved (Williams 1986b).(5) 
4. RURAL CLASS CREATION - POLITICAL SUCCESS OR FAILURE? 
Measured politically, how successful has development planning through 
land reform and development projects been in defusing conflict and ensuring 
stability? 
Once implemented, land reform can be successful in raising a few 
peasants above the many, and in co-opting the most militant leaders into 
the middle classes (Harrison, 1981:123).(6) Progressive farmer strategies 
may also yield political rewards. For example, in Kenya, according to 
Currie and Ray (1987:93), the twelve percent of smallholders who cash crop 
are a politically loyal middle peasantry, and the possibility of mass land 
ownership gives legitimacy to the post-colonial state. In addition, the 
growth of smallholder production has reduced landlessness and urban drift, 
thereby diminishing the political threat of both (ibid:94). 
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Settlement schemes may also be politically successful. The Tyefu 
Irrigation Scheme in South Africa's Ciskei bantustan has been lauded by its 
planners. According to one~ the local community had previously been 
-notoriously recalcitrant and opposed to authority-, but its attitude had 
changed dramatically as a result of the scheme (see Proctor-Simms, 1978:-
58). The Ciskei government for its part says that the high costs of the 
project are acceptable because the scheme~s -most important benefit has 
been the ~winning over~ of the local community who are now collaborating 
with the authorities~ (ibid:141). 
In Kenya, Leys (1977b:355) has observed the effect on political 
consciousness of indebted settlement scheme farmers when each year saw the 
selective eviction of a few ..... persistent defaulters ..... on debt repayment. 
Some settlers tried unsuccessfully to organize a collective refusal to 
repay (ibid). Despite ongoing unrest in response to the loan-repayment 
issue, the political stability of the government was not threatened because 
no matter how great their distress, the settlers did not want to risk 
losing their plots (Harbeson, 1971:249). 
5. THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN POLITICS AND ECONOMICS. 
The development policies of many governments lead to the conclusion 
that short-term political objectives frequently over-ride long-term 
development goals (Dinham and Hines, 1983:161). As such, the political 
usefulness of development in the long run tends to be less than what it 
appears to be initially: economic failure catches up with, and undermines, 
political success. 
An example of this is land settlement in Kenya, where short-term 
political gains were made by settling large numbers of landless people on 
high-density schemes. However, low-density settlement, according to 
Ruthenberg (1966:132) provided a better chance for loans made to settlers 
to be repaid. Because high-density settlers' loan repayments remained 
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outstanding l they de facto absorbed a heavy element of subsidvl which could 
not continue to be carried by the remaining economy for very long (ibid:-
149) .. In other words l the prospects for further political successes were 
limited by the longer-term economic problems of the strategy .. 
Another example of the contradiction between the politics and 
economics of development is development policies around the food crisis .. 
The pressure of the crisis leads to African governments to resort to a 
development policy which entails, alongside rural development efforts, 
importing food in order to avoid political problems. But this in turn 
compounds the economic problem, and may lead to further political problems. 
Many governments now face the difficulty of rising costs of food imports at 
the same time as prices are declining for their countries J exports (Dinham 
and Hines, 1983:141). In addition, food imports keep prices down, and this 
is a disincentive to rural producers who continue to receive low returns on 
their produce. 
The politics-economics relationship also lies behind the failure of 
Kenya's Special Rural Development Prograrrme, SRDP. Here, political 
pressures meant that SROP was planned in a hurry, without involving the 
people to be affected - hence it was not only manipulative, but also 
misinformed (Oyugi, 1981:133).(7) 
6. RESISTANCE TO PLANNED DEVELOPMENT. 
The political uses of rural development may also run up against limits 
imposed by producer resistance to, and undermining of, the imposed 
strategies. 
In Kenya there are conflictual relations between peasants and capital 
(both state and private) over the conditions of labour and the distribution 
and realization of the value of the product (Bernstein, 1979a:432). 
Peasants resist by rejecting or sabotaging new production practices, and by 
refusing to grow or cut back on specific crops. They may attempt to 
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imposed by producer resistance to, and undermining of, the imposed 
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In Kenya there are conflictual relations between peasants and capital 
(both state and private) over the conditions of labour and the distribution 
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withdraw from commercial relations and find alternate income sources (as 
with coffee growers in Kenya), as well as evade crop-grading regulations 
and monopolistic terms of trade (Bernstein, 1979a:433; Bates, 1981:82). 
They use the labour market to defend themselves rather than produce crops 
with poor returns (ibid:84). Pricing and marketing policies go hand in hand 
with corruption, with the effect, according to Bates (1981:43), that peas-
ants seek to be individual exceptions to the policies by means of bribery, 
rather than engage in collective protest. Where all these forms of resist-
ance fail, individual or collective violence may be resorted to. 
Rural producers also resist through political organization. In Kenya, 
a policy to control the number of coffee trees was not enforced because it 
would have provoked political conflict (Lamb, 1974:94). However, the 
situation worsened, and restrictions were tightened to the point that 
growers could no longer defy the controls. Their options were to submit, 
or to bring political pressure to bear on the government (ibid:96). They 
adopted the latter strategy, and mobilized through the co-operatives, party 
politics and lobbies, urging the government to rather uproot trees on white 
estates (ibid:102). Government response was to try to de-politicize the 
co-ops, but in fact it was only a combination of tree disease and 
collapsing world prices that cut back the number of trees under 
smallholder cultivation (ibid:111). 
Development strategies involving land reform especially evoke 
resistance. In most countries intent on structural land reforms, there are 
beatings, evictions, burnings of houses and crops, and even murders 
(Herring, 1981:142).(8) However, other means are also used to resist land 
reform. In Kenya, through Kenya National Farmers Union lobby, capitalist 
farmers ensured that most of the former white highlands land was left 
intact. The KNFU has also won government extension and credit programmes 
that benefit large farmers (Bates, 1981:94). However, as Bates argues, 
while elite farmers are often rural allies of governments, a conflict of 
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interests remains (1981:61). HAfrica will clearly not remain immune to the 
political conflicts between agrarian and industrial interests that are an 
inherent part of the development process'" (Bates, 1981:94). 
Resistance to land reform does not only come from large landowners. 
Nigerian government schemes in some states gave officials and businessmen 
access to irrigated land, but evoked opposition from farmers expelled to 
make way without adequate compensation. While some went urban job seeking, 
others resisted by obstructing contractors and disrupting irrigation until 
police killed hundreds in 1980 (Williams, 1984:44; Wallace, 1980:65). 
Even where land reform does not radically threaten social structure, 
it may well evoke antagonism. Small-holders have often violently resisted 
compulsory land rehabilitation and consolidation. In Malawi, the colonial 
government tried to enforce soil conservation, and produced political 
unrest that was the basis of the rural side of the nationalist movement 
(Thomas, 1975:36). Even after independence, riots broke out in response to 
enforced quotas for tobacco production (ibid:38). Finally, an attempt to 
introduce individual land tenure in Lilongwe produced popular resistance, 
and the government had to alter the ownership proposals from an individual 
to an extended family basis (ibid:39/40). 
The effects of rural resistance can be seen in governments~ reponses. 
These typically involve a mixture of additional development and administr-
ative measures. For example, in Kenya, the Institute for Development Stud-
ies (IDS) recommended that district level officers be allowed to flexi-
bility in order to adjust to °ethnic, political agitation which tends to 
become a serious bottleneck'" and to "'create a visible success"''' (IDS, 1972:-
B-2). In addition; it added, ...... given the political sensitivity of land hole}-
ing, adjudication work needs positive political inputs from the M.Ps, D.C., 
P.C. and District CouncillorsH • IDS also bemoaned the popular view of SRDP 
'""as another Shimba-Hills scheme cooked-up so as to settle foreigners"", and 
hoped that #with closer administration these programs will be explained to 
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The successful implementation of development strategies may also 
generate new resistance by the very beneficiaries who are unhappy with the 
terms of their involvement. The special circumstances of subordination to 
institutional and agro-industrial capitals give rise to settler tenant and 
outgrower struggles around issues like the terms of incorporation in 
irrigation schemes, control of the immediate labour process, input costs, 
and monopsonistic marketing institutions (Goodman et aI, 1984:205). There 
are struggles over cultivation rules, the suitability and timing of inputs, 
prices, and the scope for alternative production. "'Far from there being a 
tendency towards more effective control of producers by capital, such 
control is always in danger of breaking down"" (Williams, 1984:18). 
Williams argues that conflict in peasant communities does not rise 
from internal differentiation, but from a contradiction between peasants 
and state (1985:173). Although this may often be so, state policies do 
lead to differentiation, at least at the level of distribution relations, 
and this may well generate increased conflict within rural communities (see 
below). The political success of development strategies needs to be 
evaluated in terms of the impact within rural coumunities as a whole. 
7. CONFLICT AROUND THE INEQUALITIES OF DEVELOPMENT. 
Development strategies aiming to create a "'stable rural middle class'" 
in specialized commodity production, are notably different from those 
intending to dispossess producers and convert their land and means of 
production into state or capitalist property (Bernstein, 1979a:434). But 
they both may ultimately have similar results in excluding certain classes 
or groups from development policy largesse. The question this raises is 
whether they are a new threat to the status quo. 
The Malawi experience provides an interesting answer to this question. 
In that country, the colonial government tried introducing land settlement 
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to deflate unrest in 1946 and 1953 by landless peasants and tenants on 
estates. Its strategy was to resettle 40 000 people on unused estate land 
between 1946 and 1972 (Thomas, 1975:43). In response to similar unrest at 
independence, further land was bought and distributed. But this provided 
only two-acre size holdings that were only enough for subsistence. 
Pressure to break up the estates has continued, as has rural instability. 
While land reform can win support where it ends landlord power 
(Halliday, 1979136), in Iran popular hopes that all would get land were not 
met, and half the landless remained discontented (ibid). These people, and 
the small middle peasants who had their expectations raised, now constitut-
ed another centre of unrest (Greussing and Kippenburg, 1975/6:126). An 
upwardly mobile peasantry can turn sharply radical when frustrated, and it 
is an important factor in political agitation (see Charlesworth, 1980:261). 
It is hardly surprising that land reform strategies have generated new 
conflicts between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of the project. This 
follows from the fact that many land reform policies - as in S.E. Asia, 
Egypt, Bolivia and Iran - are all deliberately unequal and have as their 
aim, encouraging a -rich farming class~ at the expense of other classes 
(Halliday, 1979:135). Although relationships between the two are not 
always directly exploitative (cf Moment B), the visible inequalities in 
distribution (cf Moment C) may generate class tensions. 
In the case of the Ciskei bantustan, it has been observed that 
to juxtapose the settlers and the people with no land 
rights ••• could build up problems for the future. The 
widening of the gap between rich and poor, even at the 
rural level, makes a conflict situation possible 
(McI.Daniel, 1980:14). 
In a confidential memorandum, one Ciskei official has noted: 
Is it that in Ciskei we are too obsessed with 
spectacular capital intensive projects to bother about 
the masses'? Will the day not dawn when the voters of 
Ciskei will rebel and say "What is there for us in 
agr icul tural development'?;;·? (Anonymous, 1979: 4) . 
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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 
In tile Mozambique Eduardo Mondlane co-operative, there was competition 
tor land-use between co-op members and outsiders, while in the case of 
Chaimite, there has been violent conflict along the same lines (Harris, 
1980:345,349). The Malawi Salimi Lakeshore Development Project benefits 
750 people with incomes seven times higher than the 20 000 poor in the area 
_ at the cost of u envy and violence, results strikingly similar to those 
experienced during the Jmaster farmer J schemes in the colonial daysu 
(Thomas, 1975:38). 
Where scheme participants hire outside labour, this may be an added 
source of conflict. At Mumias, workers hired by the company to service 
outgrower plots tlave sabotaged harvests on occasion (Mulaa, 1981:98). In 
some instances, conflict may even occur between participants (see the case 
of the Gezira scheme Barnett, 1977:96). 
There has also been conflict at KiesKffirrnahoeK in Ciskei, where those 
excluded from the irrigation scheme, have killed settlers~ dairy cattle as 
a form of protest. Workers on the Tyefu nucleus estate went on strike in 
1979 over the issue of wages (field research, August 1979). 
In the light of these examples, it is evident that political successes 
in rural development are by no means unqualified, and that the economic 
characteristics of these may well generate additional political problems. 
8. CONCLUSION. 
The relationship between rural development and political stability is 
contradiction-ridden. On the one hand there is a recognition that politi-
cal stability requires at least some pay-off for all classes, but on the 
other hand, the short-term political uses of development policy plus an 
inegalitarian development policy inherently seem to lead to conflict in 
the longer-term. This contradiction reflects - in an exaggerated form -
the distinction between political and economic goals of development as 
discussed in chapter two. 
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EruNOTES 
1. "Hu qover nrneflt can iqnore tt-Ie social and political disruption caused 
~y toud production failures on this scale. Virtually all African 
governments have intervened in the production and the marketing of food in 
order to improve availability and to control prices" (Dinham and Hines, 
1983:137). 
2. The price and availability of food in the urban areas is a sensitive 
political question. There were significant food riots in Liberia in 1979, 
and in Sudan 1979 and 1982 (Dinham and Hines, 1983:137). 
3. Such decisions are made by bureaucrats who attribute shortages of food 
to inadequacies in peasant production rather than low prices and poor 
marketing, storage and distribution systems. The productivity of modern 
agriculture in the West, and the bias of aid polices aqainst more modest 
schemes, add to the pressures to go for large scale. In addition, 
agribusiness is keen to research, supply and manage such schemes, 
especially when aid agencies guarantee payment (ibid:143-4). 
4. The Ciskei's Keisk~nahoek irrigation proiect has been visited by 
diplomatic personnel from at least fifteen countries, and has featured 
prominently in South African government propaganda media (Fieldwork 
observation, Jvlay 1979 - GB). 
5. For example, in Kenya, BAT(K) contracts small producers to grow 
tobacco on terms that include conditions on quality and inputs (Curry and 
Ray, 1987:94). The farmers carry the losses when bad weather or market 
conditions yield adverse returns on production. As sole purchaser of leaf 
tobacco, BAT(K) has major bargaining power over the price it pays prod-
ucers. In addition, BAT(K) is protected against labour disputes or sabot-
age, though it still exercises managerial control through an extension 
scheme. And since it does not own land, it is less threatened by national-
ization (ibid). 
6. The seven percent of the peasantry who got land in Chile's 1964-1973 
agrarian reform became a privileged petty bourgeoisie under the tutelage of 
the state, and unlike the landlords and the other rural classes, they 
supported the Christian Democratic government (Kay, 1981:502). 
7. Road building under the SRDP was supposed to be labour intensive, but 
the implementors ufor obvious political reasons (need for quick programme 
visibility) chose to use heavy machinery as opposed to labour intensive 
methods as originally planned" (ibid:186/7). 
8. In E1 Salvador, landowners killed over 50 land reform officials in one 
year (Buckley, 1981:55). Landlord violence has also accompanied the 
Ethiopian Dirgue's land reform programme (Brietzke, 1976:656). 
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CONCLUSION 
1. Introduction. 
2. Structure of the thesis. 
3. Relating two concerns: social structure and development. 
4. The three Moments of production argument. 
5. Meeting specific challenges. 
b. Limitations. 
7. Conclusion. 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
This conclusion tackles five broad areas. Firstlv .. it summarizes the 
structure of the thesis. Second 1 v.. it St-IOWS how the relation between 
development and social structure has been dealt with in the work, and how 
this is linKed to the structure of the thesis. The third area covers the 
siqnif icance of the key ttleoretical component of the work, viz. trle three 
i'-'loments of production model. Fourthl v, I assess how the thesis meets the 
cr1allenqes outlined in the Introduction, and lastlv .. I note some of the 
limitations of the work. 
2.. S TRlJt~. TlJRE CjF THE THESI S. 
Tile wide t-anC18 or issues cover-ed in the precedin l ] ctlapter~, maKes it 
dirticult to eu'aso ttle tutality in any simple way. There is a danqer uf 
utinl] ttll? wtlule. To repeat an Ott-usetJ met,"HJtlur in the ttlf?sis, ttlis w()ultJ 
mearl lusirKl ':3iont ut ttle WDOfj a':; one /Joes atJout '3crutinizinu eactl tcpe. In 
ctv:lPtf:'r wClulu be ina(j80uate. Instea<J, and dS a pr'8cursur to pullinq the 
over-all argument toqett-Ier, it is worth recappinq its structur-e. 
I beqln bv settinq out a "praqmatic" methodoloqical position, in terms 
of which I proceed to theorize a detinition of development and broad 
economic concePts. This enables me to then focus particularly on capital-
ist development, as well as the international capitalist system and the 
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factors underpinninq underdevelopment in the periphery. Against this back-
ground, my attention turns to aqriculture~s role in development, the 
character of rural social structure, and the economics and politics of 
planned rural development. The arguments are thus cumUlative, building on 
each other, as the analysis develops. Each consecutive part depends on 
those precedinq it. This is not to imply that the thesis consists simply 
of stages teleoloqically building up to a single ultimate statement. 
Rather, each part is intended to be of value in its own right, and while 
later parts are founded on their predecessors, all of them contribute 
directly to the understanding of the topic, viz. the relationship between 
social structure and development. This will become more especially 
apparent in the section below. 
2. RELATING TWO CONCERNS: DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE. 
. : 
i I 
It is evident that my argument moves from the general to the partic-
II 
ular in the structure of the thesis. This is not fortuitous, but part of 
the way in which I have tackled the core issue of the relationship between 
social structure and development (and specifically rural development). My 
basic hypothesis has been that social structure, as a variable alongside 
environmental factors, is central to development. My aim has been not only 
to demonstrate this as a very broad proposition, but also to show the part-
icular ways in which this is the case at varying levels of abstraction 
ranging from modes of production in general, through the capitalist mode of 
production and the international economy, to the agrarian social structure. 
This objective required an elaboration of the two broad concepts: 
social structure on the one hand, and development on the other. ~Social 
structure~ is analysed in terms of various economic structures (relations 
of production, dependence-extraversion, etc.), political structures (the 
state) and social classes. "Development" is elaborated in terms of its 
economic significance concerning productive capacity, departments of 
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production, and the Agrarian Question. While both social structure and 
development are major issues on their own, my tasK has been to investigate 
how they relate to each other. 
In doing so, I have worked with a crucial distinction between the 
course of a social structure on one hand, and the course of productive 
capacity on the other. This distinction is sorely lacking in much of the 
literature (see however Frobel et al, 1981). For example, there is often 
assumed to be some identity between capitalism and development (be this 
identity positive or negative in character). The corresponding investiga-
tions have tended to confuse the two issues, frequently merging one into 
the other and then losing sight of it as a distinct object of analysis. 
Thus, the development of capitalism and capitalist development have been 
taken as meaning the same thing. Depending on the (changing) context, this 
meaning slides from one to the other. It is seldom explicitly or clearly 
recognized that distinct concerrlS are involved: the phrase ~development of 
capitalism" reflects a vantage point concentrating on the course of a 
social structure, while ...... capitalist developmentU emphasizes the issue of 
productive capacity. The relation between these two concerns cannot simply 
be assumed: it must be problematized. 
Part of the reason for the absence of this distinction in much of the 
literature is because in Marxism, the purpose of looking at social 
structure and/or productive capacity has not been aimed at explaining the 
relationship between the two. Instead, it has been with a view to assessing 
their implications for political transformation (see for example, Galeski, 
1972:102). The problem has been touched on only in passing. Because the 
purpose in this thesis has been to investigate how the course of productive 
capacity relates to social structure, this has necessitated that a clear 
distinction be drawn between the two issues. More than this, it has meant 
disentangling and separating them precisely in order to discover the 
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terms of their interrelation. For this reason, my approach in this thesis 
has qenerally been to treat social structure separately from development, 
before lookinq at the relation between them. This pattern is evident 
throughout the structure of the work, as shown by the table below: 
Moments of production. 
Relations and forces etc. 
Class structure. reproduction. 
Mode of production. articulation. 
Capitalist mode of production. 
Genesis and expansion of CMP. 
transtormation. conservation-
dissolution. new production 
telations. Extraversion. etc. 
Class structure 
Agrarian social structure: 
capitalist. kulak and simple 
commodity producer classes. 
State 
Class structures of planned 
deveiopment. 
Politics. 
Productive capacity 
Economic surplus 
Positive and negative implications 
Dependent growth. growth wi thout 
development. surplus transfer. 
Use of surplus 
Rural development. 
Agricultural productivity. 
Agrarian Question. 
Planned development 
Limits and failure 
3. THE THREE MOMENTS OF PRODUCTION ARGUMENT. 
Within the overall thrust of the thesis concerninq social structure 
and development, my most central (and most original) concepts have been the 
three Moments of" production. As theorized initially in chapter five, Moment 
A refers to relations of possession/separation from the means of product-
ion, Moment B to relations within the labour process, and Moment C to 
relations of distribution and utilization. By distinguishing each Moment, 
and by emphasizing the need to consider all three Moments, I have been able 
to cut through a great deal of confusion in the debates around social 
structure and development. It is largely on the foundation of these 
concepts, that my entire theory is built. 
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My argument is that to understand how social structure affects 
development, we need to analyse social relations of production in terms of 
the characteristics at Moments A, Band C, and the relationships between 
these Moments. This schema means that relations of production cannot be 
defined by anyone Moment. Indeed, by reference to the whole, one can go 
further and distinguish between homogenous relations (where there is a 
class congruency between the three Moments), and heterogeneous relations 
(involving disparate relations at each Moment). These concepts provide the 
basis to theorize a mode of production and the articulation of its internal 
and external relations. The three Moments of a mode are linked together 
through reproduction of the whole, and through the system dynamics deriving 
from the structure. In this way, the three Moments may fruitfully underpin 
an explanation of development and rural development, in that they provide 
for a clear identification of social structure and an analysis of its 
significance for productive capacity. 
Not only has much analysis confused the identification of social 
structure with the issue of development as described in section two above; 
it has also been unclear in its identification of the social structure. 
This is especially the case concerning capitalist social structure and 
capitalist development, where there has been confusion about the 
identification of capitalist relations as such. In development studies, 
the arguments have flown thick and fast about whether capitalism generates 
development or underdevelopment in the Third World, but without adequate 
attention to what is meant by capitalism. Those writers who have argued 
about whether the Third World is capitalist or not, have not advanced the 
debate substantially, because they have lacked adequate criteria for 
defining what constitutes capitalism. 
There has been a simplistic attempt to label production relations as 
capitalist due to characteristics like production for exchange (Frank and 
the dependency school), or the existence of wage-labour (Laclau). 
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Alternatively, and equally simplistically, the appellation has been based 
on characteristics like reproduction within a capitalist context (some 
writers within the articulation approach), or commercialization of the 
whole process (Banaji). But these attempts concentrate respectively on 
Moment C, Moment B, reproduction and the system dynamic of the relations of 
production - and assume that one aspect suffices to describe the whole. 
Clearly, it is impossible to agree on the relationship between capitalism 
and development, when different things are meant by capitalism. Indeed, 
much of the debate says more about the different writers" conceptions of 
capitalism than about development. 
It is clear that without a holistic view which can both distinguish 
and encompass the three Moments of production, any efforts to cut through 
the confusion about identifying capitalist relations will have limited 
success. My schema gets past many problems with its comprehensive concept 
of mode of production. This makes possible an analysis of the capitalist 
mode of production, and its articulation with non-capitalist structures, at 
all Moments of production (and in terms of reproduction within capitalist 
relations of distribution and the system dynamics of competition, commerc-
ialization and capital accumulation). Marx"s concept of differing subsump-
tion under capitalism is revised within this framework to refer to articul-
ation within the capitalist relations of the CMP that varies according to 
the character of the forces of production especially at Moment B. 
Applying this perspective to the international economy, I have 
distinguished between the CMP at the centre and the CMP at the periphery, 
on the basis of the different internal CMP articulation (at Moments A, B 
and C) and different external CMP articulation (again at all three Moments) 
in the two situations. This approach is superior to articulation theory 
which tends to ignore the internal articulation, and to dependency theory 
which fails to recognize the external. The different effects of articulat-
ion in centre and periphery go hand in hand with class differences in each 
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situation~ and both underpin the differences between central and peripheral 
states and economic systems. 
The phenomena of monopoly competition~ extraversion-dependence, and 
disarticulation-unevenness, are all facets of this complex articulation of 
social relations regarding the periphery. Understanding them as such means 
that it is possible to see their differing contributions to development and 
underdevelopment. Similarly, the three-tier economic structure character-
istic of the periphery is also a facet of this articulation, and conceived 
in these terms, it provides insight into informal/formal sector model. All 
these are fundamental to understanding the underdevelopment exhibited in 
dependent growth and growth without development. I also show how these 
factors relate to class structures and practices, and how classes also 
directly affect development and underdevelopment. 
Analysing the role of agriculture in development is also illuminated 
by the perspective of the three Moments of production and ti,e concepts 
built upon them. Factors affecting agricultural productivity (land-size, 
labour-input, and means of production) cannot be understood at the level of 
labour process alone (Moment 8), but are part of a wider context of 
re~ations at Moments A and C. Agrarian social structure and its many 
classes can be characterized and distinguished in a comprehensive manner in 
terms of the three Moments, of reproduction and of system dynamics. Analys-
ing the Agrarian Question in these terms, leads to locating it in the 
articulation between capitalist relations in agriculture and industry, and 
between both of these sets of relations and the diverse non-capitalist 
classes in agriculture (middle peasants, kulaks and simple commodity 
production). On this basis, the ~conventional wisdom- about the need for 
agrarian capitalism to resolve the Agrarian Question is shown to be flawed. 
Lookinq at the social structural implications of rural development 
policies in terms of their impact on the diverse Moments of production 
gives insight into the distinctions between progressive farmer, marketing 
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terms Ut reproduction and system c.lynamics. Ihis facilitates an assessment 
of wtletrler the total relations of production involved are capitalist or 
not, and here my earlier theorization of the CMP and sUbsumption is useful. 
I t shows that rather ttlan being capitalist classes, progressive farmers, 
outqrowers and settler tenants exhibit several heterogeneous non-capitalist 
relations. Their articulation to the dominant CMP is crucial to 
understandinq ttleir dynamics and limitations regarding development. 
I conclude that much rural social structure in the periphery evidences 
multi-class characteristics, rather than a primary relation of production. 
The recognition of this complexity is an advance on simplistic labelling 
and hasty conclusions about the significance of capitalist class relations 
for development. A more complex set of relations implies a more complex 
relation to development. This relation needs to be firmly located in the 
broader context of Moments A, Band C at the levels of the peripheral 
economy and the international economy as a whole, and furthermore in 
political context as well. The particular rural class situations in 
Tropical Africa, in conjunction with broader economic and political 
relations, do not bode well for productive capacity there. 
4. MEETING SPECIFIC CHALLENGES. 
My aim in this thesis has also been to meet certain more limited 
challenges facing students of development and specifically rural 
development. As outlined in the Introduction, these challenges are: 
(i). To use clear and explicit philosophical principles that will ensure a 
close relationship between theory and empirical study of development (and 
specifically rural development). 
(ii). To develop comprehensive units of analysis so as to fully understand 
the relations among the parts, and between these parts and the whole. 
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(iii). To elaborate an approach that keeps development firmly within its 
project as an economic phenomenon. 
(iv). To synthesize insights from a range of analyses into an integrated 
and rigorous whole. 
(i). All of these challenges are interrelated. For exarnple JO synthesizing 
insights involves the use of clear philosophical principles. However JO it is 
also possible to point to certain areas in the thesis which are of 
particular relevance to a particular challenge. 
Thus JO in response to the first challenge concerning clear 
philosophical principles JO the first part of this thesis is devoted to 
investigating what is required from such principles. In additionJ' the role 
of such principles in the production of knowledge is discussed JO and an 
interpretation of Marxist methodology is presented. Throughout the thesis 
I have continually attempted to relate what is being said to these 
principles. It will be evident that concepts such as quantity-quality 
distinctions JO interconnections i social process, history and contradiction 
inform the entire work. I believe that my interpretationJ' development and 
application of Marxism to economic development demonstrates some of the 
wider potential of this approach. 
In terms of my methodological approach, I have also tried at all times 
to avoid reification and bear in mind the limits of theory. This is 
explicit in my chapters on the capitalist state, the generation and 
expansion of capitalism, agrarian transition and my analysis of rural 
development strategies. In none of these is the intention to reproduce a 
version of reality in thought. Instead, it is to draw on certain empirical 
cases to show both how my theory may illuminate them and vice versa. It has 
been a guiding principle throughout that my theorization deals in 
abstractions, and while these may help explain realitYi by their nature 
they cannot approximate its particularity, historicity and multi-causal 
complexity. In this regard, however, it should be recognized that in its 
emphasis on social structure, my argument does not preclude any role for 
ideology and conscious human volition vis-a-vis development. The 
distinction between relations and relationships made early on in the work 
is an acknowledgment of the limits of a structuralist perspective. 
(ii). In response to the second challenge of developing comprehensive units 
of analysis, the structure of this thesis with its different levels of 
abstraction and generality is relevant. All its parts have their place in 
the overall framework of studying development in the most general terms 
through to its character in the international capitalist system and 
ultimately to the specific case of individual rural development strategies. 
In addition, the thesis contains the specific concepts of economic system, 
and modes (and homogeneous/heterogeneous relations) of production to 
encompass the totality, its parts and the relation between them. It also 
criticises explanations and prescriptions for development/underdevelopment 
which ignore overarching units of analysis. 
As touched on in the previous section, the concepts of three Moments 
of production, reproduction of the whole JO and system dynamic also assist in 
theorizing the distinctions between units as well as the links between 
them. They enable one to distinguish between elements or features of 
capitalism, and the capitalist mode as such (and therefore their respective 
implications for development). They also enable one to avoid the pitfalls of 
concepts of international modes of production and unique modes in each 
social formation (see chapter fifteen), and instead to understand the 
articulation between the different levels of the whole. In addition, they 
help to analyse how articulation can lead to one unit internalizing an 
external relationship within it or being reproduced within another unit 
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(and what all this means for development). 
(iii) .. Concerning the third challenge of maintaining " .. development .... as an 
economic phenomenon, I have given substantial attention to a preliminary 
definition and understanding of development as designating exclusively 
economic processes and attributes concerning productive capacity. This 
understanding has been retained throughout the work. The criticism might be 
made that such an allegedly ..... economistic..., focus does not properly belong to 
a thesis conducted under the discipline of Political Studies. I would 
counter, however, that my argument clearly shows that the study of 
development cannot be limited to the discourse of pure economics, and that 
development is integrally bound up with issues of social relations, social 
control and politics. I have thus continuously related development to 
political factors. This is evident in my discussion of the base-superstr-
ucture model, the issue of surplus, the capitalist state, articulation, 
planned rural development and the failure of development strategies. It 
will not escape the readeris attention that there is a certain irony in my 
conclusion that ""despitei'''' my economic definition, development in practice 
comes to have a meaning that is anything but purely economic. There is 
actually nothing contradictory about this: indeed, it is only by keeping 
one"s eyes on development as an economic category that it is possible to 
see, in reality, how and why ""'planned development"" departs from the analyt-
ical definition and may become, in effect, its opposite. 
(iv). The fourth challenge of synthesizing insights from various other 
stUdies has been an important part of the entire thesis. It will be 
evident that I have tackled various debates in the field in the course of 
my argument, whether they be around the base-superstructure model, or 
defining what is internal to a mode of production, or the significance of 
dependence vis-a-vis other factors of underdevelopment. In all of these I 
have argued for or incorporated positions based on the theoretical points 
developed in this thesis. I have also specifically combined contributions 
from three different approaches: dependency theory, artiCUlation of modes 
of production, and class struggle emphases. This has not been an easy task, 
and I have had to critically understand the limitations in each. Depend-
ency theory is shown to work with (inter alia) inadequate units of analysis 
and concepts of capitalism (see chapters twelve and fifteen); articulation 
theory to miss the underdeveloped aspects of social structure like depend-
ency and the three-tier structure of the economy (chapters eighteen to 
twenty). The class struggle approach is shown (inter alia) to underpin 
many of the various dependence and artiCUlation factors, but these are not 
automatically given by classes, and neither can they be directly reduced to 
classes (chapter twenty-one). I have therefore tried to show how the 
different approaches draw attention to different phenomena. At the same 
time, I have argued that they complement and enrich each other by account-
ing for some of the blindspots in each other's approach. 
The conflicting dimensions of these different approaches have not been 
glossed over. For example, I discuss the problem of the relative weight of 
each of the approaches, given that supporters of each have claimed primacy 
of account for the particular factors they stress (see chapter twenty-one). 
I have argued for the primacy but not exclusivity of class structure. 
Similarly, I have criticized as well as drawn from other insights, 
including elements of modernization theory, Baranis concept of surplus, and 
the theories of the informal sector and the Agrarian Question, integrating 
them within my overall framework. 
The attempted synthesis of theoretical insights has been complemented 
by drawing from empirical data from a variety of sources and contexts. 
Both operations have been performed on the basis of the framework developed 
in the thesis. The key elements of this are my particular definition of 
relations and forces of production, Moments A, Band C of production, 
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reproduction and system dynamics. In addition to these concepts, there is 
also my particular understanding of the relationship between political, 
ideological and economic factors. All these elements have provided a basic 
framework in terms of which I have evaluated, accepted and rejected source 
material. The aim has been an integrated, coherent and consistent whole. 
6. LIMITATIONS. 
To the extent that I have successfully met all the challenges 
discussed above, this thesis constitutes a wide-ranging theory of the 
complexities of social structure and development. But, despite the length 
of this thesis, it is in a sense not long enough. Firstly, as pointed out 
in the Introduction, it lacks a discussion of development in relation to 
socialism. This lacuna may perhaps have resulted in a one-sidedness, and 
even in some misconceptions, about the relationship between capitalism and 
development. A comparative study may have avoided some of these problems. 
At the same time, my resulting three Moments schema may be of value in 
researching social relations for concerns other than development and rural 
development. It could be fruitfully applied to studies concerned with, for 
example, questions of patriarchy and domestic labour. 
Secondly, the thesis lacks an analysis of development and specifically 
rural development in social formations that are more difficult to locate in 
terms of a centre and periphery model - for example, New Zealand and the 
Scandanavian countries. How their economic systems developed and provided 
answers to the Agrarian Question raises important issues for the study of 
Third World development. Any prognosis for the latter has to take these 
experiences into account. Further research is needed here. 
Thirdly, in order to be fully developed, the arguments in this thesis 
need to used in some empirical research - at macro or micro-levels (or, 
preferably, at both). As it stands, this thesis is limited to being an 
elaborated prolegomena to the study of development (and rural development 
speciticallv). It still needs to be tested in the field. In this it would 
be important to see how parts ot this thesis relate to the whole - for 
example, how a specitic development proiect relates to development plans, 
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to articulation with other relations and forces of production, to class 
dynamics, the state and the international capitalist system. It would also 
be valuable to see how this would in turn relate back to my definition of 
development and social structure, and even to my use of Marxism. 
7. CONCLUSION. 
Planned rural development continues despite its poor record in 
achieving either economic or political objectives. One reason for its 
persistence is because the ideology of ""rural development"" has become 
an entrenched part of the conventional wisdom about the role of the 
state in the periphery (see Williams, 1981a:17). Another reason lies in 
the vested interests that development programmes serve. In this light, it 
matters little whether rural development plans succeed or fail, because 
rural development planning as such may be expected to continue regardless. 
Unfortunately, the poor performance of such development will probably also 
persist. In my view, this is because there are not the political or social 
groups with the strength, vision and - dare I say it - the theoretical 
apparatus to come up with more effective alternatives. Although my theory 
concentrates on the problems of "'what is"", I would hope that it might also 
be of value in creating new development strategies. That, however, is 
the task of a different thesis. 
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